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§ 1. Nature and grounds of receivership.

Complainant's husband died intestate, leaving her and two children
surviving, and being the owner at the time of his death of an undivided
one-sixth interest in certain lands in Texas, in one-third of which, under
the laws of the state, complainant took a life estate. No division of
the lands affecting complainant's interest was ever made. Subsequently
defendants acquired the interests of all of the other tenants in common
of the property, including the interest of complainant's children as
remainder-men, and drilled numerous oil wells thereon which produced
large quantities of oil. Held, that complainant was entitled either to
one-eighteenth of the net proceeds of the oil produced, or to the income
which such share would produce during her lifetime, and that, while
she was not entitled to the appointment of a general receiver to take
control and management of the property, she was entitled to the ap-
pointment of a special receiver to collect and hold such share of the
proceeds pending the determination of her rights therein; the defendants
being numerous, and for the most part corporations formed for the
sole purpose of producing and selling oil.

-Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Snow, 113 Fed. 433......51 C. C. A. 267

§ 2. Management and disposition of property.

A court, having possession of property through its receiver, may au-
thorize him to lease the same.

-Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Eaton, 114 Fed. 14....51 C. C. A. 640
Such lease should not be given for a period that will needlessly pro-
long the litigation, and, if necessary, a provision for cancellation, at the
court's option, should be inserted.

-Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Eaton, 114 Fed. 14....51 C. C. A. 640
Where property is leased by a receiver for a fixed term, with the ex-
press sanction of the court, and no right to terminate the lease is re-
served, and the lessee is ousted by order of court before the natural
termination of the lease, compensation should be awarded him for such
actual damage as he has sustained.

-Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Eaton, 114 Fed. 14....51 C. C. A. 640
The receiver ought not to have rented an office in New York without
the express sanction and approval of the court.

-Braman v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 114 Fed. 18..51 C. C. A. 644

§ 3. Accounting and compensation.

A claim of $2,952 for hotel bills, claimed to have been paid by the
receiver while in New York on receivership business, was properly dis-
allowed, as an unnecessary outlay.

-Braman v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 114 Fed. 18..51 C. C. A. 644
Twelve thousand dollars was a reasonable compensation for two years'
service as receiver of a Kansas railroad, only 60 miles in length, the

volume of whose business was small, and the road itself operated dur-
ing most of the receivership by a lessee, who was entitled to all the
earnings, where the receiver resided in Massachusetts, and was only
in Kansas on a few occasions, and where his services were confined
to issuing receiver's certificates and negotiating them when he could
find a purchaser.

-Braman v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 114 Fed. 18..51 C. C. A. 644

RECORDS.

Transcript on appeal or writ of error, see "Appeal and Error," § 3.

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To master or commissioner in equity, see "Equity," § 5.

RELEASE.

See "Payment.'

§ 1. Requisites and validity.

A party executing a release to a railroad company for a claim for per-
sonal injuries cannot avoid it, as obtained by false and fraudulent repre-
sentations, unless he first returns or offers to return the money received
as the consideration for its execution.

-Hill v. Northern Fac. Ry. Co., 113 Fed. 914.........51 C. C. A. 544

REQUESTS.

For instructions in civil actions, see "Trial," § 3.

RESCISSION.

Of contract for sale of goods, see "Sales," § 2.

RESERVATIONS.

For grantor in fraudulent conveyance, see "Fraudulent Conveyances," § 1.

RES GESTÆ.

In civil actions, see "Evidence," § 1.

RES JUDICATA.

See "Judgment," § 3.

REVENUE.

See "Customs Duties"; "Internal Revenue"; "Taxation."

See "Appeal and Error."

REVIEW.

RISKS.

Assumed by employé, see "Master and Servant," §§ 2-5.

Within insurance policy, see "Insurance," § 4.

RULES.

Regulating performance of duties by servant, see "Master and Servant," § 3

SALES.

Of property of decedent under order of court, see "Executors and Adminis-
trators," § 1.

