PUBLICATIONS NOTICED AND REVIEWED. ATKINSON, E. Cheap Cotton by Free Labor. (E. Atkinson.) CANNAN, E. Production and Distribution. (F. A. Fetter.) (A. T. H.) Page. 155, 157 148 & ss. COHN, G. Nationalökonomie des Handels und des Verkehrswesens. DAVIDSON, J. Bargain Theory of Wages. DESTRÉE, J. & VANDERVELDE, E. Socialisme en Belgique. (W. F. B.) The Federalist, edited by P. L. Ford. (C. H. Smith.) Gage Bill: Dec. 16, 1897. (A. L. Ripley.) GARDINER, S. R. History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate. GEORGE, HENRY. Political Economy. (A. T. H.) GODKIN, E. L. Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy. (N. T. Bacon.) Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften, Suppl. Bd. II. (H. W. F.) Social Spirit in America. (Note.) HOBBES, Ethics of, edited by E. H. Sneath. (W. F. B.) HOOYKAAS, Reportorium op de Koloniale Litteratur. (Comment.) 351 LEVASSEUR, E. L'Ouvrier Américain. (H. W. F.). 354 NOYES, A. D. Thirty Years of American Finance. (J. C. S.) PANTALEONI, M. Différences d'opinions des économistes. (Note.) (W. I. Lowe.) ROUSIERS, PAUL DE. Trusts. (W. B. Bailey.) RICHARDSON, O. H. National Movement in the Reign of Henry III. WARD, L. F. Outlines of Sociology. (Note.) WAXWEILER. Participation aux bénéfices. (N. P. Gilman.) Gilman.) YULE'S Theory of Correlation. (Note.) ZENKER, E. V. Anarchism. (W. F.B.) 103 108 THE YALE REVIEW. MAY, 1898. COMMENT. European Opinion on the War; Financial Possibilities and Perils; SIN INCE the publication of our last number, the war with Spain, which seemed then a remote possibility, has actually begun. Any discussion of its justification, or any rehearsal of the long series of events which finally led to the rupture, would now have an historical interest only. But the attitude of European nations towards it may affect both the course of the war and the conditions of peace and has therefore a practical bearing upon current events. The general tone of English public opinion is as pleasant as it is surprising. The English press as a body credits us with humane motives, and holds that we are within our rights in waging war. Not that this view is unanimous. The sections of the press and the public which were most bitter against the north in the days of secession, now favor the cause of Spain. Aristocratic organs like the Morning Post or the St. James's Gazette still "prefer Castile to Connecticut," the appearance of self-respect to the reality. Ultra-Conservative journals in the north of England, which regarded the civil war as a tariff squabble, still scout the idea that considerations of humanity have any weight in the actual conduct of affairs. But these people no longer represent English public opinion. A generation ago, those who sympathized with American national aspirations hardly had a foothold in English society; now they domi nate it. For perhaps the first time in a great crisis, the London Times is with us. Part of this change is perhaps due to international conditions. England feels herself without an ally in Europe, and is correspondingly anxious for coöperation in America-just as she was in Canning's day. But a larger part is due to the increasing democratization of English public sentiment. In the contest between democracy and flunkeyism, the influence of men like Mill and Bright has finally won a victory. In Germany, on the other hand, the course of events has been the reverse of that which has prevailed in England; and Germany's attitude to us has become less friendly instead of more so. The German spirit is far less democratic than it was a generation ago; and this movement of German thought has led German public opinion, such as it is, to sympathize with the divine right of other kings besides the German Emperor; to support the Turk in his dealings with the Armenian and the Cretan, to condone the oppressions of the Spaniard in Cuba and make light of attempts to remedy them. Add to this the fact that Germany has become a trading and money-making country, and is brought into keener commercial rivalry with America, and there is no wonder the German press and public, with scarcely an exception, are quite ready to accept a distorted version of facts and motives. It might at first sight seem as though France with her change from an imperial to a republican form of government, would be less hostile to us as a nation than she was in the Civil War. But, in the first place, France is not a republic in the sense in which that name is applied to the United States. France, it is true, has no king; but her administration is bureaucratic to the last degree. The Zola trial may serve as an instance of the remoteness of modern France from liberal ideas as understood by English-speaking peoples. In the next place, the Americans whom the French have seen in Paris have not always been the most favorable specimens of what our country can produce. We are thought by the large section of the Parisian public which takes the Figaro for its gospel, to be a nation of nouveaux riches, spoiled children of fortune, quick to ape the vices of Paris, and incapable of appreciating its virtues. Finally-and this counts for most of all-France regards herself as the leader and champion of the Latin civilization against the Saxon. France is interested in supporting the credit of Spain, not only financially but morally. The more England and America draw together, the more does France draw apart from both. France and England have for centuries represented two kinds of morality so different that each has at times been prone to deny all morality to the other. Most Frenchmen find it difficult to believe that our sympathy for Cuba is more than a pretense under which to cloak our greed of pelf. There will be one way to prove them wrong; that way is, to decline to annex territory as the result of the war. If we do this, we shall furnish an object lesson in international morality which will be worth many times what the war costs. If we do this, we shall gain the respect of other nations for our motives; and shall give, to any Anglo-American coalition which the future may have in store, a standing and influence greater than that which belongs to its physical power alone. Of such a coalition the circumstances which have thus far attended the conduct of the war bear no little promise. We may hope that, as the result of these disturbances, we can secure a permanently better feeling toward nations like England, which understand us; and increased respect for our disinterestedness on the part of other nations which do not understand us so well. These are ends in whose pursuit men of all parties and opinions can coöperate. Not the least important of the national problems which the war has crowded upon us is that of ways and means. This is not because any danger exists of lack of funds, but because of the effect for good or for evil which our financial measures must leave behind them. If, as the Senate Finance Committee recommend, greenbacks and "coining the seigniorage" are substituted for bonds, the dangerous precedent, established in the civil war, of issuing government currency in time of financial |