it is within the power of the legislature to relieve such corporation from the forfeiture and to direct a discontinuance of a suit brought to recover the same, on the ground that the county had not acquired any separate interest in the money forfeited distinct from that of the state. Similarly it has been held that the legislature may release a penalty given by statute after a verdict therefor, but before a judgment in an action brought for the benefit of a county. And it has been held that the legislature is competent also to relieve from a forfeiture imposed by statute, where the money accrues to a county, even after a judgment has been recovered for the same.3 Direction to Make Restitution to Taxpayers. It has been held that the legislature has power to direct a restitution to taxpayers of a county, of property exacted from them by taxation, into whatever form the property may be changed, so long as it remains in the possession of the county. b. COUNTY INDEBTEDNESS Inability of Legislature to Create Indebtedness to Third Person. The legislature cannot, in general, by a mere legislative act, create an indebtedness from one county to another or to a third person. - Power to Direct Payment of Just Claim. But the legislature may direct the county authorities to allow just claims out of the public treasury, or may fix the amount and direct the means to be raised by taxation for the payment. Equitable Claims Invalid in Law. And where the claim against a county is invalid in law, but is equitable and just in itself, the legislature may give it legal effect." 5. Inability of Legislature to Create Indebtedness on Part of County. - Jackson County v. La Crosse County, 13 Wis. 490. 6. Power of Legislature to Direct Payment of Just Claim. Dennis v. Maynard, 15 Ill. 477. Restoration of Diverted Trust Funds. . Where a specific fund, given to a county by the legislature to be held in trust for certain purposes, was diverted from that purpose and mixed with the general funds of the county, it was held not to be error in the court to award a mandamus to compel such fund to be paid over to the persons entitled to it, and to direct an order to be drawn upon the general funds of the county in the treasury. Pike County v. People, in Ill. 202. 7. Direction to Pay Equitable Claims. Ritchie v. Franklin County, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 67; People v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343; Chapman v. Morris, 28 Cal. 393; Beals v. Amador County, 35 Cal. 624; Creighton v. San Francisco, 42 Cal. 446; Coles v. Washington County, 35 Minn. 124; Guilford v. Chenango County, 13 N. Y. 143; Lycoming County v. Union County, 15 Pa. St. 166, 53 Am. Dec. 575. See also Craft v. Lofinck, 34 Kan. 365. Thus it has been held to be competent for the legislature to provide a fund for the extinguishment of certain claims by the issuance of bonds in the name of a county and city, although the claims were without legal obligation, since they exceeded the limit fixed by the charter of the city, beyond which it was not permitted to create an indebtedness. People v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343. Reimbursement for Trial by County from Which Cause was Removed. - In Lycoming County v. Union County, 15 Pa. St. 166, 53 Am. Dec. 575, it was held that an act providing for the reimbursement to a county, by other counties from which certain causes had been removed for trial by virtue of a prior act, of a proper proportion of the expenses which had been incurred by the former county on account of said trials, was constitutional. Claim for Building Bridge. A bridge upon a public highway across a stream dividing two towns, having been swept away, was rebuilt under a contract made in good faith with the commissioners of highways of the two towns, and was used by the public. It was the duty, not of the towns, but of the county, to construct the bridge, but in an action against the county it was held not liable because it had not ordered the construction and the work was not done under its direction. Thereupon an act was passed (c. 156, Laws of 1872), entitled "An Act for the relief of C. and others," by which the board of supervisors of the county were authorized to adjust and audit the claims" of C. and others, to allow so much as the work was worth, not exceeding the contract price, and to cause the amount to be levied and collected upon the two towns, or upon the county, in their discretion. It was held that the act was mandatory, and not simply permissive to confer authority upon the board of supervisors to act or not in their discretion. People