demand on the respondent in this case, and after the time when the respondent claimed that the local-option law was in force in Gratiot county under and by virtue of these unsigned and unverified proceedings, and at which time also, as appears from the record, the chairman was out of office, and had no authority, under any of the provisions of this act, to perform a duty which the law required him to perform at the very time the proceedings were had, and before the final adjournment of the board." It was held, upon the basis of the conceded and undisputed facts, that the local-option law was not operative in the county. In Thomas v. Abbott, 105 Mich. 687 (63 N. W. 984), it was held that it was sufficient if the journal entry of the order was signed below the record of adjournment to the next day. In Shelden v. Township of Marion, 101 Mich. 256 (59 N. W. 614), the validity of the State and county taxes was assailed for want of the signature of the clerk of the board of supervisors to the record of the board in relation to the equalization of the assessment rolls and the apportionment of taxes for the year in question. At the trial the person who had been clerk, and was then deputy clerk, was permitted to sign the record nunc pro tunc, but later on the trial court held that he had no authority to make such amendment. Speaking upon this question, this court said: "It is, we think, generally held that the clerk whose duty it is to make the record may make amendments of the same while in office, and when no rights have been built up on the faith of the imperfect record. See 1 Dillon on Municipal Corporations (4th Ed.), §§ 294, 295; 1 Beach on Public Corporations, § 1300. See, also, Boyce v. Auditor General, 90 Mich. 314 (51 N. E. 457). There is respectable authority for holding that the clerk may make such an amendment after having retired from office (Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H. 168; Kiley v. Cranor, 51 Mo. 541); and, where this is not permitted, it has been held that one who has retired from office, and has been since re-elected, and has custody of the record, may properly make the amendment. Welles v. Battelle, 11 Mass. 477; Mott v. Reynolds, 27 Vt. 206. In the present case the amendment consisted simply in affixing the signature of the clerk. He was at the time in the sworn custody of the records as deputy clerk, and could act, within the reasoning and principle of the cases which permit a clerk on reelection to amend a record made up during a former term. He was properly permitted to make the amendment. We do not decide what would be the effect if a third person had acquired rights to the property taxed before the attempted amendment. But such is not the case here. As before stated, this is an equitable action for money paid, and no hardship is done to plaintiff in permitting the amendment. In Boyce v. Auditor General, supra, we held that the chairman and clerk could, while still in office, affix their signatures. The case of Auditor General v. Hill, 97 Mich. 80 (56 N. W. 219), is cited as supporting the doctrine that, after having retired from office, the chairman and clerk could not properly affix their signatures to the record. Such a holding is not necessarily in conflict with the views herein expressed, but it should perhaps be stated that the point was not argued or considered in the case of Auditor General v. Hill. On the contrary, as appears by the opinion, it was admitted that, if the proceedings were not signed until after the chairman and clerk had retired from office, the record was void. The court, therefore, determined the case solely upon the question of fact. The case of Weston v. Monroe, 84 Mich. 342 (47 N. W. 446), was a case in which no attempt was made to correct the omission, and was also a case in which the rights of third persons had arisen, which distinguishes it from the present. The amendment here was made before the rights of any third parties had intervened, and was made by a lawful custodian of the record, and upon his own knowledge. See, as further bearing upon this question, Cooley on Taxation (2d Ed.), pp. 320, 321; Parish v. Golden, 35 Ñ. Y. 462.” In the case now before us, it is undisputed that the record was properly signed by the chairman, and was also signed by the clerk at some time during his then or immediately succeeding term of office; and, if the rule of the Shelden Case is applicable to this case, the record was properly authenticated. There is much force, however, in the contention of counsel for appellee that there is a clear distinction between the statutes, which renders that rule inapplicable, in that the local-option statute limits the time for signing the record to the time "before final adjournment." We do not find it necessary, however, to determine this question, since, in our judgment, the case must be determined against appellee upon another point. The record of the board of supervisors in question is fair upon its face. The record of the board for October 21, 1908, contains the report of the committee to whom the local-option petitions were referred; the resolution submitting the question to the electors and its adoption. Immediately following the adoption of the report and resolution appears the following: "Moved by