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that is, one of 800 tons, took originally 24 months; one later, 30 months or more. The smaller boats of from 127-267 tons were at times completed in 13 months.

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"During 1917, 83 were added and 66 lost.

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During 1917, Germany had 126 fighting U-boats, and in October 146, in February, 1918, 136, and in June, 1918, 113. It must be observed that of fighting boats only a small percentage had actually been 'at the front. In January, 1917, when conditions were more favorable, there were, for instance, 12 per cent at the front,' 30 per cent in harbor, 38 per cent were making trials, being repaired, etc., and 20 per cent were disarmed. During the years of war, the U-boats ran down badly. The crews had often all too short a time for training and had no longer confidence in their weapon. It can thus be explained that there was of late but little desire for the dangerous service, and all the more so, as our world-experienced seamen saw and acknowledged how futile was all their sacrifice.

"The same was the case with the High Sea Fleet. Its crew knew, when orders were given early in November to run out, that, with the small number of vessels, it meant the same as a useless sacrifice of countless precious lives.

"When there was question of battle, they demurred, and every sensible person will be grateful to them for this. By their action they rendered their people an inestimable service on the fifth of November."

WHAT WILL BECOME OF OUR NAVAL OFFICERS? This is a question which is asked not only by naval officers themselves, but by many of our people.

Almost our entire fleet, and all of our submarines, are in the hands of our enemies, and our only hope is that, when peace is concluded, they may be so generous as to give back to us a part at least of our navy. Even if we should have the good fortune to recover the whole, the financial situation of our country would not be such as to permit the maintenance of as large a navy as we had before the war. The idea of demobilization entertained by our enemies in the first flush of victory, but which will not be feasible for some years to come, need not be taken into consideration. The fact with which we have to reckon is that it is more than probable that at least one-half of our naval officers will enter other professions. Among them are many elderly men, to whom the taking up of an entirely new calling is bound to be most difficult, but who, nevertheless, since they have families dependent upon them, will be obliged to seek a new source of income. Those to whom work is necessary must be distinguished from those who have adequate private means.

The next question to be considered is, for what form of employment the officers will be best fitted.

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The three and a half years' instruction of the naval officer, and his later essentially practical experience, would make it seem that he is especially fitted for a practical calling. A nautical education produces a nautical "point of view" which may be called in general a practical point of view." His knowledge of navigation is founded on an extensive knowledge of mathematics and natural science. In addition, the always increasingly complicated equipment and weapons of our warships, necessitate a fairly exact knowledge of various technical branches on the part of naval officers: for instance, fine mechanics and electro-technique. To these more special forms of knowledge is added the experience in organization, common to all officers, which often qualifies them to take the leadership in various branches of work. But especially valuable is the comprehensive grasp of affairs, which so many naval officers acquire from their voyages to foreign countries.

For what province, then, in the economic life of the nation is the naval officer best fitted? It is true, that the merchant fleets of the world lack efficient seamen, but not the German merchant fleet, the greater part of which we have already lost, the fate of the remainder being undecided until after the conclusion of peace. Moreover, the losses during the war, among merchant marine officers, were less than the losses in ships. Therefore, in this domain, also, loss of occupation is threatened, and, what would otherwise be so suitable a berth for the naval officer, is out of the question.

In a national air merchant service, which must come if we wish to profit by the immense progress made, during the war, in aviation, there would be great possibilities for employment. Here, the naval officer, with his knowledge of navigation, his nautical and technical knowledge, would be of the greatest use; the officers of the army flying corps would be also well fitted for the same calling. Such an organization, would offer great opportunities for employment, not only to naval officers, but to the active under officers of the navy as well. Finally, for elderly officers, who are unfitted for the more dangerous business of the service, there would be open a number of other branches. There would be positions for directors of different kinds of technical work to be filled, especially in the domain of wireless telegraphy, in which the majority of naval officers are particularly well grounded. For the younger officers, there would be an equal number of openings. Naval officers with a knowledge of languages could be employed with advantage in foreign countries, as commercial agents.

Finally, after this tremendous war, there will be many naval officers who will be in need of rest and quiet, and these should be given pecuniary assistance by the government, and allowed to form colonies on the crown or other government lands. Thus many a seaman would have, his own bit of earth to care for.

At any rate, something must be done quickly. In order that everything may be in readiness, it is the duty of a grateful government to come forward with adequate remuneration for the courageous submarine crews and sailors of the entire fleet, who for four long years have cheerfully performed their dangerous and arduous service in our behalf.