v. Livingston County, 68 N. Y. 114. - Claim of Counsel Assigned by Court to Defend Prisoner. - An act of the legislature authorized the board of supervisors of a county at its next annual session to audit and pay, as a county charge to the relator, the counsel assigned by the court to defend a prisoner Impairment of Obligation of Contracts. But the provision in the Federal Constitution, and in the state constitutions generally, prohibiting a state legislature from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, applies to contracts between a county and third persons.1 Thus it has been held that the repealing of an act which authorized the issuing by a county of bonds in aid of railroads in certain cases, does not affect the validity of bonds issued under a contract which was made and partly performed prior to the passage of the repealing act.2 2 Change of Mode of Payment. Also, it has been held that a creditor cannot be compelled to accept another and an essentially different mode of payment from that provided by his contract as determined by the laws existing at the time he became a creditor of the county, as where the legislature attempts to require the creditors of the county to surrender their evidences of indebtedness and accept new ones different in terms from the old.3 Revocation of Mere Gratuitous Concession. But where a claim against a county is not recoverable by action, or is not a public charge in virtue of any pre upon the charge of murder, the disbursements actually incurred by said counsel in conducting the defense of the prisoner. It was held that it was the duty of the defendant to audit and pay the relator's claim as if the words of the act had been imperative, and this though previous to the passage of the act there existed no legal liability on the part of the defendants which could be enforced by action or otherwise to pay the claim. People v. Erie County, Sheld. (N. Y.) 517. Restoration of Money Paid by Mistake. - By an act of the legislature, approved Oct. 14, 1856, the town of Bristol was detached from Jackson county and attached to the county of La Crosse. By another act of the next session, approved March 3, 1857, it was restored to Jackson county. But, in the meantime, the treasurer of that town had paid to the treasurer of La Crosse county the amount of state and county taxes collected in that town for the year 1856. In 1858 a further act was passed requiring the treasurer of La Crosse county to pay over to the treasurer of Jackson county the amount so received. It was held that the act of 1858 requiring the treasurer of La Crosse county to pay over to the treasurer of Jackson county the amount in question was constitutional. Jackson County v. La Crosse County, 13 Wis. 490. 1. Impairment of Obligation of Contracts United States. U. S. v. Miller County, 4 Dill. (U. S.) 233; Moultrie County v. Rockingham Ten-Cent Savings Bank, 92 U. S. 631; Ralls County Ct. v. U. S., 105 U. S. 733; Nelson v. Police Jury, III U. S. 716. Alabama. Slaughter v. Mobile County, 73 Ala. 134. California. - Nevada Bank v. Steinmitz, 64 Cal. 301. Florida. Fla. 451. Columbia County v. King, 13 Mississippi. - Beck v. Allen, 58 Miss. 143. New York. - People v. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 1, 17 Am. Rep. 178. - McCless v. Meekins, 117 ·Com. v. Allegheny County, v. Fond du Lac County, 16 People v. Williams, 8 Cal. 98; English v. Sacramento, 19 Cal. 172. And see the title IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. 2. Nevada Bank v. Steinmitz, 64 Cal. 301. See also Slaughter v. Mobile County, 73 Ala. 138. In the same way it has been held that subscriptions to railroad stock made in pursuance of a power granted by statute before the power was revoked remained binding after the abrogation of the power by the state constitution. Moultrie County v. Rockingham Ten-Cent Savings Bank, 92 U. S. 631. 3. Change of Mode of Payment under Original Contract. McCracken v. Moody, 33 Ark. 81; Rose v. Estudillo, 39 Cal. 270. But as to the power of the legislature to refuse in such case to provide funds by taxation unless new evidences of debt are accepted, see the title TAXATION. Transfer of Claim from General to Special Fund. Where a claim at the time of its accruing was an allowed claim, payable out of the general funds of the county by the then existing laws, it could not be made a charge against a special fund alone by a subsequent act of the legislature. Scruggs v. Underwood, 54 Ala. 186. Diversion of Fund Designated for the Payment of Certain Claims. Also, where a fund in the county treasury has been provided and