may be revived by the treaty; for although a law has psssed in that State to confiscate the lands of all the British subjects who should be absent on a certain day, yet the proprietary lands were not meant to be comprehended within that provision; the commissioners who were to sell the confiscated property, never disgranted by another law of the State as vacant and not as confiscated lands, without having been actually escheated to the State by an office being found or any other formality whatever; and they are even expressly distinguished from land to be confiscated by the very act passed for the purpose of confiscating.

Mr. Gallatin here read the clause of the act he alluded to.

Supposing, however, every thing I have said on this subject as very doubtful, it is not less true that this article, under an appearance of reciprocity, grants a positive advantage to Great Britain without any equivalent being given-is, if not an infraction, at least a restriction over the legislative powers, and an exception to the laws of the different States on a subject of a delicate nature-may involve not only some of our citizens, but even several of the States in complex lawsuits and serious embarrassment, and although it may thus create much mischief, can give us no possible benefit.

or devise the same; and that neither they, nor | of that State and of the south-western territory, their heirs or assigns shall, so far as may respect the said lands, and the legal remedies incident thereto, be regarded as aliens. I am not a lawyer, and, in expressing an opinion, I mean nothing more than to communicate my doubts, and ask for an explanation. There would be no difficulty in finding the meaning of the article, did it apply only to those British sub-posed of a single acre of the lands, which were jects, who have acquired lands under the laws of the States; but the former connection of this country with England, renders the subject difficult to be explained, even by men of legal abilities; for its explanation must depend on the consequences of a principle unknown to the laws of England. The principle of the English law is, that no subject can shake his allegiance, that is to say, that no man who was once a citizen, can become an alien. Yet, by the effect of the revolution, British subjects, who, before 1776, had a right to hold lands in America, as part of the British Empire, have become aliens in the United States, and the effect of that alienage upon their titles to such lands, and how far that effect is changed by the operation of the treaty, | seem to me to be questions of a very nice nature. I will, however, beg leave to suggest what to me appears to be the effect of the treaty. So far as lands have been confiscated by the laws of any State, and those laws carried into effect, and so far as such lands having been considered as escheated, an office has been found, and the escheat been completed, I con- From the review I have taken of the treaty, ceive the treaty will create no alteration; but and the opinions I have expressed, it is hardly where the lands have not been confiscated, necessary for me to add, that I look upon the either because no laws had been passed for that instrument as highly injurious to the interests purpose, or because they had not been carried of the United States, and that I earnestly wish into effect before the treaty of 1783, and where it never had been made; but whether in its the legal formalities of finding an office, &c., present stage, the House ought to refuse to necessary to complete an escheat have been neg-carry it into effect, and what will be the probalected, it seems to me the treaty may operate in three ways. Firstly, it will prevent any State from completing an escheat by finding an office, &c., when they have neglected doing it. Should the treaty be finally defeated, either Secondly, it will enable the British subjects to new negotiations will be more successful or sell or devise, and therefore to convert their life Great Britain will refuse to make a new arestate into a fee-simple for ever. And thirdly, rangement, and leave things in the situation in it will enable those subjects to institute suits in which they now are, or war will be the consecourts for the recovery of those lands, pro-quence. I will, in the course of my observaviding them with a legal remedy, they had not before, since their alienage would have been a sufficient bar against bringing real actions. If the treaty may be supposed to have that effect, its tendency so far as relates, not to private estates, but to the former proprietary estates, may prove vexatious and injurious to several of the States. It will strengthen the proprietary claims of the Penn family, not in Pennsylvania, but in the State of Delaware. It may have some effect on the decision of the Fairfax claim in Virginia, and even on such parts of the lands of Maryland, which have been sold, although formerly the property of the Baltimore family, as vacant lands and not confiscated lands. In North Carolina, the proprietary claim of the Grandville family, which includes the best half

ble consequences of a refusal, is a question which requires the most serious attention, and which I will now attempt to investigate.

tions, make some remarks on the last supposition. I do not think that the first will be very probable at present, and I am of opinion that under the present circumstances, and until some change takes place in our own or in the relative political situation of the European nations, it is to be apprehended that in such a case, new negotiations will either be rejected or prove unsuccessful. Such an event might have perhaps followed a rejection of the treaty even by the Senate or by the President. After the negotiator employed by the United States had once affixed his signature it must have become very problematical, unless he had exceeded his powers, whether a refusal to sanction the contract he had made would not eventually defeat, at least for a time, the prospect of a new treaty.

In mentioning my objections to the treaty itself, I have already stated the advantages which in my opinion would result to the United States from the non-existence of that instrument; I will not repeat, but proceed at once to examine what losses may accrue that can be set off against those advantages.

