corps, in which he had for colleagues, at the two great capitals of Europe, not a few of the most distinguished men of the times. His spotlessness of private character, eminent talents, extent and minuteness of general information, and fine conversational powers, could not fail everywhere to attach to his person the most distinguished social consideration; while on the part of the governments to which he was accredited, the manly uprightness and good faith characterizing all his official conduct, in the full spirit of the American diplomacy, secured him the highest respect and confidence. A peculiar elegance of courtesy and tact, maintained without compromise of the high-toned republicanism of his political sentiments, also served in no small degree to conciliate the good will and good feeling of all parties, as well to the country as to its representative of which he had, on more than one occasion, striking and gratifying proofs." Mr. Gallatin returned to the United States in the winter of 1827, and established his residence at the city of New York. From this time he took no part in the management of public affairs, with the exception of the preparation of the argument, in behalf of the United States, to be laid before the King of the Netherlands, on the subject of the North-Eastern Boundary. In 1831 he published Considerations on the Currency and Banking System of the United States, in which he advocated the suppression of small notes, and the advantages of a regulated Bank of the United States. In 1838 he rendered valuable and important public service, in effecting the resumption of specie payments by the banks of New York, after the financial crisis of 1836. The latter years of Mr. Gallatin's life were devoted chiefly to the study of the natural features, productions and aboriginal languages of America. In 1836 he published a Synopsis of the Indian Tribes in the United States, east of the Rocky Mountains, in :he British and Russian Possessions. In 1842 he was elected the first President of the Ethnological Society, in the founding of which institution he was mainly instrumental, and the next year he was chosen to the Presidency of the New York Historical Society, both of which offices he continued to fill until his death. During the excitement attending the north-western boundary question, in 1846, which seemed to threaten a rupture between England and the United States, he published a pamphlet on the subject, in which he advocated a moderate course, which would prevent "the scandalous spectacle, perhaps not unwelcome to some of the beholders, of an unnatural and unnecessary war.' This production accomplished beneficial results. His later pamphlets, War with Mexico and Peace with Mexico, are written in the same spirit of moderation, impartiality and benevolence. On the twelfth of August, 1849, Mr. Gallatin died at the village of Astoria, near New York. THE BRITISH TREATY. A Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Great Britain, was concluded on the nineteenth of November, 1794. Subsequently it was ratified by the President. On the second of March, 1796, the President proclaimed it the law of the land, and the same day communicated it to the House of Representatives in order that the necessary appropriations might be made to carry it into effect. On the twenty-sixth of April following, in Committee of the Whole on the subjoined resolution: "Resolved, as the opinion of this Committee, that it is expedient to pass the laws necessary for carrying into effect the Treaty with Great Britain; " Mr. Gallatin spoke thus:* MR. CHAIRMAN: I will not follow some of the gentlemen who have preceded me, by dwelling which has already been the subject of our deupon the discretion of the legislature; a question liberations, and been decided by a solemn vote. Gentlemen who were in the minority on that question may give any construction they please to the declaratory resolution of the House; they may again repeat that to refuse to carry the treaty into effect is a breach of the public faith which they conceive as being pledged by the President and Senate. This has been the ground since the beginning of the discussion. It is beon which a difference of opinion has existed cause the House thinks that the faith of the nation cannot, on those subjects submitted to the power of Congress, be pledged by any conand Mr. Madison's remarks on the same subject, at page 144 in the first volume of this work; also Mr. Giles' speech in See Mr. Ames' speech on the British Treaty at page 104, the following pages of this volume. stituted authority other than the legislature, | been objected to as groundless, I will observe that they resolved that in all such cases it is that I am not satisfied that the construction their right and duty to consider the expediency | given by the British government to that article of carrying a treaty into effect. If the House think the faith of the nation already pledged they cannot claim any discretion; there is no room left to deliberate upon the expediency of the thing. The resolution now under consideration is merely "that it is expedient to carry the British treaty into effect," and not whether we are bound by national faith to do it. I will therefore consider the question of expediency alone; and thinking as I do that the House has full discretion on this subject, I conceive that there is as much responsibility in deciding in the affirmative as in rejecting the resolution, and that we shall be equally answerable for the consequences that may follow from either. It is, however, true that there was a great difference between the situation of this country in the year 1794, when a negotiator was appointed, and that in which we are at present; and that consequences will follow the refusal to carry into effect the treaty in its present stage, which would not have attended a refusal to negotiate and to enter into such a treaty. The question of expediency, therefore, assumes before us a different and more complex shape than when before the negotiator, the Senate or the President. The treaty, in itself and abstractedly considered, may be injurious; it may be such an instrument as in the opinion of the House ought not to have been adopted by the Executive; and yet such as it is we may think it expedient under the present circumstances to carry it into effect. I will therefore first take a view of the provisions of the treaty itself, and in the next place, supposing it is injurious, consider, in case it is not carried into effect, what will be the natural consequences of such refusal. of the treaty, is justified even by the letter of the article. That construction rests on the supposition that slaves come under the general denomination of booty, and are alienated the moment they fall into the possession of an enemy, so that all those who were in the hands of the British when the treaty of peace was signed, must be considered as British and not as American property, and are not included in the article. It will, however, appear by recurring to Vattel when speaking of the right of "Postliminium," that slaves cannot be considered as a part of the booty which is alienated by the act of capture, and that they are to be ranked rather with real property, to the profits of which only the captors are entitled. