deree cannot interfere therewith
without invading their posses-
sion. Wilson v. Trexler (90 S.
E. 180), 106 S. C. 15.
5. Under Carmack amendment
to the interstate commerce act,
punitive damages are not recov-
erable against a carrier for mere
wrongful acts. Harman V.
Southern Ry. Co. (90 S. E. 1023),
106 S. C. 209.
6. Under the Carmack amend-
Iment of the interstate commerce
act, punitive damages were not
recoverable against a carrier for
unauthorized wilful or wanton
acts of its servants in delaying
transportation of goods shipped,
notwithstanding the later enact-
ment of the Cummins amend-
ment, making carriers liable for
"actual loss." De Loach v.
Southern Ry. Co. (90 S. E. 701),
106 S. C. 155.
7. As general damages both natu-
rally and necessarily flow from
the wrongful act, party whose
rights are invaded need not al-
lege general damages, but is en-
titled to recover such damages
as follow natural, necessary and
proximate result of act of wrong-
ful invasion which fixes his right
of action. Vann v. Tyler (91
S. E. 301), 106 S. C. 377.
8. As special damages naturally
but not necessarily flow from
the wrongful act, but are re-
coverable, although wrongdoer
could not have anticipated par-
ticular result, it is necessary to
allege and prove special dam-
ages. Id.
See, also, Commerce. Harman v.
So. Ry. Co. (90 S. E. 1023), 106
S. C. 209. Landlord and Tenant.
Saine v. Hertzog (91 S. E. 859),
106 S. C. 501. Logs and Log-
ging. Griggs v. Graves (91 8. E.
319), 106 S. C. 431.
DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT.
1. Under the statute giving an ac-
tion for wrongful death, where
none existed before and limiting
the right of recovery to those
cases in which the party injured
would have been entitled to re-
cover if death had not ensued,
the beneficiary of a decedent who
had released the defendant could
not recover. Rish v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry. (90 S. E. 704), 106
S. C. 143.
1. In interpreting trust deeds,
Courts are not bound by the
rigid rules controlling in the con-
struction of law deeds. Duncan
v. Clarke (90 S. E. 180), 106 S. C.
17.
2. Where a trust deed read that
E. should hold for the life of her
husband, "and at his death for
the use of such issue as he shall
leave living," and he left five
children and a grandchild, such
granchild was not entitled to a
sixth share, his father also being
entitled to a sixth, since "issue"
means those persons whose names
are practically written in the
statute of distribution, and when
heirs named in the statute come
forward, an heir and his or her
child may not both take. Dun-
can v. Clarke (90 S. E. 180),
106 S. C. 17.
3. In foreclosure suit, living chil-
dren of the mortgagor and her
husband who had deeded the
property to her for life and at
her death to their "body issue,"
and to "her heirs and assigns
forever," held to be necessary
parties to be brought in under
section 171 of Code Civ. Proc.
1912. Bank of Prosperity v.
Dominick (90 S. E. 264), 106
S. C. 120.
4. Where deed delivered to the
grantee was returned for re-
nunciation of dower by the gran-
tor's wife, and, before that was
done, the grantor died, and his
pretended wife renounced dower,
and the price was paid, not to
the grantor's legal representa-
tive, or his heirs at law, but to
an attorney at law, the deed was
Bunch
never legally delivered.
v. Dunning (91 S. E. 331), 106
S. C. 300.
5. Where a man gets valuable
tract of land for nothing from
one whose condition is such that
the borderland between weak-
mindedness and imbecility is a
mere shadow, in the absence of
a clear and satisfactory explana-
tion, he is guilty of fraud.
Tuten v. McAlhaney (91 S. E.
328), 106 S. C. 328.
6. The registry of a deed is a
matter entirely different from
its proof; the principal object
being to affect third parties with
notice. J. W. Dillon & Son Co.
v. Oliver (91 S. E. 304), 106 S.
C. 410.
7. While the intention of the
grantor should govern, it cannot
violate a rule of law, "intention"
being a word of art, and signi-
fying the meaning of the writing.
Sandford v. Sandford (91 S. Ē.