I conceive that the hopes of obtaining better | tended that those decisions cannot be considerconditions by a new negotiation are much less ed as legal impediments, yet it has been insisted in the present stage of the business than they | by Great Britain that they are. The two govwere when the treaty was in its inchoate form ernments have come to issue on this point, as before the Executive; and in order to form a may be seen by recurring to the printed corjust idea of the consequences of a rejection at respondence of Mr. Jefferson. It is one of the present, I will contemplate them upon this sup- points to which the jurisdiction of the commisposition, which appears to me most probable, sioners must extend, since, on account of the to wit, that no new treaty will take place for a decisions of our courts, it is one of the cases certain period of time. where compensation could not be obtained, and has been refused by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings; and for greater security the commissioners are, by the treaty, empowered to take into their consideration all claims, whether of principal or interest, or balances of principal or interest. These commissioners must be considered less as judges than as political As I am not sensible that a single commer- agents, who will come with a determination to cial advantage has been obtained by the treaty, support the claims contended for by their reI cannot mention the loss of any, as a mischief spective nations. They will, therefore, disagree that may attend its rejection. If, however, the on the subject of war interest, and it will be East India article is supposed to be beneficial, left solely to the fifth commissioner, that is to it must, on the other hand, be conceded that say, to lot, to decide whether that interest shall we have enjoyed every benefit arising from it be paid by the United States or not. Eight for a number of years, without treaty, and con-years interest amounts to one-half of the whole sequently because it was the interest of the amount of debts due by America to Great BriEast India company that we should enjoy them, tain at the beginning of the war; for it must be and that it is not probable that circumstances remarked that this claim extends to all debts will so far change there during the short period whether good or bad, because it has been reto which this article is limited as to induce that fused on all, and can be recovered by the ordicompany to adopt a different policy towards us. nary course of judicial proceedings on none. The indemnification to be obtained from What those debts amount to is very uncertain. Great Britain for spoliations on our trade, if I have seen a variety of calculations on this subconsidered as a national reparation for a nation-ject. If they are estimated as they have been al aggression, is certainly, as I have already stated it, an important object gained by the treaty. But if it is to be viewed as a money transaction, and its loss as a national loss of money, it will be well to examine whether in this point of view, viz. of money, we should not be gainers on the whole by not carrying the treaty into effect. I have made no objections to that article of the treaty which relates to British debts. Whatever the amount may be, if it is just that we should pay them it must be just to pay that amount; but when we are examining the situation in which we should be if we had no treaty, when we are calculating the losses we are to experience by obtaining no compensation for our claims, it is right to consider the amount of those claims, and to compare it with the probable amount of the claims of the other party, and of the sums of money which a non-execution of the treaty and a re⚫fusal on the part of Great Britain to do us justice, to indemnify us for our own losses and to enter into new negotiations, would justify us in withholding. That subject has already undergone a full discussion, and I will recall the attention of the committee only to the demand of Great Britain for interest on the British debts. It is well known that our courts have uniformly refused to allow to the British creditors the interest which has accrued on their demands during the late war, that is to say, during eight years. Although we have con

by some, at five millions sterling, one-half of them will amount to more than twelve millions of dollars; and when we take into consideration the amount of principal we shall have to pay, on the principles stated by a gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Nicholas, his calculation of near fifteen millions of dollars in the whole, will not seem exaggerated. But even taking the amount of those debts at the lowest estimate, the amount of war interest, and of the principal we shall have to pay, far exceeds the amount which the most sanguine among us expected to recover from the government of Great Britain by virtue of the treaty, on account of the spoliations committed on our trade.

The only positive loss, therefore, which in my opinion will arise from our having no treaty is that of the western posts. I have already stated that, surrendered in the manner settled by the treaty, I conceive them to be of very insignificant value in a commercial point of view, and of very little use, if any, as a security against the Indians; for it must be remembered that our own laws, for the purpose of preserving peace with those tribes, have enacted under severe penalties that our own citizens shall on no account whatever, cross over the boundary line between them and ourselves, although within the territory ceded to us by Great Britain, unless they have special licenses from our government. It is therefore our own opinion that peace cannot be preserved with the In