On foreclosure of railroad mortgages, see "Railroads," § 1.

On order or judgment of court, see "Judicial Sales."

Tax sales, see "Taxation," § 2.

§ 1.

Construction of contract.

A provision that the usual strike clause shall mutually govern in a
contract for the purchase of all the coke manufactured by the seller
during a fixed period (the latter guarantying a specified amount; the
price, time of payment, and quality of the coke being agreed upon)
qualifies only the guaranties that the purchaser will take all the coke
manufactured, and that the seller will furnish a specified amount, dur-
ing such period.

-Hull Coal & Coke Co. v. Empire Coal & Coke Co., 113 Fed. 256....
51 C. C. A. 213

A provision in a contract for the purchase of all the coke manu-
factured by the seller during a fixed period (the latter guarantying a
fixed amount; that in case of strikes, accidents, or other causes causing
stoppage in the works of the seller, deliveries under the contract may
be "suspended") relieves the seller from the obligation of its guaranty,
where such causes have prevented it from furnishing the guarantied
amount during the specified time, for the word "suspended" does not
mean "postponed," and therefore the purchaser cannot demand delivery
of coke, to make up the deficiency, after the expiration of the fixed
period.

-Hull Coal & Coke Co. v. Empire Coal & Coke Co., 113 Fed. 256..........
51 C. C. A. 213

In a contract for the purchase of all the coke manufactured by the
seller during a fixed period, time is an essential element, because of
the fluctuations in the market, and the life of the contract must be lim-
ited to the time fixed by the parties.

-Hull Coal & Coke Co. v. Empire Coal & Coke Co., 113 Fed. 256..........
51 C. C. A. 213

The fact that the quantity of oil to be sold and bought was not defi-
nitely determined at the date of the contract, but was to be ascertained
by extrinsic evidence, was immaterial.

-Manhattan Oil Co. v. Richardson Lubricating Co., 113 Fed. 923....
51 C. C. A. 553

The contract obligated defendant to sell only so much oil as plaintiff
might require for its own use for the purpose intended within the year,
and not as much as it might require within a reasonable period after the
expiration of the year.

-Manhattan Oil Co. v. Richardson Lubricating Co., 113 Fed. 923........
51 C. C. A. 553

§ 2. Modification or rescission of contract.

The terms of a contract for the purchase of all the coke manufactured
by the seller for a fixed period, the seller guarantying a specified
amount, are not changed by the buyer sending to the seller orders for
delivery of coke in excess of the specified amount, where such orders
are received in due course of business, but are not accepted.

-Hull Coal & Coke Co. v. Empire Coal & Coke Co., 113 Fed. 256....
51 C. C. A. 213

Where a buyer in a contract for weekly shipments of coke for a fixed
period failed to pay on the 20th of the month for the coke received
during the preceding month, as required by the terms of the contract,
the seller might repudiate the contract; the latter not being in default.
-Hull Coal & Coke Co. v. Empire Coal & Coke Co., 113 Fed. 256....
51 C. C. A. 213

§ 3. Warranties

Where a vendee has ordered an article of a manufacturer for a par-
ticular purpose, and has had the opportunity of inspecting it during the
manufacture, and relies on his own judgment, there is no implied war-
ranty against latent defects.

-Dodge v. Dickson Mfg. Co., 113 Fed. 218...........51 C. C. A. 175
A contract for the manufacture of a motor required the purchaser to
furnish an inspector to pass on all workmanship, with power to reject
such as should not conform to the agreement, and to signify acceptance
before removal from the factory. Such purchaser, while claiming a
failure to complete the contract in the time limited, and after his in-
spector had complained of defects in the construction and refused to
accept the motor, accepted it in its condition, in order to get possession.
The manufacturer subsequently sued for the contract price, and for
extra work outside the contract. Held, that it was proper to exclude
evidence as to the character of the tests made at the factory, for the
purpose of showing their incompleteness, and, as to tests made after
delivery, to show that alleged defects were such as not to be discernible
until the motor was used, since the purchaser, by acceptance, waived
the right to insist on a further test.

