292.

tion. In the former case it was held that the acts of Congress of 1862 and 1863 [12 Stat. at L. 345, 532, 709, chaps. 33, 142,

tender for debts, had no reference to taxes imposed by state authority. The legal tender acts expressly provided that the notes should be receivable for national taxes, and the context forbade the conclusion that Congress intended to include state taxes under the term "debts," and there was hence no conflict with the statute of Oregon which required the taxes due the state to be collected in coin.

law, the United States are not prohibited | rett, 102 U. S. 472, 26 L. ed. 197, relied from adopting any remedies for the recov- upon by the defendants, involved the quesery of a debt due to them which are known to the laws of Pennsylvania. The prohibitions, if any, either express or implied, contained in the enactment of 1866, are for|73], making United States notes a legal others, not for the government. They may be obligatory upon tax collectors. They may prevent any suit at law by such officers or agents. But they are not rules for the conduct of the state. It is a familiar principle that the King is not bound by any act of parliament unless he be named therein by special and particular words. The most general words that can be devised (for example, any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate) affect not him in the least, if they may tend to restrain or diminish any of his rights and interests. He may even take the benefit of any particular act, though not named. The rule thus settled respecting the British Crown is equally applicable to this government, and it has been applied frequently in the different states, and practically in the Federal courts. It may be considered as settled that so much of the royal prerogatives as belonged to the King in his capacity of parens patriæ, or universal trustee, enters as much into our political state as it does into the principles of the British Constitution.

In Meriwether v. Garrett, supra, it was held that taxes levied before the repeal of the charter of a municipality, other than such as were levied in obedience to the special requiremant of contracts entered into under the authority of law, and such as were levied under judicial direction for the payments of judgments recovered against the city, could not be collected through the instrumentality of a court of chancery at the instance of the city's creditors. Such taxes could be collected only under authority from the legislature.

A tax may or may not be a "debt" under a particular statute, according to the sense "It must, then, be concluded that the in which the word is found to be used. But government is not prohibited by anything whether the government may recover a percontained in the act of 1866 from employ-sonal judgment for a tax depends upon the ing any common-law remedy for the collec-existence of the duty to pay, for the ention of its dues. The reason of the rule forcement of which another remedy has which denies to others the use of any other than the statutory remedy is wanting, therefore, in applicability to the government, and the rule itself must not be extended beyond its reason." See also United States v. Stevenson, 215 U. S. p. 197, 54 L. ed. 156, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35.

The statute in the Savings Bank Case contained a provision (now in § 3213, Rev. Stat., U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2083) which expressly authorized the bringing of an action. But the court also found a sufficient basis for its judgment in the general power of the government to collect by suit taxes that are due, where the statute imposing the tax does not deny that remedy. This point was presented, considered, and decided in the determination of the cause, and the decision is none the less authoritative because there was another ground for the ultimate conclusion. Florida C. R. Co. v. Schutte, 103 U. S. p. 143, 26 L. ed. 336; Union P. R. Co. v. Mason City & Ft. D. R. Co. 199 U. S. p. 166, 50 L. ed. 137, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19.

Neither Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 19 L. ed. 101, nor Meriwether v. Gar

not been made exclusive. Whether an action of debt is maintainable depends not upon the question who is the plaintiff or in what manner the obligation was* incurred, but it lies whenever there is due a sum eith er certain or readily reduced to certainty. Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. p. 542, 20 L. ed. 493.

Here the tax was a stamp tax, but the language as clearly imports the obligation to pay as did that of the statute before the court in the Meredith Case, supra. Section 6 of the war revenue act of 1898 provided that there should be "levied, collected, and paid" in respect of the instruments mentioned, "by any person or persons or party who shall make, sign, or issue the same, or for whose use or benefit the same shall be made, signed, or issued, the several taxes or sums of money" set forth in the schedule which followed. There is nothing in the nature of a stamp tax which per se negatives either the personal obligation, otherwise to be derived from the words imposing the tax, or its collection by action. The stamp is to be affixed to the instru ment "to denote said tax." Secs. 7, 13, 14

