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in the appeal) she was entitled upon the death of the Chinaman partially intestate to share as a widow. Sheang Thye Phin v. Tan Ah Loy J. C. (1920) A. C. 369.

SALES.

The respondents sold to the claimant sodium sulphide in drums. The drums were delivered to the claimant in Manchester, but the respondents knew that they were intended for export. Owing to the difficulty of opening and reclosing the drums it is impracticable to open them until the contents are actually required for use. The drums were resold by the claimant, and owing to the congestion on the French rlys. and other causes they did not reach the ultimate consignees at Lyons and Genoa respectively till some months later. On the drums being opened by those consignees the contents were found to be not sodium sulphide but caustic soda of inferior quality. The drums were thereupon rejected. On a claim for damages by the claimant against the respondents:

Held, that the damages were to be assessed according to the prices ruling, not at the date of the delivery in Manchester, but at the date when the drums were opened by the ultimate consignees at Lyons and Genoa. Van Den Hurk v. R. Marten & Co., (1920) I K. B. 850.

By eight contracts in similar form, made in June and July, 1914, a firm of merchants in New New York sold to a Co. which carried on business at Antwerp a quantity of wheat to be shipped during Aug. and not later than the middle of Sept. 1914, from an Atlantic and or Canadian port at sellers' option, under one contract to Rotterdam and under the rest to Antwerp, at a price free on board including freight and insurance, to be paid net cash on presentation of bills of lading or delivery order. The contracts provided that the sellers were to furnish marine policies of insurance for two per cent. over invoice amount; and they contained the following clauses: "In the event of war, should sellers not have received from buyers approved English and or American policies.... for approximate invoice amount, covering war risk three days prior to shipment, sellers shall have the right, if they think fit, and are able, to cover war risk for account and risk of buyers." "In case of prohibition of export, force majeure, blockade or hostilities preventing shipment, this contract or any unfulfilled part thereof shall be at an end."

At the beginning of Aug. the sellers cabled to the buyers that they could not effect insurance against war risk and that they were therefore unable to sell the drafts, and asking the buyers to arrange payment in New York. The buyers refused, and the sellers on Aug. 6, cancelled the contracts. The buyers claimed damages for breach of contract. The dispute was referred to arbitration in London under a clause in the contracts. The wheat was in fact shipped, but for other buyers and for other ports. The sellers claimed that they were entitled to treat the contracts as cancelled, as they were unable to sell in America exchange on Rotterdam or Antwerp. The arbitrators found that the business of exporting grain from America to Europe was based upon the sale of exchange in America, and it had long been a well-recognized usage or custom for shippers of grain from America to sell or negotiate the exchange to or with an exchange buyer in America, and the sale of wheat could not be carried out, unless such exchange were possible, and it was an implied term and for condition of the contracts that the sellers should at all material times be able to sell or negotiate the exchange; that the buyers were aware of this usage or custom at the time when the contracts were made; that from Aug. I to 6 inclusive when the sellers claimed to cancel the contracts they were unable to sell exchange on Antwerp or Rotterdam, and this inability continued throughout the whole period for shipment provided by the contracts: that from Aug. 1 to 6 inclusive no war insurance could have been affected by the sellers on the shipments: that the commercial purposes of the adventure, so far as the sellers were concerned became frustrated by the impossibility in the circumstances prevailing of their being able to sell or negotiate exchange in America; that this impossibility and the circumstances prevailing were caused by hostilities; and that shipment was prevented by hostilities with in the meaning of the prohibition clause in the contracts: They accordingly made an award in favour of the sellers:

Held, first. that the shipment was not "prevented" by hostilities within the meaning of the prohibition clause in the contracts, "prevention" there meaning a physical or legal prevention.

Held, secondly, that the question whether a term should be implied in the contracts providing for their dissolution on the ground of the frustration of the commercial adventure was a question of law for the Court; and that, as the buyers were not concerned with the general method by which the sellers financed their exports of wheat to Europe, and considering that the contracts contained a provision as to insurance of war risks in the event of war, a term or condition could not be implied in the contracts that if the sellers were unable to sell the exchange the contracts should be determined. In re Comptoir Commercial Anversois and Power, Son & Co. C. A. (1920) 1 K. B. 868.

Under a c. i.f. contract for the sale of goods, the seller, in the absence of any custom or special stipulation to the contrary, does not perform his obligation of tendering to the buyer along with the other shipping documents a policy of insurance by tendering instead of a proper policy a brokers cover note or a certificate of insurance.

