regular army. The seventy-seventh article of war declares that officers of the regular army are not competent to sit on courts-martial to try the officers and soldiers of other forces. The crucial question in this case is, was this volunteer army the same army as the regular army, or was it a different and supplemental army? Was this volunteer force raised under the act of 1899 the same force as the regular army, or was it one of the "other forces" of the United States within the intent and meaning of article 77? On a cursory reading of the article the question does not seem to be difficult, nor the true answer to it doubtful. And, were it not for the earnest and forceful presentation of their view by the learned counsel for the government, and for the fact that the general commanding the army under the advice of the judge advocate general has held that under the act of April 22, 1898 (30 Stat. 361, c. 187), and of March 2, 1899 (30 Stat. 977, c. 352), the volunteer force is the same force as the regular army, and that the officers of the latter may lawfully try the officers of the former (Circular 21, H. Q. A., June 30, 1898), that contention might not seem forceful. But the opinions of the officers of the executive department of a government relative to the construction of a statute whose execution has been intrusted to them justly command and should receive the careful consideration of the courts, and in doubtful cases they should be permitted to lead the way to their decisions. Their opinions ought not to be overruled or disregarded unless upon a deliberate and careful review of the decisions which they render it clearly appears that they are tainted with error. On the other hand, the decisions of these officers are not controlling or conclusive upon the courts. It is the function and duty of the judicial department of the government to construe its statutes and to declare their meaning. That duty the courts may not renounce or abandon to others, and in its discharge they must exercise their own independent judgments, guided only by the established principles of the law and the recognized canons of interpretation. While the opinions of the officers of the executive department of the government may be permitted to lead the way to the proper construction of ambiguous statutes intrusted to them to enforce, yet where the words of the acts are plain, and their meaning is clear, these must prevail. Hartman v. Warren, 76 Fed. 157, 162, 22 C. C. A. 30, 36, 40 U. S. App. 245, 254; Webster v. Luther, 163 U. S. 331, 342, 16 Sup. Ct. 963, 41 L. Ed. 179; U. S. v. Tanner, 147 U. S. 661, 663, 13 Sup. Ct. 436, 37 L. Ed. 321; Merritt v. Cameron, 137 U. S. 542, II Sup. Ct. 174, 34 L. Ed. 772; U. S. v. Graham, 110 U. S. 219, 3 Sup. Ct. 582, 28 L. Ed. 126; Swift, C. & B. Mfg. Co. v. U. S., 105 U. S. 691, 26 L. Ed. 1108.

Guided by these familiar and indisputable rules of law, the question whether the volunteer force raised under the act of 1899 was the same force as the regular army, or one of the "other forces" of the United States, within the meaning of article 77, will be considered. That article reads:

"Officers of the regular army shall not be competent to sit on courts-martial to try the officers or soldiers of other forces except as provided in article 78." The exception in article 78 relates to the officers of the marine corps, and does not withdraw the appellant or the officers who tried him

from the prohibition of the general rule announced in article 77. The provisions of the act of March 2, 1899, pertinent to the issue under consideration are these:

*

"That from and after the date of the approval of this act the army of the United States shall consist of * * ten regiments of cavalry, seven regiments of artillery, twenty-five regiments of infantry," and appropriate officers, departments and corps. 30 Stat. 977, c. 352, § 1.

"That to meet the present exigencies of the military service, the president is hereby authorized to maintain the regular army at a strength of not exceeding sixty-five thousand enlisted men to be distributed amongst the various branches of the service, including the signal corps, according to the needs of each, and raise a force of not more than thirty-five thousand volunteers to be recruited as he may determine from the country at large, or from the localities where their services are needed, without restriction as to citizenship or educational qualifications, and to organize the same into no more than twenty-seven regiments organized as are infantry regiments of war strength in the regular army and three regiments to be composed of men of special qualifications in horsemanship and marksmanship to be organized as cavalry for service mounted or dismounted, * provided, further,

that such increased regular and volunteer force shall continue in service only during the necessity therefor and not later than July 1st, 1901. All enlistments for the volunteer force herein authorized shall be for the term of two years and four months unless sooner discharged." 30 Stat. 977, § 12.

That the president shall have power to continue in service or to appoint by and with the advice and consent of the senate certain brigadier generals of volunteers and major generals of volunteers; "provided, that regular army officers continued or appointed as general officers or as field or staff officers of volunteers under the provisions of this act shall not vacate their regular army commissions." 30 Stat. 977, § 13.

That the president is authorized to appoint, with the advice and consent of the senate, officers of the volunteer staff, including 12 assistant commissaries of subsistence with the rank of captain. 30 Stat. 977, § 14.