dians if ever our own citizens have a free and |
uncontrolled intercourse with them. And yet
it is a positive condition of the treaty that the
British traders settled at Detroit and in the
other posts-men who from habit are attached
to Great Britain, and inimical to the United
States: who have given repeated proofs of that
enmity: who possess an unbounded influence
amongst the Indians, and have been the chief
promoters of the Indian war-that these men
may remain there as British subjects, and that
they and all other British subjects may have
the privilege for ever to pass over that line,
which we have forbidden our citizens to cross,
and may continue to carry on with the Indians
living within our territory, a free trade and
commerce uncontrolled by our laws and by
those regulations which we have imposed, or
may impose on our citizens; in other words,
we have agreed that these men may preserve
their baneful influence over the Indians, and
their allegiance to Great Britain; and we may
therefore expect that influence to be exerted
which suits the interest and will be in conform-
ity to the directions of their sovereign. I must,
therefore, repeat that as I think that at any
time since 1789 we might have had the posts
without these conditions, provided we had then
agreed, as we have by the late treaty, to make
a compensation for the British debts, I had
much rather that we could again be placed in
the situation in which we were two years ago;
and I will not hesitate to declare that in my
opinion our claim to the posts and the chance
we had to obtain them by negotiation, in the
year 1793, was better than their possession up-
on the terms of the treaty. But as the question
now is not what would be best to be done if
no treaty had been made; as the negotiator has
put us in a worse situation than we were before
that treaty; as the subject of the present exam-
ination is the consequences that will follow if
no treaty at all is made; and as one of those
consequences will undoubtedly be a further de-
tention of the posts, and less hope to obtain
them in future, I will certainly agree that it is
better to have them, even encumbered with
these conditions, than not to have them at all.
For although they may not be of an immediate
advantage, either as a commercial object or as
giving security against the Indians, their posses-
sion will enable us to prevent a further exten-
sion of the British settlements within our ter-
ritory and by forming settlements of our own,
to acquire by degrees sufficient strength in that
quarter to have nothing to fear either from the
British or from the Indians.

The further detention of the posts, the national stain that will result from receiving no reparation for the spoliations on our trade, and the uncertainty of a final adjustment of our differences with Great Britain, are the three evils which strike me as resulting from a rejection of the treaty; and when to those considerations I add that of the present situation of this country, of the agitation of the public mind, and of the

advantages that will arise from union of sentiments, however injurious and unequal I conceive the treaty to be, however repugnant it may be to my feelings, and perhaps to my prejudices, I feel induced to vote for it, and will not give my assent to any proposition which will imply its rejection. But the conduct of Great Britain since the treaty was signed, the impressment of our seamen and their uninterrupted spoliations on our trade, especially by seizing our vessels laden with provisions, a proceeding which they may perhaps justify by one of the articles of the treaty, are such circumstances as may induce us to pause awhile, in order to examine whether it is proper, immediately and without having obtained any explanation thereon, to adopt the resolution on the table, and to pass, at present, all the laws necessary to carry the treaty into effect.

The eighteenth article of the treaty, the provision article, as it is called, has already been fully investigated by a gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Nicholas, and I have been astonished that those gentlemen who have spoken in favor of the treaty have given no direct answer to his remarks on that point. The second clause of that article declares that "whenever provisions, becoming contraband according to the existing laws of nations, shall for that reason be seized; the same shall not be confiscated, but the owners indemnified." This clause of the article does not contemplate provisions or other articles not generally contraband, when attempted to be carried to a besieged place; for the third clause of the same article provides for the last mentioned case, and declares, "that a vessel thus laden and sailing for a besieged place shall not be detained, nor her cargo, if not contraband, confiscated, unless after notice she shall again attempt to enter;" which implies, that in case of notice thus given, provisions may be confiscated, whilst the provisions contemplated in the second clause are not to be confiscated. It is, therefore, admitted by that article, that there are cases other than that of provisions and other articles not generally contraband, carried to a beseiged place, in which those provisions and articles may be regarded as contraband. It is admitting a principle unknown to the laws of nations, infringing our neutrality, destructive of our trade, and liable to every misconstruction. The British_ have shown what they meant by provisions becoming contraband according to the existing laws of nations, when they have taken our vessels laden with provisions, and given us an indemnification, of ten per centum. So immediately connected is that proceeding of the British with this article, that even the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Hillhouse, could not separate them in his own mind; and when speaking of the indemnification we are to obtain in such cases, as are contemplated by the article, he repeatedly called it "ten per centum;" thinking only of the compensation, given by the British in the case before mentioned, as one contemplated in the article, since the words

