Representative HALE BOGGS, SAN DIEGO, CALIF., October 10, 1956. Chairman, Subcommittee on Customs, Tariffs, and Reciprocal Trade Agreements, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, D. C. DEAR SIR: It is respectfully requested that the following statement be included in the record of the hearings on trade policy conducted by your subcommittee during September 1956. In order that our interest in trade policy be understood, it might be well to explain the history of our group. Some 1,200 of us, wives, mothers, sisters of tuna fishermen banded together in the spring of 1955 to help fight the devastating impact that unrestricted imports of Japanese frozen tuna were having on our livelihoods, our homes. The situation, which was then dramatized by the enforced idleness of almost the whole west coast tuna fleet, is no less critical today. Instead of the fleet being put out of business in one fell swoop, the same goal is being reached in degrees no less inexorably. The danger which hung like the sword of Damocles over us then hangs there now-except that the hair which holds it is fraying, strand by strand, bringing our financial destruction closer, each month, each year. Our original purpose was to achieve an equitable quota on imports of frozen tuna from Japan. In following the devious path upon which our course has led us, we come consistently on two words which are in effect a brick wall-trade policy. At first these words had no more than the normal significance to uswomen whose chief concerns previously had been those of any average American housewife. But now those words have a bitter connotation for us, for we know that it is the trade policy of the United States, as it is practiced, that must bear the responsibility for the peril that faces us. The necessity of trade with other countries is obvious. For the United States to extend a helping hand to less fortunate countries which we keep within the free world is as essential. Superficially, it would seem a self-evident truth that it is better to help these countries to be more self-sufficient through trade than to render them loans or outright gifts. The defense of our Nation plays an important part in these considerations. As long as our country remains strong economically, we can continue in our position of world leadership. But no government creates wealth. Whatever economic aid our Government makes available through loan, trade agreement, or gift to other nations, comes out of the earnings and income of the American people. If we become bankrupt at home, we shall defeat ourselves, and it will be too late for defense. The experience of domestic tuna producers-one small part of our Nation's economy-may not seem significant. But to this add the experience of othersother segments of the American domestic fish producers, textiles, ceramics, and many others which when taken together spell out an important part of our total economy. When we look at the entire picture, we can begin to see the enormity of the situation. Each person in the United States whose livelihood is in jeopardy because of imports, encouraged by the trade concessions this Nation has so freely given, is weighing the evidence, and wondering to what end it will lead us. It would not be farfetched to predict that within the next few years, should the Government not protect American producers from unfair competition with cheap foreign labor better than it has in the recent past, that there will be such a tide of revulsion to the mere idea of foreign imports as to make even a moderate trade program most difficult to implement. As wives of American tuna fishermen, we are concerned, and needfully so, for our personal welfare, but above that, we are concerned with the welfare of our Nation. We do not feel that the present trade policy of the United States, as it is carried out, is fulfilling its primary purpose of benefiting this Nation militarily and economically. We believe that a searching reexamination and reappraisal of our reciprocal trade agreements policy is needed in order that the good of this Nation might best be served. More specifically, we believe that the American producer needs greater protection from imports against which he cannot hope to compete. He needs deeper consideration before concessions are given, he needs help when harmed, he needs better procedures for determining the extent of injury. He is not expendable. Very truly yours, TUNA FISHERMEN'S WIVES EMERGENCY COMMITTEE, Hon. HALE BOGGS, SEATTLE, WASH., September 11, 1956. Chairman, Subcommittee on Customs, Tariff, and Reciprocal Trade Agreement, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, D. C. DEAR SIR: As owners of one of the largest and most efficient filleting and freezing plants on the Pacific coast, we request relief from excessive imports of frozen fillets. American fishermen and plant employees receive more for their catches and labor than foreigners, yet market prices for frozen fillets are largely set by heavy imports. This results in sporadic operation of boats and profitless operation of plants. As potential protein producers during an emergency, our facilities should be permitted to operate during peacetime, yielding a reasonable profit to the operator and some return on the owners' investment. Otherwise, these facilities may cease operation or be diverted to other uses. Very truly yours, NORTH PACIFIC FROZEN PRODUCTS Co., Hon. HALE BOGGS, BOOTH FISHERIES CORP., CHICAGO, ILL., October 1, 1956. Chairman, Subcommittee on Customs, Tariffs, and Reciprocal