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that the "army of the United States shall consist" of the cavalry, infantry, and artillery of the regular army; that the regular army may be temporarily increased to 65,000 men, and that the president may “raise a force of not more than thirty-five thousand volunteers.” 30 Stat. 977, 979, c. 352, SS 1, 12. The petitioner is one of these volunteers, and, if the effect of the classification of 1898 had been all that counsel claims, yet by the literal terms of the act of 1899 Deming was a member of another force than the regular army,-a member of the volunteer force.

Counsel for the government advance another argument in support of the contention that the volunteers, under the acts of 1898 and 1899, were not other forces than the regular army. It is that the law and the practice upon this subject during the war of the Rebellion were established to prevent state troops from being tried by the officers of the regular army; that the volunteers during that war were raised by the states, and officered by their governors; and that their regiments were designated by the names of the states from which they came, while the volunteers called under the acts of 1898 and 1899 were raised under a different system, were not so nearly assimilated to the militia, and that those received under the act of 1899 were not apportioned to or raised by the states, their regiments were not designated by the names of the states, but, like the regulars, they were enlisted from the country at large, their regiments took numbers supplemental to those of the regiments of the regular army, and their officers were appointed, not by the governors, but by the president. This contention, in our opinion, is based on a misconception of the real reason which inspired the legislation and the policy which for so many years has prohibited the trial of volunteers by regulars. That reason was, not that the volunteers were state troops and the regulars national troops, that the volunteers were raised by the states and their officers were appointed by the governors, while the regulars were raised by the nation and their officers were commissioned by the president. It was, as has been shown in an earlier part of this opinion, that the knowledge, training, habits, hopes, and ambitions of the officers of the regular army, who had devoted themselves for life to the discipline and efficiency of that force, necessarily conditioned their opinions of the heinousness of military offenses; and these opinions, this knowledge and training, these hopes and ambitions, differed so widely from those of the officers of the volunteer force, who came from civil life, for a limited time, ignorant of military law and of the customs and practices of a soldier's life, and anxious to speedily return to their civil occupations, that congress established the rule that the former should not be competent to sit on courts-martial for the trial of the latter. The reason of this rule applies to the volunteer force raised under the act of 1899 with as much force as to those raised during the war of the Rebellion.

Finally, it is contended that the provision of section 6 of the act of April 22, 1898, "that the volunteer army and the militia of the states when called into the service of the United States shall be organized under, and shall be subject to, the laws, orders and regulations governing the regular army,” indicates that the volunteer army and the militia are a part of the regular army, and hence the same force as that army, within the meaning of article 77. The enactment appears to us to demonstrate the contrary, and that because, if the volunteers and the militia were a part of the regular army, they were subject to the laws, orders, and regulations governing it, without a special declaration to that effect. A similar provision may be found in the act of July 22, 1861 (12 Stat. 269, c. 9, § 2), under which the volunteer forces for the war of the Rebellion were enlisted, and yet those volunteers were held to be other forces than the regular army.

The result is that when the acts of 1898 and 1899 were passed there was an article of war in force enacted by congress which expressly prohibited the officers of the regular army from sitting on courtsmartial to try the officers or soldiers of other forces. Prior to the passage of these acts the volunteer force was in fact, and had been uniformly held to be, one of these other forces, so that in law and in practice this article of war forbade the officers of the regular army to try the officers or soldiers of the volunteers. There is no express repeal or modification of this inhibition in the acts of 1898 and 1899. There is nothing in these acts repugnant to or inconsistent with the prohibition, nothing to show that congress intended thereby to withdraw or to change it, but strong indications, in the marked distinction it studiously maintains between the regular army and the volunteer army, and in the fact that it provided for military boards composed entirely of officers of the volunteer army to examine into the efficiency and qualifications of the volunteer officers, that it intended to preserve and to maintain the inhibition. The reason which inspired this legislation and the policy and practice it evidences apply with all their cogency and force to the officers and soldiers of the volunteer force raised under the act of 1899. These facts and the considerations to which we have adverted have irresistibly forced our minds to the conclusion that the volunteer force raised under the act of 1899 was not the same force as the regular army, but that it was one of the "other forces" specified in article 77, and that the officers of the regular army were forbidden by that article to sit on any court-martial to try the petitioner, who was an officer of the volunteer force raised under the act of 1899.