designated by law for the payment of certain claims, creditors holding them have a vested interest in the fund of which the legislature cannot deprive them. Rose v. Estudillo, 39 Cal. 270; Youngs v. Hall, 9 Nev. 212. When Diversion of Fund Does Not Interfere with Prior Vested Right. But the payment of all ordinary claims against a county is subject to any specific appropriation and setting apart of the county revenues for any designated purpose, unless such appropriation interferes with some prior vested right to the revenue. Humboldt County v. Churchill County, 6 Nev. 30, in which case the court said: "The legislature undoubtedly has the power to direct that certain claims against the county shall have a preference over all others which are not so situated as to give the holder a vested right to money in, or to come into, the treasury, at the time of the legislative action." vious or existing laws, but is only founded in equity and justice, and is made a county charge by the legislature, the action of the legislature in such case does not vest a right in the claimant until the money is raised and actually paid over, when no condition is imposed upon the claimant, and nothing is done or required to be done by him as a consideration for the concession; and hence a repeal of the act operating merely as a revocation of a gratuitous concession is not within the constitutional inhibition against the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts.1 2 3. Over Remedies. As the remedy by suit against a county is given by the state, it may be withdrawn or denied at any time the legislature may think proper. But while the legislature may change the nature and the extent of the remedy by which a contract and the right of parties against a county may be enforced, it has been held that it cannot fully extinguish all existing remedy so as to leave no redress, for thereby the obligation of contracts would be impaired. 3 4. Validation of Void Acts. The legislature has power to validate or ratify the acts of a county and its officers that are not in violation of constitutional provisions, not only in the matter of irregularity in authorized proceedings, but even where the county has acted without any legislative authority whatever.5 4 COUNTING-HOUSE. A counting-house, according to the common understanding of mankind, is a part of a house devoted to purposes of commerce; a room or set of rooms appropriated by merchants, traders, and manufacturers to the business of keeping their books, accounts, letters, and papers. It therefore need not be an entire house. 6 COUNTRY. The term "country" in its primary meaning signifies place, and, in a larger sense, the territory or dominions occupied by a community, or even waste and unpeopled sections or regions of the earth; but its metaphorical meaning is no less definite and well understood; and in common parlance, in historical and geographical writings, in diplomacy, legislation, treaties, and 1. Revocation of Mere Gratuitous Concession. People v. Montgomery County, 67 N. Y. 109. 2. Withdrawal of Remedy Against County. Hunsaker v. Borden, 5 Cal. 288, 63 Am. Dec. 130. 3. Impairment of Obligation of Contracts. - National Bank v. Sebastian County, 5 Dill. (U. S.) 414; Griffith v. Sebastian County, 49 Ark. 24. See also Bruce v. Schuyler, 9 Ill. 221, 46 Am. Dec. 447. Thus in Griffith v. Sebastian County, 49 Ark. 24, it was held that the Arkansas Act of Feb. 27, 1879, expressly repealing all laws declaring counties to be corporations, and prohibiting suits against them elsewhere than in the county court, did not apply to actions in equity which had already accrued, since otherwise the parties would be deprived of all remedy, as the county court had no equity jurisdiction. See the title IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. 4. Validation by Legislature of Void County Acts. Shawnee County v. Carter, 2 Kan. 115; Burns v. Multnomah R. Co., 15 Fed. Rep. 177; Marshall v. Silliman, 61 Ill. 218; People v. Holden, 82 Ill. 93; Barnes v. Lacon, 84 Ill. 461. 5. United States. Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 327; Grenada County v. Brogden, 112 U. S. 261; Otoe County v. Baldwin, III U. S. I; Quaker City Nat. Bank v. Nolan County, 59 Fed. Rep. 660; Roberts v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 158 U. S. 1. North Dakota. 4 N. Dak. 66. Texas. Ran Nolan County v. State, 83 Tex. 182; Ball v. Presidio County, (Tex. Civ. App. 1894) 27 S. W. Rep. 702, 88 Tex. 60. Virginia. - Cumberland County v. dolph, 89 Va. 614. Wisconsin. Single v. Marathon County, 38 Wis. 364. The validation by statute of proceedings of a county cures all defects therein, although such statute was enacted after the commencement of the suit based on such alleged defects. Hall v. Baker, 74 Wis. 118. 