board it before it had stopped, it is error to instruct that if the car, eren
if not quite at a standstill, was moving with such extreme slowness
that a person might fairly undertake to board it, and while plaintiff was -
about boarding it the conductor suddenly started it, so that it moved
forward with a jerk, defendant's negligence would be established.
-Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. v. Hudson, 113 Fed. 449...51 C. C. A. 283
One about to board a train who has knowledge of facts which would
put a person of ordinary prudence and diligence upon inquiry to ascer
tain whether or not the train is permitted to carry passengers is char-
ged with a knowledge of all the facts which a reasonably diligent in-
quiry would discover.
-Purple v. Union Pac. R. Co., 114 Fed. 123..........51 C. C. A. 564
One who, knowing that a conductor has no authority to grant free
transportation, enters and rides upon his train with the deliberate in-
tention not to pay his fare, under an agreement or under a tacit under-
standing with the conductor that he shall ride free, commits a fraud
upon the railroad company, and is not a passenger, but is a mere tres-
passer, to whom the only duty of the company is to abstain from willful
or reckless injury.
-Purple v. Union Pac. R. Co., 114 Fed. 123..........51 C. C. A. 564
One who enters and rides upon a car or train which he knows, or by
the exercise of reasonable diligence would know, is prohibited from
carrying passengers, is a trespasser. and not a passenger, and the only
duty of the railroad company toward him is to abstain from wanton
or reckless injury to him.
-Purple v. Union Pac. R. Co., 114 Fed. 123..........51 C. C. A. 561
In the absence of any rule or practice permitting freight trains to
carry passengers, the presumption is that one riding for his own con-
venience on a freight train, an engine, a hand car, or any other car-
riage of a common carrier not designed for the transportation of pas-
sengers, is unlawfully there, and is a trespasser.
-Purple v. Union Pac. R. Co., 114 Fed. 123..........51 C. C. A. 564
Plaintiff boarded a caboose on defendant's freight train to make in-
quiries from the conductor concerning his wife, having expected her on
that train, and while he was still in the caboose, and waiting for the
conductor, the train started. When the conductor came, he demanded
that plaintiff pay his fare or get off, but refused to stop the train.
Plaintiff stepped out onto the platform, and the conductor locked the
door, leaving him outside, and he was thrown from the train by the
sudden lurching of the caboose, after having attempted to re-enter.
Held wrongful conduct on the part of the conductor, for which the com-
pany was liable if it was the proximate cause of the injury.
-Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Bruyere, 114 Fed. 540....51 C. C. A. 574
The question whether the wrongful conduct of the conductor was the
proximate cause of the injury was for the jury.
-Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Bruyere, 114 Fed. 540....51 C. C. A. 574
To jury in civil actions, see "Trial," § 3.
Exclusion or expulsion, see "Aliens," § 1.
Citizenship ground of jurisdiction of United States courts, see "Courts," § 1.
Against estate of bankrupt, see "Bankruptcy," § 8.
Mining claims, see "Mines and Minerals," § 1.
Of patent, see "Patents," § 2.
Parol evidence, see "Evidence," § 4.
On sale of decedent's property under order of court, see "Executors and Ad-
ministrators," § 1.
1. Steam vessels meeting or crossing.
Under article 24 of the navigation act of 1890, which provides that
"every vessel overtaking any other shall keep out of the way of the
overtaken vessel," where a tug with a tow saw a schooner a quarter
of a mile ahead, on nearly the same course, and overtook and passed
her, but the tow, which was on a 200-fathom line, did not see the
schooner until within 200 feet, and struck her directly astern, negligence
must be inferred on the part of both tug and tow, unless there is evi-
dence to warrant a finding that the schooner in some way brought about
the collision.
-The Nathan Hale, 113 Fed. 865; The Doris, Id......51 C. C. A. 489
Evidence considered, and held not to sustain a claim made by a tug
and tow that a schooner which they overtook, not seeing the tow,
changed her course after the tug had passed and ran into its wake,
thus causing by such act a collision between her and the tow, which
struck her directly astern.
