contains abridgments of the national rights, but changes the municipal regulations of the United States: and how have these things been effectac-ed?-By the substitution of a foreign power in the place of the House of Representatives. If the treaty-making power be thus extensive, and if it be so absolutely obligatory, as to deprive the House of Representatives of the right of judging as to the expediency of making the provisions for its complete effectuation, of what use is the House of Representatives as a distinct branch of the government? Will it not be a mere formal, and not an efficient branch of the government? An entire new system of jurisprudence may thus be introduced by treaty, and become obligatory upon the House of Representatives-obligatory upon the nation. When a British minister undertakes to declare, that the motive for the revocation of a hostile order was, to take away every pretext from evil-disposed persons among us, who, cording to the intelligence he had received, were endeavoring to irritate our own people against Great Britain, as well as to oppose the measures of our own government, &c., and to assign the same reason for refraining from giving that opposition to some exceptionable measures of our government, which he otherwise might have done; and when the United States so far listen to this language, as immediately to enter into negotiation upon the subject, my apprehensions of British interference, of British influence, are strongly excited, particularly when the British minister seems to make a common cause between the two governments against what he is pleased to call evil-disposed persons. I will here incidentally remark, that as far as these "evil-disposed persons " have produced the revocation of the hostile order of November, and a relaxation of British hostility in other respects, they are certainly entitled to applause from the United States, whatever epithets may have been bestowed upon them by a British minister. The contents of the treaty have very much confirmed my original apprehensions. Gentlemen have often said, show us the danger of British interference, of British influence. To my mind, the treaty itself contains the evidence. The treaty itself corresponds with what I consider as the object of the British minister in giving the invitation to it. I find it in the following particular instances. Whenever the question, which necessarily results from the unlimited scope given to the treaty-making power, shall be presented to the people of the United States, to wit:—Shall the House of Representatives become a formal, or remain an efficient, branch of the government; they will pause, before they will decide upon its annihilation. Their love of liberty, their love of their own interests, will check, for a moment, personal affections, or antipathies: party sensations, state jealousies will be disarmed, and the people will be found right in their decision. Even in the midst of the clamor of war and disunion, which has been momentarily excited for a particular object, the people cannot be led to such fatal extremities, as the doctrine contended for would necessarily produce. Much less will this be the case after they shall have been relieved from these causeless apprehensions. Before the treaty, the right of laying a special as well as a general embargo existed in the If, therefore, the House should exercise a United States: the right of laying a special constitutional right of judging of the propriety embargo upon British vessels is surrendered. of the object of expenditure, and a refusal Before the treaty, the right of sequestration ex- should be the result of their judgment, I do not isted, and the exercise of it was proposed. This believe that it will produce that fatal hostility right, so far as it respects Great Britain, is for- of departments which would eventuate in a total ever surrendered. Before the treaty, the right dissolution of the government; but will be an of discriminating against British goods, in favor exercise of one of the salutary checks, provided of those of other nations, existed, and the exer- in the constitution, which, in my opinion, concise of it was proposed. This right is surrender-stitute its merit, and not its reproach. ed. Before the treaty, the right of suspending commercial intercourse with Great Britain existed, and was proposed to be exercised; the exercise of that right is stipulated against for a limited time, &c. All these are restrictions of the exercise of the rights of national sovereign-be ty, and seem to me complete evidence of British interference. These circumstances furnish two reflections. The one is, that the British cabinet deem the measures proposed, to be more efficacious, than they have generally been represented to be in the United States; and hence, the extreme caution to stipulate against the future exercise of them. The other is, that party sensations must have had great influence upon the extraordinary envoy of the United States, to induce his consent to these great abridgments of the rights of national sovereignty. The treaty not only I shall now proceed to consider, whether a war with Great Britain will be the probable consequence of a refusal to make the necessary provision for carrying the British treaty into effect. To my mind, there does not appear to the least ground for the clamor, which has been excited from this suggestion. I believe that Great