Hafner v. Bank of Enterprise. [Vol. III, N. S. the notice had been sufficient without the giving of an undertaking which, as we have seen, it was not. It is of no importance probably, but the appeal was not under Section 6408, but under Section 6101, Revised Statutes. The appeal provided for in Sections 6407 and 6408, Revised Statutes, are those cases not specially provided for. In the allowance or refusal to allow a claim of an executor or administrator the appeal is specially provided for by Section 6101, Revised Statutes, and the time for giving of the undertaking is twelve days, and not twenty days, as provided in Section 6408, Revised Statutes. The special provision must govern; Section 4956, Revised Statutes, so determines. The judgment of the common pleas court is affirmed at the costs of Henry C. Downing and the case remanded to the probate court for further proceedings. T. H. Gilmer, for plaintiff in error. JURISDICTION. [Circuit Court of Hamilton County.] MARIE L. HAFNER V. BANK OF ENTERPRISE. Decided, July 25, 1902. Jurisdiction-Of the Circuit Court of the United States-Pleading— Waiver of Technical Defect in. 1. The Circuit Court of the United States is not a court of special jurisdiction within the contemplation of Section 5090, Ohio Revised Statutes, but is a court of general though limited jurisdiction. 2. While the answer "Now comes the defendant and says that she denies" is technically not in good form, yet when the parties went to trial upon such answer below it will be treated on review as a sufficient general denial. GIFFEN, J., SWING, J., and JELKE, J. PER CURIAM. Heard on error. The answer, "Now comes defendant and says that she denies," etc., is technically not in good form, but as the parties went to trial below without objection to its form and on the assumption that it is a good traverse to the allegations of the petition, it will be treated here as a sufficient general denial. At all events, it could be cured by amendment. We are of opinion that the Circuit Court of the United States is not a court of special jurisdiction within the contemplation of Section 5090, Revised Statutes. The provisions of this section are confined to judgments of inferior tribunals. Wehrman v. Reakirt, 2 C. S. C., 29; Seney's Code (1860 Ed.), p. 162, Section 120 and notes; Memphis Med. Co. v. Newton, 2 Handy, 163; Hollister v. Hollister, 10 How. Pr. (N. Y.), 532-539. As against the provisions of this statute the Circuit Court of the United States is a court of general but limited jurisdiction (see Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U. S., 327, opinion per Mr. Justice Harlan, page 340), and as such has the right to pass upon its own jurisdiction, and its judgment is entitled to all the presumption in its favor which attaches to the judgments of courts of general jurisdiction of our own and sister states. "Neither the constitutional provision, that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state, nor the act of congress, passed in pursuance thereof, prevents an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by which a judgment offered in evidence was rendered. "The record of a judgment rendered in another state may be contradicted, as to the facts necessary to give the court jurisdiction; and if it be shown that such facts did not exist, the record would be a nullity, notwithstanding it may recite that they did exist." Pennywit v. Foote, 27 Ohio St., 600; Spier v. Corll, 33 Ohio St., 236; Wilhelm v. Parker, 17 C. C., 234, 237; Dodd v. Groll, 19 C. C., 718. The petition in this case alleges the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States of the District of Kansas, and the answer denies the same. Its jurisdiction is fairly put in issue. Conceding that the presumption which obtains in favor of the judgment sustains the burden on the plaintiff in the first instance, what evidence does an examination of the record disclose to rebut it? Haffner v. Bank of Enterprise. [Vol. III, N. S. (1) There is the testimony of the witness, R. P. March, in his deposition, "Exhibit B:" "Were you personally acquainted with John A. Hafner and Marie L. Hafner? "A. I was. "Where did they reside in 1894? "A. At Enterprise, Kansas, and they continued to reside there until some time in 1895." (2) There is the evidence in the note itself dated "Enterprise, Kansas, November 1, 1893," also P. O. address, "Enterprise, Kansas. "Due November 1st, 1894.” (3) The fact that the action was brought in the district of Kansas. Weighing this evidence as against the presumption, we find as a fact that Marie L. Hafner was a citizen of Kansas on June 29, 1894, and are hence of opinion that the Circuit Court of the United States had no jurisdiction of a cause of action between Marie L. Hafner and the Bank of Enterprise, both being citizens of the same state. Judgment reversed. J. D. Creed and E. A. Hafner, for plaintiff in error. 