delicate and dangerous undertaking. General Dragomiroff's division, the fourteenth, was the first to cross. During the night of the 25th Dragomiroff's division reached Simnitza, and remained concealed therein, while bridges were built over two narrow arms of the river separating the northern shore from a wide mud-flat which borders the main stream.

At dark on the evening of the 26th the pontoons and troops moved out of Simnitza; the guns were placed in position among the willows lining the river-bank, and the preparations completed as rapidly as possible. At one o'clock on the morning of the 27th the whole of the fifty-third regiment, twelve companies, with eight mountain guns, entered the boats and started for the Bulgarian shore. If our memory serves us, the fifty-third is the regiment of Volkynia, which in the Crimean War so acquitted itself in the memorable defence of Sebastopol as to gain a reputation akin to that of the fifty-seventh French regiment in the army of the First Empire, which was known as "Le Terrible," and bore upon its colors the proud motto, Un contre dix." If we are correct in this, the fifty-third was well selected to lead the main army of Russia in its advance across the Danube, and, knowing how much of the glory of the past, success in the present, and hope for the future rested upon its valor, it nobly performed the momentous duty devolved upon it.

When the boats were about half-way over the Turks discovered the movement, and at once opened a heavy fire, which did not for a moment check the advance of the fifty-third. From the force of the current the line of boats became somewhat disarranged, and reached the shore at unequal intervals.

The river-bank at this point is very steep and difficult to climb, and the ground rises in a succession of terraces, each offering a strong position for defence. Any of our readers who participated in the landing of Worth's division at Vera Cruz will well remember how officers and men, without waiting for the boats to touch the shore, eagerly leaped into the water and rushed to the first line of sand-hills, behind which they expected to find the enemy. So in this case the Russians sprang from the boats, climbed the first bluff with great difficulty, and at once came into action; for the Turks, supine as they are, were more on the alert than the Mexicans. The boats returned at once for more troops, and continued constantly

plying across the river. As more men landed, the Russians continually gained ground, and steadily advanced, gradually enlarging the area in their possession. Up to eight o'clock they fought in groups, as they happened to come together; about that hour companies and battalions were formed, and after that all went on regularly. It is stated that the Turks had at least 6,000 infantry at hand soon after the crossing commenced, and at least one battery and a half. About one o'clock in the afternoon the Russian field-guns began to cross, and by two o'clock the Turks were driven out of Sistova and beyond the commanding heights, so that the crossing was fully secured. The boats steadily continued their work, and so successfully that when evening came all the infantry of the eighth corps and the fourth rifle brigade were firmly established on the Bulgarian bank, and the thirty-fifth division of the thirteenth corps was in the act of crossing.

The Russian arrangements were admirable, for the Turks were completely deceived, and this most delicate operation was accomplished with a loss of less than a thousand officers and men in killed, drowned, and wounded. While the passage of troops in boats continued, the construction of a bridge was begun on the 28th, and, notwithstanding the interruption caused by a storm, was completed on the 2d of July, when the cavalry, artillery, and trains commenced pouring over. By the 3d of July the Russian outposts extended some eighteen or twenty miles from the river, with cavalry patrols pushed still farther south. The time had thus passed when the Turks could hope to prevent the further crossing of the Russians; their only chance was on the 27th and 28th, when, if their troops had been properly posted, they might have crushed those who first crossed before artillery and reinforcements could be brought over to support them. The attempt to prevent a large army from passing a long river by posting a weak cordon of troops along its course must almost necessarily fail. All that can be done is to watch carefully, so that the first attempt to cross may be promptly discovered, and, having already posted the troops intended for the defence in strong bodies at convenient points in rear, march them rapidly to the crossing-place, and at once attack those already over before they can be fully supported. The chief danger and difficulty in crossing a large river is in the fact that all reinforcements and supplies must come by one or VOL. CXXV. - NO. 258.

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two narrow bridges, which may at any time give way, and over which progress is slow at best; so that there always is in such cases the contingency that a portion of the crossing army may be completely separated from the rest and exposed, without the possibility of retreat, to the attack of the whole of the hostile army.

The Russians had thus carried out the second great object of the campaign; their left being over the Danube in the Dobrudscha, their right interposed between Widdin and Rustchuk. Between the right and left was the Quadrilateral; between both and Constantinople lay the Balkans. The preliminaries thus accomplished with marked success, the real and decisive work lay before them. So much has been said about "Quadrilaterals," that the term appears to be invested in the minds of many with some mysterious power, so that it may be well to devote a little space to this particular Quadrilateral, that our readers may be able to form some opinion as to what it will do for the Turks.