Where the parties to a c. i. f. contract, for the sale of goods which have been duly shipped, enter into a stipulation that the seller, instead of tendering with the other shipping documents a policy of insurance, with a broker's undertaking to hold the policy for the buyer's account, the seller does not perform his obligation under the stipulation by tendering a certificate of insurance without broker's undertaking.

Observations on a broker's cover note and a certificate of insurance. Wilson, Holgate & Co. v. Belgian Grain and Produce Co. (1920) 2 K. B. 1, 89 L. J. (K. B.) 300;

SERVICE.

The Court or a judge has no jurisdiction to order service of any summons other than a writ of summons on a party or person in Scotland.

The words "foreign country" in r. 8A of O. xi. of the R. S. C., 1883, have precisely the same meaning as in r. 8, and neither rule applies to Scotland, or to any other part of the British Dominions. In re Campbell. (1920) I Ch. 35.

Leave will not be granted under O. xi. r. I (e) to a purchaser of goods under a c. i. f. contract from a foreign vendor to serve notice of a writ of summons on the vendor outside the jurisdiction in an action for breach of contract, where the essential breach on which the action is founded is the failure to ship the goods at the foreign port, upon the allegation of the purchaser that the breach is the failure to tender shipping documents within the jurisdiction

Decision of the C. A. reversed. Johnson v. Taylor Bros. & Co. H. L. (E.) (1920) A. C. 144.

TAXATION.

A ry. co., which was incorporated and carried on business in the United States in 1905, issued first mortage 5 per cent. gold bonds to the plt. co. to the amount of £500,000, and undertook by a deed of trust to pay the principal money and interest in London. The deft. co., who were parties to the deed of trust, guaranteed the payment of those sums, if the ry. co. made default. A clause in the deed of trust provided that it should be construed and the rights of all parties claiming thereunder should be regulated, by the law of England, the ry. co. agreeing to be sued in England. Both the plts. and defts. were English corporations. Subsequently an income tax of 2 per cent. was imposed by the United States Government upon (inter alia) income derived by foreign corporations resident in the United States. The ry. co. in making a half-yearly payment of interest on its bonds claimed to deduct the United States income tax:— Held, that ther was no English statute which allowed payment of income tax to a foreign country to be considered as a discharge of an English contract, and that at common law a contract made in this country was not governed by the law of another country, and further that there could not be impliedly read in to the contract a stipulation that the plts. agreed that the provisions of the United States Income Tax Acts should be enforceable against them in England, and that therefore the American ry. co. and the deft. co. were not entitled to deduct United States income tax from the sums thev agreed to pay to the plts. as interest on the Bonds. Indian and General Investment Trust, Ld. v. Borax Consolidated, Ld. (1920) 1 K. B. 539.

TRUSTEE.

Where the private property of a belligerent Sovereign, in this case F. ex-Tsar of Bulgaria, has become forefeited on the outbreak of war, and after commission directed an inquisition has found that the rights of such Sovereign in bonds and stocks

enumerated in a schedule to such commission standing in his name have become forefited to His Majesty, the Court, on petition by the Att.-Gen., being satisfied that the ex-Tsar is a trustee out of the jurisdiction, and unwilling to transfer the bonds and stocks, will under the Trustee Act, 1893, appoint a new trustee, in this case the Treasury Solicitor, with the right under the vesting order to call for a transfer of, to transfer and deal with, and receive interest on such stocks and bonds. Re Ferdinand, ex-Tsar of Bulgaria. 122 L. T. 115.

II. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.*

ALIENS.

In habeas corpus proceedings by a Chinese, who had been previously admitted as a son of a native-born citizen, but was excluded upon his return, after a three year visit in China, because of discrepancies in his testimony and that of his alleged father, regarding conditions in China, but not relating to the question of relationship, which was the only issue in dispute, held, that such discrepancies were insufficient to sustain the Department's order of exclusion.-Ex parte Lum You, 262 F. 451.

Where an alien in his declaration of intention, and later in his petition for naturalization, erroneously stated the sovereigty to which he owed allegiance, which allegiance, as required by statute, he "particularly" renounced, the court is without power on hearing of his petition, by an order nunc pro tunc, to allow amendment of the declaration and petition, to date back to the time of their filing. U. S. v. Vogel, 262. 71 12 (New, vol. 7 Key-No. Series).

That a naturalization certificate was obtained fraudently and not in good faith may be established by subsequent acts and statements of the naturalization citizen, showing his disloyalty and continued adherence to his former sovereign U. S. v. Kramer, 262 F. 395.

A proceeding to deport an alien, on the ground that he was found advocating or teaching the unlawful destruction of property, is unfair and invalid, in view of the search and seizure and due process clauses of the Constitution, when based upon pamphlets obtained by forcibly raiding orderly meetings of the union to which he belonged, without warrant or process. Ex parte Jackson, 263 F. 110.

