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The captain discussed the voyage with the English pilot.

The pilot advised the master as to what he considered the best route to the Maas Lightship, and the pilot laid down the course on the chart, via Galloper Lightship.

We reached the Hook of Holland February 20th, at 3 p. m. about.

The captain went ashore to see about securing a German pilot, or pilot for Germany, and the Dutch sea pilot remained on board until he returned.

The captain applied to his agents at Rotterdam for a pilot.

I do not know the agents' names.

The captain told me in off-hand conversation that the agents furnished the pDot.

The pilot for Germany came on board the 21st, between 4-5 p. m.

The sea pilot went ashore then and the other pilot took charge, I presume.

I do not know the pilot's name.

I had no conversation with the pilot until 11 o'clock that night, when I called him and he instructed me to cast the lead, and we found 17 fathoms and altered the course to NE. % E.

I was on watch from 8 to 12 that night and from 8 to 11 the next morning, and during these periods had some conversation with the pilot.

The pilot claimed to be a general pilot; he claimed to be a North Sea pilot. He said he had run into the Weser but said he had not been to Bremen or Bremerhaven since the war started. He was talking about ships which run from Rotterdam to the River Plate, and I assumed he was either master or mate of a ship on that run.

He said he was not a government pilot, but a private pilot.

He said nothing about holding a license either as master or pilot.

I was informed by another pilot at the Hook that the Dutch government pilots are not allowed to leave Dutch waters, and could not make the trip to Germany.

He seemed to know how to handle the ship all right; he knew his courses and he knew his distances. As he had been sent on board by the agents, I supposed he was qualified to take us in safely, but I believe now if he had been a qualified man he would have been better posted.

During my watches on the night before and the day of the explosion the vessel was running at full speed. This was, of course, on the pilot's orders. The pilot never seemed anxious about mines.

We had double outlook on watch for floating mines. We posted double lookouts after leaving Nab Lightship.

We saw our first mines on Saturday morning, the 20th, by the North Hinder Lightship, west of there about 6 to 8 miles. We saw two groups of three mines each and passed between them, three on each side, about a quarter of a mile away from them. I saw the mines

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myself. We met a Dutch ship shortly after seeing these mines and she signaled that we were standing into danger and to keep a sharp lookout.

After meeting this vessel we saw seven more mines within an hour. In all we passed 13 mines within two hours, between 8 and 10 a. m.

They were floating mines. They floated about a foot out of water and were easily distinguishable at a mile.

They were new and freshly painted, without seagrowth. They were equipped with balance bars or rods on top and were marked with the letter "H" in white. They were marked with three white letters and they may have all been "H," but we could not distinguish the other two.

We reported these mines to two Dutch torpedo boats that same afternoon.

I jjever saw any more mines after that, but one was reported on the next watch which I did not see.

The first night after leaving Maas, the 21st, we steered NE. % E., I think, but I am not certain. Then at 10.45 we changed the course to NE. V* E. by compass. While we were on that course I went off watch. When I came on watch the next morning at 8 o'clock we were steering East by South. We took a cast of the lead at 10 o'clock and the bottom was 14 fathoms. Overcast and light fog at the time. After 10 o'clock it shut in thick and we were still steering East by South. At 11 o'clock we struck an obstruction amidships. It was within 2 minutes of 11 o'clock.

The approximate position when we struck was north and west of the position of Norderney Lightship, about 3 miles away, 13 fathoms of water by the lead.

The vessel did not lose her headway when we struck. I do not know how the tide was. The boiler burst and the steam was shut off automatically. The explosion broke the vessel in two amidships and cracked her up to the hurricane deck. There was a hole in her and when she listed to port this hole came up to the water line and could be plainly seen. The hole must have been at least 6 feet in diameter and, I presume, she was split up right from the bottom.

There was only one explosion while we were on board.

The boats had been swung out constantly since we left the Downs. In 20 minutes we were clear of the ship.

Three men were lost. They were the Third Assistant Engineer William Bazzell, and one Spanish fireman and one Spanish coal passer. These men were presumably in the after fireroom or coal bunker. That is where they would be in any case while on duty. No one in our crew saw these men after the explosion occurred, to my knowledge. The engine and boiler room space was filled with steam and water instantly, and there is no question in my mind that three men were either killed instantly or were drowned after being first rendered unconscious by the shock. The engineers went down into the engine and boiler rooms as far as they could and looked for these men, but it was impossible to find any trace whatever of them. It was also impossible to remain long, on account of the volume of water pouring into hole from the sea. I am satisfied that all possible was done to find the men, and that they were not abandoned until danger made it absolutely imperative.

I was in the captain's boat. After we had cleared we heard one more explosion, about 25 minutes after clearing, and we believe it to have been a second mine. As soon as we got a short distance away the ship was closed in by the fog, and we did not see her sink. There is no question in my mind that she sank very soon; she was down by the stern and a heavy port list, her port rail being under when we last saw her.

When we cleared the vessel, we steered south by west by boat compasses, trying to make the beach.

