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cial training or technical knowledge, and so on. But in the absence of such circumstances, the rule applies that where the subject-matter of false representations is at hand, and the truth easily ascertainable, one cannot be heard to say that he has been defrauded by such representations, if he neglected to avail himself of a present and reasonable opportunity to learn the truth.848 "The misrepresentations which will vitiate a contract of sale and prevent a court of equity from aiding its enforcement must relate to a matter, respecting which the complaining party did not possess at hand the means of knowledge. * * A court of equity will not undertake, any more than a court of law, to relieve a party from the consequences of his own inattention and carelessness. Where the means of knowledge are at hand and equally available to both parties, and the subject of purchase is alike open to their inspection, if the purchaser does not avail himself of these means and opportunities, he will not be heard to say that he has been deceived by the vendor's misrepresentations. If, having eyes, he will not see matters directly before them, where no concealment is made or attempted, he will not be entitled to favorable consideration when he complains that he has suffered from his own voluntary blindness, and been misled by over-confidence in the statements of another." 6*4 "In determining whether the representations are mere expressions of an opinion or statements of fact as such, reference must always be had to the subject-matter to which they relate, the circumstances under which they were made, and the difference in the means of knowledge in reference to the matter between the plaintiff and defendant. If the plaintiff ought, by reasonable diligence, to have known the truth or falsity of the statements, or had equal facilities for knowing as the defendant, he cannot be blindly believing where he ought not to have believed, or trusting where

643 Mulholland v. Washington Match Co., 35 Wash. 315, 77 Pac. 497; Pigott v. Graham, 48 Wash. 348, 93 Pac. 435, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1176; Strubhar v. Shorthose, 78 Ill. App. 394; Mather v. Barnes (C. C.) 146 Fed. 1000; Civ. Code Ga. 1910, § 4581.

644 Slaughter's Adm'r v. Gerson, 13 Wall. 379, 20 L. Ed. 627.

men are knaves and liars, and which declares them guilty of negligence, and refuses them redress, whenever they fail to act on that presumption. The fraudulent vendor cannot escape from liability by asking the law to applaud his fraud and condemn his victim for his credulity." So the court in California explains that the rule that means of knowledge is equivalent to knowledge, and that one having the opportunity, and knowing the facts constituting the fraud of which he complains, cannot be inactive and afterwards allege a want of knowledge arising by reason of his own laches, applies to a determination of whether or not an action has been brought within the time limited after the discovery of the fraud, but has no application to the right of a party to a cancellation of his contract on the ground of fraud; and equity will not withhold relief from parties ignorant of the true condition who, relying on false representations as to material facts, made for the purpose of inducing assent, are thereby inveigled into contracts, on the ground that there were circumstances calculated to arouse suspicion and cause an investigation whereby they might have discovered the fraud, for the liability of the adverse party arises from his own fraud, unaffected by the question of diligence on the part of the one seeking relief. Along the same line of thought, the court in Missouri points out that fraud is a willful and malevolent act, directed to perpetrating a wrong to the rights of another, and such an act in a vendor is actionable as against the mere negligence or inadvertence of the purchaser in failing to prevent fraud.663 And in Massachusetts it is said that the old rule that fraudulent representations may be such that one is not justified in acting upon them is now somewhat relaxed, in order that persons guilty of actual fraud may not too easily escape liability by setting up the victim's undue guilelessness; 64 for while the law will not

661 Strand v. Griffith, 97 Fed. 854, 38 C. C. A. 444.

662 Eichelberger v. Mills Land & Water Co., 9 Cal. App. 628, 100 Pac. 117.

663 Judd v. Walker, 215 Mo. 312, 114 S. W. 979.

664 Reggio v. Warren, 207 Mass. 525, 93 N. E. 805, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 340, 20 Ann. Cas. 1244.

save persons from the consequences of their own improvidence and negligence, yet it looks with even less favor upon misrepresentation and fraud.665 In New York, the rule is stated to be that one who perpetrates a fraud is estopped to claim that the party defrauded ought not to have believed or trusted him. And in Oregon, it is held that, where one assumes to have knowledge of a subject of which another may be ignorant, and knowingly makes false representations regarding it, upon which the other relies to his injury, the party who makes such statements will not be heard to say that the person who took his word and relied upon it was guilty of such negligence as to be precluded from receiving compensation for injuries which were inflicted on him under cover of the falsehood.667

To illustrate this rule by some pertinent examples, we may cite first certain cases holding that, where a party was guilty of a positive and willful fraud inducing the adverse party to act thereon and to execute an instrument, the fact that the adverse party was guilty of negligence in executing the paper without further inquiry as to its contents will not deprive him of the right to sue for fraud.668 So the fact that a grantee might have ascertained the exact amount of a debt secured by a mortgage on the property, by communicating with the mortgagee, is no defense to an action by him for deceit against his grantor for a willfully false representation as to the amount of such debt.669 And where a vendor makes a false representation as to the amount of taxes due on the premises, he is liable, although the vendee could have ascertained its falsity by inquiry."70 So again, a person taking the note of a third person in payment for property, on the false representation that the

665 Rollins v. Quimby, 200 Mass. 162, 86 N. E. 350.

666 Electrical Audit & Rebate Co v. Greenberg, 56 Misc. Rep. 514, 107 N. Y. Supp. 110. And see Wells v. Adams, 88 Mo. App. 215. 667 Steen v. Weisten, 51 Or. 473, 94 Pac. 834. And see Buckley v. Acme Co., 113 Ill. App. 210.