Where the evidence on which a deportation proceeding was based was obtained by unlawful raids, without warrant or process, of the hall and orderly meetings of a union, and the government freely disclosed the manner of obtaining the evidence in both the deportation preceeding and a proceeding for habeas corpus, the situation was not one wherein he mode of procuring the evidence could not be collaterally raised and determined at the trial.

The refusal to produce one of the government's material witnesses for cross-examination in a deportation proceeding, unless the alien would disclose what he expected to prove and deposit the costs, denied due process of law, and rendered the procedings unfair, though the government had another witness to the same matter.

An alien coming to the United States in 1882, but thereafter living for 17 years in Mexico, where he registered at the British consulate as a British subject, and returning to the United States in 1913, must file a certificate of arrival with his petition for naturalization, as required by Act June 29, 1906. 4, subd. 2. par. 4 (Comp. St. 4352), in the case of aliens arriving in the United States after the passage of that act.

The filing of a certificate of arrival by one applying for naturalization under Act June 29, 1906, 4 (Comp. St. 4352,) is compulsory and jurisdictional.

Act June 29, 1906. (4 Comp. St. 4352), requiring the filing of a certificate of arrival by applicants for naturalization arriving in the country subsequent to its passage is not concerned with arrivals which are merely incidental to passage through the country, but only with those arrivals made the basis of a claim to citizenship. In re-Elliott 253 F. 143.

Where a libel for damage to cargo against two carriers, one of which was German, is dismissed as to such respondent because of its absence caused by the war, the dismissal should be without prejudice to any rights of libelant or its co.respondent.-Kuhnhold v. Netherlands-American Steam Nav. Co., 264 F. 320.

Under Act Nov. 3. 1893 (Comp. St. 4324), requiring a Chinaman, applying for admission on the ground that he was formerly engaged in the United States as a merchant, to establish the fact that he was such for at least one year before his Copyright 1920 by West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.

departure, one who had been a merchant for at least one year before his departure for China with the intention of returning could not be excluded on his return by the immigration officials, on the ground that his original entry was fraudulent, but could be deported only by a judicial proceeding.-White v. Chin Fong, 40 S. Ct. 449.

While the decision by the Secretary of Labor on the exclusion of a Chinese person is final unless the preceedings were manifestly unfair or show manifest abuse of discretion, the decision must be made after a hearing in good faith, however summary, and must find adequate support in the evidence.

Where three white citizens had testified that petitioner was a native Chinese upon investigation to determine his status before he visited China, but identified him only from his photograph, and on his return he was excluded as not being the person he claimed to have been in the preliminary investigation, the omission from the record sent to the commissioner of immigraton and, on appeal, to Secretary of Labor, of statement that on the later investigation the three white witnesses were confronted with petitioner, and there was mutual recognition, rendered the report unfair so that the Secretary's order for exclusion was not final. The great power given Secretary of Labor by the Acts of Congress over Chinese immigrants and perosns of Chinese descent must be administered, not arbitrarily and secretly, but fairly and openly, under the restraints of the tradition and principles of free government aplicable where the fundamental rights of men are involved. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 40 S. Ct. 566.

The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution are not limited in their application to citizens but apply to all persons within the United States, including aliens, so that aliens cannot be deprived of their liberty without due process of law and are exempt from unwarranted searches and seizures.

There is no constitutional limit to the power of Congress to exclude or expel aliens.

Congress has intrusted the administration of the immigration laws to the Department of Labor, and the Department of Justice has no legal right or power to deal with the exclusion or expulsion of aliens.

Statutory restrictions on immigration, like all other statutes, are, if possible, to be construed in accordance with the spirit as well as within the letter of the Constitution.

Act Oct. 16, 1918, 1 (Comp St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 42891/4 b (1), authorizing deportation of aliens who are members of organizations advocating the forcible overthrow of the government "overthrow" means more than radical change in the form and function of the government.

The courts have no jurisdiction on habeas corpus proceedings to interfere with proceedings in the Department of Labor for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens, unless and until there is some error of law in that department, or the proceedings are unfair the department's decision on the facts is conclusive.

If the proceedings in the Department of Labor for the exclusion or expulsion of aliens are unfair or otherwise lacking in the essential elements of due process of law, or if the Secretary proceeded on an erroneous view of the law, the courts must review such proceedings.

