Among other things prayed are the following:

"That, upon the final hearing hereof, the said defendants may be decreed to put the said premises into such repair and condition in every respect, as far as circumstances will permit, as the same were in at the time the said Louise C. Nelson entered upon the same, under said lease as aforesaid, and to make a reasonable compensation to your oratrix for all wastes done, committed, or suffered by her on the said premises, and damages occasioned thereto by the removal of the said frame building as aforesaid; that the said defendant Louise C. Nelson may be decreed to keep the said premises in good and sufficient repair and condition during the remainder of her time therein."

The defendant Nelson answered the bill of complaint. Her answer contained, among other things, the following:

"She admits that on or about the 1st day of May, A. D. 1907, she entered into a lease for the said premises, but denies that at the time of the execution of the said lease she knowingly signed any lease for the frame building in question. This defendant, further answering, states that she is now and has been for eight years and upwards the owner of the frame building in question, and that at the time she placed said building upon the premises in question she did so under a written lease for the land executed between herself and one John M. Hoffman as attorney in fact for William H. Varney; and that all ground rent for the said premises was by her paid to the said John M. Hoffman or his assignees. * * *

"This defendant admits that on or about the 3d day of April, 1909, she was preparing to remove from the premises in question the frame building in question, and based her right so to do upon actual ownership of the building, coupled with the further fact that her lease of said premises expires May 1, 1909."

A hearing was had in open court. From a decree dismissing the bill of complaint, the case is brought here by appeal.

Upon the hearing the complainant did not show that she was the owner in fee of the land upon which the building stood. She offered no deeds in evidence, but contented herself with offering in evidence a lease made May

1, 1907, between herself and Mrs. Nelson, in which, among other property described, was "one frame building now used as a boathouse." The complainant claims that

"The fact that the frame building is included in the lease, without any exception made as to its being of a different ownership than the other property, prima facie makes Mrs. Hoffman the possessor of a title to it superior to the claims of Mrs. Nelson, the lessee. In other words, whatever title Mrs. Hoffman can be said to have to the land itself and to the cement building leased through the recitals in the written lease of 1907 must necessarily be no greater than her title to the frame building, inasmuch as all are included in the one description.'

On the part of the defendant it was shown that she entered into possession of the property by virtue of a written lease in May, 1902, made between John M. Hoffman and herself, in which it was recited that the premises were leased for "the purpose of erecting a bath or boat house thereon." It was provided in the lease that, at the expiration of the term, Mrs. Nelson was to yield and deliver up the premises "in like condition as when taken,” etc. It was shown that it was agreed by Mr. Hoffman and Mrs. Nelson that she might move a frame building upon the premises, and that the title thereto should remain in her, and that she should have the right to remove it. Mrs. Nelson also testified that she did not know that any reference was made to this frame building in the lease she obtained from Mrs. Hoffman, until after this bill was filed. The record shows very clearly that the agreement about the building was made with Mr. Hoffman as outlined above, but it is contended that, as Mrs. Nelson signed the lease, she is now estopped from questioning the title of Mrs. Hoffman to the building. If the controversy was between the landlord and tenant at the expiration of a lease over simply the question of who was entitled to the possession, there would be much force in the contention. But the bill of complaint concedes that, when it was filed, Mrs. Nelson was entitled to the posses

sion of the property, and avers that complainant was the owner in fee simple of the premises.

This claim is disputed by defendant. It thus became important for complainant to establish her title. See Jochen v. Tibbells, 50 Mich. 33 (14 N. W. 690); Shaw v. Hill, 83 Mich. 323 (47 N. W. 247, 21 Am. St. Rep. 607). The decree is affirmed, with costs.

BLAIR, C. J., and GRANT, MCALVAY, and BROOKE, JJ., concurred.

KNABUSH v. COMMON COUNCIL OF VILLAGE OF BRITTON.

1. INTOXICATING Liquors-License Bond-MANDAMUS-EVIDENCE. In proceedings for mandamus to compel a village council to accept a liquor bond tendered by a saloonkeeper, inquiry whether the members of the council would accept the bond of a surety company was properly excluded.