-Dodge v. Dickson Mfg. Co., 113 Fed. 218.......

§ 4. Remedies of seller.

..51 C. C. A. 175

The contract price for the construction of a motor was not to exceed
$4,000; and the manufacturer, in an action for the price and for extra
work, showed that, after the motor was shipped, it sent the purchaser
bills aggregating more than $4,000, and for extra work, and that the
purchaser, having received and retained them, subsequently inclosed a
statement of independent counter charges, which admitted the items
for $4,000, and $388.68 for extras. Held sufficient to make a prima facie
case for the aggregate of such items, since the claim by the purchaser
that he was entitled to items in his claim did not affect his admission
of the correctness of the manufacturer's charges.

-Dodge v. Dickson Mfg. Cɔ., 113 Fed. 218......

SALVAGE.

§ 1. Amount and apportionment.

..51 C. C. A. 175

Where a libelant made greatly exaggerated and unwarranted claims
for salvage services and towage, he will not be allowed interest on the
amount awarded..

-Merritt & Chapman Derrick & Wrecking Co. v. Chubb, 113 Fed.
173....
..51 C. C. A. 119

See "Payment"; "Release."

SATISFACTION.

SET-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM.

Set-off of claim against corporation in action to enforce stockholders' liabil
ity, see "Corporations," § 1.

See "Payment"; "Release."

SETTLEMENT.

SHIPPING.

See “Admiralty"; "Collision"; "Maritime Liens"; "Salvage"; "Towage.”

§ 1. Liabilities of vessels and owners in general.

The owners of a ship are liable for an injury to a carpenter, employed
by a firm which had been hired to make repairs or changes in the in-
terior of the ship to fit it for cargo, and who was sent on beard to work
during the night, and fell through a hatchway in a dark and unusual
place, which had been negligently left open, without notification or
warning to those who were doing the work.

-West India & P. S. S. Co. v. Weibel, 113 Fed. 169...51 C. C. A. 116

§ 2. Carriage of goods.

A cargo was injured by sea water which entered the vessel through a
hole which had been worn and eaten by corrosion through the iron bottom
of a valve chest three-eighths of an inch thick. The peculiar liability to
corrosion of iron in such place was well known, and, while there was
evidence of inspection, it was not specific as to manner in which such in-
spection was made, and it did not appear that the valve chest had ever
been removed for examination since it was placed in the ship nine years
before, or even that the valve itself had been taken out. Held, that such
evidence did not show reasonably careful inspection, such as was incum-
bent upon the owners under a provision of the bill of lading requiring
them to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, in order to
exempt them from liability.

-The Friesland, 113 Fed. 1018.....

......51 C. C. A. 594

A provision of a bill of lading exempting the carrier from liability for
loss or damage occasioned by unseaworthiness, provided the owners had
exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, leaves upon the
owners the burden of proving such due diligence, which includes
thorough and careful inspection.

-The Friesland, 113 Fed. 1018.....

.....51 C. C. A. 594

A lighter was loaded with 100 barrels of cement in the hold and a large
number of rolls of bagging, weighing 253 tons, piled upon the deck. It
was the duty of respondent to transfer the load to a steamer; and when
a portion of the bagging had been unloaded, all of which was taken from
the side next the steamer, the lighter listed to the other side, and a por-
tion of the bagging was thrown overboard, and lost or damaged. The
load was unusual in weight and height, but not to an extent to endanger
it if properly handled. It was properly loaded, and the lighter had been
brought with it a considerable distance in safety. Held, that the fact of
its unusual height required that in unloading the removal should be dis-
tributed as evenly as possible over the whole load, which was also shown
to be the usual way, and that the negligent manner of unloading was the
cause of the vessel's listing, and rendered respondent liable for the
damage.

-McAllister v. Southern Pac. Co., 113 Fed. 1019......51 C. C. A. 597

STALE DEMAND.

See "Equity," § 2.

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