6. Counting-House. - Piercy v. Maclean, L. R. 5 C. P. 252, 256, 258. For decisions as to cases coming within that definition under the statute 7 and 8 Geo. IV., c. 29. § 15, see Reg. v. Potter, 2 Den. C. C. 235, Temp. & M. 561, 15 Jur. 498, 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 575, 20 L. J. M. C. 170; under the Municipal Corp. Act, 5 and 6 Wm. IV., c. 76, § 9, Re Creek, B. & S. 459, 113 E. C. L. 459; and under 2 Wm. IV., c. 45, 27, Piercy v. Maclean, L. R. 5 C. P. 252. international codes, not to refer to sacred writ, the term "country" is employed to denote the population, the nation, the state, the government, having possession and dominion over the country. The word "country," in the revenue laws of the United States, has always been construed to embrace all the possessions of a foreign state, however widely separated, which are subject to the same supreme executive and legislative control.2 A state, however, may with propriety be called a country; and in certain 1. U. S. v. The Ship Recorder, 1 Blatchf. (U. S.) 225. In that case the court said, further: "Thus Vattel says, The term country seems to be well understood by everybody. However, as it is taken in different senses, it may not be unuseful to give it here an exact definition. It commonly signifies the state of which one is a member. In a more confined sense this term signifies the state, or even more particularly the town or place, of our birth.' (Bk. 1, c. 9, § 122.) 'When a nation takes possession of a distant country, and settles a colony there, that country, though separated from the principal establishment, or mother country, naturally becomes a part of the state, equally with its ancient possessions. Whenever, therefore, the political laws or treaties make no distinction between them, everything said of the territory of a nation ought also to extend to its colonies.' (Bk. 1, c. 18, § 210.) The whole of a country possessed by a nation, and subject to its laws, forms its territories, and it is the common country of all the individuals of the nation.' (Bk. 1, c. 19, § 211.)" Country from Whence He, Came Chinese Exclusion Acts. (See also the title CHINESE ExCLUSION ACTS, vol. 5, p. 1104.) — A United States statute provided that under certain circumstance a Chinese laborer should be removed to the country from whence he came.' It was held that the words "the country from whence he came did not refer exclusively to the Chinese Empire. The court said: "The United States attorney argues that as a matter of law every Chinese laborer found to be unlawfully in the United States must be deported to China; in other words, that the act must be construed by substituting the words Empire of China' for the words the country from whence he came.' I hold, however, that such construction is unwarranted. Manifestly the law was framed in contemplation of the probability that Chinese laborers would attempt to enter the United States from the Sandwich Islands, from Canada, Mexico, Australia, and even from Europe, just as they have in fact been doing; and it was intended to exclude all such, and provide for their deportation, even though by reason of their expatriation any of them should have become entitled to the protection of any other government, and their return to China should be impossible. To give the narrow construction of the law contended for is but to invite all the thousands of Chinese residents of British Columbia to come this way, and travel at the expense of the United States, whenever for pleasure or convenience they wish to revisit their native land.' In re Leo Hem Bow, 47 Fed. Rep. 303. See also U. S. v. Chong Sam, 47 Fed. Rep. 878. In U. S. 2. Ah Toy, 47 Fed. Rep. 305, the petitioner, although he had been residing in Canada, was not entitled under the laws of that country to return. It was held he must be deported to China. The court said: "As this defendant is not entitled, under the laws of Canada, to return to that country, his case is distinguishable from the case of In re Leo Hem Bow, 47 Fed. Rep. 302, in which I have given an opinion to the effect that, within the meaning of the Exclusion Act, British Columbia is the country to which he should be removed." Country Store. An application for insurance on a stock of goods represented that it was to be upon "all of goods usually kept in a country store,' and that there was no cotton or woolen waste or rags kept in or near the property to be