of most value in this respect. The battleship of increased size is therein better suited to strategical purposes because (1) Radius of action at all speeds is greater, due to greater relative fuel capacity. (2) Sustained sea-speed in bad weather is greater because of greater seaworthiness. (3) It has greater "cruising life" due to greater stores. capacity. From strategical considerations, it appears that the larger battleships possess all the advantages. (c) Economic Considerations.-This is the real basis of controversy, i. e., will "larger" or "smaller " ships make the better return on the amount invested? There are many who view with extreme reluctance the expenditure of large and increasing sums on single units of fighting power and bring forward statements in support of their contentions which are not only economic, but tactical; the tactical matters having already been dealt with, the economic considerations will now be taken up. It has been shown that increased cost is not necessarily due to increased size (displacement), i. e., it may be due to higher cost of construction of hull, of armor and especially of compartmentation, of armament, of motive machinery, of fittings and equipment, etc., whether such higher cost of construction be caused by increased labor cost (eight-hour law, better or more intricate workmanship, etc.) or by higher material cost. For instance, if the earlier (and smaller) battleships could have been built with equally good under-water protection, their first cost would have been much greater and the principal economic argument against the battleship of increased size would more obviously lose its seeming force. It is a fact that the battleship of increased size considered as a single unit can be made to (a) Have greater fighting power. (b) Be more resistant by reason of better protection. (c) Have greater mobility both as to high speed and as to radius of action, i. e., it is a better fighting unit. While the original first cost of the larger ship is greater and the cost of upkeep of the single ship may be greater, the matter of the operation and upkeep of the less number of larger ships presents a different aspect, as in this respect they cost less because of (a) Less total number of officers and men to man them. (c) Less total docking, repair and stores cost, and it therefore appears that the total operating and upkeep cost of the less number of larger battleships must be less than the total similar costs in the case of the greater number of smaller battleships. On the other hand, where the fewer larger ships are compared with the greater number of smaller ships, it is found that for the larger ships the damage or loss of a single ship is not only a greater unit loss in the military sense, but it is also a greater money loss; but, the larger ships are more effectively protected against damage. From economic considerations, it appears that the advantages and disadvantages of battleships of increased size, considered together, are ADVANTAGES More powerful units. Less operating and upkeep cost. DISADVANTAGES Greater unit first cost. Greater unit loss risked. Since the total first cost has been assumed to be the same whether larger or smaller battleships are built, it appears that the total operating and upkeep cost of the less number of larger battleships is less, which constitutes a constitutes a decided economical advantage. (d) Legislative Considerations.-An additional consideration which cannot be overlooked, although it may not be as it should be, is the fact that Congress does not use the budget system of making appropriations. "Increase of the navy" is voted by appropriating for certain numbers of vessels of certain types with fixed limit of unit cost, which is usually stated as "exclusive of armor and armament." As Congress is not likely to change its methods of making appropriations, our limited number of vessels should be as powerful as can be built. (e) Summary.-The comparative advantages and disadvantages of numerous battleships of increased size when compared with those of a greater number of smaller battleships, including the bases of equal strength and equal cost, summarize as follows: From the above discussion and summary it appears that a given number of battleships of increased size are of greater tactical and strategical value and of greater economic value than the greater number of “smaller " battleships that can be built for the same amount, or that represent the same total fighting strength. VI. GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS In the course of the foregoing considerations and discussion, the following main points have been developed : The battleships of increased size, considered singly, can carry more fighting power, be protected for more effective. resistance, have higher speed under all conditions, have greater radius of action and greater cruising life. That battleships of increased size, considered together, are of greater tactical value, of greater strategic value, and of greater economic value (because of less maintenance cost). The conclusion that is to be had from the considerations set forth appears to be definitely in favor of the battleship of increased size. DISCUSSION The Naval Reserve After the War (SEE PAGE 2757, WHOLE No. 190) LIEUT. COMMANDER R. R. SMITH, U. S. Navy.-There appears in the Naval Institute Proceedings for December, 1918, an article entitled, "A Plan for Maintaining the Naval Auxiliary Reserve after the War," by Lieutenant Ernest Draper, U. S. N. R. F. The writer's plan for maintaining the Reserve leaves the impression that all officers of the Merchant Marine are to be under the control of the Navy Department under conditions similar to those which obtained during the war. Inasmuch as all of the merchant ships now being manned by officers of the Naval Reserve will revert to the owners or to the Shipping Board, it is difficult to see on what basis such a plan would be successful. In the first place the data furnished relative to the amount of shipping under the control of the Shipping Board, given as ten million tons, is misleading in that very little of this tonnage, at least less than one-half, can ever be permanently under the direct control of the Shipping Board. This ten million tons includes the Dutch ships which were taken over and which must be returned, German and Austrian interned ships whose status is not as yet settled, and all privately-owned vessels belonging to the railroad and shipping lines which must be returned to their owners. Practically every officer in the navy who has given the matter any thought recognizes the need for a very strong Naval Reserve after the war. The Shipping Board is already undertaking considerable work in preparing civilians for seafaring life by establishing training ships and schools. The augmentation of the merchant marine personnel must, of necessity, be undertaken by the owners or controllers of the ships and not by the navy. It is hardly probable that the navy could run these ships on a commercial basis and it is not desirable that the navy should pervert its military activities and training to commercial channels. To establish a Reserve we must approach the matter from an entirely different angle. I believe that the first requisite of an officer of the Naval Reserve is a good record in the merchant marine. It is entirely feasible to establish a correspondence course for these officers extending over a period of not less than one year; divide the work in such small portions that it will not become burdensome, and into at least twelve sections requiring some work during every month. I have discussed this idea with a number of merchant marine officers who stated that they would welcome such instruction as they could do the work at sea. There is no |