CONTINGENT. (See also the titles ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, vol. 3, p. 440; CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE, vol. 5, p. 824; ESTATES; LEGACIES AND DEVISES; REMAINDERS AND EXECUTORY INTERESTS; USES; WILLS.) — The word "contingent" when applied to a use, remainder, devise, bequest, or other legal right or interest, implies that no present interest exists, and that whether such interest or right ever will exist, depends upon a future uncertain event. The legal definition of the word concurs with its ordinary acceptation in showing that the term "contingent " implies a possibility.1 CONTINUANCE. See ENCYC. OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE, titles ADJOURNMENT, vol. 1, p. 238; CONTINUANCES, vol. 4, p. 822. CONTINUE, CONTINUOUS, ETC.- To "continue means to remain in a given place or condition; to remain in connection with; to abide; to stay.2 1. Jemison v. Blowers, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 692. And it was there held that the term contingent demand was inapplicable where a present claim existed, or where it was certain to arise in future; and is only applicable where there is no claim in præsenti and where it is uncertain whether in fact any will ever arise. In Law a remainder which depends upon an uncertainty is a contingent remainder, and so an expense which depends upon some future uncertain event is a contingent expense. People v. Yonkers, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 272. an Bankruptcy Contingent Liability. (See also the title INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY.)Under the United States Bankrupt Act of 1867 the only contingent liabilities allowed to be proved were those contracted by the bankrupt. A contingent liability contracted by a bankrupt, in its legal signification, means obligation of the bankrupt arising from his contract; the duty to perform which is dependent, as to when or whether the obligation shall become absolute, upon the occurrence of an event the happening of which is a matter of some uncertainty. Heywood v. Shreve, 44 N. J. L. 104. The Maine statute of 1878 contained the same provision. A contract given by one partner to another to assume all the debts of the firm, and save him harmless therefrom, is not such a claim as may be proved against the estate of the obligor in insolvency until there has been a breach. It is not a contingent debt not a contingent liability, for until the breach there is no liability. The contingency is whether there ever will be a debt or liability. A contingency, depending upon a breach of a contract by one of the parties, is not such as is required under the insolvent law to make a contingent debt or liability. Fernald v. Johnson, 71 Me. 437. See also Greene v. Dyer, 32 Me. 460; Woodard 7. Herbert, 24 Me. 358. In Zimmer 2. Schleehauf, 115 Mass. 52, it was held that a liability for tort was not within the statute. other is not an agreement to maintain it there. The court said: "It was rather faintly pressed that the proposition in the Act of the 16th of March, 1831, to the city, to engage to construct and continue the railroad from the intersection of Vine and Broad streets, down Broad to Cedar street, and accepted, was as an agreement to maintain it there. This is a position which is not at all maintainable. In the collocation of the words used, continue so obviously means to extend, that argument is not required to refute the position. See Webst. Dict., ad verb. continue.' Philadelphia v. Philadelphia, etc., R. Co., 58 Pa. St. 263. Continued Notice. (See also the title NOTICE.) - In Matter of Smith, 1 Ashm. (Pa.) 354, it was held that a continued notice in a daily newspaper did not necessarily mean a daily continuance. Continued Drunkenness - Divorce. (See also the titles DIVORCE; HABITUAL DRUNKARD.) — A statute provided that a divorce should be granted for continued drunkenness. The court said: "The words 'continued drunkenness are used in their ordinary sense in our statutes, and signify gross and confirmed habits of intoxication." Gourlay v. Gourlay, 16 R. I. 705. Continuous. (See also CONSTANT, vol. 6, p. 880.)