such unfavourable circumstances, as that, for want of the securities required, and other obstacles, no appeals were made in certain cases, nor any claims in others. The undersigned presumes that these facts will appear from the documents which he has had the honour of submitting to his Lordship's consideration; and that it will not be deemed necessary, at present, to particularize these cases and their merits, or detail the circumstances which discriminate some from others. That great and extensive injuries having thus, under colour of his Majesty's authority and commissions, been done to a numerous class of American merchants, the United States can, for reparation, have recourse only to the justice, authority, and interposition of his Majesty. That the vessels and property taken and condemned have been chiefly sold, and the proceeds divided among a great number of persons, of whom some are dead, some unable to make retribution, and others, from frequent removals and their particular circumstances, not easily reached by civil process. That as, for these losses and injuries, adequate compensation, by means of judicial proceedings, has become impracticable, and, considering the causes which combined to produce them, the United States confide in his Majesty's justice and magnanimity to cause such compensation to be made to these innocent sufferers as may be consistent with equity; and the undersigned flatters himself that such principles may, without difficulty, be adopted, as will serve as rules whereby to ascertain the cases and the amount of compensation. So grievous are the expenses and delays attending litigated suits, to persons whose fortunes have been so materially affected, and so great is the distance of Great Britain from America, that the undersigned thinks he ought to express his anxiety that a mode of proceeding as summary and under the tion, Secre Confedera tary of Foreign Affairs, an office which he resigned to become Chief Justice in 1789. In 1794 the country was on the brink of war with England, but the treaty which Jay negotiated with Lord Grenville, November 19, 1794, averted war for some piece is the years. The full text of a memoran dum laid by Jay before the British little expensive may be devised as circumstances and the peculiar hardship of these cases may appear to permit and require. And as (at least in some of these cases) it may be expedient and necessary, as well as just, that the sentences of the courts of vice-admiralty should be revised and corrected by the Court of Appeals here, the undersigned hopes it will appear reasonable to his Majesty to order that the captured in question (who have not already so done) be there admitted to enter both their appeals and their claims. The undersigned also finds it to be his duty to represent that the irregularities before mentioned extended not only to the capture and condemnation of American vessels and property, and to unusual personal severities, but even to the impressment of American citizens to serve on board of armed vessels. He forbears to dwell on the injuries done to the unfortunate individuals, or on the emotions which they must naturally excite, either in the breast of the nation to whom they belong, or of the just and humane of every country. His reliance on the justice and benevolence of his Majesty leads him to indulge a pleasing expectation that orders will be given that Americans so circumstanced be immediately liberated, and that persons honoured with his Majesty's commissions do, in future, abstain from similar violences. It is with cordial satisfaction that the undersigned reflects on the impressions which such equitable and conciliatory measures would make on the minds of the United States, and how naturally they would inspire and cherish those sentiments and dispositions which never fail to preserve, as well as to produce, respect, esteem, and friendship. LONDON, July 30, 1794. JOHN JAY. John Jay, Correspondence and Public Papers (edited by Henry 75. "The X Y Z Despatches" (1797) By C. C. PARIS, October 22, 1797. A LL of us having arrived at Paris on the evening of the 4th instant, on the next day we verbally, and unofficially, informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs therewith, and desired to know when he would be at leisure to receive one of our secretaries with the official notification. He appointed the next day at two o'clock, when Major Rutledge waited on him . . . That, be PINCKNEY and GERRY sent to France in 1797 as joint envoys to settle various disputed between the two govern ments. Talleyrand, French Foreign fused to re Minister, re ceive them, but through secret agents ("X," "Y," and "z") made an demand for unofficial bribes as a necessary In the evening . . . Mr. X. called on General Pinckney, questions and after having sat some time, *** whispered him that he had a message from M. Talleyrand to communicate when he was at leisure. .. General Pinckney said he should be glad to hear it. M. X. replied that the Directory, and particularly two of the members of it, were exceedingly irritated at some passages of the President's speech, and desired that they should be softened; and that this step would be necessary previous to our reception. sides this, a sum of money was required for the pocket of the Directory and ministers, which would be at the disposal of M. Talleyrand; and that a loan would also be insisted on. M. X. said if we acceded to these measures, M. Talleyrand had no doubt that all our differences with France might be accommodated. . . . October the 21st, M. X. came before nine o'clock; M. Y. did not come until ten: he had passed the morning with M. Talleyrand. After breakfast the subject was immediately resumed. . . . He [M. Y.] said . . . that if we desired caused war him to point out the sum which he believed would be satisfactory [to the Directory], he would do so. We requested him to proceed; and he said that there were thirty-two millions of florins, of Dutch inscriptions, worth ten shillings in the pound, which might be assigned to us at twenty shil ... preliminary ment. The to any settle extracts are from the en voys' despatches home, which were made public and with France in 1798. They are an diplomatic correspondrelations with example of ence. For France, see Contemporaries, II, Nos. 199, 213, 216; III, ch. 1.e. a bribe. The Ameri can grievance was the ille American merchantmen; the French grievance was that commercial lings in the pound; and he proceeded to state to us the We committed immediately to writing the answer we proposed, in the following words: "Our powers respecting a treaty are ample; but the proposition of a loan, in the form of Dutch inscriptions, or in any other form, is not within the limits of our instructions; upon this point, therefore, the Government must be consulted; one of the American ministers will, for the purpose, forthwith embark for America; provided the Directory will suspend all further captures on American vessels, and will suspend proceedings on those already captured, as well where they have been gal capture of already condemned, as where the decisions have not yet been rendered; and that where sales have been made, but the money not yet received by the captors, it shall not be paid until the preliminary questions, proposed to the ministers of the United States, be discussed and decided: which was read as a verbal answer; and we told them they might copy it if they pleased. M. Y. refused to do so; his disappointment was apparent; he said we treated the money part of the proposition as if it had proceeded from the Directory; whereas, in fact, it did not proceed even from the minister, but was only a suggestion from himself, as a substitute to be proposed by us, in order to avoid the painful acknowledgment that the Directory had determined to demand of us. It was told him that we understood that matter perfectly; that we knew the proposition was in form to be ours; but that it came substantially from the minister. privilege had been allowed to England. - See No. 74, above. We asked what had led to our present conversation? And General Pinckney then repeated the first communication from M. X. . . . OCTOBER, 27, 1797. About twelve we received another visit from M. X. He mentioned the change in the state of things which had been produced by the peace with the emperor, as warranting an expectation of a change in our system; to which we only replied, that this event had been expected by us, and would not, in any degree, affect our conduct. M. X. urged, that the Directory had, since this peace, taken a higher and more decided tone with respect to us, and all other neutral nations, than had been before taken; that it had been determined, that all nations should aid them, or be considered and treated as their enemies. We answered, that such an effect had already been contemplated by us, as probable, and had not been overlooked when we gave to this proposition our decided answer; and further, that we had no powers to negotiate for a loan of money; that our Government had not contemplated such a circumstance in any degree whatever; that if we should stipulate a loan, it would be a perfectly void thing, and would only deceive France, and expose ourselves. M. X. again expatiated on the power and violence of France: he urged the danger of our situation, and pressed the policy of softening them, and of thereby obtaining time. The present men, he said, would very probably not continue long in power, and it would be very unfortunate if those who might succeed, with better dispositions towards us, should find the two nations in actual war. We answered, that if war should be made on us by France, it would be so obviously forced on us, that, on a change of men, peace might be made with as much facility as the present differences could be accommodated. We added, that all America deprecated a war with France; but that our present situation was more ruinous to us than |