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June 9.-New German Assault.
shipped to France.
Second Marne Battle
begun. July 16.-Ex-Tsar shot at Ekate
rinburg. July 18.-General Foch's counter
attack, July 20.-Germans recrossed the
Aug. 2.--Soissons recovered.
Chancellor Hertling re
signs. Oct. 1.--St. Quentin regained. Oct. 4.-Abdication of King Ferdi
nand. Oct. 9.-Cambria regained. Oct. 10.-British took Le Cateau.
Oct. 13.-French recovered Laon.
Italian offensive on Piave.
British at Mons.
LESSONS OF THE WAR The Battle Of JUTLAND.—Simultaneously with the surrender of the German fleet off the Firth of Forth, Scotland, Captain Persius, the wellknown German critic, made some astonishingly candid admissions regarding the decisive character of the defeat which was administered to the German High Seas fleet by the British Grand fleet in the Battle of Jutland.
It is characteristic of the wholesale deception practiced upon the German nation by its rulers that the Kaiser should have announced the defeat at Jutland as a glorious victory for the German Navy-a lie which was industriously distributed by German propagandists throughout the world, and notably in this country.
The first doubts as to the condition of the German feet were aroused by the fact on the fleet's return to Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, the navy yards at these ports were tightly closed and no civilian was allowed to enter. This doubt increased as the months and the years went by and the German fleet made no second attempt to dispute the mastery of the seas.
The losses by actual sinking of ships of the German fleet are now proved to be just those which were positively claimed by Admiral Jellicoe in his report of the battle. But it will be remembered that he spoke of some three or four capital ships, which had come under heavy gunfire and were so badly listed or on fire, that their sinking before they could be brought back to port was considered to be inevitable. These vessels were very badly smashed up indeed; but, thanks to the most excellent subdivision and general under-water protection which is incorporated in the German ships, they evidently managed to limp back to a home port for repairs.
There used to be a saying among our naval officers that the landing of the first successful heavy gun salvo would probably win the fight, meaning that if the ten or twelve big shells “straddled " the enemy ship, the destruction wrought would be so great, both upon personnel and upon the complicated structure and gear of the ship, that she would be heavily handicapped for the rest of the fight.
Now in his report, Admiral Jellicoe stated that his own flagship, the Iron Duke, registered on a ship of the Kaiser class, and placed several successive straddles across her. Another of his ships, according to his report was able to hold the range long enough to straddle on another German ship with six successive salvos. Now the shooting was done with 1400-pound, 13.5-inch high-explosive shells. The damage done must have been most serious, and Captain Persius now tells the world that “the losses of the German fleet were enormous, and that it was clear to every thinking man” on that day “that the Skagerrak battle must be the only general naval engagement of the war. His article in the Berlin Tageblatt goes on to say that the German fleet was saved from destruction partly by good leardership and partly by favorable weather conditions. Had the weather been clear or Admiral von Scheer's leadership less_able, the destruction of the whole German Navy would have resulted. The long-range British gun, he says, would have completely smashed the lighter-armed German ships.”
The honor of the fight lay with Admiral Beatty, who did not hesitate to bring his armored cruisers under the fire of the German battleships, in his determination to hold the enemy until the British battleship fleet could come up and get into action. This initiative, skill and courage, in spite of the loss of three of his battle cruisers gained for him the supreme command of the Grand fleet and the honor of receiving, three years after the battle of Jutland, the surrender of the enemy against which he fought on that memorable day.-Scientific American, 7/12.
