penalties.2 The assessment of penalties was the unlawful element of the Joint Traffic Association and the Trans-Missouri Freight Association, whic brought upon those organizations the condemnation of the supreme court of the United States.73 Bu new organizations were quickly formed by th various railroad companies, eliminating all penaltie from their rules and regulations, purporting upo their face to leave each railroad perfectly free to ac with respect to any matter of freight or passenge traffic freely and independently, according to its ow volition. It is a notable fact that the various ass ciations of roads covering the entire country sti exist, monthly meetings are held, and if one road d sires to make an excursion rate, report of that r quest or desire is made to the association, action taken at the meeting, the request is granted or "di approved," and the railroad acts independently, its own volition, according to the action of the ass ciation, the effect being the same as under the o form of organization and as before the condemn tion of their methods by the supreme court of t United States. In case of any judicial inquiry testimony can be developed to show what the m ing spirit of such action is. Absolute secrecy a inability of the law to obtain information perm the various forms of combinations to go on, so far all appearances are concerned, as complying wi the law. But we know there is a combination, co cert of action, but no proof can be obtained, beca nothing is committed to writing except that whi appears lawful.

72 Id.; De Witt Wire Cloth Co. v. New Jersey etc. Co., 14 Y. Supp. 277.

73 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540; United States v. Joint Traffic Assn., 171 S. 505, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25.

the intent alone of the parent is decisive, and if he makes an honest mistake as to the best course, to be taken in dealing with such a difficult question, allowance ought to be made accordingly. It is enough that he acted from pure motives.46 The parent, however, renders himself liable the same as any other person whenever he breaks up the marital relations between a married daughter and her husband, simply because he may be displeased with the marriage, or because it was against his wishes, or because he wishes the relation to continue no longer. Parents who wrongfully cause a separation between their child and his wife are jointly liable, although each does not participate in all of the acts of the other.48

47

§ 449. Action by Husband for Assault or Other Injury to His Wife. The third way in which the husband may be injured by the misconduct of third persons, recognized at common law, was by "beating or otherwise abusing her,"49 and the husband had the right to institute actions for all injuries which the wife sustained by any form of tort, as by assault and battery, personal injury through negligence, and the like.50 At common law, marriage operated as an absolute gift to the husband of all the personal property or rights which the wife had.51 The husband

46 Tucker v. Tucker, 74 Miss. 93, 19 South. 955; White v. Ross, 47 Mich. 172, 10 N. W. 188; Tasker v. Stanley, 153 Mass. 148, 26 N. E. 417; Brown v. Brown, 124 N. C. 19, 70 Am. St. Rep. 574, 32 S. E. 320; Bennett v. Smith, 21 Barb. 439.

47 Oakman v. Belden, 94 Me. 280, 80 Am. St. Rep. 396, 47 Atl. 553; Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St. 23, 51 Am. Rep. 791.

48 Price v. Price, 91 Iowa, 360, 51 Am. St. Rep. 360, 60 N. W. 202. 49 Ante, sec. 441.

50 Anderson v. Anderson, 11 Bush (Ky.), 327.

51 Locke v. McPherson, 163 Mo. 493, 85 Am. St. Rep. 546, 63 S. W. 726.

also had the right to recover, in his own right, damages which he, as husband, may have sustained by any such acts. The gist of such an action by him was the loss of services, or damages which he may have sustained in caring for her in case of injury. So, upon this theory, and for such loss sustained by him, he still has the right, by modern law, to maintain an action against a third person, or against a railway company for a personal injury to his wife through negligence. He may, in such an action, recover for any diminution in her usefulness, aid and comfort as a wife, because of the negligent omissions or commissions of others.52 This common-law right of action is not in any wise abridged or affected by modern statutes.53 The term used by modern authority in this connection is, that the husband may recover for the loss of "society" of his wife which results from the negligence of a third party.54 Loss of society occurs when she has sustained injury such as incapacitates her for usefulness, aid and comfort as a wife which she possessed at the time of the injury.55 This is a much more reasonable ground upon which to base the right of action than is the mere loss of service. And, indeed, under the modern statutes enlarging the rights of married women,

52 Furnish v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co.. 102 Mo. 669, 22 Am. St. Rep. 800, 15 S. W. 315; Maxson v. Delaware etc. R. R. Co., 112 N. Y. 559, 20 N. E. 544; Fuller v. Naugatuck R. R. Co., 21 Conn. 557; Blair v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 89 Mo. 334, 1 S. W. 367; Matthew v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 63 Cal. 450; Berger v. Jacobs, 21 Mich. 215; Kavanaugh v. Janesville, 24 Wis. 618; Cregin v. Brooklyn C. R. R. Co., 83 N. Y. 595, 38 Am. Rep. 474; Nanticoke v. Warne, 106 Pa. St. 373; Kelley v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 168 Mass. 308, 46 N. E. 1063, 60 Am. St. Rep. 397, and cases cited.

53 Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. Glenn, 66 Ohio St. 395, 64 N. E. 438.

54 Furnish v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., supra; Jones v. Utica etc. R. R. Co., 40 Hun, 349.

which in a measure abridge the right of the husband to compel her to work for him, loss of society and assistance is regarded as the true theory upon which to base such an action by him.50 The husband, under modern statutes giving the wife a separate independent status, with the consequent right to sue for the protection of all her rights and the redress of all her wrongs, cannot maintain an action for any permanent injury which his wife may sustain, the right to bring such action resting in the wife herself.

Detailed recounting of special injuries or the manner in which the wife may be injured, so as to affect the rights of the husband, does not fall within our purpose in stating, as we have, the general doctrine at this point. If injury is by assault, negligence, etc., these matters are found elsewhere. One special injury may be stated. The husband has the right to complain by action of another who sells an injurious drug to his wife in large quantities, where she is in the habit of using the same, such as chloral, opium or morphine, where such person has knowledge that the wife is in the habit of using the same to excess.

57

§ 450. Husband or Wife Cannot Sue Each Other.The decisions by our courts under the statutes conferring upon married women separate property rights, and an independent status, so far as concerns her personal and property rights, not possessed at common law, have thus far, without exception, denied the right of a wife to sue her husband for personal wrongs committed during coverture. Such a right cannot be conferred by implication. The legisla ture should speak in no uncertain terms when it

56 Kelly v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 168 Mass. 308, 60 Am. St. Rep. 397, 46 N. E. 1063.

57 Hoard v. Peck, 56 Barb. 202; Holleman v. Harward, 119 N. C. 150, 56 Am. St. Rep. 672, 25 S. E. 972.