Effect as to property involved, see "Lis Pendens."
To employé, see "Master and Servant," §§ 2-5; "Shipping," § 1.
To passenger, see "Carriers," § 2.
In admiralty, see "Admiralty," § 2.
Defendant's evidence tended to show that decedent was employed by
a corporation, and was a subscriber to a hospital, and that a verbal
contract existed between the hospital and the company that all the
latter's employés, by paying $1 per month, should be entitled to medical
attendance at the hospital free. There was conflict in the evidence as
to whether subscribers were entitled to treatment at their homes, where
decedent's treatment was received. Plaintiff testified that he never
agreed to attend subscribers away from the hospital, which was not
denied. Held not to sustain the defense that plaintiff could not recover
because the services were rendered under contract with the hospital.
-Corbus v. Leonhardt, 114 Fed. 10......
..51 C. C. A. 636
In action to construe will, see "Wills," § 1.
Allegations as to particular facts, acts, or transactions.
In particular actions or proceedings.
See "Admiralty." § 2; "Equity," § 3.
For broker's commission, see "Brokers," § 1.
Foreclosure, see "Mortgages," § 1.
Of insurance, see "Insurance."
Under revenue laws, see "Internal Revenue."
Of attorney, see "Principal and Agent."
Adoption by United States courts of practice of state courts, see "Courts," § 1.
Procedure of particular courts, see "Courts."
Particular proceedings in actions.
See "Abatement and Revival"; "Evidence"; "Judgment"; "Judicial Sales";
"Limitation of Actions"; "Trial."
Particular remedies in or incident to actions.
See "Injunction"; "Receivers."
Procedure in criminal prosecutions.
See "Bail," § 1; "Criminal Law."
Procedure in exercise of special jurisdictions.
In admiralty, see "Admiralty."
In bankruptcy, see "Bankruptcy," § 2.
In equity, see "Equity."
By insolvent corporation, see "Corporations,” § 4.
Effect of proceedings in bankruptcy, see "Bankruptcy," § 5.
Ground for reversal in civil actions, see "Appeal and Error," § 9.
On appeal or error, see "Appeal and Error," § 6.
See "Attorney and Client"; "Brokers."
§ 1. Rights and liabilities as to third persons.
A power of attorney is an instrument by which the authority of an
attorney in fact or private attorney is set forth.
-Treat v. Tolman, 113 Fed. 892..
§ 1. Nature and extent of liability of surety.
A surety's liability does not ordinarily extend beyond the penal sum
of the bond,-as, for instance, to cots and interest,-unless he has in
some way resisted or obstructed the recovery of the claim against him.
-Thomas Laughlin Co. v. American Surety Co., 114 Fed. 627; Blake
v. Same, Id.; Boyd v. Same, Id.; Cleaves v. Same, Id.; Post v.
Same, Id.; Johnson v. Same, Id......
.51 C. C. A. 247
In computing the pro rata to be paid creditors of a defaulting con-
tractor by the surety on his bond (the penalty of the bond being insuffi-
cient to satisfy the claims in full), claims which have been acquired
by a third party, who has contracted to indemnify the surety, should
be considered.
-Thomas Laughlin Co. v. American Surety Co., 114 Fed. 627; Blake
v. Same, Id.; Boyd v. Same, Id.; Cleaves v. Same, Id.; Post v.
Same, Id.; Johnson v. Same, Id.....
.51 C. C. A. 247
Of claims against bankrupts, see "Bankruptcy," § 8.
See "Injunction"; "Mandamus."
Validity of personal judgment obtained on substituted service, see "Judg-
ment," § 1.
See "Mines and Minerals”; “Shipping"; "Trade-Marks and Trade-Names."
Protection of rights of property by injunction, see "Injunction," § 2.
Direct or remote consequences of injury, see "Damages," § 1.
See "Counties," § 1; "Municipal Corporations," § 2; "Towns," § 1.
Mineral lands, see "Mines and Minerals," § 1.
§ 1. Government ownership.
On the trial of one accused of unlawfully cutting timber on land of
the United States, evidence of a custom in that locality, known to the
51 C.C.A.-48
general land office, of entering on land and cutting the timber there-
from before patent was obtained, is inadmissible, since a custom to
violate the law cannot justify itself.
-Teller v. United States, 113 Fed. 273......
Where defendant unlawfully cut timber on public land, the fact that
he acted in accordance with a general custom in that locality is not
evidence of an honest intent on his part.
-Teller v. United States, 113 Fed. 273....
................51 C. C. A. 230
Where defendant unlawfully cut timber on public land, the fact that
before cutting he endeavored to ascertain whether the land was sur-
veyed, and also notified a special agent of the government that he was
cutting the timber, and was not warned off for three weeks, is not evi-
dence of an honest intent.
-Teller v. United States, 113 Fed. 273.
On the trial of defendant for unlawfully cutting timber on pubile
land, the court charged that, in order to convict, the jury must find
that there existed in his mind a willful and wrongful purpose to obtain
the timber in violation of law; and that if he entered on public land
knowing it was such, without having complied with the provisions of
law giving him a right to do so, and cut timber therefrom, they would
be authorized to find the requisite criminal intent. Held, that such
charge fairly stated the law, and was as favorable to defendant as he
was entitled to.