- Continuous use means a use which is constant and uninterrupted. Suffield v. Brown, 4 De G. J. & S. 199. Continuous Injury. · By the term “continuous injury" (as a ground for an injunction), is not meant never ceasing, but recurring at repeated intervals, so as to be of repeated occurrence, and so as to be of the same sort of damnification to the plaintiff as an actual continuous mischief would be. Wood v. Sutcliffe, 8 Eng. L. & Eq. 220. See also the title INJUNCTIONS. Continuous Line. In Black . Delaware, etc., Canal Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 130, it was held that two railroads form a continuous line when their tracks and rails join so that a train may pass from the tracks and rails of the one directly upon that of the other; they form a "connected" line when this can be done by means of an intervening or connecting road. Perpetual in the Sense of Continuous. - Fairchild. Masonic Hall Assoc., 71 Mo. 530. And see PERPETUAL. Continuous Services. (See also the title MILITARY LAW.) — Where a naval officer 1esigned his commission one day and upon the next was appointed to a higher office, it was held Volume VII. CONTINUOUS EASEMENT. - See the title EASEMENTS. CONTRA. Contra is a Latin adverb and preposition meaning against, over against, opposite, in front of. In introducing a legal citation it means "to the contrary." 1 CONTRABAND OF WAR. (See the titles INTERNATIONAL LAW; WAR.)— Articles of commerce which neutrals are prohibited from furnishing to either one of the belligerents, for the reason that by so doing injury is done to the other belligerent.2 some Continuous Open Current Account. (See also the title LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.) It was provided that the statute of limitations should begin to run only from the date of the last item of a continuous open current account. The court thus construed the phrase continuous open current account:" "An account, to be continuous, must be without break or interruption; by the term 'open' we mean thing that is not closed; and the term 'current,' as used in the statute, signifies ' running,' 'passing,' a connected series.' See Webster's Unabridged Dictionary. Hence a continuous open current account is an account which is not interrupted or broken, not closed by settlement or otherwise, and is a running, connected series of transactions." Tucker v. Quimby, 37 Iowa 19. Continuous Passage. (See also the title TICKETS AND FARES.) The purchaser of a "train check" issued to another person upon a limited ticket and expressed to be good only for a continuous passage, is not entitled to subsequently pursue the journey begun by the purchaser of the ticket, though the check be offered for passage within the time limited thereon. The court said: "Then, as to the instruction which the court gave of its own motion, it is self-contradictory. It tells the jury that the check was valid for one continuous passage, and yet it tells them that two men can ride on it, one succeeding the other at a point on the line of continuous passage. In other words, it makes the words continuous passage,' on the face of the check, refer to a continuous passage of the defendant's trains, or of the check, and not to a continuous passage of the passenger to whom it is issued. This, we take it, is not the meaning of the words. Af * * The continuous passage referred to in the check is the continuous passage of the person to whom it was first issued, and of no other person; and this person cannot, without the consent of the carrier, introduce another person in his stead." Walker v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 15 Mo. App. 341. "Continuous Carriage" as Used in Interstate Commerce Act. This Act does not include or apply to all carriers engaged in interstate commerce, but only such as use a railway or a railway and water craft "under a common control, management, or arrangement" for a "continuous carriage or shipment" of property from one state to another; nor does it apply to the carriage of property by rail wholly within one state, although shipped from or destined to a place without the state, so that such place is not in a foreign country. Exp. Koehler, 30 Fed. Rep. 867. See also the title INTERSTATE COMMERCE. Continuing Guaranty. One who enters into what is called a "continuing guaranty" is one who undertakes to be responsible for moneys to be advanced or goods to be sold to another from time to time. Buck . Burk, 18 N. Y. 343. See also the title GUARANTY, New or Continuing Contract. (See also the title LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.) A statute provided that payment upon a contract should be evidence of a new or continuing contract. In Engmann . Immel, 59 Wis. 257, the court said that the word continuing as there used has its natural meaning of perpetuating, protracting, or prolonging from one time to another. Continuing Trustee. (See also the title TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.)