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the construction given by America is that which was understood by the parties at the time of making the treaty. The journals of Mr. Adams, quoted by a gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Coit, prove this fully; for when he says that the insertion of this article was alone worth the journey of Mr. Laurens from London, can it be supposed that he would have laid so much stress on a clause, which, according to the new construction now attempted to be given, means only that the British would commit no new act of hostility-would not carry away slaves at that time in possession of Americans? Congress recognized that construction by adopting the resolution which has been already quoted, and which was introduced upon the motion of Mr. Alexander Hamilton; and it has not been denied that the British ministry during Mr. Adams' embassy also agreed to it. But when our negotiator had, for the sake of peace, waved that claim: when he had also The provisions of the treaty relate either to abandoned the right which America had to dethe adjustment of past differences, or to the fu-mand an indemnification for the detention of ture intercourse of the two nations. The dif- the posts, although he had conceded the right ferences now existing between Great Britain of a similar nature, which Great Britain had and this country arose either from non-execu- for the detention of debts; when he had thus tion of some articles of the treaty of peace or given up every thing which might be supposed from the effects of the present European war. to be of a doubtful nature, it might have been The complaints of Great Britain in relation to hoped that our last claim-a claim on which the treaty of 1783 were confined to the legal there was not and there never had been any impediments thrown by the several States in dispute the western posts should have been the way of the recovery of British debts. The restored according to the terms of the treaty of late treaty provides adequate remedy on that peace. Upon what ground the British insisted, subject; the United States are bound to make and our negotiator conceded, that this late resfull and complete compensation for any losses titution should be saddled with new conditions, arising from that source, and every ground of which made no part of the original contract, I complaint on the part of Great Britain is re-am at a loss to know. British traders are almoved. Having thus done full justice to the other nation, America has a right to expect that equal attention shall be paid to her claims arising from infractions of the treaty of peace, viz., compensation for the negroes carried away by the British; restoration of the western posts, and indemnification for their detention. On the subject of the first claim which has lowed by the new treaty to remain within the posts without becoming citizens of the United States; and to carry on trade and commerce with the Indians living within our boundaries without being subject to any control from our government. In vain is it said that if that clause had not been inserted we would have found it our interest to effect it by our own laws. Of this we are alone competent judges; if that condition is harmless at present it is not possible to foresee whether, under future circumstances, it will not prove highly injurious; and whether harmless or not, it is not less a permanent and new condition imposed upon us. But the fact is, that by the introduction of that clause, by obliging us to keep within our jurisdiction as British subjects, the very men who have been the instruments used by Great Britain to promote Indian wars on our frontiers; by obliging us to suffer those men to continue their commerce with the Indians living in our territory, uncontrolled by those regulations, which we have thought necessary in order to restrain our own citizens in their intercourse with these tribes, Great Britain has preserved her full influence with the Indian nations. By a restoration of the posts under that condition we have lost the greatest advantage that was expected from their possession, viz. future security against the Indians. In the same manner have the British preserved the commercial advantages which result from the occupancy of those posts, by stipulating as a permanent condition, a free passage for their goods across our portages without paying any duty. boundary line leaves to the southward the sources of that river. Had not that been the intention of Great Britain the line would have been settled at once by the treaty, according to either of the two only rational ways of doing it in conformity to the treaty of 1783, that is to say, by agreeing that the line should run from the northernmost sources of the Mississippi, either directly to the western extremity of the Lake of the Woods, or northwardly till it intersected the line to be drawn due west from that lake. But by repeating the article of the treaty of 1783; by conceding the free use of our ports on the river, and by the insertion of the fourth article, we have admitted that Great Britain, in all possible events, has still a right to navigate that river from its source to its mouth. What may be the future effects of these provisions, especially as they regard our intercourse with Spain, it is impossible at present to say; but although they can bring us no advantage they may embroil us with that nation: and we have already felt the effect of it in our late treaty with Spain, since we were obliged on account of that clause of the British treaty, to accept as a gift and a favor the navigation of that river which we had till then claimed as a right. Another article of the new treaty which is connected with the provisions of the treaty of 1783, deserves consideration; I mean what re- The seventh article of the treaty is intended lates to the Mississippi. At the time when the to adjust those differences which arose from the navigation of that river to its mouth was by effects of the present European war. On that the treaty of peace declared to be common to article it may also be observed, that whilst it both nations, Great Britain communicated to provides a full compensation for the claims of America a right which she held by virtue of the British, it is worded in such a manner, the treaty of 1763, and as owner of the Floridas; when speaking of the indemnification for spobut since that cession to the United States, Eng-liations committed on the American commerce, land has ceded to Spain her claim on the Floridas, and does not own at the present time an inch of ground, either on the mouth or on any part of that river. Spain now stands in the place of Great Britain, and by virtue of the treaty of 1783 it is to Spain and America, and not to England and America that the navigation of the Mississippi is at present to be common. Yet, notwithstanding this change of circumstances, we have repeated that article of the former treaty in the late one, and have granted to Great Britain the additional privilege of using our ports on the eastern side of the river, without which, as they own no land thereon, they could not have navigated it. Nor is this all. Upon a supposition that the Mississippi does not extend so far northward as to be intersected by a line drawn due west from the Lake of the Woods, or, in other words, upon a supposition that Great Britain has not a claim even to touch the Mississippi, we have agreed, not upon what will be the boundary line, but that we will hereafter negotiate to settle that line. Thus leaving to future negotiation what should have been finally settled by the treaty itself, in the same manner as all other differences were, is calculated for the sole purpose, either of laying the foundation of future disputes or of recognizing a claim in Great Britain on the waters of the Mississippi, even if their as will render it liable to a construction very unfavorable to our just claims on that ground. The commissioners, to be appointed by virtue of that article, are to take cognizance and to grant redress only in those cases where, by reason of irregular or illegal captures or condemnations, made under color of authority or commissions from the King of Great Britain, losses have been incurred, and where adequate compensation cannot now be actually obtained by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. If Great Britain should insist that, since the signing of the treaty, they had, by admitting appeals to their superior courts, afforded a redress by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings; if those courts were to declare, that the captures complained of, were neither illegal, nor made under color, but by virtue of authority or commissions from the king, and if that construction should prevail with the commissioners; the indemnification which our plundered merchants would actually receive, in consequence of the provisions of this article, would fall very short of their expectations and of their just claims. Yet this article, considering the relative situation of the two countries, at the time when the negotiation took place, is as much as could reasonably have been expected by America. When a weak nation has to contend with a powerful one, it is gaining a great deal if the national honor is saved even by the shadow of an indemnification, and by an apparent concession on the part of the aggressor; and however objectionable the article might appear at first view, I am, on the whole, satisfied with it. The remaining provisions of the treaty have no connection with past differences; they make no part of the convention which was the avowed object of Mr. Jay's mission: they apply solely to the future intercourse of the two nations as relating to commerce and navigation; and had they been entirely omitted, our differences would have been nevertheless adjusted. It is agreed on all hands, that, so far as relates to our commerce with Great Britain, we want no treaty. The intercourse, although useful perhaps to both parties, is more immediately necessary to England, and her own interest is a sufficient pledge of her granting us at all times a perfect liberty of commerce to her European ports. If we want to treat with her, it must be in order to obtain some intercourse with her colonies, and some general security in our navigation. to what has been said on the subject of contra- The twelfth and thirteenth articles were obtained by our negotiator with a view to the first object. The twelfth article, however, which relates to our intercourse with the West Indies, is found upon examination to be accompanied by a restriction of such nature, that what was granted by Great Britain as a favor, has been rejected by the Senate as highly injurious. The thirteenth article, which relates to the East Indies, and remains a part of the treaty, is, like the twelfth, conferring a favor limited by restric-ment of a belligerent nation to their officers and tions, and so far as I can depend on the opinion of the best informed judges on this subject, these restrictions put the trade in a more disadvantageous situation than it was before the treaty. As the West India article declares, that we shall not re-export any produce of those islands to Europe, so the East India article, at the same time that it grants us the privilege which we enjoyed before, and which we enjoyed because it was the interest of the East India Company to grant it to us-that of being admitted into the British seaports there-prohibits our carrying any articles from thence to any place except to America; which regulation amounts to a total prohibition to export East India articles to China, or to obtain freights back to Europe; and upon the whole I cannot help thinking, from what has fallen on this floor, and