The records on which the decisions of the Secretary of Labor, in proceedings for the deportation of aliens, are based, must under Immigration Rules 17 and 22. requiring affidavit for warrant and right to counsel and production of evidence, be fairly made by real trials before immigration inspectors though the trials may be summary, or the alien is deprived of his real rights on appeal given him by Act Feb. 5, 1917, 17 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919 4289 1/4 ii).

An unfair or misleading record in proceedings for the deportation of an alien is as much a fraud upon the law and upon the Secretary of Labor as upon the alien, since the general policy of the United States has been to admit all immigrants except those specifically described as undesirable.

The amendment of Immigration Rule 22, subd. 5, par. (b) which originally entitled an alien to counsel when arrested, so as to entitle him to counsel only when the hearing has proceeded sufficiently to protect the government's interests, and which was made in contemplation of a large number of hearings of deportation proceedings, tended to make those proceedings unfair by depriving the aliens of counsel until after they had admitted membership in a proscribed organization.

Though Congress has delegated to the Department of Labor the power and duty of investigating and deporting aliens of the proscribed classes, the fact that the department, in issuing warrants, acted on the information secured by agents of

the Department of Justice, instead of on its independent investigation, does not render the proceeding void, though the method of investigation may have been such as to cast suspicion on the fairness of the proceedings.

In proceedings for the deportation of aliens, the question whether there is any evidence to support a finding necessary to the deportation of the al en is a question of law, which can be reviewed by the courts in habeas corpus proceedings.

The hearing of certain aliens who admitted membership in the Communist party and knowledge of its principles and aims held to have been sufficiently fair to warrant their deportation if that party was one proscribed by Act Oct. 16, 1918 1 Comp St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 4289 1/4 b (1), even though there may have been some errors in the procedure.

Where, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, aliens, held under warrant for deportation are entitled to their discharge because the hearings were unfair and denied due process of law, such discharge is without prejudice to new proceedings for deportation for any cause, existent or not.

The discretion of the Secretary of Labor, under immigration law, 20 (Comp. St. Ann. Sup. 1919 1/4k), to release aliens on bail not less than $500, ending hearing and final decision, is one with which the courts ordinarily cannot interfere, either as to the granting or refusing of bail or as to the amount, but such interference is warranted where there is an abuse of the power given.

Aliens arrested for deportation cannot be held in custody for an unreasonable length of time without a hearing, and the fact that a large number of arrests were made by the department at the same time, so that speedy hearings were impossible, does not justify the delay. Coyler v. Skeffington, 265 F. 17.

Iowa. Where property has been devised to alien enemy, no action can be maintained by the alien to recover it or the increment of the property while a state of war exists, and he acquires no dominion over it whether for use or service.

A devise to an alien enemy is not void under the Trading with the Enemy Act, but the property devised will be held by the executor until termination of war, since such a devise does not give "aid or comfort to the enemy" nor increase his "resources," and since the making of the will is not an act of "trading" within such act.

War operates as an interdiction on all commercial or other specific intercourse and communication with the public enemy, so that with out a license all commercial transactions, all trading between citizens or states or nations at war, is unlawful, and all contracts growing out of such trading or out of voluntary intercourse with a public enemy are void. In re Kielsmark's Will, 177 N. W. 690.

Missouri

In action to declare a constructive trust, it was a good defence that plaintiff and her husband were aliens and therefore prohibited from owning real estate under Rev. St. 1909 750.

Under Rev. St. 1909, 750, making it unlawful for an alien to own real estate, where an alien had received a deed conveying an absolute title, the state alone could attack the conveyance, declare a forfeiture, and take the property. Ales v. Epstein, 222 S. W. 1012 New York

The five years' residence necessary for naturalization cannot be computed from sea service on foreign vessels, if applicant's wife and children reside in the United States, since master of vessels sailing under foreign flag i to some extent acting under laws of and subject to officials of the foreign country. Petition of MacKinnon, 183 N. Y. S. 108.

A native of Warsaw, who in his declaration of intenti on pursuant to Act Cong. June 29, 1906, 4 (Comp. St. 4352), renounced generally all allegiance to all foreign potentates, and particularly to William II, emperor of Germany, and who was qualified for citizenship, would not be denied it because not particularly renouncing allegiance to the Tsar of Russia, who had exercised no authority in Poland for many months prior to such declaration of intention; that city having been occunied as a conquered city by German forces and confirmed to Germany by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 3, 1918. In re Guldenstern, 183 N. Y. S. 524.

Where an action is pending at the outbreak of belligerency, the proper procedure for raising the point as to plaintiffs' incapacity to sue, because they are alien enemies. is by a motion to stay or arrest the action penedente bello, as they had capacity when they sued, at which time their capacity would be judged. A demurrer for misjoinder is a proper procedure, where some parties are alien enemies and some are not, and the own

ership of the chose is joint, as in a partnership, in which case the alien enemies are necessary parties, and some may not sue when other joint owners are debarred.

