great foundation of public law, which it mainly concerns the peace of mankind both in their politic and private capacities to preserve inviolate (g). The exceptions by which it has been attempted to restrict the prohibition of forcible intervention in the internal affairs of independent states are wholly inadmissible. Even such interventions as are humane and disinterested in their purpose are illegal. Though they may be beneficial in act, they are pernicious in example; for charity may be made a cloak for ambition, and a state is no more justified than a private person in doing evil that good may come. Though its charity be genuine, a nation has no right to impose benefits upon its neighbours by force, or to gratify its humanity at the expense of their independence (r). To procure an eminent good by means that are unlawful is as little consonant to public justice as to private morality. A nation is not justified in assuming rights that do not belong to her, merely because she means to apply them to a laudable purpose, nor in setting out on a moral crusade of converting other nations by acts of unlawful force (s). It has been said that the rule is subject to exceptions, which cannot with propriety be expressed in institutes or elements of international law. This evasion, which hath been applied to excuse the usurpation of kings, is just as applicable to excuse the usurpation of republics; but it is not therefore entitled to the indulgence with which it has been cited by a republican lawyer (t). The admission that such exceptions cannot with propriety be stated in a legal work, is an admission of their illegality; for if they were founded in law and justice, they ought to be stated therein. It cannot be improper that a legal work should be correct, which it cannot be, where it lays down general rules without setting (9) Le Louis, 2 Dod. 243; The Antelope, 10 Wheaton, 120. (-) Vatt. ii. § 7. (#) Le Louis, 2 Dod. 257; Vatt. ii. § 7. (1) Kent Comm. i. 23. E forth the exceptions by which they are limited. Convenience can be no more deemed an excuse for public wrong, than want for private dishonesty. Matter of policy must always be distinguished from matter of law. The concessions which it is prudent to make to a sovereign vary with his power and influence; but those who treat of the law of nations must be guided by more certain rules, or they will never arrive at any fixed principles (u). The discretion of a statesman is properly employed in determining whether a state shall exercise the right it has; but to assume a right which it has not is mere usurpation. The maintenance of peace is the usual plea with which usurpations are excused. Such was the plea set up by those sovereigns who many years ago took upon themselves by their mutual compacts to dispose, according to their pleasure, of the dominions of other sovereigns, as if they had been the dominions of the contracting parties. Such wrongs are the offspring of what is called reason of state, which, says Bynkershoek, I define-Monstrum horrendum informe ingens, cui lumen ademptum. With those who once give way to this monster, and allow themselves to deal with the property of others as their own, all discussion of the law of nations is idle (v). (u) Bynk. F. L. xxiv. Prudentiæ politica causam a jure gentium semper distinguendum esse reor. Prout plus minusve metuimus a principibus plus minusve detur omnino expedit: sed qui de jurisprudentiâ gentium acturus est, aliis et certioribus regulis uti oportet: sin autem semper vagabitur pede incerto. (v) Bynk. Q. J. P. i. xxv. His injuriis prætexitur studium conservandæ pacis quod et ipsum prætexitur injuriis longe adhuc majoribus, quæ potissimum ab aliquot retro annis invaluerunt; quum nempe principes mutuis pactis de aliorum principum regnis et ditionibus de animi sententiâ statuunt, atque si de re suâ statuerent. Has injurias peperit et adhuc parit ratio, quam dicunt, statûs: quam ipse definio. Monstrum horrendum informe ingens, cui lumen ademptum. Huic monstro si semel cedas, semelque tibi indulgeas aliena non alio loco habere, quam tua: jam frustra est omnis disputatio de jure gentium et publico. Yet it has been said, that when a country is divided by civil war, each faction is to be deemed an independent state, and that a foreign power may assist those whose cause it deems to be just; and his conclusion is deduced from the principle, that they are independent of all foreign authority, and that no foreign power has any right to judge their acts (w). This doctrine is contradicted by the precedents which in such cases prohibit not only interference, but even intercession. Peter, King of Arragon, having resolved to punish severely the rebellion of the inhabitants of Valencia, was requested to postpone his intention until he had received the ambassadors of Alphonso, King of Castile, who were instructed to intercede on behalf of the rebels. Peter replied, that he was astonished that the King of Castile should propose to send an embassy on such a mission; that all