294), 106 S. C. 304.
8. In an action to foreclose a pur-
chase-money mortgage on lot al-
leged to contain a certain num-
ber of acres, evidence held in-
sufficient to establish defendant's
contention that it did not con-
tain such number of acres when
plaintiff conveyed. Wright v.
Seale (91 S. E. 291), 106 S. C.
261.
9. Deed granting land "to have
and to hold unto G. F. S., his
heirs and assigns, forever, the
condition of said sale being: That
said G. F. S. is not to mortgage
or in anywise dispose of said
land. And after his death it is
to go to his wife and his and her
children"-grants a fee simple.
Sandford v. Sandford (91 S. E.
294), 106 S. C. 304.
10 A condition against alienation
following a fee simple grant is
void, since a remainder after a
fee is void, and an attempt to
convey a fee and deprive the
grantee of an incident of owner-
ship is void. Id.
11. Where the condition of gran-
tor is such that borderland be-
tween weak-mindness and im-
becility is a mere shadow, and
he conveys valuable property to
stranger in blood without con-
sideration, burden is on grantee
to remove presumption of undue
influence. Tuten v. McAlhaney
(91 S. E. 328), 106 S. C. 328.
12. Evidence held to show that
deed was secured by undue in-
fluence upon grantor of doubt-
ful mentality, without consider-
ation. Tuten v. McAlhaney (91
S. E. 328), 106 S. C. 328.
13. Where a deed conveyed land in
trust for use of grantor's life for
life, with remainder over in fee
to her children, although the
estate conveyed to children could
not become vested interest in
possession until death of life
tenant, when life tenant died
the statute executed use in
children. Holder V. Melvin
(91 S. E. 97), 106 S. C. 245.
14. The legal interest of trustee in
an estate given to him in trust is
measured, not by words of in-
heritance in the deed or will, but
by object and extent of trust
upon which the estate is given.
Holder v. Melvin (91 8. E. 97),
106 S. C. 245.
15. Where a deed provided an
estate in trust to wife of gran-
tor for life, with remainder over
in fee to her children, the trust
was active until death of the life
tenant, but passive as to re-
mainder to children, as no active
duty rested upon trustee in con-
nection with the remainder.
Holder v. Melvin (91 S. E. 97),
106 S. C. 245.
16. A deed, conveying land in trust
to grantor's wife for life, with
remainder over in fee to children,
held to convey a vested remain-
der in fee in a child of the life
tenant in esse when deed was
executed, but who predeceased
mother, so that share of such
child passed to its issue. Holder
v. Melvin (91 S. E. 97), 106 S.
C. 245.
18. The construction of a deed is a
question of law for the Court.
Metz v. Metz, (91 S. E. 864),
106 S. C. 514.
19. Deeds executed by a father to
his children of parts of land
claimed to have been included in
a prior deed by him to them are
admissible as bearing on the
question whether the prior deed
was delivered. Metz v. Metz (91
S. E. 864), 106 S. C. 514.
1. Fraud is recognizable at law as
well as in equity. Gordon-Mc-
Cabe & Co. v. Colleton Mercan-
tile & Mfg. Co. (90 S. E. 161),
106 S. C. 27.
2. Equitable jurisdiction did not
attach to an action between deal-
ers in cotton, because plaintiffs,
also seeking the recovery of a
specific sum of money, claimed
the right to foreclose their lien
on defendant's cotton in their
possession, which lien they had
already in fact foreclosed, since
they had an adequate and com-
plete remedy at law. Id.
3. Jurisdiction in actions for ac-
counting. See Account. Gordon-
McCabe & Co. v. Colleton Mer-
cantile & Mfg. Co. (90 S. E. 161),
106 S. C. 27.
4. In an action to recover land,
charge in answer that trustee
had violated the trust and given
plaintiff a deed of trust proper-
ty for his own benefit, against
the cestui que trust's rights,
was an issue triable by chancel-
lor. Middleton v. Levi (90 S. E.
325), 106 S. C. 32.