*263

$264

Section 25 provided that the Commissioner | not more than $100, and not exceeding $200 of Internal Revenue should cause to be pre- under § 10, in the case of a bill or note. And pared "for the payment of the taxes pre- under § 13, where there is intent to evade scribed in this act suitable stamps denot- the law, the offense is punished "by a fine ing the tax on the document, article, or not exceeding $50, or by imprisonment not thing to which the same may be affixed." exceeding six months, or both, in the disThe stamp is the evidence, and its pur-cretion of the court." The unstamped inchase the convenient means, of payment. strument is made inadmissible in evidence When a statute says that a person shall (§§ 7, 14), is not allowed to be recorded pay a given tax, it obviously imposes up- (§ 15,) and by the provision of § 13 is to on that person the duty to pay, and this "be deemed invalid and of no effect." may be enforced through the ordinary *But these penalties were provided in ormeans adapted to the recovery of a definite der to induce the payment of the tax, and sum due, unless that course is clearly pro- not as a substitute for payment. It canhibited. not be supposed that Congress intended, by penalizing delinquency, to deprive the government of any suitable means of enforcing the collection of revenue. In large transactions, as in the case at bar, the fine which could be imposed would be much less than the tax, and no reason is suggested why the government should forego the collection of that which, under the statute, is its due. Punishment by imprisonment, under § 13, is imposed only where it can be shown that there was an "intent to evade the provisions" of the act; and while this remedy is appropriate in such a case, and is for the obvious purpose of discouraging evasion, it is without application where, for any other reason, the tax has not been

its revenue. The provision invalidating the instrument is likewise punitive. The object was not primarily to deprive instruments of effect, but to insure the discharge of the obligation to pay; and that obligation would still be undischarged, even though, by reason of the nonpayment, the instrument was deemed invalid.

The objection was made in the Savings Bank Case, supra, that the tax had not been assessed. The court held, however, that no other assessment than that made by the statute was necessary in order to determine the extent of the bank's liability. Following this rule, Judge Blatchford said in United States v. Tilden, 9 Ben. p. 386, Fed. Cas. No. 16,519, where the action was brought to recover unpaid taxes on income: "The extent of the liability of the individual for* income tax is defined by the statute, equally with the extent of the liability of the bank for the tax on undistributed earnings. In each case it is necessary, in an action of debt for the tax, to resort to sources of information outside of the stat-paid, and thereby the government has lost ute, to ascertain the amount on which the per centum of tax fixed by the statute is to be calculated. The difference between the two cases, in that respect, if there be any, will be, in every case, one of degree merely, not of principle. The statute, in imposing the per centum of tax on the income of the individual, makes a charge on him of a sum which is certain for the purposes of an action of debt, because it can be made certain through the action of a judicial tribunal, by following the rules laid down in the statute. That is the principle of the decision in the case of the bank, and it controls the present case." See also King v. United States, 99 U. S. p. 233, 25 L. ed. 374; United States v. Erie R. Co. 107 U. S. p. 2, 27 L. ed. 385, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83; United States v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 123 U. S. p. 114, 31 L. ed. 139, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77; and United States v. Snyder, 149 U. S. p. 215, 37 L. ed. 707, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 846. The statute now before us fixes a tax of a specified amount, according to the consideration or value of the lands conveyed.

It is insisted, however, that the provision for penalties excludes the idea of a person al liability. Thus it is made a misdemeanor to sign or issue one of the described instruments to which a stamp has not been affixed, punishable under § 7 by a fine of'

It is insisted, however, that there is no provision for the removal of the ban from the instrument in case the tax were collected by suit, and that this shows the intention to bar the latter remedy; for it is said that the purpose could not be to destroy the effect of the instrument and at the same time to compel the payment of the tax.