1904.] Summit County. TRIAL FOR HAVING POSSESSION OF STOLEN GOODS. [Circuit Court of Summit County.] PASQUALE CARANO V. STATE OF OHIO. Decided, October Term, 1902. Criminal Law-Burglary and Larceny-Knowingly Receiving Stolen Goods-Mistake in Verdict as Rendered-Qualification of Jurors— Circumstantial Evidence-Effect of Having Stolen Goods in Pos session. 1. The language of a verdict should not be strained and a prisoner held to have been acquitted, where it is clear that the jury did not intend to find him not guilty, and it is not error in such a case to overrule a plea in bar against further proceedings. 2. The fact that a juror has served upon the trial of a plea in bar is not a ground for challenge upon the subsequent trial of the accused under the indictment, the trial of the plea in bar not being a trial of the cause within the meaning of Section 7278. 3. A juror who states that he has formed an opinion as to the guilt of the accused, but who believes that he can render an impartial verdict is not subject to challenge for cause, but is within the exception of the second paragraph of Section 7278. 4. Where it is admitted by the defendant that he has stolen goods in his possession, it is not error to refuse to charge with reference to circumstantial evidence tending to trace the goods from the place where they were stolen to his house. 5. It is not error to admit evidence as to packing material being seen in the car from which the goods were stolen, when it appears that some of the material was scattered between the car and the house of the defendant in which the goods were discovered. 6. Possession of stolen goods by a defendant soon after the theft was committed, raises a presumption against him which calls for an explanation as to how he came into possession of the goods. MARVIN, J.; HALE, J., and CALDWELL, J., concur. Error to the court of common pleas. The plaintiff in error was indicted at the January Term, 1902, of the court of common pleas of this county, there being two counts in the indictment. The first count charged burglary and larceny, and set out in proper form that the defendant committed such burglary and larceny by breaking into a railroad car in the night season and taking therefrom a consider 1 Carano v. State of Ohio. [Vol. III, N. S. able quantity of goods, all set out in the indictment, and the charge is that this was done unlawfully, maliciously and forcibly; in short, everything necessary to constitute the crime of burglary and larceny is this count of the indictment. The second count of the indictment charges the plaintiff in error with having received the same goods named in the first count of the indictment, and that he so received them knowing them to have been stolen. * To this indictment, and to each count of it, Pasquale Carano pleaded not guilty. He was put upon his trial before a court and jury, and at the close of the evidence and after argument of counsel and the charge of the court the jury retired, and upon coming again into court returned the following verdict: "do find that the prisoner at the bar, Pasquale Carano, is guilty of receiving stolen goods valued at $48.84, and do not find as charged in the first and second counts in indictment. S. P. Thompson, Foreman." Thereupon the court inquired of the jury if some mistake had not been made in their verdict, to which the foreman of the jury replied that they had made a mistake. The jury were then instructed to retire to their room and agree upon a verdict, which should be responsive to the indictment. The jury then retired again to their room, and upon again coming into court returned a verdict in which they found that the prisoner "is guilty as he stands charged in the second count in the indictment, and not guilty as he stands charged in the first count in the indictment, and fix the value of the goods at $48.84. S. P. Thompson, Foreman." A motion was then made by defendant that he be discharged, notwithstanding the verdict, and for cause say, that the verdict first returned by the jury was, in effect, a verdict of not guilty, and that the court had no authority to require further verdict of the jury. This motion the court overruled, and error is charged in that regard. Thereafter a motion was made by the plaintiff in error for a new trial, and this motion was granted. Carano was then called upon again to plead to the indictment, and he thereupon filed a plea in bar to any further proceedings under the indictment, |