money on February 5, 1914, to Mr. Herndon, a lawyer in Charleston, and got the deed with a renunciation of dower on it, not by the plaintiff in this case who is found by the jury to be the lawful wife of Stevens, but by one Nora Harmon or Nora Stevens, who claimed to be the wife of Stevens. We cannot escape the conclusion that not only was there sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of the jury, concurred in by the trial Judge, that the deed was invalid, but no other reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence that the deed never was legally delivered to the defendant.

Stevens and Dunning negotiated for the sale, a deed was prepared and signed by Stevens and offered to Dunning. Dunning declined to accept it until proper renunciation of

dower was made by the wife of Stevens, and it was 1,2 returned for that purpose; before this was done

Stevens dies, and some months later the pretended wife of Stevens renounces dower, and the money is paid over, not to a legal representative of Stevens or his heirs at law, but an attorney at law. Even if Mr. Herndon was the attorney of Stevens as an attorney at law or attorney in fact his authority ceased and was revoked by Stevens' death, and he had no power or authority to represent him after his death. Any authority he had as agent or attorney ceased with the death of Stevens. Johnson v. Johnson, 27 S. C. 316, 3 S. E. 606, 13 Am. St. Rep. 636.

Stevens died before the deed was delivered or the money paid, and the attorney, Herndon, had no power or authority after his death to deliver the deed and collect the money set forth in the deed as the consideration. Having reached the conclusion that the finding of the jury, concurred in by the trial Judge, that the deed was invalid in that it was never legally delivered to the defendant, this conclusively determines the cause, and it is unnecessary to consider the other exceptions in the case.

The exceptions are overruled, and judgment affirmed.

SANDFORD ET AL. v. SANDFORD ET AL.

(91 S. E. 294.)

1. DEEDS CONSTRUCTION--ESTATES CREATED.-A deed granting land, “to have and to hold unto G. F. S., his heirs and assigns, forever, the conditions of said sale being: That said G. F. S. is not to mortgage or in any wise dispose of said land. And after his death it is to go to his wife and his and her children"-grants a fee simple.

2. DEEDS CONSTRUCTION-ESTATES CREATED.-The condition following the grant therein is void, since a remainder after a fee is void, and an attempt to convey a fee and deprive the grantee of an incident of ownership is void.

3. DEEDS CONSTRUCTION-ESTATES CREATED "INTENTION."-While the intention of the grantor should govern, it cannot violate a rule of law; "intention" being a word of art, and signifying the meaning of the writing.

Before BOWMAN, J., Orangeburg, July, 1916. Affirmed.

Action by Sylvanus Sandford and others against Govan F. Sandford and others. Decree for defendant, Govan F. Sandford, and plaintiffs and certain other defendants appeal.

Messrs. R. E. Copes and W. B. Martin, for appellants, cite: As to rule of construction: 102 S. C. 242; 75 S. C. 434. Conditions of sale part of habendum: 45 U. S. 353. "Heirs" as word of purchase: 36 S. C. 44; 14 S. E. 198; 10 S. E. 878; 94 S. C. 243; 104 S. C. 100.

Messrs. Raysor & Summers and Wolfe & Berry, for respondents, cite: As to construction of deed: 39 S. C. 280; 57 S. C. 175. Common law estates conveyed by deed: 88 S. C. 300; 76 S. C. 487; 51 S. C. 555; 46 S. C. 356; 102 S. C. 367; 101 S. C. 428. Repugnant limitations: 102 S. C. 243. Repugnancy: 102 S. C. 243; 15 S. C. 441, 442; 21 Pick. 42; 2 Bl. Com. 109; 4 Kent Com. 535; 2 Washb. R. P. 6; 2 Tiffiny R. P. 499. Construction of legal terms: 102

S. C. 11 and 367. Variance by parol: 15 S. C. 32; 58 S. C. 132, 133.

February 8, 1917.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by MR. Justice FRASER.