- The words continuing trustee apply to a person who continues to act in a trust together with trustees or a trustee newly appointed, and not to a person who is not to continue to be a trustee after new trustees are appointed, but who ceases to be a trustee at the moment they are appointed. In re Coates, 34 Ch. Div. 376. See also In re Glenny, 25 Ch. Div. 611; Travis v. Illingworth, 2 Dr. & Sm. 344; In re Norris, 27 Ch. Div. 333; Nicholson v. Wright, 5 W. R. 431, 26 L. J. Ch. 312; Pell v. De Winton, 2 De G. & J. 13. Continuation of Damages. - In Brown ข. Grand Trunk R. Co., 24 U. C. Q. B. 350, it is said that several unconnected acts of damage, each complete in itself and unconnected with any other, will not constitute a continuation of damages. Continuance. See NON-CONTINUANCE. CONTRACT LABOR LAW. I. INTRODUCTORY, 83. 1. Meaning of Term, 83. II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE, 84. III. WHO ARE EXCLUDED, 84. 1. Statute Affects Only Alien Immigrants, 84. 2. Character of Occupation Followed, 84. a. Generally, 84. b. Occupations and Persons Excepted by Statute, 85. IV. PENALTY FOR ASSISTING PROHIBITED IMMIGRANTS, 86. 1. When Penalty Recoverable, 86. 2. Jurisdiction of Actions for Penalty, 86. 3. Nature of Action for Penalty, 87. V. EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION OF PROHIBITED IMMIGRAnts, 87 CROSS-REFERENCES. For other matters of SUBSTANTIVE LAW and EVIDENCE related to this subject, see the titles: ALIENS, vol. 2, p. 64; CHINESE EXCLUSION ACTS, vol. 5, P. 101; IMMIGRATION; UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS; UNITED STATES COURTS. I. INTRODUCTORY 1. Meaning of Term. The name "Contract Labor Law” is generally applied to the Act of Congress of Feb. 26, 1885, entitled “An act to prohibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States, its territories, and the District of Columbia." 2. Outline of Statute. The main provisions of the Act are, first, that the prepayment of transportation, or the assistance or encouragement of the migration, of aliens or foreigners under contracts to labor in the United States is unlawful; second, that such contracts made previous to their migration are void; third, that every person or corporation guilty of unlawfully assisting or encouraging the immigration of such laborers is subject to a penalty; fourth, that the master of any vessel knowingly bringing such laborers into the country is to be deemed guilty of a msidemeanor. This statute has been supplemented by several subsequent enactments providing, among other things, for the inspection of vessels bringing passengers to the United States; for preventing the landing of aliens included in the prohibition of the Act, and enforcing their return if they have actually landed; forbidding, under the penalty of the original Act, the encouragement of immigration by circulating in foreign countries advertisements containing promises of employment, and forbidding owners of vessels, either directly or by their agents, to solicit immigration, except by ordinary commercial advertising; and enlarging the penal provision of the original Act so as to render not only masters of vessels but all others who assist in bringing prohibited aliens into the country guilty of misdemeanor. 1. 23 U. S. Stat. at Large 332; 1 Supp. U. S. Rev. Stat. (2d ed.) 479. 2. 24 U. S. Stat. at Large 414, 1 Supp. U. S. Rev. Stat. (2d ed.) 541; 25 U. S. Stat. at Large 565, I Supp. U. S. Rev. Stat. (2d ed.) 633; 26 3. History of Statute. Previous to the passage of the Act of 1885 it had become the practice for large capitalists in the United States to contract with their agents abroad for the shipment of great numbers of an ignorant, servile class of foreign laborers, under contract by which the employer agreed upon the one hand to prepay their passage, while on the other hand the laborers agreed to work after their arrival for a certain time at a low rate of wages. The effect of this was to break down the labor market, and to reduce other laborers engaged in like occupations to the level of the assisted immigrant. This evil finally became so flagrant that the "Contract Labor Law" was, under the influence of the trade-unions and labor associations, introduced into Congress and passed, with the design of protecting the interests of the laboring class; of raising the standard of foreign immigrants; and of discontinuing the migration of those who had not sufficient means to pay for their own passage.' II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE. The Act of 1885 and the legislation supplementary to it are constitutional as valid exercises by Congress of the power to regulate commerce, and of the power inherent in sovereignty to forbid the entrance of foreigners, or to regulate their admission as it may see fit, which power is vested in the United States in the national government.3 III. WHO ARE EXCLUDED 1. Statute Affects Only Alien Immigrants. — The statutes regulating the