668 Muller v. Rosenblath, 157 App. Div. 513, 142 N. Y. Supp. 602; Arnold v. Teel, 182 Mass. 1, 64 N. E. 413; Walker v. Freedman (Sup.) 114 N. Y. Supp. 51.

669 Hutchinson v. Gorman, 71 Ark. 305, 73 S. W. 793.

670 Wright v. United States Mortgage Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 42 S. W. 789.

maker is responsible, is entitled to recover damages, though he might have ascertained the falsity of the statement." 671 And a purchaser of real estate is entitled to rely upon the representations of an agent for the sale thereof, as to its location, and is not bound by the doctrine of caveat emptor to make further inquiries as to its boundaries.872 Again, where plaintiff employed defendant as an architect and supervisor of construction of a building, on his fraudulent representations that he had great knowledge and skill in such matters, and that the maximum cost of the building such as plaintiff desired would not exceed a certain sum, it was held that he had thereafter a right to rely on such representations, and so was not guilty of such carelessness as to bar his right to recover because not exercising means to ascertain that the representations were not true.673 On the same principle, one who was a director and vice president of a bank, and who bought stock from the cashier in reliance on the latter's representations as to the condition of the bank, was held not estopped by negligence in not knowing its condition from recovering for the false representations.74 And a brewery which fraudulently sells intoxicating liquor as a non-intoxicating brew cannot defeat a recovery by a retail purchaser on the ground that it was his duty to inspect the liquor and ascertain its character. 675

§ 115. Same; Extent of Investigation Necessary.— While a person negotiating for a contract is not justified in relying blindly on representations made to him by the other party, where the facts are open to his view, yet he should not be required to enter into any detailed study of the subject-matter in order to verify the statements made, nor should he be charged with negligence precluding any relief against fraud, if he omits to make such a study. As stated in some of the decisions, one is justified in relying

671 Pallister v. Camenisch, 21 Colo. App. 79, 121 Pac. 958. 672 Roberts v. Holliday, 10 S. D. 576, 74 N. W. 1034.

673 Edward Barron Estate Co. v. Woodruff Co., 163 Cal. 561, 126 Pac. 351, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 125.

674 Snider v. McAtee, 165 Mo. App. 260, 147 S. W. 136.

675 Anderson v. Evansville Brewing Ass'n, 49 Ind. App. 403, 97 N. E.

676

on a representation made to him in all cases where the representation is a positive statement of fact, and where an "investigation" would be required to discover the truth." We understand the term "investigation," as here used, to denote a search, a test, or an inquiry-something more, in fact, than a mere inspection of visible characteristics, or an examination more detailed or exhaustive than is implied in merely superficial observation. Thus, in Wisconsin, it is said that a person cannot complain of false representations when he might have discovered the truth of the matter by the exercise of ordinary observation, not necessarily by search; 77 and in Washington, that the rule of non-liability for false representations as to the condition of an article is applicable only in those cases where the defect is patent, and can be ascertained by the use of ordinary care and prudence.678 Thus, for example, where the vendor of land states positively that the tract contains a certain number of acres, the vendee may rely on this statement, and is not bound, as a measure of precaution, to have it surveyed and measured, and he may rescind the sale, or obtain a reduction of the purchase price, if there is less land than the vendor represents. 679 So, where land sold is situated in a state other than that in which the parties live and contract, the purchaser is not obliged to go or send into that state and examine the property in order to ascertain whether the vendor's representations in regard to it are true or false.680 So, prospective purchasers of mining property have a right to rely on statements made to them

676 Perry v. Rogers, 62 Neb. 898, 87 N. W. 1063; Brucker v. Kairn, 89 Neb. 274, 131 N. W. 382; Martin v. Hutton, 90 Neb. 34, 132 N. W. 727, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 602; Latta v. Button Land Co., 91 Neb. 689, 136 N. W. 1013; H. W. Abts Co. v. Cunningham, 95 Neb. 836, 146 N. W. 1036.

677 Jacobsen v. Whitely, 138 Wis. 434, 120 N. W. 285.

678 Klock v. Newbury, 63 Wash. 153, 114 Pac. 1032. But see Hafer v. Cole, 176 Ala. 242, 57 South. 757, holding that, where a buyer has a right to rely on the seller's representations, it is immaterial that the defects are patent.

679 Quarg v. Scher, 136 Cal. 406, 69 Pac. 96; Lovejoy v. Isbell, 73 Conn. 368, 47 Atl. 682; Judd v. Walker, 114 Mo. App. 128, 89 S. W. 558; Farris v. Gilder (Tex. Civ. App.) 115 S. W. 645.

680 Scott v. Burnight, 131 Iowa, 507, 107 N. W. 422; Hansen v. Kline, 136 Iowa, 101, 113 N. W. 504. And see, infra, § 118.