It is insisted, however, that, if the members of this court-martial were disqualified to try the petitioner, that objection was waived, because not made at the trial, and the judgment was not void, but merely erroneous and voidable, so that it was impregnable to collateral attack by the writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus cannot be made to perform the office of a writ of error, but it is the proper process to challenge a void judgment and to relieve the defendant from its baleful effect. It may not be invoked to review and avoid an erroneous judgment of which the court had jurisdiction, but it is always effective to relieve a prisoner from the restraint imposed by a judgment that is absolutely void. In re Reese, 47 C. C. A. 87, 107 Fed. 942, 948; Ex parte Buskirk, 72 Fed. 14, 21, 18 C. C. A. 410, 417, 25 U. S. App. 613, 615; Ex parte Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 8 Sup. Ct. 164, 31 L. Ed. 216; Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713, 718, 5 Sup. Ct. 724, 28 L. Ed. 1117; Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 81, 83, 15 L.

Ed. 838; Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 13, 23, 25 L. Ed. 538; In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731, 8 Sup. Ct. 1263, 32 L. Ed. 274; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 4 Sup. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274; U. S. v. Pridgeon, 153 U. S. 48, 59, 14 Sup. Čt. 746, 38 L. Ed. 631; Rose v. Roberts, 99 Fed. 948, 40 C. C. A. 199. A judgment or sentence of a court which had no jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the person affected by its adjudication is absolutely void. But the judgment or sentence of a court empowered to hear and determine the issues relative to the subject-matter and the person affected by its decision, although it may be wrong and irregular, is simply voidable, and cannot be successfully attacked collaterally. Foltz v. Railroad Co., 60 Fed. 316, 318, 8 C. C. A. 635, 637, 19 U. S. App. 576, 581. Hence the question here presented is, did this court-martial have jurisdiction to hear and try the petitioner for the offense for which he was charged? The legal presumption is that courts of general jurisdiction have the power and the authority to make the adjudications which they render, and that their judgments are valid. But no such presumption accompanies the sentences of courts of inferior or limited jurisdiction. It is indispensable to the maintenance of their judgments that their jurisdiction shall be clearly and unequivocally shown. A court-martial is a court of limited jurisdiction. It is a creature of the statute, a temporary judicial body authorized to exist by acts of congress under specified circumstances for a specific purpose. It has no power or jurisdiction which the statutes do not confer upon it. The articles of war specify the officers who are empowered to convene these courts (articles 72, 73, 74, 81, 82), the officers who may compose them (articles 75, 76, 77, 78, 80), and the persons and charges which they are empowered to try (articles 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83). "It necessarily follows that the jurisdiction of every courtmartial, and hence the validity of each, of its judgments, is conditioned by these indispensable prerequisites: (i) That it was convened by an officer empowered by the statutes to call it; (2) that the officers whom he commanded to sit upon it were of those whom he was authorized by the articles of war to detail for that purpose; (3) that the court thus constituted was invested by the acts of congress with power to try the person and the offense charged; and (4) that its sentence was in accordance with the Revised Statutes. The absence of any of these indispensable conditions renders the judgment and sentence of a court-martial coram non judice, and absolutely void, because such a judgment and sentence is rendered without authority of law and without jurisdiction. Runkle v. U. S., 122 U. S. 543, 546, 7 Sup. Ct. 1141, 30 L. Ed. 1167; Mills v. Martin, 19 Johns. 7, 30; Wise v. Withers, 3 Cranch, 331, 2 L. Ed. 457; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 207, 7 L. Ed. 650; Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65, 80, 15 L. Ed. 838.

Let us now measure the contention that the judgment of this courtmartial, which condemned the petitioner to dismissal and imprisonment, was not void, but was merely irregular or erroneous, by these indisputable principles. The eighty-eighth article of war reads:

"Members of a court inartial may be challenged by a prisoner, but only for cause stated to the court. The court shall determine the relevaney and validity thereof and shall not receive a challenge to more than one member at a time.”