CONVOY SYSTEM'S SUCCESS.—The following table gives statistics of vessels in organized convoy up to October 26, 1918, inclusive: Convoy. Atlantic
No. of No. of mer Losses convoys. Homeward convoys chant ships in convoy
P. C. North Atlantic
1.5 West African ports.
0.64 Rio de Janeiro.
77 0.89 Outward Various sailings from British ports
0.63 Other convoys Scandinavian (old system).....
1.15 Do. (new system)
0.41 French coal trade.
0.14 Local Mediterranean
1.24 East Coast
STATEMENT OF SHIPS IN ORGANIZED ATLANTIC Convoys
539 Ships convoyed
74 Per cent of casualties.
Total 1,027 14,968
(Gross Tonnage) Convoyed
43,196,740 33,860,491 77,057,231 Lost
654.288 Per cent of losses.
0.85 NOTE.—The above figures and the casualties only refer to convoys which reached their destination on or before October 5, 1918, and do not include convoys en route at that date.
WORLD'S DAILY AVERAGE Loss OF SHIPPING
No. of vessels
23,550 3d quarter, 1917.
15,270 4th quarter, 1917.
12,500 Ist quarter, 1918.
10,740 2d quarter, 1918.
8,600 3d quarter, 1918.
7,813 --Nautical Gazette, 30/11.
TRUTH ABOUT THE U-BOATS.—Steadily Diminishing Sea Strength.Captain Persius, in the Berliner Tageblatt, says that many cherished the hope that the German Grand fleet would fight a second Skager Rak Battle, and that its submarines would bring England down. These sanguine people were blinded by the lies which were one of the principal weapons of German land and sea warfare.
The celebrated orgies under Tirpitz and Capelle were bluff. People did not know that for a year there had been no German High Seas fleet, even to a limited extent, and that submarine forces worthy of the name only existed in the mouth of the heads of the fleet.
He says that Grand Admiral Tirpitz's mistaken construction policy was responsible for Germany's defeat. Admiral von Scheer's capable command, Admiral Jellicoe's bad leadership, and the thick weather saved Germany from disaster at Skager Rak, otherwise the longer range of the British guns would have inflicted a crushing defeat on the German feet. German losses, despite this luck, were frightful, and on June 1 it was clear to all acquainted with the situation that this battle would be the only one. Authoritative quarters openly said this.
After September, 1917, useless warship construction was abandoned by order, not of the naval but of the army authorities. Material for the construction of submarines was then so scarce that the boats of line ships had to be used. Twenty-three line ships were withdrawn from the navy in this way in 1918, including the Deutschland, eight coast armored vessels, three armored cruisers, five cruisers of the Hansa class, the small cruiser Strassburg, and 15 other cruisers; thus in 1918 the High Sea fleet consisted only of dreadnoughts, line ships of the Dessau, Helgoland, Kaiser, and Markgraf class, and some line cruisers.
When the ruthless submarine war was declared there were hardly any submarines. Hardly any were built under Admiral Tirpitz, while Admiral von Capelle constructed only a few. They would only have been completed, as far as larger boats were concerned, in 1919 and 1920. The official assertion that losses were fully covered by new construction was untrue. The following table shows the construction and losses in 1917, the first figure in each case representing the number built and the second figure the number lost : January, 6 and 4
July, 10 and 4 February, 3 and 3
August, 12 and II March, 4 and 6
September, 8 and 1 April, 4 and 1
October, 12 and 12 May, 6 and 5
November, 5 and 7 June, 8 and 3
December, 5 and 9 The number of submarines (" front boats ") was as follows in the months stated : 1917
1918 April 126 January
134 February August 134 April
128 October 146 June
137 Only a small percentage of "front boats ” have been in action. In January, 1917, when circumstances were favorable, 12 (? 32) per cent of the submarines were at the front, 30 per cent in port, and 38 per cent testing and exercising. During the war the submarines suffered severely, the crews, often insufficiently trained, had no longer the necessary confidence in their arm, and consequently there was latterly very little inclination for this dangerous service, especially as experienced seamen clearly saw that all the sacrifice was in vain. The same applies to the full sea fleet, the crews realizing that if battle was given it meant, having regard to the small number of ships available, the useless sacrifice of a large number of valuable lives. They therefore protested, and every sensible man will be thankful that they did. By their action on November 5 they rendered the nation incalculable service.-London Times, 23/11.