That the officers and enlisted men of the volunteer army shall be mustered out of the military service of the United States and discharged as provided in the act of April 22, 1898, provided that enlisted men of volunteers who desire to remain in the military service may be transferred to and enlisted in the regular army. 30 Stat. 977, § 15.

It will not be unprofitable to briefly call to mind the course of the legislation, decision, and practice of the nation relative to the matter in hand prior to 1899 before entering upon the discussion of the question which that act and the seventy-seventh article of war present. The American articles of war of 1776 provided that "the officers and soldiers of any troops, whether minute men, militia, or others," should, when joined with the regular forces, be subject to be tried by courtsmartial in like manner with the officers and soldiers in the regular forces, "save only that such courts-martial shall be composed entirely of militia officers of the same provincial corps with the offender." Davis, Military Law, p. 617. Section 6 of the act of May 2, 1792, reads in this way: "And be it further enacted, that courts-martial for the trial of militia shall be composed of militia officers only." I Stat. 264, c. 28. This provision was re-enacted in the act of Febru

ary 28, 1795 (1 Stat. 424, c. 36), in the act of April 18, 1814 (3 Stat. 134, c. 82), and in the act of July 29, 1861 (12 Stat. 282, c. 25, § 5). From these acts it will be seen how uniformly the legislation and practice of the nation excluded the officers of the regular army from courts-martial to try the officers and soldiers of the militia. Not only this, but the act of April 10, 1806, which established the rules. for the government of the armies of the United States, contained this article: "Art. 97. The officers and soldiers of any troops, whether militia or others, being mustered and in the pay of the United States, shall, at all times and in all places, when joined, or acting in conjunction with the regular forces of the United States, be governed by these rules and articles of war and shall be subject to be tried by courts martial in like manner with the officers and soldiers of the regular forces, save only that such courts martial shall be composed entirely of militia officers only." 2 Stat. 371. The fact will not be overlooked that under this article the officers of the regular forces were disqualified from trying the officers and soldiers of troops joined or acting in conjunction with the regular army, whether such troops were militia, volunteers, or others. This enactment remained unchanged until in 1874 the present article 77 took its place. Rev. St. p. 237; 18 Stat. 113, c. 333. During all this time the nation maintained a regular army, and from time to time the president was empowered by congress to raise volunteer forces to augment the strength of the regular force. Congress provided for the enlistment of volunteers in 1812 for the war with Great Britain (2 Stat. 676, c. 21), in 1836 for the Seminole war (5 Stat. 32, c. 80), in 1839 to protect the Maine boundary (5 Stat. 355, c. 89), in 1846 for the war with Mexico (9 Stat. 9, c. 16), and in 1861 for the war of the Rebellion (12 Stat. 268, c. 9; Id. 274, c. 17). No opinion of any court, or of any officer of the war department, rendered prior to June 27, 1898, to the effect that any of these volunteer forces was the same force as the regular army, or to the effect that the officers of the latter were competent to sit on courts-martial to try the officers of the former, either under the old article 97 or the present article 77, has been called to our attention. On November 19, 1863, Judge Advocate General Holt declared that "the words 'militia officers,' as employed in the ninety-seventh article of war, have been interpreted since the commencement of the Rebellion as synonymous, so far as the organization of courts-martial is concerned, with 'volunteer officers.' This construction undoubtedly accords with the spirit of the article, and in its practical enforcement the object of the rule is accomplished." In the practice of the department the officers of the regular army were not permitted to sit on courts-martial to try the officers or soldiers of the volunteer force. G. O. 53, Dept. East, 1864; G. O. 16, Dept. Missouri, 1864; C. C. M. O. II, 13, 16, Dept. Kentucky, 1865. The unanimous opinion of the writers upon military law was that the volunteer army was one of the "other forces" than the regular army, and that the officers of the latter were prohibited from sitting on courts-martial to try the officers or soldiers of the former. Bénet, Military Law (Ed. 1866) p. 25; Winthrop, Abridgment of Military · Law, 29; Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (2d Ed.) 92; Da

51 C.C.A.-23

vis, Military Law, pp. 27, 496. The decisions of the courts had recognized the two forces as different, the one as temporary, called forth by the exigency of the time, to serve during war or its imminence, and then to be dissolved into its original elements; the other as permanent and perpetual, to be maintained in peace and in war. U. S. v. Sweeny, 157 U. S. 281, 15 Sup. Ct. 608, 39 L. Ed. 702; U. S. v. Merrill, 9 Wall. 614, 19 L. Ed. 664; Kerr v. Jones, 19 Ind. 351; Wantlan v. White, Id. 470. The laws and the long-continued practice of a people evidence its public policy. Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2 How. 127, 197, 11 L. Ed. 205;. U. S. v. Association, 58 Fed. 58, 69, 7 C. C. A. 15, 73, 19 U. S. App. 36, 54, 24 L. R. A. 73. The uniform course of legislation, decision, and practice upon the subject under consideration for more than a century establish the fact that it had become the public policy of the United States to prohibit the trial of the officers and soldiers of the volunteer force and of the militia by the officers of the regular army.