Under Trading with the Eenemy Act 1917 2 (U. S. Comp. St. 1918, 3115 aa), defining "alien enemy" to include any individual partnership, or other body of individuals of any nationality, resident within the territory, including that occupied by the military and naval forces of any nation with which the United States is at war, residents of Prague, Bohemia, in the newly erected territory of Czecho-Slovakia, recognized by the United States, formerly a part of the Austro-Hungarian mpire, are not to be placed in the category of alien enemies.Waldes v. Basch, 179 N. Y. S. 713.

Certificates from the Department of Justice that an alien enemy is entitled to exception from such classification, made by virtue of a general executive order, is not sufficient to entitle an alien enemy to naturalization under Act Cong. June 29, 1906, 4, subd. II, as amended by Act May 9, 1918 (U. S. Comp. St. 198, U. S. Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 4352.

To entitle alien enemies to naturalization under Act Cong. June 29, 1906, 4, subd. II, as amended by Act May 9, 1918 (U. S. Comp. St. 1918, U. S. Comp. St. 1919, 4352) the certificate of the President excepting applicant from the classification of alien enemy must be obtained before the application is made. In re Schuster, 182, N. Y. S. 357.

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Kentucky

The general rule governing the validity of contracts is to apply the law of the place of performance, which, in the absence of contrary showing, is presumed to be the place where the contract is made.

When a contract is made by one having a regular domicile, it will be presumed that the law of the place of his domicile shall govern the validity of the contract, as well as its construction, though he may have been temporarily absent from his domicile when the contract was executed. Oil & Gas Co. v. McKinney, 221 S. W. 245. New Domain New York

A contract, though valid where it is made and is to be enforced, will not be treated as valid by the courts of another jurisdiction,, whose laws expressly declare such a contract to be void or make it a crime to engage in such a transaction, since the courts of no state will uphold contracts which are deemed to be injurious or offensive to the morale of its people, or in contravention of public law. Nielsen V. Donelly, 181 N. Y. S. 509.

A provision of a marriage settlement, made between citizens of the Swiss Republic pursuant to the law of their canton, that one-third of the community estate of the spouse's should go to the surviving children on the death of either, is supported by consideration, and can be enforced by the children -In re Schmoll's Estate, 181 N. Y. S. 542. Oklahoma

Comity does not require the courts of Oklahoma to enforce a foreign contract which is repugnant to its public policy. Union Sav. Ass'n. v. Cummins, 190 P. 869.

CORPORATIONS.

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The New York Income Tax Law, so far as it requires a Connecticut corporation employing nonresidents within state to withold the tax on their salary, is not as unreasonable regulation of the conduct of its business in New York, in the absence of any contract limiting the State's power of regulation, though it might be more convenient to it to pay such salaries in Connecticut.-Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 40 S. Ct. 228.

The laws of the state in which a corporation is organized, which becomes a part of its charter, follow the corporation when it engages in business in another state; but those laws which regulate corporations in their manner of doing business in the state do not follow it into another state. WashingtonAlaska Bank v. Dexter Horton Nat. Bank of Seattle, Wash., 263 F. 304.

A contract to equip a building in Michigan with an auto

matic fire sprinkler system, made by a foreign corporation which had not complied with the laws of Michigan to authorize it to do business or make contracts entirely through subcontractors, who manufactured and installed the system, furnishing both the materials and labor, held a Michigan contract, and not an interstate transaction, which was void under the statute (Comp. Laws Mich. 1915, 9063 et seq.), and would not support a mechanic's lien in favor of the contractor, regardless of whether its contracts with the subcontractors were local or interstate transactions.-Phillips Co. v. Everett, 262 F. 341.

Bringing suit by a foreign corporation as trustee to foreclose a mortgage on real estate situated in the state of suit does not constitute "doing business" in that state. Lane v. Equitable Trust Co. of New York, 262 F. 918.

Claim of the state of New York for license tax imposed on a foreign corporation doing business in the state under Tax Law, 181, as amended by Laws N. Y. 1917, c. 490, held entitled to priority of payment over general creditors from assets of the corporation in the hands of receivers of a federal court in New York, although the state had not, by levy, acquired a lien on the property prior to the receivership.-Sweet v. All Package Grocery Stores Co., 262 F. 727.