It is an irregular figure, at whose angles are the fortresses of Rustchuk, Silistria, Varna, and Shumla. The northern side is formed by the Danube, whose course from Rustchuk to Silistria is about seventy miles; the eastern side is an imaginary line, about fifty miles long, from Silistria to Varna; the river Devna may be taken as the south side, and it is about fifty miles from Varna to Shumla; the railway from near Shumla to Rustchuk may be considered as the western side, and is about sixty-two miles long. The ordinary and natural line of supply of these fortresses is through Varna and by the Black Sea. A railway extends from Varna to Rustchuk, passing through Pravadi and Rasgrad, and near Jenibasar; from the vicinity of the latter place a short branch of about twelve miles leads to Shumla.

At the present juncture it may be of interest to give a little more detailed information in relation to the four fortresses.

Rustchuk has some sixty thousand inhabitants, and is the seat of a very considerable commerce; it is dirty, and badly built. It is in the obtuse angle formed by the Lom and the Danube, and is commanded by high ground in the rear; but this difficulty has been met by the construction of a line of advanced earth redoubts, which must be carried before the town can be assaulted. Unless very great changes have been made quite recently, the most advanced and important of these, from its situation, is the Dajdsler Fort, which is on the left bank of the Lom, about four

thousand yards from the town, and takes in reverse the approaches to the other redoubts. This would naturally be the first point of attack in a regular siege, unless the attack were confined altogether to the extreme eastern portion of the line. To what extent the advanced works have been strengthened and increased of late we have no means of ascertaining; ample time has certainly been allowed to prepare for an obstinate defence, and the railway has afforded the means of supplying the place abundantly. As is the case with the other works of the Quadrilateral, the strength of the defence consists altogether in the advanced redoubts; their line once broken, the places will be at the mercy of the Russian artillery.

Silistria has some twenty thousand inhabitants, and is on the Danube, about eight miles above the mouth of the Tuban. It is on rather low ground, commanded by the heights in rear, which here also are occupied by advanced redoubts. The northern bank of the Danube is low and marshy, and just below the town are three marshy islands, Salgan, Hoppo, and Prival, which towards the close of the impending siege may be used by the Russians with advantage. Unless very great changes have been made during the last few months, the advanced redoubt known as the Arab Fort would naturally be the first point of attack.

Varna is a place of twenty-five thousand inhabitants, on a shallow open bay at the mouth of the Devna; the harbor is not very good. The permanent fortifications are not strong, and could be breached from a distance, were it not for the line of advanced redoubts.

Shumla has been sufficiently described in a preceding article; it has thirty thousand inhabitants. From the fact that the crossing at Simnitza and the subsequent advance to Tirnova were not seriously interfered with, and that the army of the Dobrudscha has been permitted to move upon Silistria without interference, it is to be inferred that the garrisons of Rustchuk and Silistria are only large enough to defend the works, and do not attain the magnitude of armies. The probabilities are that the mass of the Turkish forces in Bulgaria are at or near Plevna, Shumla, and Varna.

The fortresses at the angles of the Quadrilateral are of use as affording secure depots of supply for the active army, and points of support and retreat for it in the event of disaster. It is only in this regard, as facilitating and covering the movements of a large

active army in its vicinity, that such a Quadrilateral is of any especial importance. So far as the fortresses themselves are concerned, if left to themselves with merely the garrisons required for defence, they are of no especial value, and influence the ground only a little beyond the range of their guns.

For example, in this case, Rustchuk and Silistria would merely make a crossing of the river under their guns impossible, and compel the selection of other points less favorable so far as the ground is concerned. But a fortress near an enemy's line of march and communication must be watched, no matter how small the garrison; and the besieging or observing force should as a rule be superior in strength to the garrison, so that when the contending armies are nearly equal the necessity for besieging or watching several fortresses will reduce the available force of the party thus engaged below that of its antagonist.

When the attacking party is so superior in numbers that it can furnish the requisite beseiging armies without losing its superiority in the field, the fortresses have lost much of their value, which to a great extent consists in neutralizing forces much superior to the garrisons.

Now, to prevent the garrisons of Rustchuk and Silistria from interfering with their communication across the Danube, the Russians must hem in and neutralize these garrisons; and the best and most effectual method of doing it is to blockade or besiege them.

If the forces of the combatants are so nearly equal that when the Russians are weakened by the necessary detachments, the Turks can attack them on the line of Jantra near Tirnova, with wellgrounded hopes of success, then Shumla will be of great service to them as affording supplies for the movement, and a place of refuge in the event of disaster.

Varna would play the same part in relation to an attack upon Zimmerman's army in the Dobrudscha. If the Turks lost a battle near Silistria or Rustchuk, these fortresses would afford them places of shelter, but they would be hemmed in without the hope of relief unless from the successful advance of an entirely new army, while at Shumla or Varna they might be reinforced and refitted for another attempt.

Before the completion of the bridge at Simnitza on the 2d of July, considerable parties of cavalry must have crossed in boats, for on the 1st they appeared at Biela and on the 2d at Tirnova,