a contract by an infant for a course of instruction in stenography was a contract for "necessaries," the evidence must show the condition in life of the student, and that his parents or guardian refused to furnish such alleged necessary.145 If a contract for instruction in a profession or in the higher branches of education is to be considered as not one for "necessaries" in the particular case, the infant may repudiate it before attaining his majority, and he should then return any books or apparatus furnished to him in connection with the proposed instruction, and will thereupon escape any liability on his contract.146

§ 299. Same; Same; Services of Attorneys at Law.-Services of counsel are classed as "necessaries" for a minor, in the sense that payment therefor cannot be avoided on the ground of infancy, when the services rendered affect the infant's liberty or personal relief, or his protection against unjust claims or criminal proceedings, and also, according to most of the authorities, when they are necessary for the collection or preservation of his estate and are beneficial thereto.147 Thus, an infant is bound by a contract under which an attorney renders beneficial services in defending his civil or property rights,148 or in prosecuting an action for damages for a personal injury to the minor,149 or in securing the settlement of a claim in favor of the minor for a tort committed against him,150 or in collecting wages due

145 Mauldin v. Southern Shorthand & Business University, 126 Ga. 681, 55 S. E. 922, 8 Ann. Cas. 130.

146 International Text-Book Co. v. McKone, 133 Wis. 200, 113 N. W. 438; International Text-Book Co. v. Doran, 80 Conn. 307, 68 Atl. 255.

147 Munson v. Washband, 31 Conn. 303, 83 Am. Dec. 151; Crafts v. Carr, 24 R. I. 397, 53 Atl. 275, 60 L. R. A. 128, 96 Am. St. Rep. 721; Searcy v. Hunter, 81 Tex. 644, 17 S. W. 372, 26 Am. St. Rep. 837; Epperson v. Nugent, 57 Miss. 45, 34 Am. Rep. 434; Barker v. Hibbard, 54 N. H. 539, 20 Am. Rep. 160; Haj v. American Bottle Co., 182 Ill. App. 636; Sutton v. Heinzle, 84 Kan. 756, 115 Pac. 560, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 238; Spencer v. Collins, 156 Cal. 298, 104 Pac. 320, 20 Ann. Cas. 49; Helps v. Clayton, 17 C. B., N. S., 553. Compare Grissom v. Beidleman, 35 Okl. 343, 129 Pac. 853, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 411, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 599. And see Marx v. Hefner (Okl.) 149 Pac. 207.

148 Slusher v. Weller, 151 Ky. 203, 151 S. W. 684.
149 Hanlon v. Wheeler (Tex. Civ. App.) 45 S. W. 821.
150 Hickman v. McDonald, 164 Iowa, 50, 145 N. W. 322.

to him.151 So, where an attorney had successfully prosecuted a minor's claim for damages for a tort, and after the recovery of judgment, the minor attempted to enter into a disadvantageous compromise of the claim, but by the attorney's efforts the full amount was collected, it was held that the services of the attorney were necessary for the infant and therefore should be compensated.152 But an attorney who contracts with a minor and performs services under the contract is entitled to no more than a reasonable compensation, and he is not entitled to collect the full amount of the fee agreed upon unless it is made to appear that it is no more than the reasonable value of the services rendered.1 153

Cases of this kind appear to furnish an exception to the general rule that a minor is not personally liable even for necessaries, if he has a parent who is able and willing to supply his needs. It is held that a parent is not bound to furnish counsel fees for his minor child for the prosecution of an action for the protection of the latter, and from which the child's estate receives all the benefit, and that it is no obstacle to imposing a personal liability upon the infant's estate that the suit was instituted and counsel employed through a next friend, since this is a necessary formality, and if the infant knew of and profited by the proceedings, his promise to pay the necessary counsel fees will be implied.154 But an attorney who is the guardian of a minor cannot charge a fee against the minor's estate for his services rendered in the collection of a claim for damages in favor of the minor, though such a fee was agreed on before he was appointed guardian.155 And where the law of the state requires guardians to sue for and receive debts due to their wards, and to represent their wards in all actions

151 Vance v. Calhoun, 77 Ark. 35, 90 S. W. 619, 113 Am. St. Rep.

111.