-Teller v. United States, 113 Fed. 273....... ........51 C. C. A. 230
Where defendant admits that he had cut timber on 300 acres of un-
surveyed government land, to which he had no claim or color of title,
and there is evidence that he was informed by the register of the land
office that he could not acquire title because the lands were not open
to entry, and that he promised his workmen that he would stand be-
tween them and the government, and that he had fully exhausted all
his privileges of purchasing such lands, the intent constituting the
offense of unlawfully cutting timber on government land, defined by
Rev. St. § 2461. and Act June 3, 1878, is sufficiently shown.
-Teller v. United States, 113 Fed. 273..
Under Rev. St. 1878, § 2461, 20 Stat. 89, and 27 Stat. 348, making it
a misdemeanor for any person to cut timber on any lands of the
United States situate in any of the public-land states with intent to
export or dispose of the same, where the cutting is admitted, the only
intent necessary to show is the intent to export or dispose of the tim-
ber.
-Teller v. United States, 113 Fed. 273...... ........51 C. C. A. 230
On the trial of one accused of unlawfully cutting timber on land of
the United States, evidence that about the time of the cutting defend-
ant purchased and paid for the full quantity of similar land, which he
could purchase under the act of June 3, 1878, is inadmissible to show
that he would not intentionally commit a trespass.
-Teller v. United States, 113 Fed. 273.....
The exclusive right to occupy and work a mineral claim, given to
the locator by the mining laws during his occupancy, does not segre-
gate such claim from the public domain, so as to exclude such land
from the operation of Rev. St. § 2461, 20 Stat. 89, and 27 Stat. 348.
making it a misdemeanor for any person to cut timber on the public
lands.
-Teller v. United States, 113 Fed. 273.....
An occupant of a mineral claim, who has applied for a patent before
the purchase price is paid and before he receives a certificate, has no
right to cut the timber on such claim with intent to export or remove
the same, and a license from him to so cut the timber gives no pro-
tection to the licensee as against the government.
-Teller v. United States, 113 Fed. 273...
In case defendant cut the timber in good faith, he was only liable
for the value of the timber as cut, and not as manufactured.
-United States v. Van Winkle, 113 Fed. 903..........51 C. C. A. 533
There being evidence that in cutting the timber defendant acted under
what he believed to be the lawful authority of the United States, a re-
quest that the court direct a verdict for the United States for the full
amount prayed for, on the ground that it had been proven that the
lands were public lands, and that defendant had cut the timber without
authority, was properly refused, because ignoring defendant's good faith.
-United States v. Van Winkle, 113 Fed. 903..........51 C. C. A. 533
Where a landowner in good faith, for the purpose of inclosing his own
land, builds a fence on the line extending around the tract, such act is
not unlawful, and is not a violation of the act of February 25, 1885 (23
Stat. 321), which forbids the inclosure of public lands or obstructing ac-
cess thereto by one who has no claim thereto, even though such fence
so connects with fenced lands of other owners as thereby to inclose up-
claimed public lands.
-Potts v. United States, 114 Fed. 52.............
In civil actions, see "Trial," § 2.
Carriage of goods and passengers, see "Carriers."
Taxation of railroads and railroad property, see "Taxation," § 1.
1. Indebtedness, securities, liens, and mortgages.
Where at a judicial sale of a Tennessee railroad it was purchased by
a railroad company incorporated in Virginia, which had filed its char-
ter in Tennessee, and was authorized to make the purchase under Acts
Tenn. 1881, c. 9, § 2, providing that a railroad may acquire another
road by purchase, after the sale is confirmed and title vested in the
purchaser, the state alone can question the purchaser's power to hold
such title.
-Rothchild v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 113 Fed. 476....51 C. C. A. 310
The sale of railroad property in foreclosure proceedings to a committee
of reorganization, by whose plan the stockholders of the mortgagor ap-
pear to obtain some benefit in the purchasing company, is open to the
closest scrutiny where general creditors of the mortgagor are left un-
provided for; but where the foreclosure is instituted and carried on in
the ordinary course for the honest purpose only of enforcing the rights
of the bondholders against the property, the mere fact that stockholders
of the old company may, under the purchasing arrangement, be given
some interest in the securities of the new in exchange for their stock,
while it may be indicative of fraud, does not render the sale fraudulent
per se, and a general creditor of the old company cannot successfully at-
tack such sale without showing actual fraud, and that property of such
company, exceeding in value the mortgage debt, has, by reason of such
fraud, been placed beyond his reach on execution.
-Wenger v. Chicago & E. R. Co., 114 Fed. 34........51 C. C. A. 660
To a suit in equity by a creditor of a railroad company to enforce his
claim against the property of such company, which has been sold in
foreclosure proceedings, and passed into the hands of a reorganized com-
pany, on the ground that such sale and purchase were fraudulent, a
corporation which owns all the stock of the new company and the trus-
tee for its bondholders are both necessary parties, and a bill which neither
joins them as parties nor shows that they cannot be made defendants
is demurrable.
-Wenger v. Chicago & E. R. Co., 114 Fed. 34........51 C. C. A. 660
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