ings, and not subject to arrest on another charge without being first allowed reasonable opportunity to return to New York. See, also, In re Little, 129 Mich. 454 (89 N. W. 38, 57 L. R. A. 295), where a discussion of this subject will be found. Both that and the Lascelles Case are distinguishable from the present controversy, which is clearly within the principle of the following Michigan cases: People v. Judge of the Superior Court of Detroit, 40 Mich. 729; In re Cannon, 47 Mich. 481 (11 N. W. 280); People v. White, 53 Mich. 537 (19 N. W. 174); Hoffman v. Bay Circuit Judge, 113 Mich. 109 (71 N. W. 480, 38 L. R. A. 663, 67 Am. St. Rep. 458). The subject is discussed and the same rule recognized in Monroe v. St. Clair Circuit Judge, 125 Mich. 283 (84 N. W. 305, 52 L. R. A. 189).

The writ is denied.

BLAIR, C. J., and MOORE, MCALVAY, and BROOKE, JJ., concurred.

In a suit to set aside conveyances of real property made by a decedent, the determination of the trial judge on the question of fact as to the intention of the grantor in executing deeds in escrow, to be delivered after her death, without retaining control of the deeds, is held to be sustained by the proofs and the escrow to be valid in law.

Appeal from Calhoun; North, J. Submitted October 15, 1909. (Docket No. 95.) Decided November 5, 1909.

Bill by Alma A. Hoagland against Minerva A. Beckley and others to set aside a deed, and to quiet title to real estate. From a decree for complainant, defendant Beckley appeals. Affirmed.

Bernard J. Onen and George W. Mechem, for complainant.

Walter S. Powers and Frank W. Clapp, for appellant.

MOORE, J. Betsey Beckley, now deceased, on the 12th day of December, 1894, executed certain deeds of conveyance. Forty acres of land were deeded to the complainant in this case, 40 acres to Minerva A. Beckley, and 40 acres were conveyed to Minerva A. Beckley, Edson G. Beckley, Emily Jourdan, Anson I. Beckley, and Alma A. Hoagland. The grantees in these deeds were the children and heirs at law of said Betsey Beckley. Mrs. Beckley reserved in the deeds a life estate to herself. On the 11th day of December, 1905, Mrs. Betsey Beckley executed another instrument, which purported to convey the whole of said 120 acres of land to her daughter, Minerva A. Beckley, and transferred to Minerva Beckley, by instrument in writing, all of her personal property.

The bill seeks to have the former conveyance declared valid, and the later instruments, which purported to transfer the title to both the real estate and personal property, declared invalid, alleging that Mrs. Beckley was mentally incompetent at the time of the execution of the later instruments, that the execution of them was brought about by fraud, and that, the instruments executed in December, 1894, being valid, it was beyond the power of Mrs. Betsey Beckley to make a further conveyance of the property described therein. The case was heard in open court. The court found that complainant had failed to prove the mental incompetency, or any fraud perpetrated upon Betsey Beckley, but held that the deeds of December 12, 1894, were valid deeds. From the decree entered, the defend

ant Minerva A. Beckley has appealed. None of the other parties has appealed.

The deeds of December 12, 1894, were executed in the office of Joel C. Hopkins, a lawyer, later a circuit judge, who died before this case was tried. After the deeds were executed they were put in an envelope, which was sealed and indorsed as follows:

"I hereby direct that the within deeds shall be delivered to the parties of the second part therein mentioned at my decease, and as soon as that event shall occur.

"Dated Dec. 12, 1894.

"BETSEY BECKLEY."

The signature is that of Mrs. Beckley. The deeds and envelope, unopened, remained with Mr. Hopkins until after the death of Mrs. Beckley. The rule that the delivery of a deed by a grantor to a third person, to be by him delivered to the grantee after the grantor's death, is valid, is not seriously questioned. See Ellis v. Secor, 31 Mich. 185 (18 Am. Rep. 178); Wallace v. Harris, 32 Mich. 380; Latham v. Udell, 38 Mich. 238; Taft v. Taft, 59 Mich. 185 (26 N. W. 426, 60 Am. Rep. 291); Jenkinson v. Brooks, 119 Mich. 108 (77 N. W. 640); Fulton v. Priddy, 123 Mich. 298 (82 N. W. 65, 81 Am. St. Rep. 201); Meech v. Wilder, 130 Mich. 29 (89 N. W. 556).

