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enforcing the laws. Parliament has an absolute authority over common law Courts. It may change the common law at its pleasure; it may abrogate it and substitute any other rule, for the common law Courts are municipal Courts bound by municipal law. But the Prize Court, though sitting here under the authority of the King of Great Britain, is a Court of the law of nations. It belongs to other nations as well as to our own; and, what foreigners have a right to demand from it, is the administration of the law of nations simply and exclusively of the introduction of principles borrowed from our own municipal jurisprudence (x). The seat of judicial authority is, indeed, locally here, in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations; but the law itself has no locality (y). The Prize Court is a Court determining cases jure belli; and jus belli is to be determined by the law of nations, and not by the particular municipal law of any country (z). The commission, under which the Admiralty acts, requires it to proceed according to the course of the Admiralty and the law of nations; and Courts of Prize are governed in all countries by the same law equally known to each (a). So far from the king in council being able to alter the unwritten law of the Prize Court, such power is not even possessed by parliament. Neither a British act of parliament, nor any commission founded thereon, can affect any rights or interests of foreigners, unless they are founded on principles, and impose regulations, that are consistent with the law of nations. That is the only law that Great Britain can apply to them; and the generality of any terms employed in any act of Parliament must be narrowed in construction by a religious adherence thereto (b). The rules, on which the

(x) The Recovery, 6 Rob. 340.
(y) The Maria, 1 Rob. 349.
(z) Le Caux v. Eden, 2 Doug. 607.
(a) Lindo v. Rodney, 2 Doug. 613.
(b) Le Louis, 2 Dod. 238.

Courts of Admiralty profess to proceed, says Lord Kenyon, are the law of nations, and such treaties as particular states have agreed shall be engrafted on that law; and I concur with Lord Mansfield in opinion, that it is not competent to one nation to add to the law of nations by its own arbitrary ordinances without the concurrence of other nations (c).

The same character of illegality seems to attach to the interruption of the trade of the neutral port of Hamburgh by the blockade of the Elbe, imposed for the purpose of distressing the enemy in the interior. Sir William Scott contents himself with the remark, that all the general consequences of such a blockade must be supposed to have been considered by the government imposing it; and that, when the measure was once applied, the Court was under the necessity of enforcing it on the only principles, on which any blockade ever has been or ever can be established (d). This answer would be conclusive, if the Court of Admiralty were the municipal Court of an absolute sovereign, and bound to obey the orders of his government. Sir William Scott does not explain, how such a measure could be lawfully applied by the government, or lawfully enforced by the Court. It is no answer to say that the blockade was imposed on the enemy in the interior, and that it was only incidentally and by unavoidable consequence that the trade of the neutral neighbourhood was made subject. to it. Neutrals must submit to whatever inconvenience arises from the right of a belligerent to blockade the ports of his enemy; but a belligerent has no right to blockade neutral ports. A state has no right to make regulations for its own convenience, which cannot be enforced without trespassing on the rights of others (e).

Secondly, of notice.

Notice is of two kinds, constructive and actual. Constructive notice is, where notification has been

(c) Pollard v. Bell, 8 T. R. 437.

(d) The Spes, 5 Rob. 77.

(e) Le Louis, 2 Dod. 254.

made to official persons; in which case a presumption of law arises, that it has been communicated to all persons, to whom it ought to have been communicated in the course of official duty. Thus, where it was said, that no intelligence of a blockade had been received from the consul of the state of Hamburgh; the Court held, that it must be presumed, because communication having been made to the consul here, it was his duty to make the communication to the consuls of his government in foreign ports. And as the information had arrived at Hamburgh by private channels, the same communication must be presumed to have been made from public authority to the public minister; and if there had been any neglect, the consequence must be imputed only to the state and its officers, who are answerable to its subjects for the consequences of such neglect (f). The effect of a notification to any foreign government is to include all the individuals of that nation. It would be the most nugatory thing in the world, if individuals were allowed to plead their ignorance of it. It is the duty of foreign governments to communicate the information to their subjects, whose rights they are bound to protect. A neutral master can never be heard to aver against a notification of blockade, that he is ignorant of it. If he is really ignorant of it, it may be a subject of representation to his own government, and may raise a claim of compensation from them, but it can be no plea in the court of a belligerent (g). It is the duty of a government, having received public notification, to communicate it to their subjects in foreign ports (h). But the presumption does not arise, till a reasonable time has elapsed for the purpose of making the communication. Thus, when the notification was made known to the Prussian Consul at Amsterdam, on the 12th of April, it was held to be constructively known to a Prussian subject at Rotterdam, on the (f) The Spes and Irene, 5 Rob. 79.