152 Crafts v. Carr, 24 R. I. 397, 53 Atl. 275, 60 L. R. A. 128, 96 Am. St. Rep. 721.

153 Hanlon v. Wheeler (Tex. Civ. App.) 45 S. W. 821; Hickman v. McDonald, 164 Iowa, 50, 145 N. W. 322.

154 Crafts v. Carr, 24 R. I. 397, 53 Atl. 275, 60 L. R. A. 128, 96 Am. St. Rep. 721.

155 Appeal of Ennis, 84 Conn. 610, 80 Atl. 772.

unless some other person is appointed as guardian ad litem or next friend, the services of an attorney in settling the estate of a deceased person in which a minor is interested are not necessaries for which the minor is liable, in the absence of an employment of the attorney by the minor's guardian.15 And it is ruled that an attorney who volunteers his services for a minor, merely at the suggestion of the latter's relatives or friends, cannot ordinarily recover therefor. 157

§ 300. Contracts Made for Infants by Third Parties.An infant is not bound by any contract made by another person purporting to act for him, unless such person has been appointed his guardian or next friend, or is in some manner authorized by law to act for him.158 Thus an infant, whose name is signed without lawful authority to a private settlement out of court with the administrator of an estate in which he has a distributive share, may, on coming of age, disaffirm the settlement and cite the administrator to an accounting. 159 It has been held, however, in some cases that, when a contract is beneficial to an infant, the law will put in an acceptance of it for him, even though he is ignorant of its existence.160

§ 301. Estoppel Against Infant.-The doctrines of estoppel, waiver, and acquiescence do not apply to infants; in the absence of fraud or bad faith, an infant cannot be estopped by anything he does, nor by keeping silence as to his rights, from asserting his true age nor from avoiding his contract by pleading his disability.161 Thus, if the prop

156 McIsaac v. Adams, 190 Mass. 117, 76 N. E. 654, 112 Am. St. Rep. 321, 5 Ann. Cas. 729. And see Marx v. Hefner (Okl.) 149 Pac.

207.

157 McIsaac v. Adams, 190 Mass. 117, 76 N. E. 654, 112 Am. St. Rep. 321, 5 Ann. Cas. 729.

158 Slusher v. Weller, 151 Ky. 203, 151 S. W. 684; Pittsburg, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Haley, 170 Ill. 610, 48 N. E. 920; Muehlbach v. Missouri & K. I. Ry. Co., 166 Mo. App. 305, 148 S. W. 453. 159 Piatt's Heirs v. Longworth's Ex'rs, 27 Ohio St. 159.

160 Richards v. Reeves (Ind. App.) 45 N. E. 624.

161 Alvey v. Reed, 115 Ind. 148, 17 N. E. 265, 7 Am. St. Rep. 418; Cowie v. Strohmeyer, 150 Wis. 401, 136 N. W. 956, 137 N. W. 778; Wetutzke v. Wetutzke, 158 Wis. 305, 148 N. W. 1088. But see Royal v. Grant, 5 Ga. App. 643, 63 S. E. 708.

163

erty of an infant is sold by another person, and the infant, knowing of the sale, neglects to state his title to the purchaser, he may still sue for and recover the property from the latter, the law presuming him to be incapable of understanding and protecting his rights. 162 So, where an infant is entitled to an estate in remainder, his father being the tenant for life, and the latter seeks to incumber the estate for the purpose of improving the property, the infant cannot assent to such a contract nor be estopped to dispute it.18. So, where the plaintiff, who was a minor, owned stock in a corporation which went into voluntary liquidation and transferred its property to defendant corporation, and the plaintiff accepted shares in the defendant company in lieu of his stock in the original corporation, it was held that the fact that the dissolution of the old company and transfer of its stock were made with plaintiff's consent did not estop him from disaffirming his contract on account of his minority, and that he could recover the amount paid for his shares from the defendant corporation.164 Again, the receipt of money or property by an infant during the course of a transaction does not preclude him from repudiating such transaction.165 And the giving of a bond by a minor to dissolve an attachment on a stock of goods which he had purchased in part from the attachment plaintiff does not operate as an affirmance of the contract sued on nor as an estoppel.166 In cases of actual fraud, however, the rule may be different. In one of the decisions, it is said that an infant may be bound by an equitable estoppel if his conduct has been in