exclusion of contract laborers are directed only against alien immigrants, and consequently alien residents when returning after a temporary absence in a foreign country are not within the purview of the acts, and cannot be excluded.4 2. Character of Occupation Followed a. GENERALLY. The statute has been held by the United States Supreme Court to be directed solely against the importation of unskilled cheap labor, and it is therefore to be construed as limited to cases where the assisted immigrant is brought into the country 1. The object and history of this legislation is fully examined in U. S. v. Craig, 28 Fed. Rep. 795; U. S. v. Holy Trinity Church, 36 Fed. Rep. 303, 143 U. S. 457; U. S. v. Laws, 163 U. S. 258; U. S. v. Gay, 80 Fed. Rep. 254. 2. In U. S. v. Craig, 28 Fed. Rep. 795, it was held that the Contract Labor Law of 1885 was an exercise by Congress of the right" to regulate commerce with foreign nations," within the scope of that power as determined in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1; Smith v. Turner, 7 How. (U. S.) 283, and subsequent decisions. To the same effect see In re Florio, 43 Fed. Rep. 114. 3. Ekiu v. U. S., 142 U. S. 659. See also the title CHINESE EXCLUSION ACTS, vol. v., p. 1102. In Lees v. U. S., 150 U. S. 476, Brewer, J., discussing the constitutionality of the Contract Labor Law, said: "This question was elaborately considered by Mr. Justice Brown, then a judge of the District Court, in U. S. v. Craig, 28 Fed. Rep. 795, and the conclusion reached that there was nothing in the Act conflicting with the Constitution. In Church of the Holy Trinity v. U. S., 143 U. S. 457, its constitutionality was assumed; and since the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U. S. 581, and the case of Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698, affirming fully the power of Congress over the exclusion of aliens, there can be little doubt in the matter. Given in Congress the absolute power to exclude aliens, it may exclude some and admit others, and the reasons for its discrimination are not open to challenge in the courts. Given the power to exclude, it has a right to make that exclusion effective by pun ishing those who assist in introducing, or attempting to introduce, aliens in violation of its prohibition. The importation of alien laborers, who are under previous contract to perform labor in the United States, is the act denounced, and the penalty is visited not upon the alien laborer - although by the amendment of February 23, 1887, 24 Stat. 414, c. 220, he is to be returned to the country from which he came but upon the party assisting in the importation. If Congress has power to exclude such laborers, as by the cases cited it unquestionably has, it has the power to punish any who assist in their introduction." 4. In re Panzara, 51 Fed. Rep. 275; In re Martorelli, 63 Fed. Rep. 437; In re Maiola, 67 Fed. Rep. 114. 5. U. S. v. Laws, 163 U. S. 258; Holy Trinity Church . U. S., 143 U. S. 457, reversing 36 Fed. Rep. 303. The last case was an action brought in the United States Circuit Court against the plaintiff in error to recover the penalty under the Act for the importation of an alien clergyman under a contract to enter into its service as rector and pastor. The United States Supreme Court, after a full examination of the spirit and intent of the statute, concluded that it was intended only to prevent the influx of cheap unskilled labor under contract; and applying the rule that a statute is to be construed according to its spirit and not according to its letter, where a literal construction would lead to absurd results, held that the importation of clergymen was not within the statute, and that the defendant was, therefore, not liable. under contract to perform manual labor or service. 1 b. OCCUPATIONS AND PERSONS EXCEPTED BY STATUTE. - Congress by specific enumeration in the Contract Labor Law and legislation amendatory thereof has declared that certain classes of persons performing labor or service shall not be affected by the provisions of the statute: thus Domestic Servants. The Statute of 1885 excepts from its provisions persons employed strictly as personal or domestic servants.2 Actors, Artists, Lecturers, and Singers. The provisions of the Act of 1885 do not apply to "professional actors, artists, lecturers, and singers. 