the tract. We have, however, already given reasons for the belief that the treatise is, in parts at least, of an age considerably later than the Aristotelian epoch, that post-classical usages are interwoven into the very warp and woof of it, and that to emend it into strict accordance with the Greek of Aristotle's age would be almost equivalent to rewriting the work. Further, we are disposed to think that even after all the violations of classical usage had been pruned away, not even then would the essay produce on a judicious reader with an ear for style the impression of being the work of Aristotle, or even of one of his immediate successors; and that wholesale emendation might do more harm than good by disguising from us the real character of an essay which, though ancient and full of interest and instruction, does not seem to have emanated from Aristotle, nor from any of the pupils whom he taught in person.

ART.

ART. IV.-Fortification: its past Achievements, present Development, and future Progress. By Major G. Sydenham Clarke, C.M.G., Royal Engineers. London, 1890.

M

AJOR CLARKE has the courage of his opinions. His views on the theory and practice of fortification differ in many important respects from those taught in the schools and maintained by a large proportion of his brother officers; and he has said so in language which some have denounced as dogmatic, and more have thought to be irritating. Controversial, he assuredly is; and in supporting his thesis, he has not always confined himself to the gravity of argument and dignity of demeanour which are commonly assumed to be the concomitants of scientific discussion. Sarcasm, irony, and ridicule, are pressed into his service as opportunity offers, and are wielded with an aptitude and dexterity which seem to belong to the profession of attack rather than to that of defence. Among military engineers, of all ages and all countries, there has been a certain tendency to follow in the gradually deepening ruts of established usage, to substitute authority for common sense, and the lessons of the schools for practical requirements. Major Clarke is an engineer; but no one is more keenly sensible of the existence of this tendency; he feels it as a personal injury, and he lays himself out to demolish it. Of course he will not succeed; he may very probably bring about a complete revolution in the art, and we believe he has gone far towards rendering monumental' structures impossible for some time to come, at least in this country; but we fear that at the best he will only introduce a new pedantry, with new fetishes. This is in the nature of things; but it is far indeed from being what Major Clarke proposes. His contention, throughout, is that the school theory of fortification is erroneous, not because it is taught in the schools, but because it aims at applying fixed methods rather than principles; and that thus permanent fortifications, on the most elaborate system, of the most approved geometrical trace, and with an intricacy of design greater than that of Rosamond's bower, have frequently given less favourable results than the roughest earthworks hastily thrown up to meet the requirements of the moment, and with primary reference to tactical principles. By implication, indeed, though not in exact words, he seems to say that, outside very narrow limits, permanent fortification is a mistake; for permanent fortification has almost necessarily some theoretical object in view, some fancy to illustrate, some idea to exemplify, which may, but

more

more frequently may not, be in accordance with the true scientific principles, the principles of tactics, by which alone the defence should be ordered. 'Tactical principles and human nature are,' he urges, 'practically the same in all ages, and in them alone can a solid basis be found for systems of fortification.'

On this text Major Clarke enlarges through the greater part of his volume, with a wealth of historical illustration which would be still more convincing than it actually is, if we did not sometimes feel a doubt as to whether the facts are not treated in the manner suggested by Mr. Froude's celebrated comparison of history to a child's letter box, out of which, by a proper selection, any wished-for word may be formed. Among other such instances, we may mention the siege of Belfort by the Germans in 1870-1, which Major Clarke adduces as a proof of the utter futility of an enceinte as a practical retrenchment.' This stupendous enceinte,' he says, ' a veritable triumph of the draughtsman's art,' was defended by two rough and ready redoubts, Les Perches.' The capture of these involved the surrender of Belfort; they were turned into a formidable artillery position, and the enceinte and citadel did not await the opening of fire. From which, he argues, it follows that no enceinte can now hope to offer any further resistance on its own account.' Abstract propositions of this nature are always open to a suspicion of exaggeration, and this one is not yet generally accepted; but, true or false, it is not a legitimate deduction from the circumstances of the fall of Belfort as narrated, which prove only that the design of this particular enceinte, dominated by these particular heights, was faulty. It is quite possible to conceive an enceinte not so dominated. But in fact, the fall of Belfort is no illustration of the point, one way or another. The enceinte and citadel did, indeed, surrender eight days after the fall of the Perches, not because they were indefensible-for that was never proved-but in consequence of orders from the central government, on the signing of the preliminaries of peace.