-The Nathan Hale, 113 Fed. 865; The Doris, Id......51 C. C. A. 489
The steamers Grand Traverse and Livingstone met in Lake Erie in
the early morning, shortly before daylight, being on practically parallel
courses. The night was clear, and they saw each other when four
miles apart. When a mile and a half apart, and again when a mile
and a quarter of a mile, the Traverse signaled her intention to go to
the right, each time porting half a point, but she received no answer
to her signals, the last only being heard by the Livingstone, which
thereupon starboarded her helm, and a collision resulted. When the
last signal was given and heard the vessels were in a position of safety,
and had the Livingstone ported, as she should have done, or even kept
her course, there would have been no collision. Held that, the naviga-
tion of the Traverse having been correct in all respects, neither the fact
that her port light had gone out, nor that her lookout had temporarily
left his post after the vessels had sighted each other, could have mis-
led the Livingstone or contributed to the collision, which was due solely
to the Livingstone's change of course after the signal of the Traverse
was heard and understood; nor was the Traverse chargeable with con-
tributory fault in failing to stop and reverse in the brief time remaining
after the unexpected change of course of the Livingstone first created
a situation of danger.
-The Livingstone, 113 Fed. 879...
§ 2, 3. Overtaking vessels.
Where an overtaking steamship is passing too close to another, so as
to create danger of a collision, the latter is justified in slowing, or even
in reversing, so as to shorten the time of passing, and such action can-
not be charged as a fault by the overtaking vessel in case of collision.
-The Aureole, 113 Fed. 224..............
........51 C. C. A. 181
The force called "suction," exerted by one vessel on another, due to
the creation of currents by a moving vessel, and the effect of which is
apparently greatest when a larger and faster vessel is passing another
moving in the same direction in shallow water and a narrow channel,
has been recognized in many cases by courts of admiralty; and a court
is not justified in refusing to consider it as a cause in a case of collision
between two steamships, one of which had overtaken and was passing
the other in a river at a distance of not more than 75 to 100 feet, and
where, under the evidence, it appears that the overtaken vessel, though
with her helm hard a-port, suddenly sheered to port, and struck the
other after the latter had nearly passed.
-The Aureole, 113 Fed. 224...
Evidence considered, and held to show that a collision between two
steamships, one of which had overtaken and was passing the other in
the Delaware river at a place where the water was shallow as com-
pared with the draught of the vessels, was due to the fault of the over-
taking vessel in passing too close to the other, so as to create a suction
which caused the overtaken ship, which was the smaller of the two, and
had slowed to half speed, to deviate from her course and draw against
the other.
-The Aureole, 113 Fed. 224..
A tug passing down a stream with a schooner in tow, held in fault
for a collision between her tow and another tug which had become
disabled and was unmanageable, because she failed to see the disabled
vessel, and note her condition or hear her alarm signals, until so close
upon her that the collision could not be avoided.
-The Protector, 113 Fed. 868; The Golden Age, Id. .51 C. C. A. 492
A tug, having in charge eight canal boats in three tiers, tied them up
on reaching a pier in the East river at about 1 a. mn., to await a favor-
able condition of the tide before proceeding further. The night was
then clear, and the tug left the tow to engage in other work. At 3
o'clock a fog came on, and later in the morning became very dense. The
canal boats, when left, tailed down the river with the ebb tide, but
when the tide rose gradually swung out across stream, and, while lying
thus, about 6:30 a. m., a ferryboat collided with one of the canal boats
and injured it. When the fog began to rise, the tug was a very short
distance from the tow, and had only two light boats in charge, and
could have returned to the tow. Held negligence on the part of the tug.
and that it was liable for the injury.
