ready to sound the alarm when necessary, and to point out the actors in any pernicious project. The public papers will be expeditious messengers of intelligence to the most remote inhabitants of the Union.

Among the many curious objections which have appeared against the proposed Constitution, the most extraordinary and the least colorable, is derived from the want of some provision respecting the debts due to the United States. This has been represented as a tacit relinquishment of those debts, and as a wicked contrivance to screen public defaulters. The newspapers have teemed with the most inflammatory railings on this head; yet there is nothing clearer than that the suggestion is entirely void of foundation, the offspring of extreme ignorance or extreme dishonesty. In addition to the remarks I have made upon the subject in another place, I shall only observe, that as it is a plain dictate of common sense, so it is also an established doctrine of political law, that "States neither lose any of their rights, nor are discharged from any of their obligations, by a change in the form of their civil government.” *

The last objection of any consequence, at present recollected, turns upon the article of expense. If it were even true, that the adoption of the proposed government would occasion a considerable increase of expense, it would be an objection that ought to have no weight against the plan. The great bulk of the citizens of America, are with reason convinced that Union is the basis of their political happiness. Men of sense of all parties now, with few exceptions, agree that it cannot be preserved under the present system, nor without radical alterations; that new and extensive powers ought to be granted to the National head, and that these require a different organization of the Federal Government; a single body being an unsafe depositary of such ample authorities. In conceding all this, the question of expense is given up; for it is impossible, with any degree of safety, to narrow the foundation upon which the system is to stand. The two branches of the Legislature are, in the first instance, to consist of only sixty-five persons; the same number of which Congress, under the existing Confederation, may be composed. It is true, that this number is intended to be increased; but this is to keep pace with the progress of the

* Vide Rutherford's Institutes, vol. 2. book 11. chap. x. sect. xiv. and xv.-Vide also Grotius, book 11. chap. ix. sect. viii. and ix.

population and resources of the country. It is evident that, a less number would, even in the first instance, have been unsafe; and that a continuance of the present number would, in a more advanced stage of population, be a very inadequate representation of the people.

Whence is the dreaded augmentation of expense to spring? One source indicated, is the multiplication of offices under the new Government. Let us examine this a little.

It is evident that the principal departments of the administration under the present Government, are the same which will be required under the new. There are now a Secretary at War, a Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a Secretary for Domestic Affairs, a Board of Treasury consisting of three persons, a Treasurer, assistants, clerks, etc. These offices are indispensable under any system, and will suffice under the new, as well as the old. As to ambassadors, and other ministers and agents in foreign countries, the proposed Constitution can make no other difference, than to render their characters, where they reside, more respectable, and their services more useful. As to persons to be employed in the collection of the revenues, it is unquestionably true, that these will form a very considerable addition to the number of Federal officers; but it will not follow, that this will occasion an increase of public expense. It will be in most cases nothing more than an exchange of State for National officers. In the collection of all duties, for instance, the persons employed will be wholly of the latter description. The States individually, will stand in no need of any for this purpose. What difference can it make in point of expense, to pay officers of the customs appointed by the State, or by the United States?

Where then are we to seek for those additional articles of expense, which are to swell the account to the enormous size that has been represented? The chief item which occurs to me respects the support of the Judges of the United States. I do not add the President, because there is now a President of Congress, whose expenses may not be far, if anything, short of those which will be incurred on account of the President of the United States. The support of the judges will clearly be an extra expense, but to what extent will depend on the particular plan which may be adopted in regard to this matter. But upon no reasonable plan can it amount to a sum which will be an object of material conse

quence.

Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any extra expense that may attend the establishment of the proposed Government. The first thing which presents itself is, that a great part of the business that now keeps Congress sitting through the year, will be transacted by the President. Even the management of foreign negotiations will naturally devolve upon him, according to general principles concerted with the Senate, and subject to their final concurrence. Hence it is evident, that a portion of the year will suffice for the session of both the Senate and the House of Representatives: we may suppose about a fourth for the latter, and a third, or perhaps half for the former. The extra business of treaties and appointments may give this extra occupation to the Senate. From this circumstance we may infer, that until the House of Representatives shall be increased greatly beyond its present number, there will be a considerable saving of expense from the difference between the constant session of the present, and the temporary session of the future Congress.

But there is another circumstance, of great importance in the view of economy. The business of the United States has hitherto occupied the State Legislatures, as well as Congress. The latter has made requisitions which the former have had to provide for. It has thence happened, that the sessions of the State Legislatures have been protracted greatly beyond what was necessary for the execution of the mere local business. More than half their time has been frequently employed in matters which related to the United States. Now the members who compose the Legislatures of the several States amount to two thousand and upwards; which number has hitherto performed what, under the new system, will be done in the first instance by sixty-five persons, and probably at no future period by above a fourth or a fifth of that number. The Congress under the proposed Government will do all the business of the United States themselves without the intervention of the State Legislatures, who thenceforth will have only to attend the affairs of their particular States and will not have to sit in any proportion as long as they have heretofore done. This difference, in the time of the sessions of the State Legislatures, will be clear gain, and will alone form an article of saving, which may be regarded as an equivalent for any additional objects of expense that may be occasioned by the adoption of the new system.

The result from these observations is, that the sources of addi

tional expense from the establishment of the proposed Constitution, are much fewer than may have been imagined: that they are counterbalanced by considerable objects of saving; and that, while it is questionable on which side the scale will preponderate, it is certain that a Government less expensive would be incompetent to the purposes of the Union.

ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for discussion two points-" the analogy of the proposed Government to your own State Constitution," and "the additional security which its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, 'and to property." But these heads have been fully anticipated, and so completely exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be possible to do anything more than repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been already said; which the advanced stage of the question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.

It is remarkable, that resemblance of the plan of the Convention to the act which organizes the Government of this State, holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed. defects, than to the real excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects, are the re-eligibility of the Executive; the want of a council; the omission of a formal Bill of Rights; the omission of a provision respecting the liberty of the Press : these, and several others, which have been noted in the course of our inquiries, are as much chargeable on the existing Constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the Union: and a man must have slender pretensions to consistency, who can rail at the latter for imperfections which he finds no difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there be a better proof of the insincerity and affectation of some of the zealous adversaries of the plan of the Convention, who profess to be devoted admirers of the Government of this State, than the

fury with which they have attacked that plan, for matters in regard to which our own Constitution is equally, or perhaps more vulnerable.

The additional securities to republican government, to liberty, and to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan, consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation of the Union will impose upon local factions and insurrections, and upon the ambition of powerful individuals in single States, who might acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in the diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the prevention of extensive military establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited situation; in the express guarantee of a republican form of government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition of those practices on the part of the State Governments, which have undermined the foundations of property and credit; have planted mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of citizens; and have occasioned an almost universal prostration of morals.

Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to myself; with what success your conduct must determine. I trust, at least, you will admit, that I have not failed in the assurance I gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which have been not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people, which has been indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton and too malignant not to excite the indignation of every man who feels in his own bosom a refutation of the calumny. The perpetual changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great, are such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations, which have been in various ways practised to keep the truth from the public eye, are of a nature to demand the reprobation of all honest men, It is possible that these circumstances may have

men.