French resident was informed by one of her ministers that the offer had been made without his advice, and that he did not think that the King of France ought to have accepted it, as a sovereign should not permit any foreign potentate to interfere in his domestic affairs (ƒ). Such interference, as Wicquefort justly observes, shews that a foreign prince is desirous of protecting the subjects and taking part in the government of the country, to which his ambassador is accredited (g). In 1650, during the quarrel between the Prince of Orange and the States of Holland, when the prince was besieging Amsterdam, the Spanish ambassador offered him the assistance of the Spanish troops for the reduction of the town. The Prince of Orange replied, that the King of Spain had no business to interfere in the domestic affairs of the country; that neither he nor the states required such assistance, and that if the king's troops should advance their differences would cease, and their forces would be united against him. When the differences between the prince and the states were settled, the same ambassador in attempting to repair his first mistake committed another, by demanding an audience of the states to congratulate them on their reconciliation with the prince. As soon as the states were aware of the purpose for which he had demanded an audience, which was not discovered till he was at the foot of the staircase, they sent a message to request that it might be deferred (h). So when the French ambassador, in taking leave of the States General, entreated them to shew a little kindness and moderation in their treatment of the Roman Catholic inhabitants of the United Provinces, the states passed a formal resolution, declaring that the proposal of the ambassador was inconsistent with the peace and fundamental laws of the state; that they had heard it with great dissatisfaction, and that to prevent the disorders that might ensue, they

would take measures of such severity as should give those Catholics, who had solicited the interference of a stranger, reason to repent of their insolence. The matter being considered a domestic affair of the highest importance, this resolution was communicated to the ambassador by eight deputies, who added by word of mouth, whatever the resolution seemed to want in strength of expression (i). On the same principle an offer of mediation on the part of the States General between the Dukes of Brunswick and Lunebourg and the city of Brunswick, which they were besieging was rejected, and their deputies were not allowed to communicate with the city (j).

The doctrine of Vattel, which is as little reconcileable with reason as it is with precedent, is probably founded upon a misconstruction of a passage of Grotius, which does not support it. Grotius states (k), that in civil wars necessity sometimes creates an exception to the general rule, that sovereigns only can employ ambassadors; for instance, where a state is so equally divided, as to render it doubtful to which party the sovereignty belongs, in which case one nation is taken for the time to form two nations, and he cites the example of ambassadors sent by Vitellius to Vespasian. But this passage is to be understood of engagements and treaties concluded between the contending parties in civil war, as to matters, which are in the power of each respectively (1); such, for example, as the treaty of St. Germains-en-Laye, which was violated by the massacre of St. Bartholomew (m). It might have occurred to Vattel, that independence is matter of fact and cannot be imputed to those who are engaged in the struggles of insurrection. As far as it is possible to deduce any principle from his declama

tion about (n) Hercules and Busiris and Antæüs and Diomed, and the Prince of Orange (o); his principle appears to be this, that any foreign state is at liberty to assist the party whose cause is just. But this restriction of interference in favour of the cause of justice is an absolute prohibition of interference on the part of those who have no jurisdiction to determine the justice of the cause. Hence it follows, that no foreign power has any right to interfere in the internal affairs of an independent state. Vattel admits, that it is a violation of law (p) to incite disorders in a foreign state, and it is difficult to see how it is not equally a violation of law to foment disorders; or how disorders can be fomented more effectually than by active interference. Nor can this doctrine be reconciled with the principle which he repeatedly inculcates, that no foreign power has a right to interfere in the domestic affairs of an independent state. For the rights of sovereignty are not affected so long as the sovereign power is not displaced. Hence the remark of Tacitus respecting the ambassadors of Vitellius; nî dato a duce præsidio defensi forent, sacrum etiam in exteras gentes legatorum jus, ante ipsa patriæ moenia, civilis rabies usque in exitium temerasset: for the rights of sovereignty were vested in Vitellius and the senate, and could not be transferred to Vespasian, until he had conquered them (9). But the case would have been different if Vespasian had sent ambassadors to Vitellius, for they would have been nothing more than the messengers of rebels (r). Hence Lewis of

(n) Vatt. ii, § 56. Vattel, who rejected the chimerical theory of Grotius respecting the right of punishment. (Vatt. ii. 7) seems, from this catalogue of classical names, to have adopted its consequences, although he does not avow them. Vide Grot. ii. 20, xl.

