and their stockholders, and their respective rights and obligations under
the contract are governed by the general law, unless modified by statute.
As to matters arising out of such relations, the decisions of the courts
of the state are not binding upon the federal courts, but when a stock-
holder becomes also a borrower his contract as such is governed by the
local law, and upon the question of his rights and liabilities thereunder
the state decisions are controlling.
-Coltrane v. Blake, 113 Fed. 785....
Where a stockholder in a building and loan association becomes also
a borrower, his contract as such is governed by the local law, and where
by such law it is usurious, in a settlement on the winding up of the as-
sociation in insolvency before the maturity of his loan he should be
charged with interest on the sum borrowed at the legal rate, and cred-
ited with all sums paid as premiums and interest, but the local law
does not govern as to payments made by him as dues on his stock
which are made under his contract as a stockholder, and the principles
of equity require that as to such payments he be placed on an equality
with nonborrowing stockholders, and share ratably with them in the
assets remaining after the debts of the association are paid; and he is
not entitled to credit on his loan for such payments where the proceed-
ings are in a federal court, whatever may be the rule of the courts of
the state.
-Coltrane v. Blake, 113 Fed. 785......
Rev. St. § 914, requiring the practice in the federal courts to conform
as nearly as may be to the state practice, was not designed to abolish
in the federal courts the distinction between actions at law and suits
in equity.
-Hill v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 113 Fed. 914.........51 C. C. A. 544
A suit in equity to set aside an award of arbitrators may be main-
tained in a court of the United States by a foreign state against a corpo-
ration of the state in which the suit is brought, found and served within
the district.
-Republic of Colombia v. Cauca Co., 113 Fed. 1020; Cauca Co. v.
Republic of Colombia, Id..
.51 C. C. A. 604
Restraining criminal acts by injunction, see "Injunction," § 2.
Cutting timber on public land, see "Public Lands," § 1.
Offenses against customs laws, see "Customs Duties," § 6.
Violation of internal revenue laws, see "Internal Revenue."
On the trial of one indicted under Rev. St. U. S. § 3296, for the removal
and concealment of distilled spirits on which the tax had not been
paid, testimony was offered that, on the night before the whisky was
removed, accused broke the lock of the warehouse where it was stored.
Defendant objected on the ground that he had been indicted under sec-
tion 3268 for breaking such lock, and at the last term of the court had
been tried thereon and acquitted. Held that, though such acquittal
could be considered by the jury in considering the credibility of the
witnesses, it was not ground for excluding the testimony.
-Pilcher v. United States, 113 Fed. 248.
On the trial of defendant for removing whisky on which the tax had
not been paid from a distillery warehouse belonging to his father, a
witness testified that he was employed by a revenue officer to get up
evidence against the guilty parties; that, while concealed under the
father's house, witness heard some men discussing the removal of the
whisky, and the best way to get out of the trouble, and it was his im-
pression that one of the voices was that of defendant, but he was not
quite certain. Held, that the admission of such testimony was error.
-Pilcher v. United States, 113 Fed. 248....
..51 C. C. A. 205
§ 1. Validity, construction, and operation of customs laws in general.
Section 5 of the tariff act of 1897, which provides that whenever any
country "shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty or grant
upon the exportation of any article or merchandise from such country"
which is dutiable under the act, an additional duty equal to such bounty
or grant shall be collected thereon upon its importation into the United
States, is a protective measure, and is intended to cover every case
where by the laws of a foreign country the exporter is given, either di-
rectly or indirectly, a pecuniary benefit from the exportation, whether
by way of a direct bounty paid from the public treasury, by the remis-
sion of taxes, or by exemption from taxes which would otherwise be
imposed on the article.
-Downs v. United States, 113 Fed. 144..............51 C. C. A. 100
The laws of Russia bestow a bounty or grant upon the exportation of
so-called "free sugar," so as to work a benefit or advantage to the ex-
porter in two ways: (1) By remitting the excise tax due upon the sugar
exported, and (2) by the issuance by the government to the exporter of
a certificate of exportation, which authorizes the sale in the domestic
market of an equal quantity of "free reserve or free surplus" sugar
without the payment of the additional tax otherwise required to be paid
thereon, and which certificate is transferable and has a substantial
market value; and such sugar, when imported into the United States, is
subject to the additional or countervailing duty imposed by section 5 of
the tariff act of 1897.
-Downs v. United States, 113 Fed. 144....
§ 2. Goods subject to duty, rate, and amount.