Britain will make war upon the United States whenever she deems it her interest to do so: and that the treaty would impose no restraint upon her, if she thought her interest would justify the conduct. I also believe, that if there should be no treaty with Great Britain, she would not go to war with the United States, unless her interest should dictate the measure. In short, I believe, that Great Britain, like all other nations, will make her interest the criterion of her conduct in every question of peace or war. If this opinion be well formed, the proba- | 13th, the rebellion of La Vendee commenced; bility of war may be tested by this question. Is it the interest of Great Britain to make war upon the United States in the relative situation of the two countries? Great Britain is now engaged in a war in which the government hazards every thing. She is at this moment engaged in an important enterprise against the French West Indies. She is under the necessity of resorting to the United States for sundry supplies for facilitating the enterprise. The United States are the best commercial customer she has in the world. Under these circumstances, what would be her inducement for war? What would be her inducements to avoid it? These questions furnish their own answers. The argument of war is an argument of dependence. It is also an argument which will last for ever. If the fear of war is now to influence our conduct against our judgments, will not the same argument apply with double force two years after the expiration of the present war, to induce a continuance of the treaty upon its present injurious conditions? As the argument of war is the chief instrument by which the treaty is pressed upon the people of the United States, I beg the indulgence of the committee in taking a retrospective view of this subject, and in examining it with some minuteness. Whatever may have been my opinion at the time of receiving the information of the hostile order of the 6th of November, I am now of opinion, that at that time, Great Britain did meditate war against the United States, although I believe there is no danger of it at present. I believe, too, that the neutrality proclaimed by the United States does not, in the smallest degree, influence the conduct or disposition of Great Britain towards the United States in regard to war or peace, but that the true explanation of her disposition will be found in the course of events in Europe. On the 1st of February, 1793, France declared war against the King of England, and the stadtholder of Holland, and on the 7th of the same month against Spain. France was then at war with the Emperor of Germany, and the King of Prussia, &c. A combination of most of the despots of Europe had previously been formed, (it is generally believed on the 21st July, 1791, at Pilnitz,) for the purpose of crushing the revolutionary spirit which had appeared in France. The accession of Great Britain, Spain, Holland, Portugal and some of the Italian States to the combination already formed, made it the most formidable which has ever appeared in the history of modern times. The most desperate and bloody war of course ensued, and immediately succeeded the declaration of war against Great Britain; a series of successes took place, which threatened the absolute subjuga tion of France. On the 1st of March, the French sustained a considerable loss by the surprise of the vanguard of their army, on the river Roer; on the on the 18th, Dumourier was defeated; on the 20th, he abandoned his army; on the 3d of April, his army retreated into France; on the 4th, Dumourier himself was outlawed; on the 13th, France made a declaration against all interference with foreign governments; on the 22d of April, the President issued the proclamation of neutrality; on the 3d of May, the rebellion of Corsica commenced; 29th, the rebellion of the department of Loire; 30th, the rebellion of the city of Lyons; June 2d, thirtytwo deputies of the convention, generally called the Brissotines, were arrested. About the same time, a rebellion commenced in the departments of Bouches du Rhone, Calvados and Eure; June the 8th, the first order by Great Britain for seizure of neutral vessels bound to France, with provisions, was issued. It is here to be remarked, that the impartial state of neutrality proclaimed by the President of the United States, on the 22d of the preceding April, was probably known to the British cabinet; but, whilst flushed with these successes in her crusade against liberty, the neutrality of the United States could not protect them from the invasion of their neutral rights. On the 10th of July, Conde surrendered to the Combined Armies; on the 27th, Mayence, &c.; on the 28th, Valenciennes; at the end of July, the Spaniards were in possession of Bellegrade, Collioure, St. Elme, &c., and of the whole department of the eastern Pyrenees, and part of the lower Pyrenees. The Prussians and Austrians were possessed of the lines of Weisemburg, Fort Vauban, &c., and had blockaded Landau. The Piedmontese and Hanoverians had made successful inroads into other parts of France; the royalists of La Vendee were in possession of four departments. The royalists of the fourth were in possession of Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, and the departments of Vaucluse and Rhone. On the 28th of August, all Frenchmen were put in requisition; on the 28th, Toulon surrendered