5. In action to recover land, and
in view of admission of answer
that defendant did not own land
in dispute and that his deed was
made to secure money due him
from cestui que trust loans to
her without notice of plaintiff's
claim of title, the issue was for
the chancellor. Id.
6. In equity, the Circuit Judge
was not bound by the verdict,
as he is bound in cases at law.
Middleton v. Levi (90 S. E. 325),
106 S. C. 32.
7. The defense of laches applica-
ble to a suit for equitable relief
need not be set up specifically,
and if clearly established by the
evidence, relief will be denied by
the Court on its own motion.
Cook v. Knight (91 S. E. 312),
106 S. C. 310.
8. As the defense of laches need
not be formally pleaded and will
be applied by the Court on its
own motion, a complaint seeking
the reformation of a deed on the
ground of mistake is not sub-
ject to a motion to make more
definite and certain, though not
averring when the mistake was
discovered or that the agreement
for the conveyance was in writ-
ing. Id.
9. The length of time which will
justify a Court of equity in re-
fusing relief on the ground of
laches depends upon the facts
of the particular case; laches
connoting not only undue lapse
of time, but also negligence and
opportunity to have acted soon-
er. Id.
See Water and Watercourses.
Parish v. Town of Yorkville (90
S. E. 185), 106 S. C. 23.
See Statute of Frauds. Harly v.
Wilson (90 S. E. 183), 106 S. C.
7. Witness. Contradiction of.
Turner v. Blue Ridge Ry. Co.
(90 S. E. 185), 106 S. C. 11. Com-
petency, transactions with de-
ceased. Patrick v. English (91
S. E. 295), 106 S. C. 267. Lar-
ceny. State v. Scott (91 S. E.
318), 106 S. C. 270.
1. Evidence held insufficient to
show that one defendant, in pur-
chasing from the other, had
notice of fraud by which the
other secured a deed, so as to
put him on inquiry. Tuten v.
McAlhaney (91 S. E. 328), 106
S. C. 328.
2. Under Code Civ. Proc., sec.
438, it was incompetent for
plaintiff in an action on a
note to testify that an indorser,
since deceased, made payments
and promises to him, and in what
the last payment consisted.
Patrick v. English (91 S. E. 295),
106 S. C. 267.
3. In action upon a note indorsed
by defendant's intestate, it was
competent for plaintiff to testi-
fy that when he got possession
of the note it had intestate's
name on the back of it, and that
intestate did not put his name
on the back after plaintiff got it.
Patrick v. English (91 S. E. 295),
106 S. C. 267.
4. In prosecution for selling
liquor, action of Court, in refus-
ing to allow a State's witness to
be asked on cross-examination
"if he had not been indicted for
nonsupport of his family," was
not abuse of discretion. State v.
Grice (91 8. E. 307), 106 S. C.
280.
5. In a prosecution for seduction
under promise to marry, testi-
mony of mother, in regard to
statements by defendant before
and after event to the effect,
that he would marry girl, held
sufficient to corroborate testi-
mony of girl under statute; "to
corroborate" meaning to
strengthen or add weight or
credibility to a thing. State v.
Griffin (91 S. E. 318), 106 S. C.
283.
6. In a prosecution for seduction
under promise to marry, state-
ments of promise made by de-
fendant to mother before event
held correlated with statements
made after event, and, therefore,
competent to corroborate testi-
mony of girl. Id.
7. Where defendants were con-
victed of larceny principally on
the testimony of a small negro
boy, who claimed to have seen
the taking, motion for new trial,
based on affidavit of another that
the boy, after the trial, had
stated he did not see and could
not have seen the taking, was
properly refused; the offered
testimony being merely hearsay.
State v. Raysor (91 S. E. 311),
106 S. C. 287.
8. Testimony of one when ex-
amined before a coroner's jury
cannot be used against him on a
subsequent prosecution for the
homicide, as this would be to re-
quire him to furnish testimony
against himself; any admission
or confession in such testimony
not being free and voluntary.
State v. Perry (91 S. E. 300),
106 S. C. 289.
9. Error in admission against de-
fendant in homicide of his testi-
mony at the coroner's inquest is
not harmless because of evidence
of a similar declaration by him
elsewhere. Id.