insured. The by-laws, to which the insurance was expressly made subject, provided that no building in which cotton or woollen waste or oily rags were allowed to remain at night should be insured; and that all cotton, woolen, hempen, or oily waste, or rags, should be destroyed or removed every evening. It was held that the keeping of clean white cotton rags, if usually forming part of the stock of “a country store," did not avoid the policy. Elliott v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 13 Gray (Mass.) 139. See also the title FIRE INSURANCE. Indian Country. (See also the title INDIANS.) In U. S. v. Knowlton, 3 Dakota 74, the court said: "To define what is Indian country within the meaning of the Act of Congress punishing crimes therein committed, is not entirely free from difficulty. The definition given in the Act of Congress, if not absolutely repealed, has become obsolete and without meaning, as applied to the present condition of the country west of the Mississippi river. Without entering into a more elaborate definition, it is sufficient for the purposes of this case to say that the term 'Indian country' includes such portions of the public domain as are expressly reserved for the use and occupation of the several bands and tribes of Indians, and which are not included within the jurisdiction of any state or territorial government." 2. Revenue Laws. (See also the title REVENUE LAWS.)- Stairs v. Peaslee, 18 How. (U. S.) 526. In that case the court said: "Congress certainly could not have intended to refer to mere localities or geographical divisions, without regard to the state or nation to which they belonged; for, if the word country were used in that sense, the law furnishes no certain and fixed limits to guide the appraisers in determining what are its principal markets; and it would often be difficult to decide whether the market selected by appraisers, to regulate the value, was actually within the limits of the country from which the exportation was made." cases, when the legislature uses the expression "the country," it is natural to suppose that they mean the country for which they are legislating.1 The word is used also to signify a jury, as in the expressions, "trial by the country," "conclusion to the country," "puts himself upon the country," etc. COUNTY AFFAIRS. See AFFAIRS, vol. I, p. 908; and the title COUNTIES, ante. COUNTY AFORESAID. See AFORESAID, vol. 1, p. 919. COUNTY BLOCK. See note 3. - COUNTY CLERK. See the titles CLERKS OF COURTS, vol. 6, p. 132; PUBLIC OFFICERS. (See also the title - Mansell v. Israel, 1. Limitation of Action. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.) 3 Bibb (Ky.) 514. "But the second ground assumed, we apprehend, clearly brings the plaintiff within the exception which prevents the statute from running against a person without the country. We cannot suppose, as was contended in the argument, that the expression the country' should be construed to mean the United States, and not this state." Extradition for Crime. A convention for extradition between the United States and Switzerland provided that the party charged with crime should be given up only when the fact of the commission of the crime should be so established as to justify an apprehension and commitment for trial, if the crime had been ccmmitted in the country where such person should be found. It was held that the word country meant the special political jurisdiction that had cognizance of the crime. In re Farez, 7 Blatchf. (U. S.) 345. See also the title EXTRADITION. Mr. Dicey says: "The word country has 974 among its numerous significations the two following meanings, which require to be carefully distinguished from one another: (1) A country, in what may be called the political sense of the word, means the whole of the district or territory subject to one sovereign power;' such as France, Italy, the United States, or the British Empire. (2) A country, in what may be called the legal sense of the word, means 'a district or territory, which (whether it constitutes the whole or a part only of the territory subject to one sovereign) is the whole of a territory subject to one system of law;' such, for example, as England, Scotland, or Ireland, or as each of the states which collectively make up the United States." Dicey on Domicil, p. 31. 2. See the title JURY AND JURY TRIAL. 3. County Block. - These words written upon a block in the plat of a town were held not sufficient to indicate the dedication of the block to the county. Hennepin County v. Dayton, 17 Minn. 260. See generally the title DEdica TION. Volume VII. |