to Lord Hood, by the royalists; on the 9th of September, the Duke of York was defeated; on the 11th, Lyons was subdued; on the 30th of October, the Brissotines were executed. This was nearly the state of the war upon the European continent, at the time of issuing the hostile order of the 6th of November. In this chronological statement of facts, may be found the hostile disposition of Great Britain, widened by that order against the United States. France, convulsed with intestine divisions, which extended to the very heart of the convention, laboring under the most formidable external pressure, was supposed to be an easy prey to this terrible combination of despots: the combination having in view, as I believe, the total destruction of liberty. Great Britain, possessed of the most triumphant and formidable fleet, and guiding almost implicitly the movements of this great combination, already anticipated the destruction of liberty in France, and began to turn her attention towards the same object in the United States. Hence, the order of the 6th of November; hence, the truce between Portugal and Algiers; hence, the talk between Lord Dorchester and the Indians. These were all acts of hostility, and evidently produced by the state of things before described. But what events followed these acts of hostility? A complete reverse of fortune immediately succeeded. The Duke of York had been already defeated. On the 17th of December, Toulon was retaken by the French; on the 22d, the Austrian fortified camp near Werth, was attacked and carried; on the 24th and 25th, the army under the command of the Duke of Brunswick was defeated at Kellsburg, and the Austrian army at Geisberg; on the 26th, the lines of Weisemburg were forced, and the Austrian army defeated. On the 8th of January, the hostile order for seizing neutral vessels was revoked, and on the 9th, Lord Grenville informed the American minister that the revocation of the order was to take away all pretext from evil disposed persons amongst us, for indulging their resentment against Great Britain. But, however strongly this motive may have operated on the British cabinet, it certainly was very strongly enforced by the state of things upon the European continent, which was not only changed, but completely reversed between the 6th of November, 1793, and the 8th of January, 1794. It is remarkable, that notwithstanding the several changes in the conduct of Great Britain towards the United States, they have been uniform in their impartial neutrality towards Great Britain; of course, the uniform disposition of the United States towards Great Britain could not have produced the fluctuating disposition of Great Britain towards the United States. Great Britain, in all probability, supposed, that, in the intoxication of the combined powers, from their early successes, her influence might unite them in a war against the United States, and perhaps, in the height of her presumption, she might even have indulged the impious hope of regaining her dominion over them: but this sudden reverse of fortune checked her ambitious enterprise. Probably anticipating a speedy dissolution of the combination, and having abandoned all prospects of engaging them in her iniquitous project, and being unwilling to add a new and formidable enemy to the one she already had encountered, and even fearing the effects of her previous hostilities, a sudden revolution is produced in her conduct towards the United States: it is then she is desirous of taking away all pretext from "evil disposed persons," to indulge their resentment against her: it is then the order of revocation is seen. If, then, Great Britain was unwilling to encounter a new enemy, in her then situation, will any change of circumstances justify, at this time, the supposition of a change of disposition in Great Britain, respecting war with the United States? I believe not. Peace seems to be more important to Great Britain at this moment, than at any time previously, during the whole period of the war. The nation is desirous of peace, and distressed for provisions. The combination which indulged her presumptuous hopes, crumbled into dust. Are Prussia is at peace with France, and almost at war with Great Britain. Spain is at peace with France, and hardly at peace with Great Britain. Holland is at peace and in alliance with France, and at war with Great Britain. Austria herself is almost exhausted, and desirous of peace; and the continuation of French exertions and successes has excited the admiration and astonishment of the world. these the circumstances which would justify apprehensions of war from Great Britain? And are the United States to tremble at the sound of war from a nation thus circumstanced? I trust not. And for what cause is this war to be produced? Because the House of Representatives may deem it inexpedient to become the instrument of giving efficacy to a bad bargain. I verily believe, that the alarm of war is not serious. I verily believe it is resorted to as an artificial instrument to effect a favorite object. For my part, I believe the hazard so small, as not to constitute an item in estimating the present question. I believe that Great Britain nsiders the United States as a more important commercial connexion, particularly as it respects her views in the West Indies, than some gentlemen seem to admit; and I believe also, that she views the United States