10. As to the issue whether a cer-
tain tract was within the descrip-
tion of the deed, witnesses may
not answer yes or no, but only
describe the land and point it
out on the plat. Metz v. Metz
(91 8. E. 864), 106 S. C. 514.
11. In an action for money alleged
to have been loaned by plaintiff
through her husband to the de-
fendant, declarations made in
another case by plaintiff's hus-
band that plaintiff was owner of
defendant's business held inad-
missible as not binding on plain-
tiff in absence of authority given
husband to speak for her. True
v. Cudd (91 S. E. 856), 106 S. C.
478.
12. An alleged oral contract by a
person since deceased to will
property to the plaintiff is void
as within the statute of frauds.
Brown v. Golightly (91 S. E.
869), 106 S. C. 519.
13. In action for price of dresses
sold, defendants' evidence that
goods were defective in material
and workmanship was admissi-
ble under general denial to dis-
prove allegation of value.
Skudowitz v. Basha (91 S. E.
868), 106 S. C. 541.
14. In action for goods sold, evi-
dence that defendants had at-
tempted to rescind contract by
returning part of goods and
tendering payment for part re-
tained was inadmissible under
general denial. Id.
15. In an action for the balance
due for material and labor, it
was proper to exclude answer to
the question, "You know that
there was a provision in this con-
tract for a penalty for failure
to finish work in proper time,
did you not?" since the contract,
being in writing, must speak for
itself. Guimarin V. Southern
Life & Trust Co. (90 S. E. 319),
106 S. C. 37.
16. A written contract cannot be
supplemented by parol testi-
mony. Guimarin v. Southern Life
& Trust Co. (90 S. E. 319), 106
S. C. 37.
17. That one has undertaken to an-
swer for the default of another
cannot be proved by parol.
Guimarin v. Southern Life &
Trust Co. (90 S. E. 319), 106
S. C. 37.
18. In an action for an insurance
agent's failure to cancel a policy,
it was error to exclude evidence
that the agent's attention was
never called to the prohibited
list. Westchester Fire Ins. Co.
v. Bollin (90 S. E. 327), 106 S. C.
4.5.
19. An insurance agent held not
entitled to a directed verdict in
an action for his failure to can-
cel a policy on the ground that
plaintiff failed to prove a con-
tract requiring the agent to ren-
der that service. Id.
20. While custom may be relevant
in doubtful cases, a general cus-
tom was irrelevant where there
was no doubt at the time of the
trial. Bailey v. Savannah Guano
Co. (90 S. E. 317), 106 S. C. 50.
21. Evidence of assumption of risk
and negligence. See Ballenger
v. So. Ry. Co. (90 S. E. 1019),
106 S. C. 200.
22. In murder trial, it was error to
admit testimony that the witness,
awakened by the shooting, heard
men going by in the dark, and
a question, "Did you get him,”
replied to with the words, "Yes,
but God damn it, I got him in
the back," and that one of the
men said, "What are you going
so fast for?" where the witness
did not identify any of the
voices; the testimony being plain
hearsay. State v. Winfield (91
S. E. 327), 106 S. C. 392.
23. An examination of the deceased
by a physician chosen by the in-
surer is some evidence that a
disease, which under the terms
of the policy would have avoided
it, did not exist when the policy
was executed. Baker v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. (91 S. E.
324), 106 S. C. 419.
24. An examination of the deceased
by a physician chosen by the in-
surer is some evidence that the
existence of a disease, which by
the terms of the policy would
have avoided it, was known to
and waived by the insurer. Id.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINIS-
TRATORS.
1. Executors having already em-
ployed a large force of legal
talent may not, without necessity
being shown, employ more at-
torneys and make their compen-
sation a charge on the estate.
In re Coleman (91 S. E. 861),
106 S. C. 534.
2. The criterion for fixing fee of
attorneys employed by executors
is not the amount of the estate,
but the benefits derived and the
labor, learning and skill involved.
In re Coleman (91 S. E. 861),
106 S. C. 534.
3. Where an administrator with
will annexed conveyed stocks,
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