kings should approve of his resolution to punish rebels instead of opposing it; that they were his subjects, and must be left to his discretion (r). In 1571, Walsingham, ambassador of Queen Elizabeth at the Court of France, represented to Queen Catherine that the French ambassador at the English Court was implicated in the conspiracy of the Duke of Norfolk, and was in the habit of speaking with so much zeal on behalf of Mary Queen of Scots, as to give occasion to the belief, that he was acting on the express instructions of his court, and that France was disposed to interfere in the domestic affairs of England. Queen Catherine replied, that the ambassador's private regard for the Queen of Scots should not be permitted to be prejudicial to the service of the Queen of England; and that if he had done any thing displeasing to her, he had disobeyed the orders of the king his master (y). When the ambassadors of the Protestant princes of Germany represented to Charles 9 how () Vatt. ii. § 56. (Contra Bynk. Q. J. P. ii. 3, sub fine-Wicq. i. 22, and c. 2, passim.) (y) Wicq. ii. 92. (1) Wicq. ii. 93. much it was his interest to respect the feelings and conciliate the affections of his Protestant subjects, he replied that having the title of most Christian King, and being by birth a Catholic, he was bound to maintain the religion in which he had been brought up; that nothing could prevent his employing the ordinary process of law against heretics, who made their religion a pretext for rebellion; and that he required no tutors to instruct him how to govern his own kingdom (z). Henry 3 replied to the ambassadors, who made similar representations to him in the name of the same princes, and taxed him with breach of faith to his Protestant subjects; that he was a sovereign prince having authority to make, to construe, and to repeal the laws at his discretion, and ordered them to leave the kingdom (a). Louis 13 shortly after the marriage of Henrietta Maria, consented that the ambassadors of Charles 1 should interpose, not their mediation, but their good offices, to procure favourable terms of accommodation for the French Protestants (b). When the ambassador of Louis 13 solicited the repeal of a law recently passed against the Roman Catholics, Charles 1 expressed his extreme surprise that the King of France should pretend to intermeddle in the affairs of England to the extent of requiring information respecting the laws that had been enacted in relation to English Catholics. When the ambassador insisted that the King of France was interested in the domestic affairs of his neighbours and allies, inasmuch as the miscarriage of one might be the ruin of many; the king replied, that when the Earl of Carlisle, his ambassador, spoke in favour of the Huguenots during the siege of Montauban, it was intimated to him that his interference in the differences that had arisen between the King of France and his subjects would not be approved of (c). Cardinal Richelieu having (z) Wicq. ii. 75. (a) Wicq. ii. 76; Flass. ii. 108. (c) Flass. ii. 406. learned that the papal nuncio had been requested by the Count of Soissons to procure for him the intercession of the Pope, informed the nuncio that the king would be displeased if his holiness interfered in the matter; that it was a domestic affair, and that his Majesty would not allow any one to interpose between him and his subjects. On a subsequent occasion the French ambassador was instructed to negotiate for a settlement of the differences existing between the Pope and the Duke of Parma respecting the Duchy of Castro. The instant the subject was mentioned, the Pope declared that he required the personal submission of the Duke; that it would be a pernicious precedent to allow a subject to treat with his sovereign and to negotiate terms of accommodation through the intervention of a foreign power; that he was astonished that the King of France should countenance such a pretension on the part of a subject, since his Majesty had disapproved of the desire of the Court of Rome to intercede for the Dukes of Guise, Montmorency, Lorraine, and others, and had not permitted the Papal nuncio to say one word in favour of the Court of Soissons (d). So when the King of France interposed on behalf of the Barberini; Innocent 10 declared, that the case was a domestic matter to be decided in the ordinary course of justice, and that as he had no desire to interfere in the affairs of France, he trusted that his Majesty would not interfere therein (e). When Queen Christina, moved by her admiration of the Prince of Condè, inquired whether the Queen Regent would accept her good offices for the settlement of the differences by which France was divided; the French minister at Stockholm was instructed to reply, that as the affairs of the kingdom were on the point of being settled it was unnecessary that her Majesty should give herself any trouble upon the subject. Her Swedish Majesty felt the rebuke very sensibly, and the (d) Wicq. ii. 78. (e) Wicq. ii. 78, et seq. |