Tariff Act 1897, par. 42, places a duty on seal, herring. whale, and
other fish oils; and paragraph 568 exempts fr m duty grease and oils,
excepting fish oils, commonly used in soap making, wire drawing, or
for stuffing or dressing leather, and which are fit only for such purposes.
Held, that oil known as "cod oil," made from putrid fish livers, which,
while used principally for dressing leather, is fit for some other pur-
poses not enumerated, and, while not technically known in the trade as
a "fish oil," is subject to the duty; it not being within the exemption,
and the phrase "fish oils" not having been employed in a technical
-Swan & Finch Co. v. United States, 113 Fed. 243. ...51 C. C. A. 200
In construing tariff statutes congress must be assumed to use words
and phrases in the sense in which they have been applied by the treas-
ury department and executive and administrative officers under earlier
statutes, and, so construed, the phrase "professional production of a
sculptor," as used in Tariff Act 1897, par. 454, providing that "the term
'statuary' *
* shall be understood to include only such statuary
as is the professional production of a statuary or sculptor,"
must be considered as synonymous with "productions of a professional
sculptor."
-United States v. Townsend, 113 Fed. 442...........51 C. C. A. 276
A pile fabric, commercially known as "velvet cord," "ribbed velvet,"
or "corded velvet," is not "corduroy composed of cotton or other veg-
etable fiber," within Tariff Act 1897, par. 315, and is not assessable as
such.
-Stewart, Howe & May Co. v. United States, 113 Fed. 928...................
51 C. C. A. 558
Certain figures five feet six inches in height, representing religious
subjects, and scenes in the life of the Saviour, composed of pulverized
stone, cement, plaster of Paris, and other materials, and colored and
otherwise decorated, were properly assessed for duty under Act July
24, 1897, pars. 97, 450, at 45 per cent. and 35 per cent. ad valorem, as
manufactures of plaster of Paris not specially provided for, or as articles
and wares composed wholly or in chief value of earthy or mineral sub-
stances not specially provided for; and were not exempt from duty, under
paragraph 649 of said act, as casts of sculpture imported in good faith
for the use of a society incorporated for religious purposes.
-Benziger v. United States, 113 Fed. 1016...... ......51 C. C. A. 587
Old gunny cloth or cotton bagging, formerly used for covering cotton
bales in ragged, dirty, and partly rotten pieces, to be used chiefly as
paper stock for making Manilla paper only, is dutiable under Tariff Act
1897, par. 463, as waste, not specially provided for, at 10 per cent. ad
valorem; it being shown that, besides being used for the making of
paper, great quantities of it are used for patching cotton bales and for
conversion into yarns or for making jute shoddy.
-Train v. United States, 113 Fed. 1020.....
Articles known as "tapestries," and not commercially known as "pile
fabrics," though a portion thereof has a pile surface, are improperly
assessed for duty as "pile fabrics," at $1.50 per pound, under Act 1894,
par. 299, but are within the provisions of paragraph 302 of said act.
-United States v. McGibbon, 113 Fed. 1021..........................51 C. C. A. 625
3. Collection districts and officers.
Under the provision of section 5 of the tariff act of 1897, that the net
amount of any bounty or grant paid or bestowed by a foreign country
on the exportation of an article or merchandise "shall be from time t>
time ascertained, determined, and declared by the secretary of the treas-
ury," the decision of the secretary as to such amount is conclusive, and
cannot be reviewed by the courts; but the question whether a country
pays or bestows such bounty or grant, where it depends upon the con-
struction of the laws of such country, is a judicial one, and, while it is
to be decided primarily by the secretary, his decision thereon is review-
able.
-Downs v. United States, 113 Fed. 144.... .......51 C. C. A. 100
Act Aug. 28, 1890 (26 Stat. 363, c. 814), "to reorganize and establish
the customs collection district of Puget Sound," not only by its title, but
also by its provisions, shows the intention of congress to make a com-
plete revision of the law relating to the organization of such district;
and section 3, fixing the compensation of the collector at a salary of
$3,500 per annum, supersedes and repeals Rev. St. § 2670, on the same
subject, including the provision permitting the collector to retain fees
to the amount of $2,000 in addition to his salary.
-Saunders v. United States, 114 Fed. 42..
§ 4. Payment and collection, refunding, and drawback.