what I have heard elsewhere, from gentlemen of great commercial knowledge, that if the East India commerce had been as generally understood in America as the West India trade, that so much boasted of article would have met the same fate in the Senate with the twelfth article. But if, leaving commercial regulations, we shall seek in the treaty for some provisions securing to us the free navigation of the ocean against any future aggressions on our trade, where are they to be found? I can add nothing cruisers, and these may be redressed by appli- in the year 1780, so fully convinced were the neutral nations of the necessity of introducing that doctrine of free bottoms making free goods, that all of them, excepting Portugal, who was in a state of vassalage to, and a mere appendage of Great Britain, united in order to establish the principle, and formed for that purpose the alliance known by the name of the armed neutrality. All the belligerent powers, except England, recognized and agreed to the doctrine. England itself, was obliged, in some measure, to give for awhile, a tacit acquiescence. America, at the time, fully admitted the principle, although then at war. Mr. Gallatin quoted on this subject the journals of Congress of the year 1780, page 210, and of the year 1781, page 80. our trade-any gross violation of our rights as a neutral nation? We have no fleet to oppose or to punish the insults of Great Britain; but, from our commercial relative situation, we have it in our power to restrain her aggressions, by restrictions on her trade, by a total prohibition of her manufactures, or by a sequestration of the debts due to her. By the treaty, not satisfied with receiving nothing, not satisfied with obtaining no security for the future, we have, of our own accord, surrendered those defensive arms, for fear they might be abused by ourselves. We have given up the two first, for the whole time during which we might want them most, the period of the present war; and the last, the power of sequestration, we have abandoned for ever; every other article of the treaty of commerce is temporary; this perpetual. not be resorted to, has deprived us of the power of judging of its propriety, has rendered it an act of hostility, and has effectually taken off that restraint, which a fear of its exercise laid upon Great Britain. I shall not enter into a discussion of the imIt has been introduced into every other morality of sequestering private property. What treaty we have concluded since our existence can be be more immoral than war; or plunderas a nation. Since the year 1780, every nation, ing on the high seas, legalized under the name so far as my knowledge goes, has refused to of privateering? Yet self-defence justifies the enter into a treaty of commerce with England, first, and the necessity of the case may, at unless that provision was inserted. Russia, for least in some instances, and where it is the that reason, would not renew their treaty, only practicable mode of warfare left to a which had expired in 1786; although I believe, nation, apologize even for the last. In the same that during the present war, and in order to manner, the power of sequestration may be reanswer the ends of the war, they formed a sorted to, as the last weapon of self-defence, temporary convention, which I have not seen, rather than to seek redress by an appeal to but which, perhaps, does not include that pro-arms. It is the last peace measure that can vision. England consented to it in her treaty be taken by a nation; but the treaty, by declarwith France, in 1788, and we are the first neu-ing, that in case of national differences it shall tral nation who has abandoned the common cause, given up the claim, and by a positive declaration inserted in our treaty, recognized the contrary doctrine. It has been said, that under the present circumstances, it could not be expected that Great Britain would give up the point; perhaps so; but the objection is not, that our negotiator has not been able to obtain that principle, but that he has consented to enter into a treaty of commerce, which we do not want, and which has no connection with an adjustment of our differences with Great Britain, without the principle contended for, making part of that treaty. Unless we can obtain security for our navigation, we want no treaty; and the only provision which can give us that security, should have been the "sine qua non" of a treaty. On the contrary, we have disgusted all the other neutral nations of Europe, without whose concert and assistance there is but little hope that we shall ever obtain that point; and we have taught Great Britain that we are disposed to form the most intimate connections with her, even at the expense of recognizing a principle the most fatal to the liberty of commerce, and to the security of our navigation. But, if we could not obtain any thing which might secure us against future aggressions, should we have parted, without receiving any equivalent, with those weapons of self-defence, which, although they could not repel, might, in some degree, prevent any gross attacks upon Thus it appears that by the treaty, we have promised full compensation to England for every possible claim they may have against us, that we have abandoned every claim of a doubtful nature, and that we have consented to receive the posts, our claim to which was not disputed, under new conditions and restrictions never before contemplated-that after having obtained by those concessions an adjustment of past differences, we have entered into a new agreement, unconnected with those objects, which have heretofore been subjects of discussion between the two nations; and that by this treaty of commerce and navigation, we have obtained no commercial advantage which we did not enjoy before, we have obtained no security against future aggressions, no security in favor of the freedom of our navigation, and we have parted with every pledge we had in our hands, with every power of restriction, with every weapon of self-defence which is calculated to give us any security. There is yet another article, which stands by itself, unconnected either with adjustment of past disputes, or with commercial regulations; I mean the ninth article, which provides that British subjects now holding lands in the United States shall continue to hold them, and may sell |