Jesse Sandford conveyed to Govan Sandford a certain tract of land for a valuable consideration. The clause of the deed that is before us for construction reads as follows:

"To have and to hold all and singular the said premises before mentioned unto the said G. F. Sandford, his heirs and assigns, forever. The conditions of sale of the within piece of land are as follows: That the said G. F. Sandford is not to mortgage or in any wise dispose of said land. And after his death it is to go to his wife and his and her children."

The wife is dead, leaving no children, so it is now impossible for the remainder to take effect, even if valid. G. F. Sandford mortgaged the land. The mortgage was foreclosed and the land purchased at the foreclosure sale by George W. Binniker.

Appellant says:

"The only questions submitted to the Court under this statement of agreed facts are as follows: (1) Did the written instrument, Exhibit A, convey to the defendant, Govan F. Sandford, said real estate in fee simple? (2) If said written instrument did not convey said real estate to Govan F. Sandford, in fee simple, what estate therein was thereby granted to him, if any?"

1. The deed conveyed to Govan F. Sandford a fee simple. There can be no doubt about that. There can be no doubt

20-S.C.-106

that a remainder, after a fee simple, is void in a deed. It

is equally clear (and no citation of authorities is 1, 2 necessary) that an attempt to convey an estate in fee

simple and deprive the purchaser of the incidents of ownership is not effective in law. When Jesse Sandford conveyed the land to Govan F. Sandford, and "his heirs and assigns, forever," the entire estate was gone from Jesse Sandford, and he had nothing to limit. A grantor may add to the estate conveyed by subsequent clauses, because he may make a new grant of additional rights. The grantor cannot restrict the grant, because the thing granted is gone. It may be said that this statement will give many trust estates absolutely to the trustees. This is not the result, because as soon as a Court of equity finds either from the deed itself or competent testimony that there is a trust, the Court of equity will preserve and enforce the trust, and it matters not what may be the form of the instrument.

Appellant claims that the "intention" of the parties must govern. "Intention" is a term of art, and signifies the meaning of the writing. Even the intention will not be allowed to violate a rule of law. The law does not allow

3 the limitation of a remainder, after a fee in a deed, nor the granting of an estate stripped of its incidents. The exception that claims that the deed did not convey a fee simple to Govan F. Sandford is overruled.

2. The second question has been answered.

The judgment is affirmed.

MESSRS. JUSTICES HYDRICK, WATTS and GAGE concur in the opinion of the Court.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GARY Concurs in the result.

Rep.]

October Term, 1916.

9589

BATSON ET AL. v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.

(91 S. E. 310.)

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-STREETS-VACATION-POWERS.-Under the statute stating the charter powers and providing that the town council shall have full power to make regulations as to streets of the town necessary and proper for security, welfare, and convenience, the town council of West Greenville had power to close two streets across which a railroad was about to put eight or ten tracks, as a measure for safety within the town police power.

2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POWERS.-While a town has only the power given it by the legislature, that does not mean that the power to do each particular act must be specifically granted.

3. INJUNCTION-RESTRAINING VACATION OF STREETS-POWERS OF COURT. -Though Courts are open to award damages for invasion of private rights, they are not justified in keeping open a dangerous street while doubtful rights are being litigated.

Before MAULDIN, J., Greenville, June, 1916. Affirmed.

Action for injunction by A. C. Batson and others against the Southern Railway Company, existing under the laws of State of Virginia. From an order refusing application for the injunction, plaintiffs appeal.

Messrs. Wm. G. Sirrine, McCullough, Martin & Blythe, and R. G. Stone, for appellants.

Mr. Stone cites: As to power of municipality: 23 S. C. 517; 1 Dillon Municipal Corporations, p. 149, sec. 89; Civil Code, sec. 2923, 2926, 2951, 3065, 2946; 7 S. E. 146; 49 S. E. 314; 41 Am. Rep. 561; 78 Ga. 271; 2 Woods R. R. Law, sec. 273. Distinguishes: 92 S. C. 130.

FOOTNOTE.-As to the discontinuance or vacation of highways by acts of public authorities, see notes in 26 L. R. A. 821 to 840, 2 A. &. E. Ann. Cas. 87, 46 Am. St. Rep. 494.