111

of a want of mental capacity.109 And again, a marked difference in the mental capacity of the two contracting parties cannot be taken into account on this issue. That one of them was shrewd, clever, and unscrupulous, and the other weak and credulous, may have an important bearing on the question of rescinding a contract on the ground of fraud, false representations, or gross inadequacy of consideration.110 But if it is shown that the person seeking relief, though feeble-minded, yet had mental capacity to contract, and no fraud or undue influence appears, equity will not interfere on the ground merely that the other party was greatly his superior in respect to intelligence and sagacity. The true test always is the person's capacity to understand and assent to the particular transaction in question. However much his mental faculties may be impaired, or however low his natural endowment of intelligence, if he possesses the mental capacity to understand in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction before him, and to exercise a reasonable measure of judgment and choice in regard to it, he is sane, quoad hoc, and must be held bound by what he has done.112 On the other hand, it is equally true that a grantor in a deed, for instance, though he is not positively insane nor utterly imbecile, may yet be so far incapacitated as to be unable to bring an intelligent judgment and understanding to bear on any business matter, and so be incompetent to execute a valid deed.113 This principle is illustrated by a case in which an aged, infirm, and feeble-minded woman executed a deed conveying all her property to her son, after it had been. read over to her and after a lawyer had carefully explained to her the difference between a deed and a will, but it was

109 Bowdoin College v. Merritt (C. C.) 75 Fed. 480. 110 Supra, §§ 113, 125, 170.

111 Thomas v. Sheppard, 2 McCord Eq. (S. C.) 36, 16 Am. Dec. 632; Moore v. Cross, 87 Tex. 557, 29 S. W. 1051.

112 Davis v. Phillips, 85 Mich. 198, 48 N. W. 513; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Soesbe, 138 Iowa, 354, 116 N. W. 123; Du Bose v. Kell, 90 S. C. 196, 71 S. E. 371; Stanfill v. Johnson, 159 Ala. 546, 49 South. 223; Altig v. Altig, 137 Iowa, 420, 114 N. W. 1056. 113 Jones v. Travers (Ark.) 172 S. W. 828; Volz v. Scully, 159 Ky. 226, 166 S. W. 1015; Pritchard v. Hutton (Mich.) 153 N. W. 705; Buchanan v. Wilson, 97 Neb. 369, 149 N. W. 802.

shown that she had not at all understood the transaction, on account of her mental weakness, and rested in the belief that the instrument which she had signed was her will. On these facts, aided by a showing of failure of consideration, it was ordered that the deed should be canceled.11

§ 264. Mental Weakness Accompanied by Fraud or Undue Influence.-In cases where one of the parties to a deed or contract is shown to be feeble-minded or mentally weak, but not to such a degree as to amount to entire incapacity to contract, yet if it appears that the transaction in question was characterized by any unconscientious features, a court of equity will interfere and grant appropriate relief.115 If it is shown that the other party took advantage of such mental weakness, and induced the feebler person to execute a deed or enter into a contract to which he would not have assented in the free exercise of his deliberate judgment, accomplishing his purpose by misrepresentations, concealment, fraud, duress, threats, depriving the person of the benefit of independent advice, or by the undue exercise of any influence which he may possess over him, or by any other improper practice, then the contract or conveyance may be set aside, not alone on the ground of mental incapacity, but on the ground of fraud and imposition.116 In other words, if there be any unfairness in the transaction, then the intellectual deficiency of the party may be taken into the estimate as a circumstance showing fraud such as to justify annulling the contract or deed.117 It is said that

114 Wille v. Wille, 57 S. C. 413, 35 S. E. 804.

115 Sprinkle v. Wellborn, 140 N. C. 163, 52 S. E. 666, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 174, 111 Am. St. Rep. 827.

116 Harding v. Handy, 11 Wheat. 103, 6 L. Ed. 429; Kilgore v. Cross (C. C.) 1 Fed. 578; Yount v. Yount, 144 Ind. 133, 43 N. E. 136; Wray v. Wray, 32 Ind. 126; Harris v. Wamsley, 41 Iowa, 671; Landis v. Smith, 113 Mich. 407, 71 N. W. 937; Bennett v. Bennett, 65 Neb. 432, 91 N. W. 409, 96 N. W. 994; Roberts v. Barker, 63 N. H. 332; Garrow v. Brown, 60 N. C. 595, 86 Am. Dec. 450; Rippy v. Gant, 39 N. C. 443; Tracey v. Sacket, 1 Ohio St. 54, 59 Am. Dec. 610; Krings v. Krings, 43 Pa. Super. Ct. 590; Sparks v. White, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 86; Tally v. Smith, 1 Cold. (Tenn.) 290.

117 In re Owings, 1 Bland (Md.) 370, 17 Am. Dec. 311; Beller v. Jones, 22 Ark. 92; Hodges v. Wilson, 165 N. C. 323, 81 S. E. 340; Lamb v. Perry, 169 N. C. 436, 86 S. E. 179; Duroderigo v. Culwell (Okl.) 152 Pac. 605.

persons who, on account of mental weakness, are incapable of caring properly for their own interests, are under the special protection of the law,118 and will readily be accorded relief if they are overreached by those in whom they repose trust and confidence.119 If the other contracting party knows that the one with whom he deals is weak-minded, and undertakes to give him advice, knowing that his statements will be relied on, he must exercise the utmost good faith, and the least proof of unfair dealing will warrant the setting aside of the resulting bargain.120 Indeed, it is said that a transaction so conducted is presumptively fraudulent, and the burden of proof rests on the party claiming an advantage from it to show its entire fairness. 121 In a case in Illinois, the evidence showed that the grantor was an aged man, afflicted with hemiplegia,122 unable to dress or feed himself or to walk, needing constant care, and in such a state of mind as rendered him fearful of the loss of such care, and that he was induced, upon the promise of future support, to convey a large part of his property to others, who, on account of his condition, had complete control over him, and it was held that the conveyance was invalid and should be set aside. 123