The question remains, of how these ideas may best be made to materialize. It would seem most appropriate that the selection of positions should be a part of the duties of the secretary for demobilization, under whom should be a department for the promotion of the air merchant service, which would be managed to the best advantage by army and navy authorities in aviation. Besides the individual departments, there would be a central department having to do directly with applications for employment or for discharge from the navy. All this must be called into being quickly before it is too late. That is our duty to our naval heroes.The German Press.

GERMANY'S NAVAL DEBACLE.-From the accounts which have appeared of the visit of the Allied Naval Commission to Germany, the state of demoralization into which the German fleet had fallen after the battle of Jutland becomes abundantly manifest. A member of the commission who has supplied an account of his visit to the Times quotes a German naval officer's views upon this subject. For what they may be worth the opinions of this officer indicate that even before the battle of Jutland was fought the Germans had given up hope of successfully fighting a battle with the Grand Fleet. In the newer ships methods of protection both against gunfire and underwater attack had been carried out so thoroughly and systematically as to make the ships almost uninhabitable. It was known, of course, even before the war, that the German officers of all the grades below a commander were provided with what in the British service would be considered insufficient cabin accommodation, but it is now evi

dent that the crews of the ships for the great part lived ashore, and only spent a small portion of their time aboard the vessels.

The German officer assured one of the inspection parties that their ships were made "to fight, not to live in," and this is now proved to be literally the truth. It makes clear also why the German sailors protested against the conditions of living on board the interned ships at Scapa Flow. The internal construction and cramped conditions of habitability in the German ships is further proof, if proof were needed, that the Germans as a nation have not been capable of producing a seafaring community in sufficient numbers to fulfil the demands of their navy. The class of German seamen that manned the Emden and her sister ships and the vessels of Von Spee's squadron and the other craft which fought well in the Bight and in the earlier actions of the war, was exhausted by the disasters which fell upon, the fleet at that period. After that the men, who lived in barracks at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel and only spent short spells on board the vessels, were neither real seamen nor had the makings of them. To these men the battle of Jutland was an eye-opener and exploded all the pretty tales they had been told by their officers about the invulnerability and invincibility of their ships. After that they could only be driven or inveigled into putting themselves within risk of an engagement with the British vessels. The morale of the German Navy had been broken, and it was only a question of time when the men would revolt.

The inspection of the German ports and shipbuilding yards by the Allied Naval Commission appears to have been most thorough and complete. The passage of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal from Brunsbittel to Kiel by the Hercules and her attendant destroyers, the Verdun and Viceroy, was an historic event. Not only were the ships in harbor which are being dismantled and the building establishments visited as well as the extremely interesting experimental stations at Warnemunde, but also the air stations on the islands in the Bight and elsewhere. The Nordholz Zeppelin station was said to be beyond comparison the finest in the world, while the Nordeney seaplane station was reported as comparing most favorably with anything of the kind in France or England. It is not clear from the reports which have been published whether the investigators were given a sight of the instruments which the Germans used for gunnery control. All these instruments had been removed from the ships, but the British observers arrived at the conclusion that the German control of fire was as simple as it was efficient in the opening stages of action, and the fact that it deteriorated later on was probably due to human rather than mechanical failure. Once the control failed, the extreme nicety with which their guns had been calibrated was a disadvantage, for the projectiles from a broadside were so bunched together that very small errors in range or direction left the target untouched altogether. One other point in this connection it is well to note. The report states that " there is no reason to believe that they had anything better than the British for laying down the rate of change' and keeping the enemy under fire once he had been straddled."

With regard to the battle of Jutland, it is well to get a German point of view, but it is equally evident that the officer whose observations have been reported was not well informed on certain points. What he actually saw he could speak to, but otherwise his statements are largely speculative. He says, for example, that it was the knowledge in England that the German ships were putting to sea which brought the Grand Fleet out. This is not the case; the meeting was purely fortuitous. On the other hand, when he says that another hour of daylight would have finished the German fleet, he is indubitably correct. So also he is probably as near to the truth as possible when he says our final escape was partly due to skilful handling, but more to the good luck which had been with us from the first. We passed the stern of the English fleet in the darkness." It is entirely credible also that the High Seas Fleet would never have allowed

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itself to be drawn into action with Jellicoe's force if Admiral Scheer had known from aerial observation how near he was to the risk of a decisive action. Incidentally it was shown during the visit of the commission that a complete state of indiscipline and disorganization characterized what was left of the German Navy, both personnel and material.-Army and Navy Gazette, 18/1.

GERMAN NAVY'S DEGRADATION.-Everywhere the crews of German warships have relapsed into a state of complete indiscipline. Men drift away according to their individual inclination. The delegates of the Workmen's Councils have practically no control over the men, though the commissioned officers are compelled to salute them. All the ships in German ports have been allowed to get into a condition of unspeakable filth and disorder. Even the Mackensen, the latest German battle cruiser, which is not yet completed, is in a perfectly appalling state of filth, and is an offence to the nostrils even at a considerable distance.