Trade Agreements, Committee on Ways and Means, Washington, D. C. DEAR SIR: This statement is submitted in behalf of the American Seafood Distributors Association, a nationwide organization of more than 225 members who are engaged in wholesale distribution of domestically produced and imported seafoods. Some of our members, including Booth Fisheries Corp., of which I am president, are also directly engaged in domestic production. It is not my intention to discuss, or even to state an opinion on the general problems of national trade policy. Believing that the needs of the committee will be better served by factual information with respect to specific industries, I shall confine my discussion to the field in which I am qualified by experience to speak, the field of production and marketing of fisheries products. In common with other members of the association, my own organization is on the firing line in marketing domestic fishery products in competition with other protein foods: Meats, poultry, dairy products, and eggs. As compared with prewar years, this competition is formidable indeed. In these large-volume industries tremendous strides have been made in grading, quality control, attractive packaging, advertising, and display. Because of increased volume of production, and in spite of price supports and rigid tariff and quota protection, these agricultural products are currently priced at only about 2.5 times the prewar average prices in 1938-40. This is not greatly in excess of the 2.2 times increase in prices generally as indicated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics index of prices for all commodities. In marked contrast, the weighted average prices paid domestic fishermen for food fish went to 3.1 times the prewar average in 1948-49 and by 1954 and 1955 they went still higher to 3.6 times the prewar average. Consequently, in performing the necessary and important service of marketing a large part of the products of the domestic industry, distributors of fishery products must not only contend with greatly improved methods and facilities for marketing competing products, but they have the additional handicap of relatively higher price levels for fishery products. This can be, and often is, a very important consideration. For example, in retail marketing of frozen food items, refrigerated display space is at a premum. There is no room for low-volume, slow-turnover products. Fish items which are slow moving because they are relatively overpriced are crowded completely out of opportunity to compete in many stores. Fish prices are thus substantially out of line with competitive food products and grossly out of line with wholesale prices generally. (In 1954 and 1955 prices paid to fishermen stood at more than 160 percent of what the farmers would call parity.) Such abnormal price relationships are ordinarily self-correcting as a result of increased supplies. But in the case of seafoods, the supply, even augmented by imports, was insufficient to meet the demands of increasing population and of increased consumer purchasing power. In contrast to competitive agricultural production, which increased without increases in acreage or manpower, great increases in fishery production facilities, in manpower, and in total fishing effort have not increased fishery production above prewar levels. For the 6 years from 1936 through 1941 the domestic fishing fleet averaged about 5,500 registered vessels and about 30,000 motorboats. Stimulated by high prices in the postwar period, the fleet was rapidly expanded, so that during the 6-year period from 1950 through 1955 about 11,000 registered vessels and 45,000 motorboats were engaged. Manpower was increased by about 30,000 fishermen. Actually, the fishing power of the fleet was enlarged more than the figures indicate, for to a large extent the fleet was replaced and modernized with greater power and cruising radius and with new aids to navigation and fish finding. During these 6 years of more intensive fishing, the increased investment in production facilities and the increased operating expense of operating the enlarged fleet has not increased the average yield of food fish above the slightly less than 3 billion pounds produced annually by the smaller prewar fleet. It has thus failed to add a pound to production or a dollar to the value of the product over what could have been realized from a fleet of prewar size. The potential profits from higher prices were entirely dissipated by the increased costs of operating the completely unproductive additions to the fleet. The fact that nearly doubled effort and expense has failed to increase production is the most significant development in the history of our fisheries. For the purposes of this committee's present inquiry, its significance lies in the demonstrated fact that our domestic fishery resources are insufficient to supply the needs of our growing population. It is simply inconceivable that production could have remained static for 20 years had the resource been capable of producing more. In the latter half of that 20-year period there have been extremely strong economic incentives for increased production. But these incentives have served only to stimulate an unproductive and costly increase in investment and operating costs. Obviously a substantial supplement from imports is needed to meet consumers' needs and to protect their interests. Although there has been a substantial increase in imports since the war, the quantities received have thus far been insufficient to