But defendants contend that in what occurred upon December 12, 1894, Mrs. Beckley did not intend to part with the title to her property beyond recall, and that the deeds were to be delivered only in the event that she did not call for them; that they were testamentary in character, and that by making the subsequent deed the former deeds were rendered invalid. This presented a question of fact as to what was done and intended on the 12th of December, 1894. The circuit judge filed an elaborate opinion, in which he analyzed the testimony and the claims of the solicitors. He had the great advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses. We have been favored with the

arguments of able counsel in well-prepared briefs and orally. An examination of the record satisfies us that the decree entered was a proper one.

It is affirmed, with costs.

BLAIR, C. J., and GRANT, MCALVAY, and BROOKE, JJ., concurred.

SAMBERG v. KNIGHTS OF THE MODERN MACCABEES.

1. INSURANCE-PROOF OF DEATH-EVIDENCE.

Letters tending to show that the insured, who has been absent more than seven years, had no cause to leave his wife, were admissible to strengthen the presumption of death created by 1 Comp. Laws, § 1225.

2. TRIAL-Conduct of COUNSEL-ARGUMENT.

Improper argument may be cured by the trial court holding the statements improper, and, in the absence of a request for further instructions to the jury, is not ground for reversal.

3. INSURANCE-FRATERNAL BENEFICIARY ASSOCIATIONS-BY-LAWS -REASONABLENESS.

A by-law of a fraternal beneficiary association which attempts to abrogate a statute that raises a presumption of death from an absence of seven years, is unreasonable and invalid as to a policy executed prior to the adoption of the by-law. 4. SAME-DEATH-PRESUMPTIONS FROM ABSENCE-EFFECT OF EVIDENCE TO REBUT.

It is a question for the jury to determine whether the presumption of death is overcome by the evidence of a witness who testifies that he met the alleged decedent and talked with him before the trial.

Error to St. Clair; Tappan, J. Submitted October 21, 1909. (Docket No. 140.) Decided November 5, 1909.

Assumpsit by Anna Samberg against the Knights of the Modern Maccabees on a policy of insurance. A judgment for plaintiff is reviewed by defendant on writ of error. Affirmed.

Frank E. Jones, for appellant.

Norman I. Miller and Hovey & Baird, for appellee.

MOORE, J. Defendant is a fraternal beneficiary association. On the 10th day of March, 1889, Charles A. Samberg, then a resident of Port Huron, became a member of defendant order, and had issued to him a benefit certificate for $1,000. On or about November 24, 1894, this certificate was surrendered, and, in lieu thereof, a certificate in which Anna Samberg, his wife, was named as beneficiary, was issued. Mr. Samberg continued in the order, paid his assessments, and was in good standing until on or about March 16, 1900, when he left his home for Seattle, Wash. His wife continued to pay the dues and assessments until June, 1908. Mrs. Samberg received letters from her husband until on or about October 16, 1900, since which time she claims not to have heard from him or been able to gain any knowledge of his whereabouts. On November 1, 1907, plaintiff, as beneficiary, filed her claim with defendant order for the amount of said benefit ($1,000), in which she sets up the facts in regard to the absence and disappearance of her said husband for the period of seven years, "and alleges that the amount of said certificate is now due and payable to her as beneficiary of the insured, her said husband." The defendant order at its Great Camp Review in June, 1904, amended its by-laws by adding thereto section 88, which reads as follows:

"The absence or disappearance of a member of this order from his last known place of residence for any length of time, shall not be presumptive evidence of the death of the member and no right shall accrue under the certificate of membership to the beneficiary, nor shall any benefits be