This argument proceeds upon a misconception of the statute. The provision under which unstamped instruments are made invalid is found in § 13, which also provides a method of validation on making the prescribed payment. The portion of this section which imposes the penalty is of comprehensive scope, and must be deemed to include a conveyance of land, as well as the other instruments within the purview of the statute. While the language of the first proviso, in its original form, specifically referred to "bonds, debentures, or certificates of stock or of indebtedness," this was broadened by the amendment made by

*265

the act of March 2, 1901, chapter 806 (31 | a copy thereof, duly certified by the officer Stat. at L. 941, U. 8. Comp. Stat. 1901, having charge of any records in which such p. 2296), so as to embrace "any instrument, original is required to be recorded, or otherdocument, or paper of any kind or descrip- wise duly proven to the satisfaction of the tion whatsoever mentioned in schedule A of collector, shall, within twelve calendar this act." This amendment, in extending months after the making or issuing thereof, an existing opportunity so as expressly to be brought to the said collector of internal include all instruments mentioned in the revenue to be stamped, and the stamp tax schedule, must be construed to refer not chargeable thereon shall be paid, it shall only to instruments subsequently executed, be lawful for the said collector to remit but to those as well which had been pre- the penalty aforesaid and to cause such viously made or issued. No different con- instrument to be duly stamped. And struction is required by the language of the when the original instrument, or & statute, the obvious policy of which was certified or duly proven copy thereof, as both to supply a measure of relief from the aforesaid, duly stamped so as to entitle punitive provision and at the same time to the same to be recorded, shall be presented encourage the payment of the tax. The to the clerk, register, recorder, or other provisios of the section as amended are as officer having charge of the original refollows: cord, it shall be lawful for such officer, upon the payment of the fee legally chargeable for the recording thereof, to make a new record thereof, or to note upon the original

in the stamping of said original instrument has been corrected pursuant to law; and the original instrument or such certified copy, or the record thereof, may be used in all courts and places in the same manner and with like effect as if the instrument had been originally * stamped: And provided further, That in all cases where the party has not affixed the stamp required by law

sold, or transferred at a time when and at a place where no collection district was established, it shall be lawful for him or them, or any party having an interest therein, to affix the proper stamp thereto, or, if the original be lost, to a copy thereof. But no right acquired in good faith before the stamping of such instrument, or copy thereof, as herein provided, if such record be required by law, shall in any manner be affected by such stamping as aforesaid."

"Provided, That hereafter, in all cases where the party has not affixed to any instrument the stamp required by law thereon at the time of issuing, selling, or trans-record the fact that the error or omission ferring the said bonds, debentures, or certificates of stock or of indebtedness, or any instrument, document, or paper of any kind or description whatsoever mentioned in schedule A of this act, and he or they, or any party having an interest therein, shall be subsequently desirous of affixing such stamp to said instrument, or, if said instrument be lost, to a copy thereof, he or they shall appear before the collector of inter-upon any such instrument issued, registered, nal revenue of the proper district, who shall, upon the payment of the price of the proper stamp required by law, and of a penalty of ten dollars, and, where the whole amount of the tax denoted by the stamp required shall exceed the sum of fifty dollars, on payment also of interest, at the rate of six per centum, on said tax from the day on which such stamp ought to have been affixed, affix the proper stamp to such bond, debenture, certificate of stock or of indebtedness, or copy, or* instrument, document, or paper of any kind or description whatsoever mentioned in schedule A of this | a voluntary payment, indicate an intention act, and note upon the margin thereof the to deprive the government of the right to date of his so doing, and the fact that such compel payment by action. The party may penalty has been paid; and the same shall pay the tax in the first instance, or he may thereupon be deemed and held to be as subsequently make payment as the statute valid, to all intents and purposes, as if provides, and thus render the instrument stamped when made or issued: And pro- effective. If he is unwilling or fails to avail vided further, That where it shall appear himself of this opportunity, why should he to said collector, upon oath or otherwise, be heard to insist that because the instruto his satisfaction, that any such instrument is made invalid he should escape payment has not been duly stamped at the ment of what is due the government? In time of making or issuing the same, by the face of the express requirement of the reason of accident, mistake, inadvertence, statute that he shall pay the tax, there is or urgent necessity, and without any will no basis for the contention that from the ful design to defraud the United States provisions affecting the validity of the inof the stamp, or to evade or delay the pay-strument should be implied an intent to proment thereof, then and in such case, if hibit the enforcement or the tax by suit. such instrument, or, if the original be lost, Further, as the obvious purpose is to vali

Neither the punitive provision, nor the means thus afforded to escape it through

31 S. C.-11.

*268

*270

Upon these grounds we conclude that the United States was entitled to maintain this action, and that the demurrer should have been orerruled. The judgment is therefore reversed.

