courts can exercise only that jurisdiction conferred on them by Congress. (Ex parte Cabrera, 1 Wash. C. C. 235; Magill v. Parsons, 4 Conn. 325.) They cannot exercise common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases (Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch, 75; U. S. v. Hudson, 7 Cranch, 32; U. S. v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415; 1 Gall. 488; U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 336; contra, U. S. v. Ravara, 2 Dall. 297; U. S. v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384), nor proceed by information in criminal cases unless the power is granted by Congress. (U. S. v. Joe, 4 Chic. L. N. 105.) They are of limited jurisdiction but not inferior, and can exercise no jurisdiction which is not expressly granted or conferred by necessary implication (Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 9; U. S. v. Ta-wanga-ca, Hemp. 304), as the power to punish for contempt. (Matt. of Meador, 1 Abb. U. S. 324; U. S. v. Hudson, 2 Cranch, 329.) Their respective jurisdictions must be defined by Congress (Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738; Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. 10; McIntyre v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 506; Kendall v. United States, 12 Peters, 616; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 245; Shelden v. Sill, 8 How. 448), and cannot be enlarged or restricted by State laws. (Livingston v. Jefferson, 1 Brock. 203; U. S. v. Drennan, Hemp. 320; Greely v. Townsend, 25 Cal. 604.) The Federal courts have the right to determine their own jurisdiction. (U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; U. S. v. Booth, 21 How. 506; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 459.) Congress may consent to a second trial of a claim against the United States, although a judgment thereon has been rendered for the government. (Nock v. U. S., 2 Ct. of Cl. 451.) Congress has power to invest inferior courts with power to issue writs of mandamus (Kendall v. U. S., 12 Peters, 524), but it cannot empower a commissioner to commit a person for an alleged contempt. (Ex parte Doil, 7 Phila. 595.) The Federal courts cannot apply the writ of habeas corpus to one in jail unless confined under and by authority of the United States (Ex parte Des Rochers, McAll. 68); and State courts have no authority to issue the writ within the limits of the sovereignty of the United States. (Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506.) Federal courts have the power to issue writs only when necessary in aid of their jurisdiction in a case

pending. (Ex parte Everts, 7 Am. Law R. 79, overruling U. S. v. Williamson, 4 Am. Law R. 11.) Congress may make provision for the appointment of a board of land commissioners to settle private land claims. (U. S. v. Ritchie, 17 How. 525.) To give jurisdiction to a Federal court it is sufficient that the jurisdiction may be found in the Constitution or the law, but the two must co-operate, the Constitution as the fountain, and the laws of Congress as the streams which convey jurisdiction to the court. (United States v. Burlington etc. Ferry Co., Dist. Ct. Jowa, 21 Fed. Rep. 331.) The jurisdiction must appear of record, and be derived from congressional enactments. (Norton v. Brewster, Cir. Ct. La., 23 Fed. Rep. 840. Aud see Grace v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U. S. 283; Bors v. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; Mansfield etc. R. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 382; King Iron Bridge etc. Co. v. County of Otoe, 124 U. S. 459.) New rights and remedies may have the effect to increase the business of the court, but that in no proper sense increases its jurisdiction. (Buford v. Holley, Cir. Ct. Ala., Fed. Rep. 680.)

Original jurisdiction.-The first clause of this provision declares the extent of the judicial power (Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Co., 10 Wall 553; Delafield v. State, 2 Hill, 159), which Congress cannot abridge or extend (Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Ex parte Vallandigham, 1 Wall. 252; Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 98); nor can Congress confer original jurisdiction in cases other than those enumerate 1. (Matt. of Metzger, 5 How. 176; In re Kaine, 14 How. 103, 3 Blatchf. 1.) The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is both original and exclusive. (U. S. V. Ortega, 11 Wheat. 467; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; but see U. S. v. Ravara, 2 Dall. 297; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; The Exchange v. McFadden, 7 Cranch, 116), and co-extensive with the judicial power (Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738); but special and limited, confined to particular causes, controversies, and parties. (Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657.) It has no jurisdiction over questions of a political character. (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 1; State v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50.) In the absence of

legislation by Congress, the court may prescribe the mode and form of proceedings, so as to attain the object for which jurisdiction was given. (Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478.) It is left to Congress to organize the Supreme Court, to define its powers consistently with the Constitution, and to distribute the residue between it and the inferior courts. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657.) Although the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court jurisdiction in suits affecting embassadors, ministers, and consuls, Congress may vest a concurrent jurisdiction in such inferior courts as may be established. (U. S. v. Ravara, 2 Dall. 297; St. Luke's Hospital v. Barclay, 3 Blatchf. 259; Graham v. Stucken, 4 Blatchf. 50; Gittings v. Crawford, Taney, 1; but see Davis v. Packard, 6 Peters, 41; Mannhardt v. Souderstrom, 1 Binn. 138; Griffin v. Dominguez, 2 Duer, 656; Commonwealth v. Kosloff, 5 Serg, & R. 545.) A State court has no jurisdiction over an offense committed by a consul (Commonwealth v. Kosloff, 5 Serg. & R. 545); but an indictment against a private person for an assault upon an embassador or public minister is not a case affecting such minister. (U. S. v. Ortega, 11 Wheat. 467.) The original jurisdiction, in cases where a State is a party, refers to cases where jurisdiction might be exercised by reason of the character of the party in any suit in a Federal court (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264), and it must be a case where the State is nominally a party and substantially affected (Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 Dall. 411; New Jersey v. New York, 5 Peters, 287; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 1; Ex parte Madrazo, 7 Peters, 627; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657; Pennsylvania v. Wheeling etc. Br., 18 How. 421), a party to the record (Bank of U. S. v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904), or if it has a direct interest in the controversy (Pennsylvania v. Wheeling etc. Br., 9 How. 647; 13 How. 518), where disputes and controversies arise between the respective States (Chancely v. Bailey, 37 Ga. 532), as on questions of boundaries. (Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657; Florida v. Georgia, 17 How. 478; Virginia v. West Virginia, 11 Wall. 39; New York v. Connecticut,