The home of a corporation is in the state of its creation and generally, when it engages in business in another state, those entering into contracts with knowldge of the limitations imposed by its charter do so subject thereto. City of Jamestown v. Pennsylvania Gas Co., 264 F. 1009. Indiana

A private individual cannot maintain an action to enjoin acts within the state by a foreign corporation on the ground that it has not complied with the statuary conditions precedent to the right to do business within the state.-De Peugh v. Board of Comr's of Delaware County, 126 N. E. 484.

Contract by foreign construction company for installation of sprinkler system in manufacturing plant, involving employment of labor for weeks, building of tower, tank and other carpenter work, excavation and filling of trenches, and use of material on ground and property of manufacturing company, held not interstate comerce, but transaction of local business in state in violation of Burns' Ann. St. 1914, 4085 et seq.—

Burns' Ann. St. 1914, 4085 et seq., requiring compliance by any foreign corporation for profit before it is permitted to transact business or exercise corporate powers in the state, making failure to comply therewith a misdemeanor, contract in violation thereof is void.

A contract by foreign corporation for transaction of local business in state without having complied with Burns' Ann. St. 1914, 4085 et seq., is not entitled to protection of courts of state. U. S. Const. Co. v. Hamilton Nat. Bank of Ft. Wayne, 126 N. E. 866.

Iowa.

Where defendant's motion for change of venue was made after plaintiff had introduced testimony affirmatively showing that corporation defendant maintained no agency in the county, the failure to deny the existence of such agency does not confer jurisdiction to continue the trial.

A petition for damage caused by a resident veterinarian using hog serum furnished by a nonresident corporation, does not show that there was no liability against him apart from that of the corporation, so that corporation's failure to object to petition as not stating a cause of action against agent did not waive right of corporation to change of venue. Bruce v. State Serum & Supply Co. 177 N. W. 457.

Kansas

A sale of the shares of stock of a foreign corporation in the state of Kansas is not a "doing of business," and may be done if, on inquiry by the state charter board, the corporation is found to measure up to the conditions and qualifications, prescribed by Laws, 1919, c. 153, as to the right to sell securities in the state.

The "doing of business" is the exercise of some of the functions and the carrying on of the ordinary business for which a corporation is organized, and single and isolated transactions do not ordinarily constitute it.

A foreign corporation which as to its right to do business in Kansas, is subject to the corporation law so far as applicable, on submitting its agreement or declaration of trust and plan of operation to the charter board with request that it be permitted to sell its stock within the state, was entitled to have, its application considered by the board, and where it declined to do so mandamus to compel such action will be granted. Home Lumber Co. v. Hopkins. 190 P. 601. Kentucky

A contract between a Kentucky drainage and a foreign corporation is not void because of the failure of the corpora

tion to designate in accordance with Ky. St. 571, an agent on whom summons might be served for such failure merely renders the contract void at the option of the other party, who may enforce it, though depriving the delinquent corporation of the right to enforce the same; hence those whose lands were embraced in the district cannot attack the contract on ground of the corporation's failure to designate an agent. Yewell v. Board of Drainage Com'rs of Daviess County, 219 S. W. 1049. Michigan

Although a foreign corporation which has not complied with Comp. Laws 1915, 9063, 9067, and 9068, is not entitled to contract, yet it may maintain a personal action against a Michigan corporation to replevin its own personal property, such action not being repugnant to section 12370, prohibiting non-complying foreign corporations from maintaining any action founded upon its forbidden acts, and may have judgment where evidence of plaintiff's ownership and right to possession is sufficient, since defendant cannot claim under void contract.

In an action by a Maine corporation against a Michigan corporation, it was not error to charge that plaintiff was a foreign corporation carrying on a business within the state without authority, and as such subject to penalty for its neg lect to comply with Comp. Laws 1915, 9063, 9067, and 9068, where such noncompliance was shown.-Rex Beach Pictures Co., v. Harry I. Garson Productions, 177 N. W. 254. Minnesota

To obtain jurisdiction of a foreign corporation by service upon an agent within Minnesota, the authority of the agent and the business in which he is engaged must be of such a character that it may be said that in his person the corporation is present in Minnesota in view of Gen. St. 1913, 7735.

An agent authorized to take orders, make collections and adjustments, and dispose of property of a foreign corporation within Minnesota is an agent on whom service in Minnesota will give jurisdiction over the foreign corporation, in view of Gen. St. 1913, 7735. Nienhauser v. Robertson Paper Co., 178, N. W. 504.