bring consumer prices for seafoods back into line with those for competitive food products or into line with normal production costs. The need for reduction of abnormal production costs is particularly important. All of the arguments for higher tariffs and for quota restrictions on fishery products are based on the fallacious assumption that current costs of producing fish are normal. They are, in fact, highly abnormal in that they include the overhead and operating costs of production equipment in excess of that needed to realize and to maintain maximum production. That excess is obviously at least one-third and, in view of the technological improvements since the war, probably nearer one-half of the total equipment now in operation. It is my opinion that it is contrary to the public interest and to the long run interests of producers themselves to increase the economic incentives for further expansion of this wasteful and unproductive excess by restricting imports. Although somewhat outside of the scope of the committee's present inquiry, I should like to comment briefly on the significance to conservation thinking and practice of this failure of production to respond to increased fishing effort. In the past, most such thinking has been expressed in terms of realizing and maintaining maximum long period average yields. It is obvious that, in order to realize maximum yields, sufficient fishing effort must be applied. So, for many fisheries, the problem has been one of developing sufficient economic incentive to justify even the minimum effort necessary. Accordingly, and very properly, much of the effort of conservation agencies, such as the Fish and Wildlife Service, has been devoted to trade promotion activities and to technological studies designed to facilitate exploitation. At the same time, there has been a suspicion and in a few instances a clear demonstration that excessive fishing effort may defeat its own purpose and actually reduce production. The outstanding example is, of course, the fishery for the Pacific salmon. But long observation and painstaking scientific studies have shown that for most fisheries increases in fishing effort above the minimum necessary to realize maximum sustained yields have very little effect on the long term yield. That is to say, increased fishing does very little good, and, if yield alone be taken as a criterion, very little harm. The practical meaning of this fact to business men engaged in fishing is that excessive fishing increases the cost of catching fish. 83979-56-pt. 3—25 And to the sportsman, the practical meaning of this fact is that excessive fishing increases the time between bites and decreases the average size of the fish caught. It is therefore my opinion that conservation thinking in the Fish and Wildlife Service, in the fishing industry, and in Congress should be directed less toward total yield, which experience indicates can take care of itself, and more toward the practical objectives of reducing the costs of catching fish and of increasing the recreational value of our fishery resources. The first and minimum step is to check further uneconomic expansion by encouraging rather than discouraging imports. Respectfully submitted. R. P. FLETCHER, Jr., President. WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, Hon. HALE BOGGS, Chairman, Subcommittee on Customs, Tariffs, and Reciprocal Trade Agreements, House Committee on Ways and Means, House Office Building, Washington, D. C. DEAR CONGRESSMAN BOGGS: Enclosed is a copy of the statement the institute is submitting for inclusion in the record of the hearing conducted by the Subcommittee on Customs, Tariffs, and Reciprocal Trade Agreements. It is our understanding that the record is open until October 15 for the submission of statements. Your courtesy is appreciated. Sincerely, DANIEL A. POOLE, Editor, Outdoor News Bulletin. STATEMENT OF DANIEL A. POOLE Mr. Chairman, I am Daniel A. Poole, editor of the Outdoor News Bulletin, a conservation news service issued by the Wildlife Management Institute. The institute, a private, nonprofit, membership organization, with offices in Washington, D. C., is dedicated to the better management and wise use of renewable natural resources in the public interest. It is one of the oldest national conservation organizations in the country, with a program dating back to 1911. During the past several months much public attention has been focused on the economic plight of some segments of the commercial fishing industry. Statements by responsible organizations and individuals have blamed existing tariff rates and reciprocal trade agreements as enabling foreign fishermen to saturate domestic markets with their products. It is contended that these foreign producers, aided by favorable export conditions with the United States and because of appreciably lower overhead and operating costs, are able to compete successfully with domestic fishermen. As a result, there has been some agitation for the Federal Government to provide protection for domestic fishermen through increased tariffs on fisheries imports. There is grave doubt, however, that such action actually would benefit domestic fishermen. There now is approximately twice as much fishing effort by American fishermen than there was immediately prior to World War II. Significantly, there has not been a corresponding increase in the total annual catch. Despite expanded fishing effort, both in numbers of fishermen and in improved gear, the total harvest has not risen proportionately. In