4 Dall. 1.) A State may bring an original suit against a citizen of another State, but not against one of her own (Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Co., 10 Wall. 553; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264), though a State may be authorized to sue in the inferior courts. (State v. Atkins, 35 Ga. 315; contra, State v. Trustees, 5 Bank. Reg. 466; 1 Hughes, 133.) Where the State is a party, it may be represented by the governor. (Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66.) The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in a case where a State is enforcing its penal laws (Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264), nor in a proceeding by an alien against a citizen. (Ex parte Barry, 2 How. 65.) The constitutional grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of all cases affecting consuls, does not prevent Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in such cases, also, upon the subordinate courts of the Union. (Bors v. Preston, 111 U. S. 252.)

Equity jurisdiction.-The equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is independent of that conferred by the States upon their own courts, and cannot be affected by any legislation except that of the United States. (Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587.)

Authority of State courts.-The jurisdiction of State courts is not taken away except as to cases where such jurisdiction would be incompatible with the powers granted to the United States. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1; 3 Serg. & R. 169; Teal v. Felton, 12 How. 284; State v. Randall, 2 Aik. 89; Delafield v. State, 2 Hill, 159; U. S. v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4; Jackson v. Rose, 2 Va. Cas. 34; Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130.) Where Federal courts have paramount jurisdiction, State courts are expressly prohib ited from taking cognizance (In re Brinkman, 7 Bank. Reg. 426; Slocum v. Mayberry, 2 Wheat. 1; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738; U. S. v. Peters, 5 Cranch, 115; Duncan v. Darst, 1 How. 301; McNutt v. Bland, 2 How. 16; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters, 590); so, a State statute authorizing proceedings in rem for causes in admiralty is unconstitutional. (Crawford v. The Caroline Reed, 42 Cal. 469; In re Brinkman, 7 Bank. Reg.

426; Bird v. The Josephine, 39 N. Y. 19; Brookman v. Hamill, 43 N. Y. 554; The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, overruling Richardson v. Cleveland, 5 Port. 251; Monroe v. Brady, 7 Ala. 59; The Farmer v. McCraw, 31 Ala. 659; The Belfast, 41 Ala. 50) Congress cannot confer jurisdic tion on a State tribunal. (Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. St. 112.) The jurisdiction of the State is co-extensive with the Territory (U. S. v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. 386; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 610); but a State legislature cannot confer jurisdiction upon Federal courts, or prescribe the means or mode of its exercise. (Greely v. Townsend, 25 Cal. 604.) No part of the criminal jurisdiction can be delegated to State tribunals (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; State v. Wells, 2 Hill (S. C.) 687; Huber v. Reily, 53 Pa. St. 112; State v. McBride, Rice, 400; Commonwealth v. Feely, 1 Va. Cas. 321), but a crime not made an offense by an act of Congress is cognizable in a State court. (State v. Buchanan, 5 Har. & J. 317.) So State courts may punish for counterfeiting under a State law, unless exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the Federal courts. (White v. Commonwealth, 4 Binn. 418; State v. Randall, 2 Ark. 89; State v. Tutt, 2 Bailey, 44.) A State court has jurisdiction to punish the forgery of a land warrant, where it has not been made a crime by act of Congress. (Commonwealth v. Schaffer, 4 Dall. App. 26.) State courts may entertain an action to recover a penalty for breach of a Federal statute. (Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130; Stearns v. U. S., 2 Paine, 300; Buckwalter v. U. S., 11 Serg. & R. 193. But see Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn. 239; Davidson v. Champlin, 7 Conn. 244; Haney v. Sharp, 1 Dana, 442; U. S. v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. 4; Jackson v. Rose, 2 Va. Cas. 34.) A State magistrate may commit a prisoner to be delivered over for prosecution to the United States. (Prigg v. Commonwealth, 16 Peters, 539; Ex parte Gist, 26 Ala. 156; Ex parte Smith, 5 Cowen, 273; Ex parte Martin, 2 Paine, 348; Ex parte Pool, 2 Va. Cas. 276.)

Transfer of causes.-Congress may transfer a suit from one inferior tribunal to another. (Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299; United States v. Ritchie, 17 How. 525; Fremont v. United States, 17 How. 442.) It may also provide for the removal of causes from State to Federal courts. (Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304; Mayor v