2. SAME-EVIDENCE-CROSS-EXAMINATION

EVIDENCE.

· EXPERT AND OPINION

Where a witness as to the value of real estate is asked on crossexamination if he would take the price named by him for his own farm, similarly situated, it is not reversible error to exclude the testimony.

3. SAME-SUFFICIENCY OF SURETY-MANDAMUS.

On mandamus to compel the common council of a village to accept a liquor bond, the sufficiency of the surety is not in issue, only the good faith of the council in making the rejection.

4. SAME-MANDAMUS.

Where the evidence tended to show that the surety on the saloonkeeper's bond obtained certain property colorably in order to justify as a bondsman, it was not error to refuse a writ of mandamus to compel the acceptance of the bond by the village council.

168 MICH.-87.

Certiorari to Lenawee; O'Mealey, J. Submitted October 5, 1909. (Calendar No. 23,527.) Decided November 5, 1909.

Mandamus by Louis Knabush to compel the common council of the village of Britton to approve a liquor bond. An order denying the writ is reviewed by relator on writ of certiorari. Affirmed.

Smith, Baldwin & Alexander, for relator.

Bird & Sampson, for respondent.

MOORE, J. May 3, 1909, the relator tendered to the village council of the village of Britton a bond as a retail liquor dealer, with E. G. Price and George Allen as sureties. The council declined to approve the bond. A writ of mandamus was sued out of the circuit court for the purpose of compelling the council to approve the bond. A hearing was had. Many witnesses testified. The court declined to compel the council to approve the bond, which action it is sought to review by the writ of certiorari. The village board made a sworn return to the petition, insisting that it had acted in the utmost good faith. By consent of counsel in open court the following issues were framed:

(1) Has the common council acted in good faith in rejecting the liquor bond of relator?

(2) Is the surety George Allen worth in real estate situate within the county of Lenawee, the sum of $6,000 over and above all indebtedness, incumbrances, and exemptions from sale on execution?

The court rendered an oral opinion, and later filed a written opinion, the important part of which is as follows:

"The evidence discloses that there was no question in the deliberations of the council as to the sufficiency of the surety Price. Each of the councilmen of said village, except one, and including the president, testified as a witness upon the hearing, and each emphatically denied that the purpose of the council, or their action as members of it,

had any motive, purpose or object in view in rejecting said bond for the insufficiency of the responsibility of the surety Allen, except to do their duty under the statute as members of the council; that each of said councilmen had known the surety Allen for several years, and they had known him to be a man of limited means and property outside of a farm of 80 acres, valued in the evidence from $50 to $60 per acre, and that said farm was incumbered by a mortgage for $1,000; that said mortgage was originally for $1,500; that said surety lived upon said farm, and in the course of 10 to 12 years had succeeded in reducing said mortgage by making payments thereon in the amount of $500 and the accrued interest from year to year, and that they were informed and understood, at the time of their said action upon said bond, that the surety Allen, being pressed for payment upon said mortgage by the mortgagee, was soliciting a loan for that amount from some of his neighbors to pay and discharge said mortgage as a lien upon his land, and the evidence discloses that they believed that, whether the surety Allen gave a new mortgage to one Ousterhout, from whom he succeeded in effecting a loan, or whether he borrowed the money upon his note, they believed that the debt secured by said mortgage still remained as an outstanding obligation of the surety Allen against him, and thereby reduced his financial responsibility to that extent."

Then follows a review of the testimony, in which the following appears:

"And although the surety Allen was produced as a witness on behalf of the petitioner upon the hearing, and testified that early in the spring of this year, when he was undertaking to secure a loan of $1,000 upon his farm to discharge the old mortgage, he had $2,000 in cash in his home, and that he had $1,000 of it there for three or four years, and the other $1,000 for one or two years, and that he used this money in connection with some he acquired from his auction notes, as the proof discloses, in the purchase of the saloon property in which the petitioner had been carrying on the saloon business for the last year, and yet that question is left upon the unsupported testimony of the surety and witness Allen. This and the fact that no satisfactory evidence was produced at the hearing as to how he accumulated this money and from what source, and from all the evidence in the case, the

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