§ 265. Mental Weakness and Inadequacy of Considera. tion.-Inadequacy of consideration is not by itself sufficient ground for rescinding a contract or ordering the cancellation of a deed,124 and neither is mental weakness not amounting to entire incapacity to contract.125 Yet when these two circumstances are combined, and it is shown that a transfer of property or other contract was obtained

118 Craddock v. Cabiness, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 474.

119 Bunch V. Shannon, 46 Miss. 525.

120 Faver v. Bowers (Tex. Civ. App.) 33 S. W. 131. 121 Groff v. Stitzer, 75 N. J. Eq. 452, 72 Atl. 970.

122 In medical jurisprudence, this term means paralysis of one side of the body, commonly due to a lesion in the brain, but sometimes originating from the spinal cord. It is generally characteristic of this condition that the operations of the mind are much impaired or obscured. See Baughman v. Baughman, 32 Kan. 538, 4 Pac. 1003.

128 Dorsey v. Wolcott, 173 Ill. 539, 50 N. E. 1015.

121 Supra, § 169.

125 Supra, § 263.

from a person of feeble mind and that no consideration, or a very inadequate consideration, was given in return, a very strong presumption of fraud arises, and unless it is successfully rebutted, a court of equity will set aside the deed or contract so obtained.126 While a contract made by a person of fair understanding should not be set aside merely because it was a rash, improvident, or hard bargain, yet if made with a person of impaired mind or feeble intelligence, the inference is that it was obtained by imposition, deception, or undue influence, so as to cast upon the other party the burden of showing its fairness.127 And it is said that a comparatively slight degree of mental incapacity will justify a court in setting aside a contract for which no valuable consideration has been received.128 In these cases, also, it is not necessary that the inadequacy of the consideration should be such as to "shock the conscience." A court of equity will see to it that a bargain made with a person of weak mind shall be fair. The value of property is always a matter of estimate and opinion. But if disinterested third persons testify that in their judgment the consideration given is not adequate, it will satisfy the conscience of the court in refusing to sustain the transaction.129 Nor is it necessary to show that the mentally incapable person was actually misled by fraud or imposed upon by undue influence.180 Where there is imbecility or weakness of mind,

126 Whipple v. McClure, 2 Root (Conn.) 216; Maddox v. Simmons, 31 Ga. 512; McCormick v. Malin, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 509; Perkins v. Scott, 23 Iowa, 237; Harris v. Wamsley, 41 Iowa, 671; Hale v. Kobbert, 109 Iowa, 128, 80 N. W. 308; Williams v. Longman (Iowa) 78 N. W. 198; Worthington v. Campbell (Ky.) 1 S. W. 714; Howard v. Howard, 87 Ky. 616, 9 S. W. 411, 1 L. R. A. 610; Cray v. Wilson, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1153, 43 S. W. 186; Stevens v. Snowden, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 744; Buchanan v. Wilson, 97 Neb. 369, 149 N. W. 802; Scovill v. Barney, 4 Or. 288; Mays v. Prewett, 98 Tenn. 474, 40 S. W. 483; McFaddin v. Vincent, 21 Tex. 47; Holden v. Crawford, 1 Aik. (Vt.) 390, 15 Am. Dec. 700; Conant v. Jackson, 16 Vt. 335; Mann v. Betterly, 21 Vt. 326; Allen's Adm'rs v. Allen's Adm'rs, 79 Vt. 173, 64 Atl. 1110; Samuel v. Marshall, 3 Leigh (Va.) 567. And see, supra, § 173.

127 Juzan v. Toulmin, 9 Ala. 662, 44 Am. Dec. 448. 128 Weeke v. Wortmann, 84 Neb. 217, 120 N. W. 933. 129 See Johnson v. Johnson, 10 Ind. 387.

130 Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 483.

any act which induces the making of a contract without adequate consideration is undue and improper and a ground for setting aside the contract in a court of equity.131 But of course the court will more readily afford relief if, in addition to the elements of mental weakness and inadequacy of consideration, it is shown that there were false and fraudulent representations made in regard to the subject of the contract,132 or the actual exercise of an undue influence and control.188 These principles are illustrated by a case in Michigan, in which it appeared that a person alleged to be mentally incompetent, managed his property to advantage so long as he kept it loaned out on mortgages, but when he commenced farming on a large scale, he was constantly being overreached in contracts for all classes of work, paying many times its value, until he had exhausted his large personal estate, and began to give notes for such work. The defendant, who had known him from boyhood, and had advised him in his business, and knew of the extravagant and fraudulent character of these contracts, bought up many of the notes, and procured in place of them new notes secured by mortgages. It was held that the mortgages should be allowed to stand only for the amount of benefit conferred by the work for which the original notes were given.184

§ 266. Monomania; Fixed Particular Delusions.-In medical jurisprudence, monomania is a type of insanity characterized by a perversion or derangement of the reason or understanding with reference to a single subject or small class of subjects, with considerable mental excitement and insane delusions, while, as to all matters outside the range of the peculiar infirmity, the intellectual faculties remain unimpaired and function normally. Thus the mental incompetence of a monomaniac is partial in the sense that it is confined to a particular subject or class of subjects, and yet it is complete in the sense that, as to that subject or class of subjects, the mind is utterly deranged and incapable of

131 Corbit v. Corbit, 4 Wkly. Law Bul. (Ohio) 1006.

182 Bainter v. Fults, 15 Kan. 323.

133 Cole v. Cook, 6 N. J. Eq. 627.

184 Gates v. Cornett, 72 Mich. 420, 40 N. W. 740.