The acts of congress make no provision for a challenge to the array, and point out no method whereby the question of the disqualification of all the members may be determined in the first instance by any one but the members of the court themselves challenged one by one. It is said that a court-martial is like a jury; that the reviewing officer occupies the place of a judge; that the disqualification of a juror, if not suggested at the trial, is waived, and does not render the verdict void (Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U. S. 293, 16 Sup. Ct. 304, 40 L. Ed. 432; Clark v. Van Vrancken, 20 Barb. 281; In re Voorhees, 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 206); and that the judgment of this court-martial ought not to be held void because all its members were incompetent to sit upon it. But in the essentials of the issue the analogy does not hold. The question of the qualification of triors arises in limine. It is to be determined before the trial commences. In the case of a trial by jury, the judge, not the jury, determines the qualifications of the jurors; while in a trial by a court-martial the members of the court must determine their own qualifications, and, if all the members are incompetent to sit in the court at all, how can they be competent to decide that they are either competent or incompetent to act there? Moreover, a jury decides nothing but questions of fact, while the members of a court-martial determine both the law and the facts. This argument by analogy is not persuasive. Indeed, the analogy between the judgment of a court-martial and the judgments of courts composed of disqualified judges is much closer. All the members of this court-martial were disqualified. It was a court of inferior-of limited—jurisdiction. Why should its judgment have more virtue than those of courts of general jurisdiction some of whose judges are incompetent to sit? Yet the general rule, supported by the great weight of authority, is that the judgments of such courts are void, and that neither waiver nor consent can give them validity. Case v. Hoffman, 100 Wis. 314, 356, 75 N. W. 945, 44 L. R. A. 728; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547, 552; Low v. Rice, 8 Johns. 409; Clayton v. Per Dun, 13 Johns. 218; Edwards v. Russell, 21 Wend. 63; People v. Connor, 142 N. Y. 130, 133, 36 N. E. 807; Chambers v. Clearwater, *40 N. Y. 310, 314; Sigourney v. Sibley, 21 Pick. 101, 106, 32 Am. Dec. 248; Gay v. Minot, 3 Cush. 352; Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 219, 224, 7 Am. Rep. 513; Railway Co. v. Summers, 113 Ind. 10, 17, 14 N. E. 733, 3 Am. St. Rep. 616; Ochus v. Sheldon, 12 Fla. 138; Chambers v. Hodges, 23 Tex. 112; Gains v. Barr, 60 Tex. 676, 678; Templeton v. Giddings (Tex. Sup.) 12 S. W. 851.

The insuperable objection, however, to the jurisdiction of this courtmartial and to the validity of its sentence is that the officer who called it was not only unauthorized, but was positively forbidden by act of congress, to constitute it of the officers of the regular army, to detail these officers to sit upon it; and when these officers were so detailed they were in like manner prohibited from responding to the call and from becoming members of the court. The order convening the court-martial declared that the purpose of its call was "for the trial of Captain Peter C. Deming, assistant commissary of subsistence U. S. volunteers,” and it commanded nine officers of the regular army to meet and sit upon the court. The seventy-seventh article of war prohibited Gen. Shaiter, who issued this order, from directing these officers to sit upon a court-martial to try this officer of the volunteer force, and forbade them to do so. The court was therefore illegally constituted. It did not have a single member upon it that the commanding officer had the power to direct to participate in the trial of the petitioner, or that could lawfully do so. "It was necessary to show that the court was legally constituted in order to gain jurisdiction of the persons and offenses of those who were to be tried before it.” Mills v. Martin, 19 Johns. 33. “To give effect to its sentences, it must appear affirmatively and unequivocally that the court was legally constituted, that it had jurisdiction, that all the statutory regulations governing its proceedings had been complied with, and that its sentence was conformable to law.” Runkle v. U. S., 122 U. S. 556, 7 Sup. Ct. 1141, 30 L. Ed. 1167. In the army of the United States courts-martial derive their power—their jurisdictionfrom the acts of congress. Neither the silence, the consent, nor the agreement of the parties can confer it if it is not granted by the statutes. This court-martial derived no power or jurisdiction from the acts of the congress of the United States, because it was constituted in direct violation of, and not in accordance with, them. It was therefore entirely without jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and its judgment against him was absolutely void.

The judgment below must accordingly be reversed, and the case must be remanded to the circuit court, with directions to issue the writ of habeas corpus, and to proceed in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion; and it is so ordered.

(113 Fed. 652.)

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. February 24, 1902.)

No. 1,640.

Where a patentee has made his claim, he has thereby disclaimed and abandoned to the public all other combinations and improvements that are not mere invasions of the device, combination, or improrement which


But one who claims and secures à patent for a new machine or combination thereby necessarily claims and secures a patent for every mechanical equivalent of that machine or combination, because, in the light of the patent law, every mechanical equivalent of a device is the

same thing as the device itself. 3. SAME-MECHANICAL EQUIVALENTS.

Where form is not the essence of the invention, machines or combinations which are constructed upon the same principle, which have the same mode of operation, and which accomplish the same result by the same or by equivalent mechanical means, are mechanical equivalents, within the meaning of the patent law, although they differ in form or in name.

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