WHAT IS VICTORY ?-11.-By Arthur Pollen.-It was suggested that the position at sea could not be established satisfactorily after the war unless three essential terms of peace were made operative. They were: the restitution by Germany of the merchant tonnage destroyed, the assignment of the German colonies with their seaports to a nonGerman power, and ordinances and guarantees that Germany should not possess submarines now or in the near future. It was also suggested that the submarine might by consent be made contraband of humanity, and if not made contraband, at any rate eliminated finally as an instrument for the exercise of the rights of search and capture. But the essential matter is the tonnage, the colonies, and Germany's final deprivation of under-water instruments of war. There are, however, further points which are partly naval, partly territorial, and partly military. The fate of the High Seas Fleet need not delay us in this connection, as this is part of the general question of the enemy's disarmament.
Heligoland: the Baltic: the Dardanelles.--So I pass on to the problems of the closed seas and Heligoland. As to this last, the folly of 1892 must certainly be undone. In a moment of fatal blindness we then ceded to Germany an island to which our moral title was of the slenderest, in exchange for certain rights in Africa to which Germany had no title at all. The possession was, indeed, of no positive value to us at that time, nor, for that matter, to Germany, for it did not appear in 1892 that there was anything in German world policy that would bring her into conflict with a naval power. The singular thing about the attitude of mind of British statesmen at that time was their blindness to the very obvious fact that the real value of Heligoland to Germany would come when Germany was at war with England. Well, we have survived the war and the folly which gave our enemy this quite priceless advantage; but we must see to it that it cannot once more be used against us. In a sense, the most satisfactory arrangement would be to return it to its original owners, the Danes; but it clearly must come out of German hands, and it is possible that if restored to Denmark, its seizure by Germany in time of war could not be prevented. However this may be, it must be German no longer. The questions of the Baltic and the Black Sea are more complex. The entrances to the Black Sea have long been dominated by the power possessing the land on either side of the very narrow straits leading in and out of the Sea of Marmora, but modern armament would enable Sweden and Denmark to close the Baltic as effectually. It is more to the point that any considerable naval power on the Baltic side of the sound could make penetration through the narrow waters of the Danish Islands into the Baltic extraordinary dangerous without any obvious breach of Danish neutrality, while the seizure of the islands after a fleet had penetrated would, of course, cut their communications completely. It was for this reason that it was said that the problem of sending a British fleet into the Baltic was not naval, but military. If Germany retains her present naval force and her monopoly of the Kiel Canal she would still be able to control the sea communications of Russia and Finland absolutely, except for such alternative means as Kola Bay affords. But Kola is very distant from the centers of Russian industry, so that its employment would be exceedingly uneconomical in peace time, though of vital value in war. What the Allies have to do is to see that German domination of the Baltic cannot be re-asserted at any time, just as they must also see that Turkish domination of the Black Sea, by her possession of the only exit from it, is terminated also. But in the case of the Baltic the position of Germany is far stronger than that of Turkey, for if a power commanding Gallipoli and the Asiatic shore can make it impossible for a hostile navy to force a passage past the narrows, it is also true that a hostile navy can make it almost impossible for any Turkish fleet to leave the Dardanelles. But Germany is in no such difficulty. The possession of the Kiel Canal gives her a perfectly protected communication with the North Sea, so that if no powerful fleet threatens her in the Baltic, that sea must become a German lake. It is neither to the interest of ourselves, nor of any of the new states, Finland, Poland, and regenerated Russia, that are now coming into being, that this state of things should continue. Means must, therefore, be found of denationalizing the waterway and putting it under international control.
Summary of Imposed Conditions. We can now group the conditions of peace into three. There are, first, those which satisfy the punitive and retributive sides of justice. These conditions are, first, the punishment of those guilty of atrocities; secondly, the surrender of conquered territories and the restitution of stolen goods; thirdly, the payment for or replacement of stolen property, buildings, churches, factories, and particularly of ships; and, lastly, the indemnification of those who have either themselves suffered personal injuries, or whose relatives have been murdered or tortured into incapacity.