Sup. Bishop, seconded by Sup. Auslander, that we adjourn until tomorrow morning at 8 o'clock. Motion carried and board adjourned. Read, corrected and approved, October 22, A. D. 1908. "JAS. CURRY, Chairman. "Countersigned: FRED J. KEMP, Clerk." In the record of the proceedings for Thursday, October 22, 1908, among other things, the following appears: "Thursday, October 22, A. D. 1908. "At a regular session of the board of supervisors of the county of Sanilac, continued and held at the courthouse, in the city of Sandusky, on Thursday, October 22, A. D. 1908. Board called to order by chairman. Roll called, quorum present. Minutes of yesterday's proceedings read and approved. * * * "Moved by Sup. Erwin, seconded by Sup. Murphy, that we adjourn until tomorrow morning at eight o'clock. Motion carried and board adjourned. Read, corrected and approved, Oct. 23, 1908. "JAS. CURRY, Chairman. "Countersigned: FRED J. KEMP, Clerk." The proceedings of each succeeding day of the session are similarly authenticated up to the date of final adjournment on December 18, 1908. A transcript of the record as to the proceedings for December 18th, together with the clerk's certificate, were received in evidence against relator's objection, and read as follows: "Saturday, December 18, 1908. "At a regular session of the board of supervisors of Sanilac county, State of Michigan, continued and held at the courthouse in the city of Sandusky, on Saturday the 18th day of December, A. D. 1908. Board called to order by the chairman. Roll called, quorum present. Minutes of yesterday's proceedings read and approved. Minutes read and approved in open session, Friday, December 18, A. D. 1908. Moved by Sup. Murphy, seconded by Sup. Beckett, that we adjourn sine die. Motion carried, and board adjourned. * * "JAS. CURRY, Chairman. "Countersigned: FRED J. KEMP, Clerk. "STATE OF MICHIGAN, SS.: "County of Sanilac. * "I, Fred J. Kemp, clerk of the said county of Sanilac and clerk of the board of supervisors for said county, do hereby certify that I have compared the foregoing copy of the proceedings of the board of supervisors of said county for the year 1908, with the original record thereof, now remaining in my office, and that it is a true and correct transcript therefrom, and of the whole of such original record. "In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the circuit court of said county this 22d day of December, A. D. 1908. "FRED J. KEMP, Clerk." Such being the condition of the record, is it subject to collateral attack and impeachment by parol testimony? It is contended by counsel for appellee that they are not seeking to attack the record, but leave it as actually made. In the language of counsel: "We are not attempting to contradict the record in any respect. We are not seeking to change one word of, or to add one word to, the record. We raise no question that the record of October 21st as produced is a true transcript of the proceedings of the board for that day; that the board did on that day pass the resolution and order therein recorded. What we claim, and all we claim, is that the record as written up was not signed by the clerk within the time prescribed by the statute; that is, before the final adjournment of the board." This contention is more specious than logical. The object of the authentication is to determine with certainty what the board actually did, and without it the record is a mere nullity, and no evidence whatever of their action. We are of the opinion, therefore, that the effect of relator's proceedings was to attack the record, and seek to impeach it in a collateral manner, as against which attack the record imports absolute verity. In Stevenson v. Bay City, 26 Mich. 44, an offer was made, and overruled, to show by parol evidence that an ordinance was passed by less than a majority of all the aldermen, and was therefore void. In discussing this ruling, Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, speaking for the court, said: "When the law requires municipal bodies to keep records of their official action in the legislative business conducted at their meetings, the whole policy of the law would be defeated if they could rest partly in writing and partly in parol, and the true official history of their acts would perish with the living witnesses, or fluctuate with their conflicting memories. No authority was found, and we think none ought to be, which would permit official records to be received as either partial or uncertain memorials. That which is not established by the written records, fairly construed, cannot be shown to vary them. They are intended to serve as perpetual evidence, and no unwritten proofs can have this permanence. See Hall v. People, 21 Mich. 456." In Sweet v. Gibson, 123 Mich. 699 (83 N. W. 407), one' question before the court was whether the filing date placed upon a return of the sheriff by the clerk of the court could be contradicted by parol testimony. In the course of the opinion it is said: "The court allowed the plaintiff to contradict by affidavits the date of the return of the sheriff and the filing made by the county clerk. On one side of this issue is the affidavit of the deputy sheriff that he retained the writ until September 2d, but, supposing it should have been |