-Hughes v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 113 Fed. 925......51 C. C. A. 555
A steamer passed the Narrows and came into New York Bay at
night without a pilot, and came to anchor considerably to the east of
the anchorage grounds fixed by the secretary of the treasury, which
were marked by buoys; the master not knowing the true boundaries
of the grounds, though the rule had been in force since 1888. A tug
and tow were passing out, and the steamer was not seen by the tug
until she was within 300 feet from her, when the steamer was discovered
straight ahead. The tug then endeavored to avoid collision, and passed
about 150 feet to the east of the steamer, which was struck by the
tow. The night was clear, except for patches of fog and smoke, which
obscured view of vessels but for a few minutes. The steamer's anchor
light was visible at times at least from one to two miles while the
tug was slowly approaching her. Held, that both steamer and the tug
were at fault for the collision; the steamer in anchoring outside the
limits of the anchor grounds, and the tug in not keeping a proper
lookout.—and that the damages and costs should therefore be divided.
-The James D. Leary. v. The Evelyn, 113 Fed. 1019. .51 C. C. A. 620
5. Special circumstances and errors in extremis.
An error in extremis cannot be urged in exculpation of a vessel whose
prior negligence has brought about the situation in which a mistake
in judgment is excusable.
-The Protector, 113 Fed. 868; The Golden Age, Id. .51 C. C. A. 492
Where fault on the part of one vessel for a collision is established
by uncontradicted testimony, and such fault is of itself sufficient to
account for the disaster, it is not enough for such vessel to raise a
doubt with regard to the management of the other vessel, but any
reasonable doubt as to whether the fault of the latter contributed to
the collision should be resolved in its favor.
-The Livingstone, 113 Fed. 879....
Carriage of goods and passengers, see "Carriers"; "Shipping."
1. Subjects of regulation.
The pure-food law of Ohio (2 Bates' Ann. St. §§ 4200-4 to 4200-8)
which makes it an offense to manufacture for sale, sell, or offer to sell,
within the state, any article of food or drink which is adulterated,
within the meaning of the act, and provides that food shall be deemed
to be adulterated, among other things, "if it is colored, coated, polished
or powdered, whereby damage or inferiority is concealed, or if, by any
means, it is made to appear better or of greater value than it really
is," but that the act shall not apply to mixtures or compounds recog-
nized as ordinary articles or ingredients of articles of food, "if each
and every article sold or offered for sale be distinctly labeled as a
mixture or compound, with the name and per cent. of each ingredient
therein, and are not injurious to health," is one which it is within the
police powers of the state to pass and enforce, and is not unconstitu-
tional, as an interference with the right of congress to regulate inter-
state commerce, as applied to articles, mixtures, or compounds brought
into Ohio from other states, and sold in the original packages.
-Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 113 Fed. 616.....
Of broker, see "Brokers," § 1.
Of broker, see "Brokers," § 1.
Of physician, see "Physicians and Surgeons."
Of receiver, see "Receivers," § 3.
Of evidence in civil actions, see "Evidence," § 1.
Of experts as witnesses, see "Evidence," § 5.
Of witnesses in general, see "Witnesses," § 1.
Unfair competition, see "Trade-Marks and Trade-Names," § 2.
COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT.
See "Payment"; "Release."
Of period of limitation, see "Limitation of Actions," § 2.
In contract of sale, see "Sales," § 1.
In insurance policies, see "Insurance," § 2.
In wills, see "Wills," § 1.
What law governs limitations, see "Limitation of Actions," § 1.
Admissibility in civil actions of statements of conspirators, see "Evidence,"
§ 2.
Provisions relating to particular subjects.
See "Commerce," § 1; "Internal Revenue."
Enactment and validity of statutes, see "Statutes," § 1
Damages for breach, see "Damages." § 2.
Parol or extrinsic evidence, see "Evidence," § 4.
Contracts of particular classes of parties.
See "Carriers," § 1; "Master and Servant"; "Municipal Corporations," § 1.
|