Because of the fact that a contract in general restraint of trade naturally tends to monopoly and to destroy competition, we do not appreciate or see the force of the argument made by some writers that there is some conflict among the decisions, due to a confusion of the doctrine against contracts in restraint of trade, and that against restriction upon competition, and that the latter is of comparatively recent growth. It is said that "contracts may . . be entered into which, by their terms, impose no restraint on trade, but their effect may be to create a monopoly by putting an end to competition. In such a case, the doctrine against contracts in restraint of trade is powerless to affect in any manner the resulting combination. If, however, the doctrine against restraints on competition is recognized and applied, the agreement will be declared illegal, and the trust formed will find itself unable to enforce the contract as made." 39 Whenever competition is affected, trade is likewise affected, and vice versa. This will appear in a consideration of the various contracts the tendency of which is to create a monopoly. For example, a contract between salt manufacturers in a large producing territory, for the purpose of regulating the price, and the manner and time of receiving and distributing salt, and the manner and price of sales, tends to establish a monopoly, and destroy competition, and is a contract not only against competition, but against trade, because parties to this contract may not engage in the trade except in the manner provided in the contract.40 And so with a contract between a number of producers of nearly the whole of a commercial commodity-such as bluestone-with another company to sell all of such

39 74 Am. St. Rep. 238, note; 33 Am. L. Rev. 68.

40 Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666.

commodity to such company for a term of years at certain prices, the sales to be apportioned among the different producers.41 So with a contract entered into between independent dealers and manufacturers in the same line of business, which imposes unreasonable restrictions upon trade and the freedom of the parties thereto, and whose manifest purpose and natural tendency is to prevent competition.42

§ 496. Same Continued-Associations Between Manufacturers and Dealers.-The voluntary association of a number of corporations in a particular trade or line of business or manufacture, or of dealers in a particular product, including such a per cent of the business in a designated territory as to destroy competition, or for the regulation of prices or the manufacture of a product by assessment of penalties, or where the apparent purpose of the organization is to control the price, is illegal and void.43

§ 497. Labor Organizations.--Labor organizations within reasonable and proper limits are beneficial to both employed and employer. With respect to

41 Cummings v. Union Bluestone, 164 N. Y. 401, 79 Am. St. Rep. 655, 58 N. E. 525.

42 Texas Standard Oil Co. v. Adoue, 83 Tex. 650, 29 Am. St. Rep. 690, 19 S. W. 274.

43 Emery v. Ohio Candle Co., 47 Ohio St. 321, 21 Am. St. Rep. 819, 24 N. E. 660; De Witt Wire Cloth Co. v. New Jersey etc. Co., 14 N. Y. Supp. 277: Jackson v. Brick Assn., 53 Ohio St. 303, 53 Am. St. Rep. 638, 41 N. E. 257 (brick); Nester v. Continental Brewing Co., 161 Pa. St. 473, 41 Am. St. Rep. 894, 29 Atl. 102 (beer); Judd v. Harrington, 139 N. Y. 105, 34 N. E. 790 (butchers); Greer v. Payne, 4 Kan. App. 153, 46 Pac. 190; United States v. Hopkins, 82 Fed. 529; Anheuser-Busch Brew. Assn. v. Houck (Tex. Civ. App.), 27 S. W. 692; Griffin v. Piper, 55 Ill. App. 213 (ice dealers); Chapin v. Brown, 83 Iowa, 156, 32 Am. St. Rep. 297, 48 N. W. 1074 (grocers); Vulcan Powder Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 96 Cal. 510, 31 Am. St. Rep. 242, 31 Pac. 581.

what these limitations are, judicial opinion varies. If we were to apply the same strict rules which the courts have applied to combinations of capital, to labor organizations, we would at once see that almost every such organization was inimical to the law. Restrictions upon trade caused by these organizations are more readily perceptible than from organizations of capital. Certain rates of wages in different lines of business simply must be established and maintained, or the business cannot be carried on; and employers are hardly permitted to employ anything but union labor. The nature of the labor organizations, and their method of securing their demands, lay bare their acts and their combination, while the combination of capital can be more secretive.