ten per centum are not to be found in the clause | still held over us, is in my opinion a dereliction itself. It is not, however, material at present of national interest, of national honor, of nato decide whether a fair construction of the ar- tional independence. ticle justifies the conduct of the British or not. But it is said, that war must be the conseThe fact is uncontroverted; they still continue quence of our delaying to carry the treaty into to impress our seamen and to capture our ves-effect. Do the gentlemen mean, that if we re sels. If they pretend to justify this conduct by ject the treaty, if we do not accept the repara the treaty, it becomes necessary to obtain an tion there given to us, in order to obtain redress, explanation of the doubtful articles; if there is we have no alternative left but war? If we nothing in the treaty to justify it, their acts are must go to war in order to obtain reparation for acts of hostility and an infraction of the treaty; insults and spoliations on our trade, we must do and, even according to the doctrine of those it, even if we carry the present treaty into gentlemen who think that in common cases the effect; for this treaty gives us no reparation for House has no discretion, the treaty once broken the aggressions committed since it was ratified, by one party is no longer binding on the other; has not produced a discontinuance of those acts and it is the right as well as the duty of this of hostility, and gives us no security that they House not to proceed to pass the laws necessary shall be discontinued. But the arguments of to carry it into effect, until satisfactory assur- those gentlemen, who suppose that America ances are obtained that these acts shall cease, must go to war, apply to a final rejection of the and until Great Britain has evinced a friendly treaty, and not to a delay. I do not propose to disposition towards us. refuse the reparation offered by the treaty, and to put up with the aggressions committed; I have agreed, that that reparation, such as it is, is a valuable article of the treaty; I have agreed, that, under the present circumstances, a greater evil will follow a total rejection of, than an acquiescence in the treaty. The only measure, which has been mentioned, in preference of the one now under discussion, is a suspension, a postponement whilst the present spoliations continue, in hopes to obtain for them a similar reparation, and assurances that they shall cease.

Whatever evils may follow a rejection of the treaty, they will not attend a postponement. To suspend our proceedings will not throw us mto a situation which will require new negotiations, new arrangements on the points already settled and well understood by both parties. It will be merely a delay, until an explanation of the late conduct of the British towards us may be obtained, or until that conduct may be altered. If, on the contrary, we consent to carry the treaty into effect, under the present circumstances, what will be our situation in future? It is by committing the most wanton and the most unprovoked aggressions on our trade; it is by seizing a large amount of our property as a pledge for our good behavior, that Great Britain has forced the nation into the present treaty. If by threatening new hostilities, or rather by continuing her aggressions, even after the treaty is made, she can force us also to carry it into effect, our acquiescence will be tantamount to a declaration that we mean to submit in proportion to the insults that are offered to us; and this disposition being once known, what security have we against new insults, new aggressions, new spoliations, which probably will lay the foundation of some additional demands on the part of the aggressor, and of some additional sacrifices on ours? It has been said, and said with truth, that to put up with the indignities we have received without obtaining any reparation, which will probably be the effect of defeating the treaty, is highly dishonorable to the nation. In my opinion it is still more so not only tamely to submit to a continuation of these national insults, but while they thus continue uninterrupted, to carry into effect the instrument we have consented to accept as a reparation for former ones. When the general conduct of Great Britain towards us from the beginning of the present war is considered; when the means by which she has produced the treaty are reflected on, a final compliance on our part while she still persists in that conduct, whilst the chastening rod of that nation is

|

But is it meant to insinuate that it is the final intention of those, who pretend to wish only for a postponement, to involve this country in a war? There has been no period during the present European war, at which it would not have been equally weak and wicked to adopt such measures, as must involve America in the contest, unless forced into it for the sake of self-defence; but, at this time, to think of it would fall but little short of madness. The whole American nation would rise in opposition to the idea; and it might at least have been recollected, that war cannot be declared, except by Congress, and that two of the branches of government are sufficient to check the other in any supposed attempt of this kind.

If there is no necessity imposed upon America to go to war, if there is no apprehension she will, by her own conduct, involve herself in one, the danger must arise from Great Britain, and the threat is, that she will make war against us if we do not comply. Gentlemen first tell us that we have made the best possible bargain with that nation; that she has conceded every thing, without receiving a single iota in return, and yet they would persuade us, that she will make war against us in order to force us to accept that contract so advantageous to us, and so injurious to herself. It will not be contended, that a delay, until an amicable explanation is obtained, could afford even a pretence to Great Britain for going to war; and we all know that her own interest would prevent

her. If another campaign takes place, it is ac- | States, from one end of the continent to the knowledged, that all her efforts are to be exerted against the West Indies. She has proclaimed her own scarcity of provisions at home, and she must depend on our supplies to support her armament. It depends upon us to defeat her whole scheme, and this is a sufficient pledge against open hostility, if the European war continues. If peace takes place, there will not be even the appearance of danger; the moment when a nation is happy enough to emerge from one of the most expensive, bloody and dangerous wars in which she ever has been involved, will be the last she would choose to plunge afresh into a similar calamity.