Other instances of similar want of precision might easily be pointed out. In themselves, they are not of much importance, but they must be considered as weakening the conclusions which are based on them, and which it was quite unnecessary to bolster up by doubtful evidence. It will not be questioned that elaborate defences, prepared at leisure, have often disappointed expectations, and that improvised works have obtained most marked successes; but in discussing their relative inferiority or superiority, it ought not to be ignored that exact comparison

parison is commonly impossible, by reason of some essential difference of conditions. An entrenched position held by an army numerically strong, and with open communications, cannot be properly compared with an isolated fortress held by a garrison of a few thousand men; nor can it be urged that the earthworks of Torres Vedras, Sebastopol, or Richmond, were superior to permanent fortifications, until it is shown that permanent fortifications have failed under fairly equal conditions; but it is not to be denied that these earth works answered the required purpose as well as any permanent fortifications could have done; though, at Sebastopol, their construction in presence of the enemy was attended with great difficulty and very serious loss of men. So also at Plevna,

which probably stands out as the strongest instance in all time of the defence of a position by improvised works, works of the simplest kind, but which, under the modern conditions of breech-loading small-arms, could be reduced only by blockade, after the assailants had been repeatedly beaten back, with most terrible slaughter. But the defenders of these works, though very inferior in number to the allies, were, on the other hand, far superior to the strongest garrison for which a fortress was ever constructed; and with many and excessive differences, the position of the Turks at Plevna seems analogous to that of the French at Malplaquet, rather than at Tournay or Lisle.

Of sieges, rightly so called, those of Silistria in 1854 and of Kars in 1855 are the best known, and the most often referred to as examples of the intrinsic superiority of 'rough and ready' fortifications; and Major Clarke is inclined to accept them as such, even whilst admitting the importance of the presence of the English officers. He says:

'The successful defence of Silistria, and of Arab Tabia in particular, was mainly due to Captains Nasmyth and Butler; but the whole operation well illustrates the difference between the teaching of theory and that of war. A town subject to bombardment throughout the siege; six detached forts of simple design unconnected by trenches; one advanced work (Arab Tabia) open at the gorge and having a ditch 6 feet 9 inches deep, not palisaded; a motley garrison of about 12,000 men, subsequently reinforced by some Bashi-Bazouks -these were the conditions under which an army of 60,000 men was completely repulsed, and the wave of Russian invasion hopelessly broken.'

Similarly at Kars:

The Turkish force of about 15,000 men, forming the garrison, had been signally defeated at Kuruk-Deri, in the previous year. When the British officers arrived, the greater part of the infantry Vol. 172.-No. 344.

2 A

was

was "guileless of all knowledge of drill and discipline," and many of the officers were "ignorant even of the words of command." The men were in rags, and had not received pay for two years. The artillery alone was fairly efficient. With this garrison, General Williams completely repulsed the determined assault of Mouravieff's fine force of 35,000 men on the 29th of September, 1855. The attack began just before daybreak, and the fighting lasted for seven hours. The Russians were completely defeated, with a loss of more than 10,000 men, although the whole Turkish force engaged was under 7000, and its loss only 1200.'

We may perhaps think that Major Clarke has scarcely given full weight to what Americans have called the personal magnetism' of the English officers, or to the deduction that Turkish soldiers will fight splendidly when they have confidence in their leaders; but the force of his conclusion will readily be admitted.

'Plevna, like Sebastopol, supplies no argument against permanent works built in peace time; but, in common with all experience of war, it distinctly proves that the fortification which has been arrived at in defiance of the law of the survival of the fittest-which appears to have been evolved under an arbitrary and artificial selection akin to that which has given to us the pug dog and the lop-eared rabbitmay be safely relegated to the domain of abstract speculation.'

The point established, according to Major Clarke, is that, under modern conditions, the power of the magazine rifle is so tremendous, that, with reasonable precautions on the part of the defence, troops cannot live to cross the unprotected zone.

'An assaulting force when in movement cannot deliver an effective fire, and cannot move without exposing a full-length target to an antagonist who shows head and shoulders at most. This condition

has obtained ever since the introduction of firearms. It is a constant factor in dealing with questions of attack and defence.... Plan your assault as you will, there comes a stage at which the advance has to be made without any support from artillery fire. When the smallarm was capable of being fired only about once a minute, this zone could be crossed with comparatively little difficulty. The artillery of the attack would endeavour to keep the defenders from their parapets until the last moment, and during that last moment the fire of the defence was necessarily weak. Hence arose the vast ditches, the elaborate arrangements of flank defence, the caponiers, counterscarp galleries, &c., of the various systems of fortification. The modern rifle has rendered all these expedients absolutely unnecessary in the future. The intensity of fire which a single line of men can now deliver upon a given area exceeds enormously the maximum formerly attainable by the combination of every conceivable system of cross-flanking. The infantry garrisons can be kept under cover