Nor is the reason for this legislation and action far to seek or difficult to discern. It was not, as suggested by counsel for the government, that the volunteers and militia were citizens of the states, and that their officers were generally commissioned by the governors. It lies deeper, and is more fundamental and potential. It is grounded in that cardinal principle of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that no man shall be tried or condemned save by the hearing and judgment of his peers; in that principle which inspired the rule that deprives judges of the power to try persons accused of heinous crimes in civil life, and remits their trial to the forum of their peers, the jury. The officers of the regular army are generally taught in their youth the laws that govern the regular force, that high regard for truth and honor and that prompt and exact obedience to orders which condition its high efficiency. The officers of the volunteers spend their earlier days without knowledge of military law, preparing for agricultural, mechanical, mercantile, or professional pursuits, unaccustomed to military discipline, and exempt from the controlling commands of superiors. The officers of the regular army make the discipline of that army, the preparation for war, and war itself the work of their lives. Their hopes and their aspirations are to excel in this, their chosen profession, and upon it they rely for their livelihood. The officers of the volunteers look to civil pursuits for their ultimate success and sustenance. They leave these pursuits for a few short months at the call of their country to subdue a rebellion against or to defeat an enemy of their nation. They seek not so much to discipline the army they join, and to prepare it for war, as to speedily conclude the war, restore peace, and return to their chosen pursuits. Their hopes and aspirations center, not in their temporary occupation, but in the pursuits they have left, and to which they are soon to return. More than all this, the officers of the regular army know the unwritten code of military thought and action, and the habit of the trained soldier's life, and know them so well that their practice is involuntary, while a negLect of them seems inexcusable. The officers of the volunteer force come to the army in ignorance of this code and custom. They have short time to learn or to practice them. Their invariable practice does

not always seem to them essential to the defeat of the enemy and a speedy peace, and the heinousness of a disregard of some of their requirements does not always impress them. So it is that the thoughts, actions, habits, and ambitions of the officers of the regular army differ widely from those of the volunteers. Many things in the life of the soldier seem vital to the former that have small importance in the eyes of the latter. Many military offenses seem heinous to the former that appear venal to the latter. Congressmen have not been ignorant of these facts. They have associated with, known, and honored the officers of the regular army. They have known their pride in their profession, in the efficiency of the regular force, and the abhorrence with which they have looked upon any breach of either the moral or the military law. They have known the volunteers. These have been their constituents and their friends. Many of the members of congress have been volunteers themselves. In the light of these facts, and with this knowledge, they have thought that the officers and soldiers of the volunteer force ought not to be tried by the officers of the regular army; and they have made and maintained for more than a century the legislation which has been quoted to carry that thought into effect.

This, then, was the situation when the act of April 22, 1898, under which a judge advocate general first held that officers of the regular army could lawfully sit on courts-martial to try the officers and soldiers of the volunteer force, was passed. The acts of congress had prohibited for nearly a century, and still expressly forbade it. The decisions and the practice of the officers of the war department interdicted it. The established policy of the nation inhibited it. In the light of this legislation, decision, and policy the acts of 1898 and 1899 must be read and construed. What was there in these acts to repeal the statutory inhibition and reverse the public policy of a century? The decisions, the policy, and the practice rested on the acts of congress, and certainly nothing less than an express repeal by that body of the plain inhibition of article 77, or such legislation as clearly shows the undoubted intention of congress to strike it down, ought to be permitted to withdraw it, and to reverse the policy and practice of so many years.

The first argument in support of the contention of the government that the acts of 1898 and 1899 have had this radical effect is that, while the volunteer army was one of the "other forces" than the regular army under article 77, prior to the act of 1898, that act made it the same force as the regular army, because it provides that the organized and active land forces of the United States shall consist of the army of the United States and of the militia of the several states when called into the service of the nation; that the regular army is the permanent military establishment, which is maintained in peace and war, and that the volunteer army is maintained only during the existence of war, or while war is imminent, and is raised and organized only after congress authorizes the president so to do. 30 Stat. 361, c. 187, §§ 2-4. They insist that this enactment declares that there were but two forces of the United States,-the army and the militia,—and that, as the regular army was one part of the former force and the volunteer army was