fact, it is many millions of pounds less (1955 figures) than what it was just 4 years ago. This means that each fishing unit is taking a smaller share than it did previously. An increase in tariff rates on foreign fish products would stimulate domestic fishermen to fish harder, and more fishermen and more gear undoubtedly would be enticed to participate. Inasmuch as experience has shown that increased fishing effort has not resulted in a larger domestic catch of fish, it is believed that any such additional tariff protection would, in the end, force a still larger number of fishermen to share in the relatively static catch, and that more widespread economic misfortune would result. Increased tariff rates also would have a correlative impact on the national fisheries conservation program. The institute always has supported the formulation and carrying out of realistic programs to assure the maximum annual sustained yield of fish by commercial fishermen. We believe such a program to be in the best interest of the fishermen as well as of the Nation. On the other hand, increased fishing pressure, brought on by the incentives of improved tariff protection, would result in a more exploitative type of fishing where the catch is based on economic necessity and a struggle for survival in the industry with complete disregard for the maintenance of adequate brood stocks. Under more competitive domestic fishing conditions, fishermen will be moved and some already are to deploy their boats and equipment for more widespread use. This is evidenced in the increased pressure on Pacific salmon by tuna boat fishermen ; by New England fishermen on sea bass and fluke off the Virginia coast, and by shrimpers in the Gulf of Mexico on other species. By shifting their operations in order to maintain a longer period of productivity, commercial fishermen are taking species which already support a highly competitive commercial fishery. It should be pointed out, also, that many of the species being taken are the basis of thriving sport fisheries which provide enjoyment for many thousands of anglers as well as a livelihood for persons providing equipment and services. Leading conservationists have been contending for years that the commercial fishing industry would not be benefited by production incentives that would induce more fishermen to enter that field. Further tariff restrictions would be one of those incentive-type plans, and the institute does not think that such a move would benefit either the commercial fishing industry or the other important segments of the public that have an important stake in those invaluable natural resources. COLUMBIA RIVER PACKERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Astoria, Oreg., October 14, 1956. SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUSTOMS, TARIFF, RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, House Office Building, Washington, D. C. GENTLEMEN: The following constitutes a statement for the record in relation to hearings held by your committee September 17 to 28, 1956 relative to customs and tariff laws. We requested permission to file such a statement prior to October 15, 1956 in a letter, under date of September 7, 1956, to the Honorable Hale Boggs, Member of Congress, chairman. The Columbia River Packers Association, Inc. is the fourth largest processor of canned tuna in the Nation and the largest tuna canner located outside the southern California tuna packing center. Its main plant is located at Astoria, Oreg. It has recently acquired the business and facilities of Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd. in Honolulu, T. H. This company has been a processor of salmon and other seafood products for over half a century and entered into the tuna packing business in 1939, following the appearance of runs of albacore tuna off the coasts of Oregon and Washington. Our particular interest in the studies being conducted by your committee pertains to the importation of canned and frozen tuna. The unusual conditions which exist with respect to imports of tuna into the United States must be given special consideration in any broad approach to the general policies respecting foreign trade. WORLD RESOURCE WITH ONE MARKET The tuna fishery is a worldwide operation, with resources of varying size appearing around the world at varying distances from the Equatorial Belt. Tuna resources available off the coasts of this Nation are limited and in no way sufficient to supply the domestic market. The bulk of what is termed United States production is tuna which is caught off the coasts of Central and South American nations by American-flag vessels operating under licenses issued by the countries off the coasts of which they operate. The world supply far exceeds the amount consumed by other nations and, in fact, the United States constitutes the only substantial market for canned tuna in the world. We point this out to emphasize that there does, and always will, exist a tuna import problem as far as this Nation is concerned; and, the addi tional fact, that with very small domestic resources, the tremendous American market created during the past 30 years will always be dependent upon world- ́ wide production. It can be conservatively stated that the prewar market for canned tuna in this country approximated 21⁄2 million cases; whereas it is estimated the consumption of tuna in the United States this year will exceed 12 million cases. It is further reasonable to believe that considering the popularity of this item and our pros |