date the instrument in case the prescribed the internal revenue act of June 30, 1864, payment is made, the satisfaction of a chap. 173 (13 Stat. at L. 239), and injudgment for the recovery of the tax must cluded within its scope the stamp taxes be deemed the equivalent of the payment of then in force. It must be deemed applicable the price of the stamps under the provisos also to the taxes imposed by the act of 1898. above quoted. Section 3216 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 2084) provides: "All judgments and moneys recovered or received for taxes, costs, for feitures, and penalties shall be paid to collectors as internal taxes are required to be paid." If the case is not one within the second proviso permitting the remission of the penalty, the additional payment of $10 will be required to meet the conditions of the first proviso. But so far as the tax is concerned, the person liable therefor, on satisfying the judgment, will have the same right to have the instrument stamped by the collector as though he had paid the taxes to the officer without suit. Such a case would present no administrative difficulty in accomplishing the intent of the statute.

We have examined the other statutory provisions to which our attention has been called in support of the defense, and we find none of controlling significance, or which, taken separately or together, detract from the force of the provision imposing the obligation to pay the tax, and deprive the government of the remedy here sought.

(219 U. S. 180.)

UNITED STATES, Plff. in Err.,

V.

LUCINDA GRIZZARD, William Grizzard,
Mrs. Lila Chaney, and Wilson Chaney.

EMINENT DOMAIN (§ 106*) — INJURY TO

LAND NOT TAKEN-ACCESS.

Just compensation to the owner of a farm, a part of which is taken by the United States by permanently flooding it in improving navigation, as an incident to which a public highway crossing the flooded land is also flooded, demands an award of the damages to that part of the farm not taken by reason of the destruction of the easement of access to the turnpike by way of the highway thus destroyed.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases. see Eminent Domain, Cent. Dig. §§ 282-289; Dec. Dig. § 106.*]

I

[No. 66.]

Decided Janu

ary 3, 1911.

We are also of opinion that the statute itself provides that payment may be enforced by action. Section 31 makes "all ad- Argued December 6, 1910. ministrative, special, or stamp provisions of law, including the laws in relation to the assessment of taxes not heretofore specifically repealed," applicable to the act. Within "administrative" provisions must be included those which relate to the collection of the taxes imposed. For the administration of the statute may well be taken to embrace all appropriate measures for its enforcement, and there is no substantial reason for assigning to the phrase which is used in the section quoted a narrower interpretation. It therefore comprehends the authority conferred by § 3213 of the Revised Statutes in the following words:

IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Kentucky to review a judgment awarding damages to the owners of a farm, a part of which was taken by the government for Affirmed. public purposes.

66

. . And taxes may be sued for and recovered in the name of the United States, in any proper form of action, before any circuit or district court of the United States for the district within which the liability to such tax is incurred, or where the party from whom such tax is due resides at the time of the commencement of the said action."

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Assistant Attorney General John Q. Thompson and P. M. Cox for plaintiff in

error.

No appearance for defendants in error.

* Mr. Justice Lurton delivered the opinion of the court:

Action by the owners of a farm for a taking of a part thereof by the United States for public purposes. Judgment for the plaintiffs below.

The farm of the defendants in error lies upon Tates creek, a tributary of the Kentucky river. For the purpose of improving the navigation of that stream, the* governThis provision authorizing suit, with the ment has erected a series of locks and dams. sanction of the Commissioner of Internal As a consequence, the waters of Tates creek Revenue (Rev. Stat. § 3214) *was originally are backed up to such an extent as to flood enacted in 1866 (act of July 13, 1866, chap. or submerge a strip of the Grizzard farm, 184, 14 Stat. at L. p. 111, U. S. Comp. permanently destroying its use for agriculStat. 1901, p. 2084), as an amendment of tural purposes. The court below, a jury

*For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1507 to date, & Rep'r ladexes

*182

*181

being waived, found that 7} acres of land | the taken land, the rule applied in the cases had been actually taken. He then added: cited does not control this case. 1. "That in addition there is taken an easement of access from plaintiff's land by way of the county road to the Tates creek pike.