182 Norris v. Wait, 2 Rich. (S. C.) 148, 44 Am. Dec. 283. And see Butler v. Stark, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 1886, 79 S. W. 204. But see a discussion of this subject in Bigelow on Estoppel (3d edn.) pp. 515, 516, where the learned author states that "the authorities on the other hand are not few or obscure which maintain the proposition that if an infant of years of discretion having a right to an estate encourage a purchaser to buy it of another without asserting any claim to it, the purchaser will hold it against the infant."

163 Missouri Central B. & L. Ass'n v. Eveler, 237 Mo. 679, 141 S. W. 877, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 486.

164 White v. New Bedford Cotton-Waste Corp., 178 Mass. 20, 59 N. E. 642.

165 Millsaps v. Estes, 137 N. C. 535, 50 S. E. 227, 70 L. R. A. 170, 107 Am. St. Rep. 496.

166 Sanger v. Hibbard, 104 Fed. 455, 43 C. C. A. 635.

167

tentionally fraudulent." In another, it is held that the rule that an infant may bind himself by his actual fraud, but not by mere conduct or by silence when he ought to speak, constitutes an exception to the general rule that an infant cannot bind himself by estoppel, and is confined to cases where the infant is in fact developed to the condition of actual discretion, and to cases of actual fraud and where the contract or transaction is beneficial to him.168 But in New York, even this exception is rejected, and it is held that an infant cannot be estopped to assert the defense of infancy in an action on a contract, though the facts relied on as an estoppel may constitute a cause of action against him for tort.1

169

§ 302. Same; Misrepresentations as to Age.-By the doctrine of the common law, the fact that a minor falsely represents himself to be of full age, in order to induce another to enter into a contract with him, does not give validity to the contract, it being otherwise voidable, nor estop the minor from pleading his infancy when sued upon it, and this rule is still in force in a majority of the states.170 But in some others the doctrine prevails that if an infant has reached such a stage of development as indicates that he is of full age, or such as might well mislead a person of ordinary prudence, and if he enters into a contract with another, falsely stating that he is of full age, and the other

167 Harper v. Utsey (Tex. Civ. App.) 97 S. W. 508.

168 Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krienitz, 142 Wis. 556, 126 N. W. 50.

169 New York Building Loan Banking Co. v. Fisher, 20 Misc. Rep. 242, 45 N. Y. Supp. 795; Munger v. Hess, 28 Barb. (N. Y.) 75.

170 Wilkinson v. Buster, 124 Ala. 574, 26 South. 940; Baker v. Stone, 136 Mass. 405; Merriam v. Cunningham, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 40; Conrad v. Lane, 26 Minn. 389, 4 N. W. 695, 37 Am. Rep. 412; Burley v. Russell, 10 N. H. 184, 34 Am. Dec. 146; International Text-Book Co. v. Connelly, 206 N. Y. 188, 99 N. E. 722, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115; Johnson v. Clark, 23 Misc. Rep. 346, 51 N. Y. Supp. 238; New York Building, Loan & Banking Co. v. Fisher, 23 App. Div. 363, 48 N. Y. Supp. 152; Curtin v. Patton, 11 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 310; Kirkham v. Wheeler-Osgood Co., 39 Wash. 415, 81 Pac. 869, 4 Ann. Cas. 532. See also Rev. Civ. Code La., arts. 1872, 2224. And see Miller v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 188 Mo. App. 402, 174 S. W. 166; F. B. Collins Inv. Co. v. Beard (Okl.) 148 Pac. 846.