(g) The Neptunus, 2 Rob. 110.

(h) The Welvaart Van Pillaw, 2 Rob. 128.

15th (). When notification of the blockade of Amsterdam was given in London on the 11th of June, the Court strongly inclined to hold, that it must have been known in Lisbon on the 10th of July (k), and held it to be known in Charleston before October, but not so soon as the 8th of September (1). When a ship sailed from Lisbon, at a time when the notification must be taken to have been known, and sailed again from Saffee six months afterwards, it was held, that the blockade must be taken to have been known at Saffee at the time of her sailing (m). When a Danish ship had sailed from Rotterdam on the 28th of March, and the blockade had been notified to foreign ministers in London on the 21st, it was held, that a week was not a suffcient time to affect the parties with a legal knowledge of the blockade (n).

In the case of conterminous waters, a notification will not reach those parts, which are in the possession of neutrals. Thus, in the case of the blockade of Amsterdam, the Court was inclined to hold generally, that all sea passages to Amsterdam, by that great body of waters, the Zuyder Zee, were blockaded, supposing those passages to be in the possession of the enemy. Such as were in the possession of neutrals, it was of opinion, were not included; unless the blockading force could be applied to the interior extremity of their communication (o). Neither, in such case, will a notification of the blockade of the ports of one country, extend even to a hostile port, though itself liable to be blockaded. Thus, the notification of the blockade of the ports of Holland was held not to extend to Antwerp, though the Scheldt was blockaded: and it was urged that the Scheldt was a close

(i) The Calypso, 2 Rob. 298.
(k) The Neptunus, 3 Rob. 175.
(1) The Adelaide, 3 Rob. 285.
(m) The Hartige Hane, 3 Rob. 329.
(n) The Jonge Petronella, 2 Rob. 131.
(0) The Twee Gebroeders, 3 Rob. 336.

river. The Court held, that the Scheldt is not within the Dutch territory, but rather a conterminous river, dividing Holland from the adjacent country. Though by treaties with the Dutch, made in favour of the Dutch, we have considered the Scheldt as shut up, and appropriated to the use of Holland: yet these treaties being extinguished by war with Holland, it would be too much to say, that it is to be regarded as standing upon that footing, particularly for the purpose of a blockade; which is to act upon the interest of other states, who might be no parties to those treaties, even when they did exist. If the government had notified in express terms, that the blockade was to include the Scheldt, which they might certainly have done, (for it was just as lawful to blockade the ports of Flanders as those of Holland), the Court would have enforced the rule so prescribed; but no such signification having been made, it held, that the Scheldt was not necessarily included in the blockade of Holland (p).

Actual notice is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, shewing the knowledge of the party to be affected with it. Thus, where it was argued, that by the American treaty, there must be a previous warning; it was held, that where ships sail without actual knowledge of the blockade, a notice is necessary, but if you can affect them with a knowledge of that fact, a warning then becomes an idle ceremony, of no use, and therefore not to be required. When the master, the consignees, and all persons intrusted with the management of the vessel, appear to have been sufficiently informed of the blockade, they are not in the situation which the treaty supposes (q). So when notice was sent to the governor of the place invested, and he informed all the foreign ship(p) The Fran Ilsabe, 4 Rob. 63.

(q) The Columbia, 1 Rob. 156. Treaty of 1795, Article XVIII. And whereas it frequently happens, that vessels sail for a port or place belonging to the enemy, without knowing that the same is either besieged, blockaded, or invested; it is agreed, that every vessel so circumstanced may be turned away from such port, &c. Martens Tr. vi. 370.

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