trine, who are they that adequately believe it? and in what does the advantage or sufficiency of this faith consist? Is it in the repetition of a form of words, without regard to the import attached to them? Do they hold the faith,' who verge, with Sherlock, on Tritheism — so closely verge, that the wit of man cannot draw the line between them? or they, who fall, with South, in every thing but words, into the doctrine of the simple unity — regarding the persons of the Deity as so many relations only between him and his creature? If our opponents will not grant the sufficiency of a faith merely verbal, and yet allow the orthodoxy of the last mentioned class, it will require but a slight extension of their system to admit us also, whose faith is not substantially different; whose language is more honest; and who have, at least, the advantage of knowing, and being able to state, precisely what our meaning is.

Our opponents disclaim any construction of this doctrine inconsistent with the unity of God. This disclaimer, we doubt not, is honestly made. But do they not deceive themselves? Do they not practise an illusion on their own minds? We ask them to look into the deep recesses of their hearts, and see whether they do not find there the idea of three distinct objects of worship, covered only with a thiu veil of words without any definite meaning. We are persuaded that, if they find not these ideas, they will find nothing definite whatever that their Trinitarianism will amount to this, if fearlessly examined, or amount to nothing. We say that it is imposible, consistently with the laws that govern the human intellect, that it should be otherwise. The doctrine of the Trinity either teaches the existence of three

Gods, or it teaches nothing distinct from Unitarianism. We say not, that it does not employ very different terms from such as we can admit; but we do say that these terms, imposing as they appear, are absolutely without meaning, unless they mean more than those who employ them will admit. It is impossible we aver, for the wit of man to comprehend the distinction between the terms person and being, as applied to the Deity; or even to conceive, for one moment, that such a distinction can exist. The term person, therefore, in this connection, consistently with the disclaimer mentioned above, is altogether void of import. It conveys no more idea to the mind than if it were in an unknown tongue. We repeat, therefore, that in so far as any one is a Trinitarian, in any intelligible sense, just so far is he a worshipper of more Gods than one. We speak advisedly, and according to the dictates of our sober judgment, when we say, that between this point and Unitarianism, there is not a foot of ground, on which to stand; not a foot, from which they may not be driven by their own admissions. The doctrine is either false, or nugatory. In the one case, it must be pernicious; in the other, useless, at least. These positions, we are aware, may appear startling to many. It seems to have been generally admitted, by Unitarians, that the doctrine, though admitted not to teach more Gods than one, was still entitled to consideration, still capable of sustaining an argument as to its truth or falsehood. We think this concession unnecessary, or premature at least. We think it will be time enough to make it, when the advocates of the doctrine shall have informed us what they mean by it or when at least, they shall have shown us, that, not mean

ing this, it can have any other possible meaning whatever. This they have never done, and, we believe, they never can do it. Our statements will be denied, probably denounced; but they will not be fairly met, and refuted. Let any two of its champions agree in a definition of this doctrine assigning a precise and intelligible meaning to the terms in which it is stated; nay, let any one of them fix on a definition by which he will himself abide, and we will readily retract our error. At least,

we shall admit that a tangible topic is presented for discussion, capable of being either proved, or disproved, adopted or rejected. This, we think, is not at present, the true state of the case. We can see nothing in the dogma, short of tritheism, on which either faith can rest, or with which an antagonist can grapple. Be this, however, as it may. It is hardly to our immediate purpose to discuss the truth, or falsehood of this, or the other articles of the popular creed. We wish only to show, at present, that even if true, they are hardly entitled, as our opponents claim for them, to be regarded as essential to the christian character. And this, we think, with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, we have satisfactorily established. And, if we mistake not, the same course of reasoning will be found conclusive, so far, at least, as the exigences of our argument require, against the rest. They are not the doctrines which one would expect to find laid down as the necessary basis of a saving faith, and which ought not to be admitted as such without the clearest and most cogent proofs. The simplicity of our creed, on the other hand, we maintain, constitutes a strong probability in its favor. Our limits will not allow us to pursue this course of argument further. Neither,

perhaps, is it necessary. If we have been at all successful in communicating our impression, in illustrating our views, we think we have made it appear, at least, that our scheme of doctrine presents itself with fair and plausible pretensions; that it ought not to be rejected without a hearing. We think we have shown, that it has strong probabilities, and weighty presumptions, in its favor; that nature, experience, reason, and providence, and the whole analogy of God's works, plainly point to such a scheme, as what ought to be expected in revelation from Heaven; and as what may, therefore, be assumed, taken for granted, to be true, unless distinctly shown to be false. This, we affirm, is the true state of the controversy between us and our opponents. The burden of proof rests wholly on them. We are not called on to show, by critical investigation, and scripturål authority, that our doctrines are correct. This has indeed been done a thousand times twice told; and will still be repeated. But really such a course appears to us gratuitous. Our opponents are bound to prove, and with the clearest evidence, that our doctrines are not true. They are bound to invalidate, by undeniable authority, all the strong probabilities on our side. We are not bound to become the assailants. On the contrary we have possession of the strong hold we stand on the vantage ground. We have no fears for the result. We have no apprehensions or misgivings in regard to it. We consider its ultimate triumphs as certain. Not that we anticipate the entire eradication of error, the universal reign of truth on earth. They will doubtless continue, in a greater or less degree, to hold a divided empire in the world, while man continues to be man; and

thus to form a part of our mental and moral discipline in this preparatory state. But we do anticipate the general prevalence of more rational views of God and man, and of their mutual relations, than have hitherto obtained. We anticipate this from our confidence in the divine goodness, and in the progressive nature of the human mind. And this anticipation we would not relinquish, even though our eyes, in surveying the moral horizon, could discern no glimmerings of a brighter morning about to dawn upon the world. But it is not so with us. The day star of hope has already arisen. We are cheered by the signs of the times. The spirit of inquiry is abroad-a spirit free and masterless as the mountain breeze. Its course will not be permanently checked. The reign of mysticism, of spiritual usurpation, and dogmatical imposition, is passing away. Men are beginning to think and examine for themselves, and to make religion, both in theory and practice, a matter of personal concern. The present is, to a remarkable degree, an age of bold yet cautious speculation cautious, because well informed for rashness is allied to ignorance. It is an age of practical, business-like, common-sense philosophy. There is a tendency in the public mind to bring everything to the test of rigid scrutiny. Whatever principles in science, politics, morals, or religion, will not bear this test, will be sure to be rejected. The man who perceives not this tendency in the public mind of the present age, is blind; and equally blind is he who sees not its inevitable result.

The popular systems, both of government and reli