Argument for Donnelley. 276 U.S. sults of their investigation, which is the appropriate function of the directing officers under whatever name designated. If § 2 is penal, it is not enough for an officer either to investigate or report; he must do both, regardless of the general character of his duties, and this of course, applies to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue especially. Section 2 fails to say when reports shall be made. An offense may be discovered, but it may take weeks, months, or even years, to discover the offender and secure evidence to justify prosecution. Must an efficient officer report bare knowledge of an offense, and thus frustrate efforts to discover the perpetrator, or may he exercise his judgment as to when is the proper time to report? Is a prohibition officer subject to prosecution because his judgment happens to differ from that of a United States Attorney as to when an offense should be reported? Section 2 contains not a single characteristic of a penal statute. Few reading it would ever suspect that it might be so intended. Even if it had included a specific provision that a violation of it would constitute an offense, an officer could not tell what he would have to do to comply with its terms so as to be immune from punishment. Section 29 was not intended to apply to the purely administrative provisions of the Act. The general clause is limited to the same character of offenses previously specifically mentioned. The rule of ejusdem generis is clearly applicable. The use of the word "offense" in the general clause indicates a legislative intent to prescribe a punishment only for the violation of those prohibitions or commands in relation to manufacture, transportation or disposition of liquor, which it was the purpose of the Act to regulate or prevent, and for which offenses a special penalty had not been prescribed. 505 Argument for the United States. It is inconceivable that Congress contemplated that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and his subordinate officers might be repeatedly prosecuted and punished for violating the administrative provisions of the Act. United States v. Seibert, 2 F. (2d) 80. It has never been the theory of the Government that public officers will perform their duties only in fear of prosecution for dereliction of duty. Only in rare instances and exclusively in matters pertaining to public revenues, is a failure to make reports made penal, and in those cases the time and character of the report are clearly prescribed and the penalty for failure definitely expressed. Rev. Stats. § 3169; Comp. Stats. § 5889. A construction of the Act which would provide the means for meddlesome interference with the policy of executive enforcement officers would be far from a liberal construction "to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented." A new offense will not be deemed to have been created by statute unless the legislature has expressed its will in language sufficiently explicit to be apparent to the common mind. It is only when a statute clearly and plainly subjects parties and acts to its denunciation that they may be lawfully punished thereunder. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385; United States v. Noveck, 272 U. S. 202; United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 14; First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 206 Fed. 374. Assistant Attorney General Mabel Walker Willebrandt, with whom Solicitor General Mitchell and Messrs. Norman J. Morrisson and John J. Byrne, Attorneys in the Department of Justice, were on the brief, for the United States. The provision in § 29 that any person who violates any provision of Title II of the National Prohibition Act shall Opinion of the Court. 276 U.S. be guilty of a criminal offense does not seem to have been intended to punish administrative officers and United States Attorneys for failure to perform the numerous duties imposed on them by the Act. While the question is one on which opinions may differ, the better reason supports the view that it was not intended by § 29 to punish as a crime the failure of an administrative officer to report to the United States Attorney a case justifying prosecution. If the statute is construed to make that an offense, then it was error for the trial court to refuse to charge the jury that a violation of the Act did not occur unless the official had evidence sufficient to reasonably warrant prosecution. The other charges refused or given and complained of do not disclose prejudicial error. If the statute covers the case, the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on the question whether the plaintiff in error had in bad faith neglected to report for prosecution a case where he had sufficient evidence to warrant prosecution. MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court. Defendant was the Prohibition Director for Nevada. An information filed in the United States court for that district charged that he, having knowledge of the unlawful possession and transportation of intoxicating liquor by one Curran, did wilfully and unlawfully fail to report such violations to the United States Attorney. The jury found him guilty and the court imposed a fine of $500. Alleging various grounds for reversal, he took the case to the Circuit Court of Appeals. That court, acting under 239 of the Judicial Code, certified to this Court a question concerning which it desired instruction. Defendant submitted the question upon a brief. Later we required the entire record to be sent up, and so brought 505 Opinion of the Court. the case here for decision. The United States filed additional briefs. Oral arguments were made for the respective parties. But defendant failed to submit any other brief or to file any statement of points or specification of errors intended to be urged here. Rule 25, Par. 2(e), Par. 4. And see Rule 11, Par. 9. We confine our consideration to the question argued in his brief. Southeastern Express Co. v. Robertson, 264 U. S. 541. Home Benefit Association v. Sargent, 142 U. S. 691, 694-695. The substance of the contention is that intentional failure of a prohibition director or other enforcement officer, having knowledge of crimes and offenders against the Act, to report them to the United States Attorney is not a punishable offense. Section 2, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act (c. 85, 41 Stat. 305, 308; U. S. C., Tit. 27, § 11), provides: "The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, his assistants, agents, and inspectors shall investigate and report violations of this Act to the United States Attorney for the district in which committed, The Act does not specifically fix punishment for a violation of that provision. But § 29 provides that: "Any person who violates any of the provisions for which offense a special penalty is not prescribed, shall be fined for a first offense not more than $500 As there are no common law crimes against the Government (United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677), each case involves the construction of a statute to determine whether the acts or omissions of the accused are denounced as punishable. And regard is always to be had to the familiar rule that one may not be punished for crime against the United States unless the facts shown plainly and unmistakably constitute an offense within the meaning of an Act of Congress. United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S. 624, 628. Todd v. United States, 158 U. S. 278, 282. Fasulo v. United States, 272 U. S. 620, 629. Opinion of the Court. 276 U.S. The evidence showed, and the verdict, when read in the light of the court's charge, means that the jury found that Curran was discovered transporting ten barrels of intoxicating liquor and that plaintiff in error, with actual knowledge of that violation, intentionally failed to report the crime and offender for prosecution. Plainly that was a violation of duty imposed on him by § 2. And § 29 declares that violators of any provision shall be punished. Taken according to their ordinary meaning, the words used are sufficient to make the facts alleged and found a punishable offense. The rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of persons accused is not violated by allowing the language to have its full meaning where that construction is in harmony with the context and supports the policy and purposes of the enactment. United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 395. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95. Section 3 forbids a narrow or strict construction of the Act, and directs that all its provisions "shall be liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented.” Diligence and good faith on the part of enforcement officers are essential. The great difficulties always attendant upon efforts to suppress the liquor traffic have been noticed and cited in a number of decisions of this Court. Crane v. Campbell, 245 U. S. 304, 307. Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, 282, 297. Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545, 560. Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U. S. 581, 595. The failure to enforce laws of the States passed to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor was one of the principal reasons for the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment. Violations of such enactments were open and notorious. Connivance and cooperation between officers and offenders frequently existed. Those who drafted and passed the enforcement Act knew that national prohibition would be assailed by |