ADDRESS of General Bolivar to Congress, communicating the Project of a Constitution for the Republick of Bolivia. 25th May, 1826.

To the Constituent Congress of Bolivia.

(Translation.)

LEGISLATORS!-In submitting to you the Project of a Constitution for Bolivia, I feel overwhelmed with confusion and timidity, being convinced of my incapacity to frame Laws. When I consider that the wisdom of whole Centuries is insufficient to draw up a Fundamental Law with perfection, and that the most enlightened Legislator is the immediate cause of human infecility, and, if I may so express myself, a mockery of his divine ministry; what will be said of a Soldier born amongst Slaves, and buried in the Deserts of his Country-having seen nothing but Captives in chains, and Companions in arms to break them?-I, a Legislator!-Your liability to be deceived, and mine to commit myself, are disputing, as it were, for precedence. I know not which may suffer most in this tremendous conflict; whether it be your lot, on account of the evils you have to apprehend from the Laws you solicit me to enact; or my own, on account of the opprobrium to which your confidence exposes me.

I have employed all the powers of my mind, for the purpose of submitting to you my opinions respecting the best method of governing Freemen, according to the principles adopted amongst Civilized Nations; the lessons of experience, however, exhibit only long periods of disasters, interrupted by occasional good fortune. What guides can we follow in the shade of such obscure examples?

Legislators! Your duty calls upon you to resist the shock of two monstrous Enemies, which are constantly contending with each other, and will both attack us at the same time. Tyranny and Anarchy form an immense Ocean of Oppression, rolling round a small Island of Liberty, perpetually beaten by the violence of the waves and of the hurricanes which threaten its immediate submersion. Such is the Sea which we have to navigate in a frail bark, with such an inexperienced Pilot.

The Project of the Constitution of Bolivia is divided into Four Political Powers, an additional one having been added, without thereby complicating the Classical Division of either of the others. The Electoral Power has received certain Attributes which are not allotted to it by other Governments which consider themselves amongst the most liberal. These attributes greatly resemble those of the Federal System. It has appeared to me not only convenient and useful, but also practicable, to grant to the immediate Representatives of the People the privileges which are most desirable to the Citizens of each Department, Province, and Canton. No object is of greater importance to a Citizen than the election of his Legislators, Magistrates, Judges, and [1825-26.] 3 K

Pastors. The Electoral Colleges of every Province represent the wants and interests thereof, and are the medium of complaint of the infringement of the Laws, and of the misconduct of Magistrates. I may venture to say, with some confidence, that this branch participates in the Rights which are enjoyed by the different Governments of Federal States. By this means a new counterpoise is put into the scale against the Executive Power, and the Government acquires fresh guarantees, more popularity, and additional grounds of preference over those of the most Democratical States.

Every ten Citizens name an Elector; and the Nation is therefore represented by one-tenth of its Citizens. Nothing is required but capacity; they need not possess Estates, to enable them to exercise the august functions of sovereignty; but they must be able to write their Votes, to sign their Names, and to read the Laws. They must profess some science, or art, which secures them an honest livelihood. Nothing will exclude them but vice, idleness, and absolute ignorance. Knowledge and honesty, not money, are the requisites for exercising Political Power.

The Legislative Body is so composed as necessarily to be harmonious in its different parts: it will never be found divided for want of an Arbitrating Judge, which frequently happens where there are only two Chambers. There being Three here provided, any disagreement between two of them is decided by the intervention of the third; and a question, investigated and examined by two contending Parties, finds a third impartial one to settle it; by this means no useful Law is put aside, or until it has undergone one, two, or three votings prior to its rejection. In all matters of business between two contending Parties, a third is named to decide; and would it not be absurd that, in the most important interests of Society, such a provision, dictated by imperious necessity, should be disregarded? The Chambers will thus possess, towards each other, those considerations which are indispensable for the preservation of the union of the whole, which ought to deliberate dispassionately, and in the calmness of wisdom. Modern Congresses, I shall be told, are composed of only two Bodies. It is because, in England, which Country has been taken as a model, the Nobility and the People are represented in two Houses; and if the same course has been followed in North America, where there is no Nobility, we must suppose that the habit of living under the English Government induced the imitation. The fact is, that two deliberative Bodies must be in perpetual conflict; and for this reason Sieyes proposed to have only one. Strange Absurdity!

The first Chamber is that of Tribunes, which is privileged to originate Laws respecting the Revenue, Peace and War. This Body has the immediate inspection of those branches which the Executive administers with the least intervention of the Legislature.

The Senators frame the Ecclesiastical Codes and Regulations, and watch over the Tribunals and Divine Worship, It belongs to the Senate to choose the Prefects, Judges of District, Governors, Corregidors, and all the Subalterns of the Judicial Department. It proposes to the Chamber of Censors, the Members of the Supreme Tribunal, the Archbishops, Bishops, Dignitaries of the Church, and Canons. Whatever relates to Religion and the Laws falls under the cognizance of the Senate.

The Censors exercise a political and moral power, bearing some resemblance to the Areopagus of Athens, and the Censors of Rome, They are a sort of Fiscals on the Government, to watch over the religious observance of the Constitution and Publick Treaties. I have placed under their protection the National Jury, which is to decide on the good or bad administration of the Executive.

The Censors are charged with the protection of Morality, the Arts and Sciences, Instruction, and the Press. The most terrible as well as the most august functions belong to the Censors. They condemn to perpetual opprobium, the Usurpers of Sovereign Authority, and distinguished Criminals. They bestow publick honours for the services and virtues of illustrious Citizens. The application of glory is confided to their hands; the Censors therefore must be Men of the most unsullied reputation and unblemished life. If they err they will be accused, even for the slighest Offences. To these Priests of the Laws is the preservation of our sacred Tables intrusted; and they are bound to denounce the Profaners thereof.