more formidable as an enemy. I infer these opinions from the avidity with which this treaty seems to have been received in that country, and particularly from an expression in the speech of the king at the late meeting of parliament. Two reflections were strongly impressed upon my mind from that speech. The one, that the treaty is deemed a very advantageous one to Great Britain, the other, that Great Britain has no appetite for war against the United States, in her present situation. Hence, I cannot believe that there is the least possible foundation for the suggestion of the fatal hostility of departments of government, or of war with Great Britain, as amongst the consequences resulting from a refusal to make the necessary provisions for giving efficacy to the treaty. As the present treaty is incomplete, and as further negotiations are stipulated in the treaty itself, and in the event of a decision either way, are expected; I think the most important consequences of the vote will be these. If the House should refuse to make the provisions for carrying the treaty into effect, the new negotiations will commence without the concessions contained in the present treaty. If the provisions are made, the further negotiations will proceed under the weight of the concessions already made, and very little melioration of the present conditions can be expected, as the United States will have very little left to induce the melioration. And if no final adjustment of differences ensues, the United States will at least continue to posses all the rights attached to national sovereignty. Much has been said, and much unnecessarily said, about intemperance and heats. I will appeal to the recollection of the committee, whether there ever was a more harmonious session than the present, until this treaty was introduced into the House; and, then, whether its opponents have not discovered at least as much coolness and deliberation as its advocates. The treaty itself is the torch of discord, which has been unfortunately thrown into the United States, and it is extraordinary to observe, that those who have been most instrumental in introducing it, impute intemperance to others for a firm and decisive opposition to it. It is too much to suppose that the absolute sacrifice of opinion is an obligation due to the embarrassments, into which this treaty has thrown the United States. Upon the whole, I conscientiously believe | the treaty to be a bad one. I believe it contains the completest evidence of British interference in our internal affairs, and has laid the foundation for the further extension of British influence. It has restricted the exercise of some of the important rights of national sovereignty. It has voluntarily hazarded the neutrality of the United States in the present European war, and destroyed all pretensions to its character of impartiality. It has not af forded protection to our neutral rights, which is amongst its great objects; and, in the adjustment of the differences resulting from the inexecution of the treaty of peace, it is unequal and unjust. All these important circumstances considered, and when it is also considered, that the British persevere in impressing our seamen and seizing our vessels in violation of the clearest rights of neutral nations, even since the signing of the treaty, I cannot consent to be the instrument of giving it efficacy. I believe that it is one of those extraordinary cases which justify strong and extraordinary resistance. SPEECH ON THE JUDICIARY. The subjoined speech on the Judiciary Bill * | general happiness; whereas, another portion of was delivered by Mr. Giles, in the House of Representatives of the United States, on the eighteenth of February, 1802 : Mr. Chairman, I feel some degree of apprehension, that in the course I deem it necessary to take in the discussion of this question, some observations may fall from me which may not be in strict harmony with the feelings of some gentlemen of the committee. I shall regret, however, if a compliance with a sense of duty shall produce this effect. I wish, therefore, to apprise gentlemen, that I intend to direct my observations, as much as possible, to the effects and tendencies of measures; and that when I am constrained to speak of the views of gentlemen, it will be with respect to what I conceive to be their opinions in relation to the general interests, and not to private gratifications. It is natural that men should differ in the choice of means to produce a given end, and more natural that they should differ in the choice of political means than any other; because the subject presents more complicated and variable objects, out of which to make a choice. Accordingly, a great portion of the human mind has been at all times directed towards monarchy, as the best form of government to enforce obedience and ensure the the human mind has given a preference to the republican form, as best calculated to produce the same end: and there is no reason for applying improper motives to individuals who give a preference to either of the principles, provided in doing so they follow the honest dictates of their own judgments. It must be obvious to the most common observer, that from the commencement of the Government of the United States, and perhaps before it, a difference of opinion existed among the citizens, having more or less reference to these two extreme fundamental points, and