the author. The following day the New York press dilated on the perfection of the performance, being the most ignorant of the three. These, my dear R―, appear to be some of the reasons for the decline and fall of the drama of late years. There are three constituent factors in the drama: the author who writes, the actor who performs, and the public that receives. Of these three the public is the most important, for it calls into existence the other two as infallibly as demand creates supply. When our people shall demand the highest class of dramatic entertainment, a Shakespeare and a Garrick will appear. Until then, my dear friend, the world will rest contented with such poor things as you and me. DION BOUCICAULT. ART. III.—THE WAR IN THE EAST. PART II. WE stated in a preceding paper that the permanent army of the Caucasus, including the Cossacks of the Kuban, has long been understood to amount to nearly 170,000 men of all arms, and, with the supports available, it was reasonable to assume the capacity of the Russians to operate in Armenia with as many troops as the supplies and communications permitted, and that they would at every important point be superior in force to their antagonist. The result has not supported this assumption, but has shown either that the available Russian strength in the Caucasus has been vastly overrated, or that a very large portion of it was retained within their own territory to oppose the Turkish expeditions to SugkhumKalé and other points on the coast, and to put down the insurrection of the native tribes, or that it has been unskilfully applied. On the 23d of April columns crossed the frontier from Poti, moving upon Batoum, from Alexandropol upon Kars, and from Erivan upon Bayazeth. The attempt to cut the communication from Batoum into the interior was immediately successful, and the subsequent attacks by the Russians at that point were probably intended to drive the Turks as close in upon the town as possible, so that their own position might be shortened and more men made available for other operations. On the left, Bayazeth was occupied on the 26th, and the Erivan column moved by Dijadin and Kara-Killissa, in the direction of Toprakh-Kalé and Deli-Baba. The central column moved on Kars. Early in May another column moved from Akhaltzik upon Ardahan, and on the 17th of that month breached the works and carried the place by assault. The headquarters of the central column were now at Mazra, near Kars, which was invested, and a cavalry force thrown towards the Saganlugh. About the same time the left column reached Utsch-Kilissa, in the valley of the Murad Euphrates, with its advanced guard at Jeranos and Chamur, where a mountain road from Kagysman *North American Review, July-August, 1877, p. 35. enters the valley, and nearly half-way from Bayazeth to Erzeroum. A detachment from this column had reached Arnis, on Lake Van, and hostile Kurds were collecting at Bitlis and Diarbekir. The Turks still held Getchevan and Deli-Mussa. About the 26th, or a little earlier, Kars was being bombarded, and the Russian scouts had appeared near Olti, where the Turkish left was collecting. At the end of May the extreme right of the Russians was still in front of Batoum, while the right wing of the active army was in small force at Olti; the cavalry patrols of the centre had advanced to Vezinvaisin; the left was still at Utsch-Kilissa, with its advanced guard near Toprakh-Kalé. The Turkish left was then in rear of Olti; the centre in the Saganlugh in a strong position near Zevin; the right in front of Deli-Baba, with its advanced guard at Toprakh-Kalé. Early in June the advance of the Russian left induced Muktar Pasha to establish his headquarters at Kopri-Koi, on the Araxes, where the roads from Bayazeth and Kars unite; he left a strong force at Zevin to oppose any advance of the Russian centre; his right remained at Deli-Baba, and his left in rear of Nariman. About this time he received reinforcements stated to amount to twentyfour battalions. Up to this time everything had gone well with the Russians, in spite of the delays resulting from bad weather, and snow in the passes and on the high plateaus, and it was generally announced that the Turkish commander was so much impressed with the folly of attempting to resist the concentric advance of his antagonist upon Erzeroum that he had determined to abandon the Saganlugh, Karatschli, and Kosch passes, and fall back upon Erzeroum as the only method of extricating his army and its material. But this announcement was premature; the Turk not only held his ground, but assumed the offensive, and the Russian, with success supposed to be fully within his grasp, soon lost most of what he had gained. Muktar had learned that the Russian wings at Olti and in the valley of the Murad Euphrates were very weak, and as there was no appearance of an immediate attack by their centre, he determined to push forward both his wings. He therefore first reinforced his left, so that it consisted of eleven battalions, three regiments of cavalry, and six mountain guns, and ordered its advance upon Olti. The Russians, who do not seem to have had more than |