3 Ministers, College Professors, etc. The Act of March 3, 1891, adds a further exception in favor of ministers of any religious denomination, persons belonging to any recognized profession, and professors for colleges and seminaries.4 Members of Family and Relatives of Residents. The Act of 1885 contained a proviso that it should not be construed to prohibit any individual from assisting any 1. U. S. v. Gay, 80 Fed. Rep. 254. In this case it was held that a declaration in an action to recover the penalty under the statutes, which failed to state the character of the labor or service which the immigrant was under contract to perform, failed to bring the case within the terms of the statute as construed by the United States Supreme Court in Holy Trinity Church v. U. S., 143 U. S. 457. "The court,' said Baker, D. J., cannot indulge the presumption that the labor or service which the immigrant was under contract to perform was manual, in the absence of such averment." 64 " 2. Act of Feb. 26, 1895, § 5; 1 Supp. U. S. Rev. Stat., 2d ed., 480. Under Coachman. In the case of In re Howard, 63 Fed. Rep 263, it was held that an alien employed as an under coachman," whose duties consisted in assisting to keep the stables, horses, and carriages of his employer in good order, in driving the horses when his employer, or any of his employer's family, went out in one of the carriages, and in accompanying on horseback the younger members of the family when horseback riding, was a domestic servant within the exception of the statute. The court said: "Apparently he has no other duties. He produces nothing. He does no work on the farm, or in the garden, or in the dairy, as in In re Cummings, 32 Fed. Rep. 75. Under the sole direction of Mr. Morton [his employer] and of Mr. Morton's family, he performs services which minister exclusively to their personal comfort and enjoyment. He lives at his employer's residence in Rhinecliff, boarding with the coachman in a small cottage of Mr. Morton's, immediately adjoining his coach house, and sleeps in a room over the coach house, where two of Mr. Morton's cooks also have their rooms. such proof as this, and there being no dispute here as to the facts, it seems entirely clear that relator is employed strictly as a personal or domestic servant.' - Upon Farm Servant or Dairyman. In the case of In re Cummings, 32 Fed. Rep. 75, it was held that an alien employed as a farm servant or dairyman, having charge of a herd of cattle, the surplus dairy products of the herd being sold on the market, was not a domestic servant within the exception of the statute. The court based its opinion upon the ground that his labor was devoted, in part at least, to the production of merchandise which competed with the product of others whose entire attention was given to manufacturing such products. 3. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, § 5; 1 Supp. U. S. Rev. Stat. (2d ed.) 480. Professional Artists. - A woman imported from Paris to perform labor or service as a trimmer of hats is not a professional artist,' within the meaning of the statute. U. S. v. Thompson, 41 Fed. Rep. 28. The court said: 'Milliners, dressmakers, tailors, cooks, and barbers (some of whom no doubt call themselves artists ') are not artists' within the popular and received import of that word." 4. Act of March 3, 1891, § 5, 1 Supp. U. S. Rev. Stat. (2d ed.) 935; Act of March 3, 1893, $ 6, 2 Supp. U. S. Rev. Stat. 118. Before the passage of this amendment it had been held that the prohibition of the Act of 1885 did not include a minister of a religious society. Holy Trinity Church v. U. S., 143 U. S. 457. See supra, this section. Person Belonging to Recognized ProfessionChemist. In U. S. 2. Laws, 163 U. S. 258, it was held that a contract made with an alien in a foreign country to come to the United States as a chemist on a sugar plantation in Louisiana, in pursuance of which contract such alien did come to this country, and was employed on the sugar plantation, his expenses being paid by the defendant, was not a contract :0 perform labor or service prohibited under the Contract Labor Law. The court, after adventing to the general purposes of the Act as not intended to embrace skilled labor, called attention to the fact that by the amendment of 1891, persons belonging to any recognized profession were excepted from its provisions, and said: "We think a chemist would be included in that class. Although the study of chemistry is the study of a science, yet a chemist who occupies himself in the practical use of his knowledge of chemistry as his services may be demanded, may certainly at this time be fairly regarded as in the practice of a profession. The fact that the individual in question by this contract had agreed to sell his time, labor, and skill to one employer, and in one prescribed branch of the science, does not in the least militate against his being a professional chemist; nor does it operate as a bar to the claim that while so employed he is nevertheless practicing a recognized profession." * ** |