that it manifested itself in the modification or administration of the government as soon as it was put in operation. On one side it was contended, that in the organization of the constitution, a due apportionment of authority had not been made among the several departments; that the legislature was too powerful for the executive department; and to create and preserve a proper equipoise, it was necessary to infuse into the executive department, by legislation, all artificial powers compatible with the constitution, upon which the most diffusive construction was given; or, in other words, to place in executive hands all the patronage it was possible to create, for the purpose of protecting the President against the full force of his constitutional responsibility to the people. On the other side, it was contended, that the doctrine of patronage was repugnant to the opinions and feelings of the people; that it was unnecessary, expensive and oppressive, and that the highest energy the government could possess, would flow from the confidence The favorers of the patronage system readily availed themselves of these materials for erecting a moneyed interest; gave to it a stability, or qualified perpetuity, and calculated upon its certain support in all their measures of irresponsibility. of view. After a variable conduct had been pursued by the United States in relation to these events, the depredations committed upon commerce, and the excitements produced thereby, enabled the administration to indulge themselves in a more decisive course, and they at once pushed forward the people to the X. Y. Z. of their political alphabet before they had well learned and understood the A. B. C. of the principles of the administration. Armies and navies were raised, and a variety of other schemes of expense were adopted, which placed the administration in the embarrassing predicament, either to violate their faith with their public creditors, or to resort to new taxes. The latter alternative was preferred, accompanied with other strong coercive measures to enforce obedience. A land tax was laid for two millions of dollars. This measure awakened the people to a sense of their situation, and shook to the foundation all those federal ramparts which had been planned with so much ingenuity, and erected around the executive with so much expense and labor. Another circumstance peculiarly favorable to the advocates of executive patronage, was, that during the two first presidential terms the chief executive magistrate possessed a greater degree of popularity and the confidence of the people than ever was, or perhaps ever will be again attached to the person occupying that dignified station. The general disquietude which manifested itself in consequence of these enterprising measures, in the year 1800, induced the federal party to apprehend that they had pushed their principles too far, and they began to entertain doubts of the result of the presidential election which was approaching. In this state of things it was natural for them to look out for some department of the government in which they could entrench themselves in the event of an unsuccessful issue in the election, and continue to support those favorite principles of irresponsibility which they could never consent to abandon. This was done not only by funding the debt proper of the United States, but by assuming the payment of the State debts and funding them also; and it is believed extending the assumption beyond the actual engagements of the States. The judiciary department of course presented Hence the federal axiom, that the public debt is itself as best fitted for their object, not only bea public blessing. Shortly after this event an cause it was already filled with men who had Indian war sprang up, I will not say by what manifested the most indecorous zeal in favor of means; in consequence of which an army was their principles, but because they held their added to the list of patronage. The Algerines offices by indefinite tenures, were not subject commenced a predatory war upon the com- to periodical appointments, and of course were merce of the United States, and thence a navy further removed from any responsibility to the formed a new item of patronage. Taxes be- people than either of the other departments. came necessary to meet the expenses of this Accordingly, on the 11th of March, 1800, a bill system, and an arrangement of internal taxes, for the more convenient organization of the an excise, &c., &c., still swelled the list of pat-courts of the United States, was presented to ronage. But the circumstance which most fa- the House of Representatives. This bill apvored this system was the breaking out of a pears to have had for its objects, first, the gradtremendous and unprecedented war in those ual demolition of the State courts, by increasing countries of Europe with which the United the number, and extending the jurisdiction of States had the most intimate relations. The feel- the federal courts. Second, to afford additionings and sympathies of the people of the United al protection to the principles of the then exStates were so strongly attracted by the tremen-isting administration by creating a new corps dous scenes existing there, that they considered of judges of concurring political opinions. This their own internal concerns in a secondary point bill, however, was not passed into a law during |