The burden of proof is upon one asserting it to prove that a foreign corporation has not complied with Laws 1899, c. 69 (Gen. St. 1913, 6206), making the appointment of a resident agent authorized to accept a process a prerequisite to the acquiring of property in the state, and that act did not affect the title of land owned by foreign corporation when it was passed. Northern Counties Land Co. v. Excelsior Land, Mining & Development Co., 178 N. W. 497. Missouri

The general rule is that an intention to exclude foreign corporations from a state is not to be deduced from the fact that the law of the state have made no provision for domestic corporations of like character.

It is the disposition of the state to be liberal in its comity toward foreign companies applying for license to do business within the state, so that Rev. St. 1909, 3343. forbidding license to corporations could not be more rigo.ously enforced than is compelled by its language.

The provisos of Rev. St. 1909, 3039, 3343, and others forbidding licensing of foreign corporations for certain facts therein stated, exclude refusal of license for other reasons.

Whether the organization of a foreign corporation differing from a domestic corporation contravenes public policy depends on whether it gives the foreign corporations some advantage over domestic corporations or introduces some other evil.

The sources of the policy of the state as to foreign corporations are the statutes, the court decisions, and the purpose to preserve good moral by keping out everything tending to fraud.

The fact that the common stock of a foreign corporation is issued without a stated value, as permitted by the laws of the state of its incorporation, is not contrary to the public policy of the state as manifested by its statutes, court decisions, or executive acts or contrary to good morals, so that the licensing of such corpoartion cannot be refused under Rev. St. 1909, 3343.

The fact that a foreign corporation has issued common stock having no stated par value as permitted by the laws of the state of its incorporation which have made the stockholders liable for the unpaid portion of the consideration for the issuance, of the stock, does not injuriously affect the rights of creditors to hold the stockholders for the unpaid balance due for the stock, and does not warrant refusal of license to corporation under Rev. St. 1909, 3343.

Proviso to Rev. St. 1090, 3343, authorizing license to a foreign corporation only if the proportion of its stock em

ployed in the state does not exceed the capital stock domestic corporations are permitted to have does not warrant the refusal of license to a foreign corporation because its conmon shares were issued without stated par value. State ex rel. Standard Tank Car Co. v. Sullivan, 221 S. W. 728. New Hampshire

A foreign corporation, appearing generally in a suit, submits itself to the court's jurisdiction.-Davis v. Central New Hampshire Power Co., of Maine, 109 A. 263.

Under Laws 1913, c. 187, 1, 3, a corporation, doing business in the state without appointing the secretary of state its agent for service of process, cannot maintain an aciton on a note given for the purchase price of goods sold, though such failure does not make invalid its contracts. Ensign v. Christiansen, 109 A. 857. New York

To sustain service on corporation made after it filed a certificate surrendering right to do business and revoking its designation of a person for service of process in the state under General Corporation Law, 16a, subd. 4, as amended by Laws 1918, c. 193, it must affirmatively appear that the liability sought to be enforced by the action was incurred prior to the filing of such certificate.

Where a foreign corporation made contract in the state agreeing that employe, on his discharge from military service, could continue his services under a prior employment contract entered into out of the state employe's action for suspension after he had resumed employment on discharge from army was an action, not for breach of the subsequent agreement, but for breach of the original employment contract made out of state, rendering ineffectual service on the corporation after it had filed certificate surrendering authority to do business in the state, and revoking agency for service of process, pursuant to General Corporation Law, 16a, subd. 4, as amended by Laws 1918, c. 193, plaintiff must allege in order to render service effectual under such statut,e that the contract was made in the state. Hexter v. Day Elder Motors Corporation. 182 N. Y. S. 717.

A New York creditor of a Mexican banking corporation has no adequate remedy at law against the banking corporation, a Canadian bank, which holds funds for it on deposit ir New York, and a member of a Mexican monetary commission in control of the Mexican bank which under the Mexican monetary commission has had its assets dissipated and is in danger of further dissipation, so that the New York creditor is entitled to sue in equity for receiver of the New York assets of the Mexican bank and for injunction. Mitchell v. Banco De Londres Y Mexico, 183 N. Y. S. 446. North Dakota

Where a corporation, with its principal office in a sister state near the state line, solicited business generally in tributary territory within North Dakota, any business transact on so consummated is not an "isolated transaction," within the rule that single or isolated transactions do not violate Comp. Laws 1913, 5238, prohibiting doing business in North Dakota without first filing copy of their charter. Dahl Implement & Lumber Co. v. Campbell, 178 N. W. 197. Oklahoma

By reason of Const. art. 9, 44, foreign corporations may not exercise in Oklahoma any greater or different rights, powers or privileges than are conferred on similar domestic corporations.