The President of the Republick is, in our Constitution, like the Sun, which, firm in its centre, gives life to the Universe. This Supreme Authority should be perpetual; for in Systems that have no Hierarchy, it is more necessary than in others, that there should be a fixed Point, around which the Magistrates and Citizens, as well men as things, should revolve. "Give me a fixed Point," said one of the Ancients, "and I will move the World." To Bolivia, a President for life will serve for such a fixed Point. He is the support of the whole System, without taking any active share in it. His head has been severed, in order that his intentions may not create alarm, and his hands have been tied, that he may injure no one.

The President of Bolivia exercises the powers of the American Executive, but under restrictions favourable to the People. His continuance in Office is similar to that of the President of Hayti. I have chosen for Bolivia the Executive of the most Democratic Republick in the World.

The Island of Hayti (if I may be allowed this digression) was in a continual state of insurrection: after having tired an Empire, a Kingdom, and a Republick, every species of Government known, and others beside,

she found herself under the necessity of having resource to the illustrious Petion to save her. Confidence was placed in him, and the destinies of Hayti vacillated no longer. Petion was appointed President for life, with the power to select his Successor; after which, neither the death of this great Man, nor the succession of a new President, caused the slightest commotion in the State. Under the worthy Boyer, everything has gone on with the tranquillity and calmness of a Legitimate Reign-a triumphant proof that a President for life, with power to choose his Successor, is the most sublime inspiration of the Republican System.

The President of Bolivia will be less dangerous than that of Hayti, inasmuch as the mode of succession is better secured for the welfare of the State. The President of Bolivia is, moreover, deprived of every species of influence. He does not nominate the Magistrates, or the Judges, nor the Ecclesiastical Dignitaries, however subordinate they may be. This diminution of power has hitherto not been submitted to by any well-established Government: the possession of such power places obstacle after obstacle in the way of the Authority of a Chief, which must ever arise amongst a People under the influence of those who exercise the most important functions of Society. The Priests have the controul over the consciences, the Judges over property, honour, and life, and the Magistrates over all publick acts. As these owe their dignities, glory and fortune, to the People, the President could never hope to engage them in any ambitious views of his own. If to this consideration we add that which naturally flows from the constant opposition which exists in a Democratic Government at every step of its administration, we may assume it as certain, that the usurpation of Publick Authority will be farther removed from this Government than from any other.

Legislators! From this day forward Liberty will be indestructible in America. The uncultivated aspect of this Continent is of itself sufficient to repel the idea of a Monarchical form of Government. Deserts are suitable to Independence. Here we have neither Grandees in Nobility, nor High Dignitaries in the Church. Our wealth was almost annihilated, and it is now not much better. The Church still possesses influence; but it is far from aspiring to dominion, being satisfied with its own preservation. Without such supports, tyranny can never be permanent; and if some ambitious Men should attempt to raise Empires, the fate of Dessalines, Christophe, and Iturbide, will point out to them what they have to expect. No power is found to be so difficult of maintaining itself as that of a New Prince. Bonaparte, who vanquished so many Armies, was unable to triumph over this rule, which is stronger than Empires. And if the great Napoleon could not succeed in sustaining himself against a league of Republicans and Aristocrats, who shall hope to found Monarchies

in America, in a soil illumined by the brilliant flame of Liberty, which consumes the materials used for erecting such regal scaffolds? No, Legislators!-fear not any Pretenders to Crowns. They will prove to their heads what the suspended sword was over the head of Dionysius. These flaming Princes, who are blind enough to erect thrones on the ruins of Liberty, are erecting tombs for their own ashes, to inform future Generations how they preferred their insane ambition to liberty and glory.

The Constitutional Authority of the President of Bolivia is the most restricted of any that is known: he merely nominates the Officers of the Revenue, of Peace and War: he commands the Army. These are his functions.

The Administration belongs wholly to the Ministry, which is responsible to the Censors, and subject to the zealous vigilance of all the Legislators, Magistrates, Judges, and Citizens. The Officers of the Customs, and the Soldiers, the only Agents of this Ministry, are, indeed, not the most likely to gain the popular favour; and thus its influence is reduced to nothing.

The Vice-President is the Magistrate whose hands are most fettered of those who are in command: he has to obey both the Legislative and Executive branches of a Republican Government. He receives Laws from the former and Orders from the latter; and between these two barriers he has to proceed in a difficult path, surrounded with precipices. Notwithstanding these inconveniences, this mode of governing is preferable to that of an absolute Authority. These Constitutional barriers strengthen his political conscience, and afford him the firm hope of being enabled to obtain the light which is to guide him amidst the rocks whch surround him: they serve as a support against the impulse of his passions, moving in concert with the interest of others.

In the Government of The United States, the practice of naming the first Minister as Successor to the President, has been latterly observed. Nothing can be more suitable to a Republick than this custom; as it has the advantage of putting at the head of the Administration a Man experienced in the management of the State. When he enters upon the exercise of his functions, he goes prepared, and is accompanied by the popular voice, and by a practical experience. I have availed myself of this idea, and have established it as a Law.

The President of the Republick names, the Vice-President for the administration of the State, and for succeeding him in the command. By this foresight, those elections are avoided which so often produce that scourge of Republicks-Anarchy--the delight of tyranny, and the most immediate and most terrible danger which threatens popular Governments. You see by this mode, the most tremendous crisis passes over in Republicks as it does in Legitimate Reigns.