Customs Administrative Act June, 1890, § 1, provides that merchandise
imported in the United States shall, for the purp se of the act, be
deemed the property of the one to whom it is consigned, but that the
holder of any bill of lading consigned to order, and indorsed by the con-
signor, shall be deemed the consignee thereof. Held, that where mer-
chandise is consigned to customs brokers for another, who is the owner,
the brokers, having presented the invoice, made the entry, and received
the goods, are liable for additional duties assessed because of under-
valuation.
-Baldwin v. United States, 113 Fed. 217............51 C. C. A. 174
§ 5. Recovery of duties paid.
Under the procedure inaugurated by the customs administrative act
of 1890, by which the decision of a collector is reviewed by a special
tribunal, there is no necessity for exacting such nice precision in the
protest of an importer, or such accurate knowledge of the law by him,
as to debar him from relief from an erroneous classification and ex-
cessive assessment by the collector because he fails to designate cor-
rectly the provision under which the classification should have been
made.
-United States v. Shea, Smith & Co., 114 Fed. 38....51 C. C. A. 664
§ 6. Violations of customs laws.
Tariff Act 1897, § 32, provides that, if the appraised value of any im-
ported article subject to an ad valorem duty shall exceed the declared
value in the entry, there shall be levied and collected an additional duty,
proportionate to the excess, but not exceeding 50 per cent. of the ap-
praised value; and by a proviso it is declared that if the appraised
value shall exceed the declared value by more than 50 per cent., except
when arising from a manifest clerical error, the entry shall be held
presumptively fraudulent, and the collector shall seize the goods and
proceed as in case of forfeiture. Held, that the fact that a case is within
the terms of the proviso, and that the government has proceeded there-
under for the forfeiture of the goods, does not relieve the importer from
liability for the duties imposed by the previous portion of the section.
-Gray v. United States, 113 Fed. 213..
.51 C. C. A. 170
For breach of injunction bond, see "Injunction," § 4.
For collision, see "Collision," § 4.
1. Grounds and subjects of compensatory damages.
Damages based on the estimated expenses incurred and losses of
profits sustained by reason of defendant's failure to complete and de-
liver certain vessels within a specified time are not recoverable in an
action for breach of a contract to complete and deliver the vessels
within the specified time, though the purpose for which the vessels were
intended was understood by the parties, such damages being entirely
conjectural.
-DeFord v. Maryland Steel Co., 113 Fed. 72...........51 C. C. A. 59
Damages based on the loss of vessels in a hurricane are too specula-
tive to be recoverable in an action for breach of a contract to construct
and deliver the vessels within a specified time at a designated place,
their destruction occurring at another place.
-DeFord v. Maryland Steel Co., 113 Fed. 72. .......51 C. C. A. 59
Where there was evidence tending to show that plaintiff had, ever
since the injury sued for, been incapacitated from work in a greater or
less degree, and that such incapacity would continue for some time,
it was not error to instruct that the jury in estimating the amount of
his compensatory damages should take into consideration the loss sus-
tained through inability to work "during the period of his incapacity
and probable incapacity alleged in the complaint."
-Swensen v. Bender, 114 Fed. 1......
Loss of expected profits sustained by a lessee of a railroad lease exe-
cuted by a receiver, due to the termination of the lease prior to its
natural term by order of court, is a proper element of damages to be
awarded the lessee.
-Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Eaton, 114 Fed. 14. .51 C. C. A. 640
In the absence of special circumstances, a party failing to complete
and deliver vessels within a specified time is liable only to the amount
of the interest on the payments made prior to their delivery for the time
of the delay.
-De Ford v. Maryland Steel Co., 113 Fed. 72.........51 C. C. A. 59
§ 3. Pleading, evidence, and assessment.
In an action for injuries, an instruction not to award plaintiff any
damages for hysteria not directly caused by the accident is properly re-
fused, as it restricts the recovery to damages directly caused by the
accident, while those indirectly resulting from it may also have been
recoverable.
-Metropolitan St. Ry. Co. v. Hudson, 113 Fed. 449....51 C. C. A. 283
See "Bankruptcy"; "Fraudulent Conveyances."
Estates, see "Executors and Administrators."
Testimony as to transactions with persons since deceased, see "Witnesses,"
§ 1.
In admiralty, see "Admiralty," § 3.
In fraud of creditors, see “Fraudulent Conveyances."
Deeds by or to particular classes of parties.
See "Executors and Administrators," § 1.
See "Municipal Corporations," § 1.
Particular classes of deeds.
Of trust, see "Mortgages."
Laches, see "Equity," § 2.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION.
See "Dower"; "Executors and Administrators"; "Wills."
From indebtedness, see "Bankruptcy," § 9; "Release."
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