In a very early English case-Rex v. Journeymen Tailors of Cambridge-it was held that the combination or confederacy to raise wages by quitting work simultaneously was a conspiracy, and, as such, punishable. An act of parliament was afterward passed providing that a combination of workmen for the purpose of fixing wages was not a conspiracy.45 This doctrine was never received with favor in this country, although we find some federal courts taking rapid strides back to the doctrine of the Journeymen Tailors' case. Indeed, some early American cases followed the same principle, holding it to be criminal conspiracy for workmen, by a prearranged plan, to abandon the employment of their master.46 In fact, late cases of this character may be found in Connecticut and Virginia.47

44 8 Mod. 10.

45 5 George IV, c. 95.

46 People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9, 28 Am. Dec. 501; Commonwealth ▼. Hunt, 4 Met. 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346.

47 State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 3 Am. St. Rep. 23, 4 Atl. 890;

A

In considering the legal responsibility of union labor organizations, it must be observed that "all combinations, whether of capitalists or of workmen, for the purpose of influencing trade in their special favor by raising or reducing prices are . . . . ... illegal."48 The limit of legality of "strikes" most generally expressed appears to be this: Employees may lawfully quit their services, either singly or in a body, but if unlawful means are used to uphold or maintain a strike, or if the end to be attained is unlawful, then the strike is unlawful. Strikers commit no unlawful act so long as they do not resort to acts tending to destroy freedom action, such as intimidation, threats or violence. combination among employees, having for its object their orderly withdrawal in large numbers, or in a body, from the service of their employers, on account of a reduction in wages, although a strike, is not unlawful.49 They "have the right to combine and to fix a price upon their labor and refuse to work unless that price is obtained. They may use persuasion to induce men to join their organization, or to refuse to work except for an established wage"; but all that they do must be done in a peaceable way." But some of our courts have drawn the reins much closer. This is true particularly in Pennsylvania, Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 10 Am. St. Rep. 895, 6 S. E. 620.

50

48 More v. Bennett, 140 Ill. 69, 33 Am. St. Rep. 216, 29 N. E. 888.

49 Arthur V. Oakes, C3 Fed. 310; Longshore Print. Co. v. Howell, 26 Or. 527, 46 Am. St. Rep. 640, 38 Pac. 547; Snow v. Wheeler, 113 Mass. 179; In re Higgins, 27 Fed. 443. "Workmen have a full right to say that they will not work with certain men, and their employers must accept their dictation or go without their service": National Protective Assn. etc. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 88 Am. St. Rep. 648, 63 N. E. 369.

50 Beck v. Railway etc. Union, 118 Mich. 497, 74 Am. St. Rep. 421, 77 N. W. 13.

where there has been more trouble with strikes. There, and in some other states, union workmen may not even congregate around their former employer's place of business, or in that vicinity,51 nor may they follow nonunion workmen employed by the master, or gather around the boarding-house of such workmen, nor in any manner interfere with them or their former employer by threats, menaces, intimidation, ridicule or annoyance;52 nor may they display banners and the like;53 nor may they maintain a picket or patrol in front of the employer's premises.54 Some of the decisions have gone further into an explanation of what "threats" in truth and reality means. "No man can fail to see that there may be threats, and there may be intimidations, and there may be molesting, and there may be obstructing without there being any express words used by which a man should show any violent threats toward another, or any express intimidation. . . . . An intention to create alarm in the mind of a manufacturer, and so to force his assent to an alteration in the mode of carrying on his business, is an express violation of law."55 "The men who walk up and down in front of a man's shop may be guilty of intimidation, though they never raise a finger or utter a word. Their attitude may, nevertheless, be that of menace."50

..

51 Murdock v. Walker, 152 Pa. St. 595, 34 Am. St. Rep. 678, 25 Atl. 492; Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 131 Mo. 212, 52 Am. St. Rep. 622, 32 S. W. 1106.

52 Murdock v. Walker, supra; Consolidated Steel Co. v. Murray, 80 Fed. 811.

53 Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 9 Am. St. Rep. 689, 17 N. E. 307.

54 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443, 44 N. E. 1077.

55 Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111, 38 Am. Dec. 346.

56 Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 10 Am. St. Rep. 906, 6 S. E. 620.