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with those of a greater number of smaller battleships, including the bases of equal strength and equal cost, summarize as follows:
Congress appropriates for ships in
specific numbers and not by lump sum.
From the above discussion and summary it appears that a given number of battleships of increased size are of greater tactical and strategical value and of greater economic value than the greater number of "smaller" battleships that can be built for the same amount, or that represent the same total fighting strength.
VI. GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS In the course of the foregoing considerations and discussion, the following main points have been developed :
The battleships of increased size, considered singly, can carry more fighting power, be protected for more effective resistance, have higher speed under all conditions, have greater radius of action and greater cruising life.
That battleships of increased size, considered together, are of greater tactical value, of greater strategic value, and of
greater economic value (because of less maintenance cost). The conclusion that is to be had from the considerations set forth appears to be definitely in favor of the battleship of increased size.
The Naval Reserve After the War
(SEE Page 2757, WHOLE No. 190) LIEUT, COMMANDER R. R. SMITH, U. S. Navy,—There appears in the Naval Institute Proceedings for December, 1918, an article entitled, "A Plan for Maintaining the Naval Auxiliary Reserve after the War," by Lieutenant Ernest Draper, U. S. N. R. F.
The writer's plan for maintaining the Reserve leaves the impression that all officers of the Merchant Marine are to be under the control of the Navy Department under conditions similar to those which obtained during the war. Inasmuch as all of the merchant ships now being manned by officers of the Naval Reserve will revert to the owners or to the Shipping Board, it is difficult to see on what basis such a plan would be successful. In the first place the data furnished relative to the amount of shipping under the control of the Shipping Board, given as ten million tons, is misleading in that very little of this tonnage, at least less than one-half, can ever be permanently under the direct control of the Shipping Board. This ten million tons includes the Dutch ships which were taken over and which must be returned, German and Austrian interned ships avhose status is not as yet settled, and all privately-owned vessels belonging to the railroad and shipping lines which must be returned to their owners.
Practically every officer in the navy who has given the matter any thought recognizes the need for a very strong Naval Reserve after the war. The Shipping Board is already undertaking considerable work in preparing civilians for seafaring life by establishing training ships and schools. The augmentation of the merchant marine personnel must, of necessity, be undertaken by the owners or controllers of the ships and not by the navy. It is hardly probable that the navy could run these ships on a commercial basis and it is not desirable that the navy should pervert its military activities and training to commercial channels.
To establish a Reserve we must approach the matter from an entirely different angle. I believe that the first requisite of an officer of the Naval Reserve is a good record in the merchant marine. It is entirely feasible to establish a correspondence course for these officers extending over a period of not less than one year; divide the work in such small portions that it will not become burdensome, and into at least twelve sections requiring some work during every month. I have discussed, this idea with a number of merchant marine officers who stated that they would welcome such instruction as they could do the work at sea. There is no opportunity for a merchant marine officer to study while in port, as his stay is very uncertain and usually is occupied with taking on or discharging cargo. This course should include strictly naval subjects, such as International Law, Gunnery, and Navy Regulations. The utter unfamiliarity of many of our Reserve officers with the Navy Regulations is deplorable. When first enrolled they must seek 'advice and guidance upon simple matters which they might determine for themselves with previous instructions in the regulations.
The correspondence course would, of course, be supplemented by examinations. The examinations would include subjects not included in the correspondence course which the officer might reasonably be expected to have studied, namely: seamanship, navigation and engineering. Upon satisfactorily meeting the requirements of the Department, the merchant marine officer can be enrolled in the Naval Reserve. After a reasonable specified period of service with a good record, promotion can be obtained in the Reserve by further study and examination in accordance with plans which should be made if such a scheme were instituted.
In connection with any correspondence course for officers of the merchant marine a library of standard Navy Department publications should be distributed, or sold. The details of the elaboration of this scheme readily suggest themselves. In order to lend some incentive to merchant marine officers to qualify for commissions in the Naval Reserve, retainer pay as members of the Naval Reserve will be necessary. The lack of complete success of the Naval Militia prior to the allowance of retainer pay was chiefly due to this cause. The writer was Inspector-Instructor of the Naval Militia of Oregon for a period of two years and found that the chief difficulty in securing attendance was the fact that no corresponding punishment, such as loss of pay, could be awarded for nonattendance; in the same manner with the incentive of retainer pay the Naval Reservist will keep up his studies and strive to obtain higher rank with increased retainer pay. Any scheme for augmenting the Naval Reserve which is not based on the individual's effort is bound to meet with failure. There is such a thing as a too paternal attitude which fosters lack of initiative. It will be impracticable for officers of the merchant marine to undertake naval cruises for their education, but it will be entirely practicable to place naval officers on board the larger merchant ships for a month or so for instruction purposes if the navy personnel ever reaches the point where there are sufficient officers to permit a thing of this nature being done.
I am a firm believer in intensive training and do not believe that a man has to do one thing all his lifetime in order to be reasonably proficient at it. Experience in training officers for engineering duty and hundreds of enlisted men for engineering ratings showed that men of intelligence and a reasonable amount of education are much more adaptable and can qualify for their work in a much shorter period of time than could reasonably have been believed possible before the war.
I do not regard it within the proper province of the Navy Department to initiate a supply of raw material for merchant marine officers other
than to lend encouragement to enlisted men of the navy to enter the merchant marine as officers. Agencies, such as the Shipping Board, should be more interested in training officers for the merchant marine. When these officers have been obtained, it will then become a matter of interest to the Navy Department to encourage them to qualify for commissions in the Naval Reserve.
The abolition of the Naval Militia eliminated the only non-professional element from the navy. Originally intended to organize the seafaring element of coastal cities, it succeeded only in organizing young men of no experience into units which received some measure of naval training. Their war experience has made them a valuable reserve. Their nonseagoing officers as well as the non-seagoing officers of the Reserve recruited chiefly from college men, who were intensively trained during the war and who will return to non-seagoing professions, will require different supervision with periodical cruises to keep them from losing the seagoing habit.
Unless a man has served in the navy during the war as officer or enlisted man, has retired or resigned from the navy, or regularly follows the sea as a profession, any effort to educate him for the Reserve will be fraught with the same difficulties which we experienced in attempting to develop a naval militia.