(0) As to the Prince of Orange, and the legality of the proceedings of the convention, vid. Foster, disc. iv.

(p) Vatt. ii. 56.

(q) Bynk. Q. J. P. ii. iii.
(r) Id. ibid.; Wick. i. 38.

Bavaria imprisoned the messengers of the Pisans, who retused to admit him into their town (s). So the act of Phillip 2, who put to death the deputies of the Low Countries was cruel, but not illegal (†). Where a republic is divided by civil war, neither party can be taken to represent the state, unless the Sovereign authority continue unaltered. Hence the states of Holland rescinded all the decrees, which the factions of a subordinate state had passed against each other in time of trouble. Hence also the King of Spain yielded to the remonstrances of one of the factions that divided the city of Genoa, and refused to receive the ambassadors of the other (u). So the States General in 1643 refused to receive the ambassador of the Irish Catholics who had rebelled against the Parliament (v).

The absence of all jurisdiction to determine the right leads to the necessary consequence, that, when in the result of civil war a state changes its government, or a province or colony, that before had no separate existence, is in possession of the rights of sovereignty; the possession of sovereignty de facto is taken to be possession de jure: and any foreign power is at liberty to recognise such sovereignty by treating with the possessors of it as an independent state (w). Where sovereignty is necessary to the validity of an act, no distinction is or ought to be made between sovereignties founded on a good or bad title. Few governments have been founded on free suffrage, and election; most have originated in violence and faction. In international transactions possession is sufficient. Otherwise it would be necessary to inquire into the origin of sovereignties and to ascertain whether they are founded upon a good or upon a bad title. Such an inquiry could answer no good

(4) Bynk. Q. J. P. ii. iii.

(1) Wicq, i. 38; Bynk. Q. J. P. ii. iii.

(u) Bynk. ii. iii.

(v) Wicq. i. 24.

(e) Puff. viii. xii. 3; Wicq. i. 40, 57, 58; Bynk. Q. J. P. ii. 3; Vatt. iv. $ 14, 68; Kent Comm. i. 39.

purpose, and would furnish ample occasion to disturb the peace of nations (x).

Every sovereign has the right to permit or forbid the entrance of strangers into his territories and their residence therein, and to prescribe the terms on which such entrance or residence shall be permitted (y). Consequently, no sovereign is entitled to demand the expulsion or surrender of any person resident in the territories of another on any pretext whatever. Every state has a right to protect fugitives, and to grant an asylum to exiles. If this were otherwise, the condition of mankind would be lamentable, for the reach of imperial or popular despotism would be boundless. Charles 1 replied to the remonstrance of Lewis 13 respecting the Prince of Soubise, the chief of the Huguenots, who had fled to England; that Henry 4 had received Bothwell, who had attempted the life of James 1 (z). But it is needless to multiply precedents, for the right is proved by the authority of text writers (a); by the uniform practice of England, Holland, Switzerland, and the United States of America, acquiesced in by those most interested in opposing it; and by the conclusion of treaties for the mutual surrender of criminals, which, but for this right, would be wholly unnecessary and inopera

(x) Bynk. Q. J. P. ii. 3. Cæterum qui summam potestatem desiderant in iis, qui legatos mittunt non solent distinguere, nec etiam distinguendum est, an eorum imperia ex justo titulo, an ex solâ injuriâ originem traxerit sufficit enim quod ad eos ad quos legati mittuntur supremâ potestate utantur. Recte Paschalius dixit in Legato, c. 12; Paucissima regna dominatusque memorari possunt, quorum initiis libera gentium suffragia causam dederint. Plura imperia vis enixa est quam electio. Prima fere fundamenta imperiorum sunt turbæ et factiones. In causis publicis utique expedit, uti possidetis ita possideatis: alioquin omnium imperiorum origines essent excutiendæ, justæ nempe sint necne: et sic demum pronunciandum, qui legatos mittunt, jure an injuriâ mittant. Quod valde esset inutile et gentium tranquillitati turbandæ insignem causam præberet.

(y) Vatt. i. § 230-ii. §§ 94, 100, 114, 135.

(z) Flass. ii. 407.

(a) Grot. ii. 2, xvi.—ii. 5, xxv.—iii. 20, xli.; Puff. iii. 3, x.