About 12.45 we were picked up, after a little more than one hour in the boats.

The German patrol boat Annie Busse picked us up and kept us on board 48 hours, because the ship could not come in on account of fog. We were treated very courteously on the boat, and the German officials, officers, and crew did all they possibly could to make us comfortable. We were landed in Wilhelmshaven at 11.30 a. m. the 24th of February, and were sent to Bremerhaven, reaching here at 10 p. m. same day.

The morning of the explosion we saw no other vessels, no buoys, and no mines. No land or seamarks of any kind were to be seen.

Charles H. Winnett,
Third Officer S. S. "Carib."

American Consular Agency,

City of Bremerhaven, Empire of Germany, ss: Subscribed and sworn to before me by the above-named Third Officer Winnett on the 28th of February, 1915.

J. F. Buck, Consular Agent of the United States of America.

[Seal of American Consular Agency.]

[Inclosure 4.]

Sworn Statement of Second Officer of S. S. "Carib."

I, Jesse Boyd, born in New York City March 2, 1870, second officer of the steamer Carib, having been duly sworn, do hereby depose and say that I have read carefully the foregoing sworn statement of Third Officer Winnett, of the S. S. Carib, regarding the voyage we jointly made in the said steamer from Charleston to Bremen, with special reference to the sinking of said steamship Carib on the morning of Feb. 22, 1915, and depose further that said sworn statement of Third Officer Winnett is, according to my knowledge, in every way correct and true; and I further depose and say, that I know of no details concerning the sinking of the above-mentioned steamer Carib which would either detract from, or add to, the said sworn statement of Third Officer Winnett.

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In testimony whereof, witness my hand at Bremerhaven this 28th day of February, 1915.

Jesse Boyd, Second Officer S. S. "Carib."

American Consular Agency,

City of Bremerhaven, Empire of Germany, ss: Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February, 1915.

J. F. Buck, Consular Agent of the United States of America.

[Seal of American Consular Agency.]

[Inclosure 5.]

Sworn Statement of Chief Engineer George S. Keowen,
of S. S. "Carib."

My name is George S. Eeowen.

I was born in Brooklyn, January 10, 1875.

I never made the trip to Germany before.

I joined the S. S. Carib November 29, 1912, as chief engineer.

So far as I know, the vessel was absolutely in a seaworthy condition. Her boilers were sound.

We left Charleston for Bremen January 27th, 1915.

On the trip from Charleston to the Isle of Wight we encountered two severe storms, and the steering gear parted on both occasions. The first time the steam steering chain broke, and on the second occasion a rod on the starboard side broke. Repairs were made as soon as possible, and as far as I knew the steering gear was placed in as good shape as ever.

We took the English pilot at the Isle of Wight.

During the entire trip everything was in good condition in the engine and boiler room, with the exception of six boiler tubes, which had to be plugged.

I saw eight mines myself, after leaving North Hinder, on the 19th of February.

I should judge that the nearest we came to these mines was about 500 feet.

Having no glasses, I could not see the mines clearly. I saw that one mine at least had the letter "H" painted in white. The mines looked like ordinary buoys with a stick across the top; some were black and some were red.

We left Mass Lightship on Feb. 21st. After leaving we ran up to about 9 knots per hour, on an average, steadily up to the time of the explosion. I received no orders to slow the speed down.

Our full speed in fair weather is about 10 knots per hour, and when the sea is rough and we have bad weather our full speed was 6 or 7 knots per hour.

The explosion occurred at about 11 o'clock on the morning of the 22nd of February. The vessel was running at about 9 knots. It was hazy and we could not see over two or three miles. Everything was in order in the engine rooms. •

When the explosion came it caused one of the two boilers to explode, and in all probability one of the boilers was lifted out of the saddle and the steam pipe was broken, because with the explosion of the mine the engine room was completely filled with steam and it was impossible to see anything. The first look I had the water (sea water) covered half of the cylinder. The vessel lost her headway almost instantly; the engine probably made not more than 10 or 15 revolutions. It was out of the question to attempt to shut off the steam, and the breaking of the steam pipe rendered the engine absolutely impossible to control.

At the time of the explosion the Third Assistant Engineer, William Bazzell, was in charge of watch; Frank Redmond, oiler, two firemen, and one coal passer were on watch. Of these five men, the oiler and one fireman were saved; the Third Assistant Engineer, Bazzell, Fireman Antonio Martinez, and Coal Passer Segunda Blaz lost their lives. I could not say how they lost their lives, but I think they must have been killed instantly, either by the rush of scalding steam or inpouring sea water. Two attempts were made to reach these men, but unsuccessfully. I and the first assistant, Mr. Hubbel, went back twice, but the water was so high we could not enter the engine room, and the live steam also prevented us.

We got into the boats then, and in about 20 minutes we had cleared the vessel. I was in No. 2 boat. We waited a short distance from the ship for over 30 minutes, to see if there was a trace of life on board, but saw nothing more of the missing men.

We were picked up by the German scout boat Anme Basse after

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