Comity does not require that foreign association be granted any greater privileges in making contracts within Oklahoma than are accorded to similar domestic associations. Union Sav. Assn. v. Cummins, 190 P. 869. Oregon

Act authorizing service of summons on foreign corporation through corporation commissioner for state did not have retroactive effect, authorizing service on corporation which at time of passage of act and its taking effect had no organization or agent within state, and had retired from state and ceased to do business therein three years before; it being immaterial commissioner transmitted summons to home office of corporation. Beedle v. Stondall Land & Timber Co., 189 P. 427. Pennsylvania

Where the essential facts giving jurisdiction of foreign attachment against defendant foreign corporation appear of record, the statement of claim after judgment cannot be successfully attacked on garnishee's rule to dissolve the foreign attachment, quash the writ, and strike off the judgment. A foreign corporation, as such, is subject to foreign_attachment.-Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Skeele Coal Co., 109 A. 160.

South Dakota

A single transaction whereby a foreign corporation undertook to find a purchaser for property located in the state does not amount to a doing of business in the state so as to avoid the contract for compensation under Rev. Codes 1919, 8909. because the corporation had neithe filed copies of its charter or articles of incorporation or appointed a process agent as required by sections 8902, 8903. Charles E. Walters Co. v. Hahn 178 N. W. 448.

Texas

A foreign corporation suing to recover possession of buggies, an interstate shipment, under a conditional sale, made a chattel mortgage by statute need not allege and prove a permit from the state; there being nothing to show that it was engaged in doing business in the state. Moore-Hustead Co. v. Joseph W. Moon Buggy Co., 221 S. W. 1032.

CUSTODIAN (ALIEN PROPERTY.)

Dismissal or suspension of suit is not required by the fact that plaintiff becomes an alien enemy by declaration of war after he has recovered judgment and defendant has taken the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals, but judgment may properly be affirmed, with the modification that it be paid over to the Alien Property Custodian; aid and comfort to the enemy, the only objection to such a judgment, thus being prevented. Birge-Forbes Co. v. Heye, 40 S. ct. 160.

Where the Alien Property Custodian demanded a transfer, by one holding securities in trust for enemies, of the right, title, and interest of the enemies, and did not assert a legal right to the securities themselves, the capture did not change the character of the enemies right, and if such right was subject to an accounting, the custodian must submit to some judicial determination between himself and the trustee. The Alien Property Custodian, having taken over the rights of enemies in securities held in trust, may file a b'll to compel an accounting upon showing that the period for distribution has arrived.

Under Trading with the Enemy Act, 17 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 3115 1⁄2 i), conferring jurisdiction on the District Courts to enforce the provisions of such act, the Alien Property Custodian may begin such ancillary proceedings as are necessary to reduce to possession property taken over by him.

One holding securities in trust for enemies, whose rights have been taken over by the Custodian for an accounting, without recognizing the title of the Custod'an, and, where he disputes such title, the bill will be dismissed.

One holding securities in trust for enemies, whose rights have been taken over by the Alien Property Custodian, may sue the Custodian in the United States District Court for a settlement of his accounts and instructions. Kahn v. Garvan. 263 F. 909.

New York

The collusion of a life beneficiary, who was an alien enemy, in the unlawful accumulation by trustees of income, cannot affect the rights of the Alien Property Custodian, in whom the property was vested by Trading with the Enemy Act, 7, 9 (U. S. Comp. St. 1918, U. S. Comp. St. Ann. Sump. 1919, 31151⁄2e), and the President's order.

The rights of an alien enemy as life beneficiary of a trust vests during the war in the Alien Property Custodian, and he is entitled to have a decree reopened to protect his rights, even though the alien enemy was a party to the proceeding in which the decree was rendered. In re Schaefer's Estate, 182 N. Y. S. 732.

Under Trading with the Enemy Act 1917, as amended by Act Cong. July 11, 1919, authorizing the return of property by the Alien Property Custodian to certain citizens of Allies, residents of Dresden, Saxony, in the German Empire, have no valid claim to a right to such return to them of a right of action, and where they are joined as plaintiffs with other joint owners, who are residents of Prague, in CzechoSlovakia, and not in the category of alien enemies, a demurrer to the complaint on the ground of misjoinder of parties plaintiff must be sustained.

In view of Trading with the Enemy Act Oct. 6, 1917, as amended by Act Cong. July 11, 1919, defining "alien enemy," and relating to return of property held by Alien Property Custodian, the mere declaration by residents of Dresden, Saxony, Germany, of their intention to assume the national character of citizenship of Czecho-Slovakia cannot be accepted as a substitute for actual removal into or bona fide evidence of intention to return to that state; it being proper that courts of a belligerent nation should deny to any one the right to use a character so equivocal as to claim either

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