The ships which were handed over and are now at Scapa Flow are much in the same condition. The Baden, the latest German battleship, has now arrived there. The crews of these German ships show a very decided disinclination to do any work whatever. Every order that is given to them has to be transmitted through the Workmen's Council, of which there are as many as three in large battleships. When the orders are transmitted in this way they are usually completely ignored by the men; though it has to be said that, in the case of the ships at Scapa Flow, the discipline there varies greatly as between different ships. There was a good deal of difficulty in getting these German ships up to Scapa Flow. They were very short in lubricating oil, and the disinclination of the engine-room to do a fair share of work was very marked. The result was that, though 12 knots was the set speed, the German ships were unable to keep it.

Allied naval commissioners have been supervising demobilization in German ports. They report an almost incredible amount of disorganization. Small mine-sweeping vessels, for instance, are apt to constitute themselves at any minute independent commands and to go off on errands of their own. There is now abundant evidence that the officers and responsible command of the German High Sea Fleet fully intended to come out to fight the Grand Fleet; but that the crews were quite resolved not to take the risk, and that the order to come out and engage the British fleet precipitated the revolution.-London Times.

ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY-SUMMARY OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR CARRYING OUT NAVAL TERMS.-Introductory Note.-In spite of the fact that this article will be two months old at the time of its publication, it is, nevertheless, believed that it may possess a historic value that will render it of interest to the service at large.

As a result of conference held on board His Majesty's ship, Queen Elizabeth, on 15th and 16th November, 1918, at which Rear Admiral Hugo Meurer attended as representative of the commander-in-chief, High Sea Fleet, it has been decided that arrangements should be made and action taken as stated below for the purpose of carrying into effect the articles quoted of the terms of armistice:

Article XX.-Admiral Meurer undertakes to communicate to the commander-in-chief, Grand Fleet, as soon as possible, full details as to the location of all ships of the German Navy, other than those included in the list already forwarded.

He undertakes to ensure that notification to neutrals as to freedom of navigation in all territorial waters, as required by Article XX, shall be made immediately on his return to Germany.

Article XXIII.-Admiral Meurer is informed as follows:

(a) It is necessary that the ships should first proceed to an anchorage in the Firth of Forth, but outside the precincts of the port. This is to

allow for examination and for embarkation of the British navigating parties who are required in order to ensure the vessels being safely passed through the British mine fields en route to port of internment.

(b) The rendezvous will be a position 40 miles 90° from May Island, the leading ship being in that position at 8:00 a. m. on Thursday, 21st November, 1918.

(c) German ships are to be formed up as follows:

(1) Heavy ships in single line ahead in close order three cables apart, with the battle cruisers leading.

(2) Light cruisers in single line ahead, three cables apart, the leading light cruiser three miles astern of the rear battleship.

(3) Destroyers to be in five groups three miles astern of the rear light cruiser.

(f) A sufficient force will meet the German ships and escort them to the anchorage, a plan of which has been given to Admiral Meurer.

Sufficient notice will be given by the commander-in-chief, Grand Fleet, to the German naval command of the date on which transports will be required to repatriate the crews and the place to which they should be

sent.

Admiral Meurer states that Konig will not be ready to sail for three weeks, and that Dresden also is not ready. He is informed that Konig should sail in three weeks' time with Dresden in company. If Dresden is not ready to accompany Konig, Konigsberg is to take her place for internment.

It is noted that Karlsruhe will be interned instead of Wiesbaden.

Rear Admiral Meurer is requested to furnish a complete list of those surface warships of the German Navy, including river craft and auxiliary vessels, not specified for internment, and on which his information is at present incomplete.

Admiral Meurer is requested to arrange forthwith that Baden and three ships of the First Battle Squadron shall be based at Kiel, and the other four ships of the First Battle Squadron at Wilhelmshaven.

The light cruisers not required for internment shall remain where they are at present, pending further decision as to their disposal.

Should the German Naval Command desire to move a ship temporarily to facilitate demobilization, previous sanction must be obtained from the commander-in-chief of the Grand Fleet.

As regards these warships, Admiral Meurer states that German authorities desire to retain as many men on board as possible, after the ships have been disarmed, on account of the grave difficulty which exists in providing housing accommodation for large numbers of seamen at the German naval bases under present circumstances.

The commander-in-chief, Grand Fleet, will take up this question and communicate the decision of the Allies and United States to the German Naval Command.

Article XXV.-Admiral Meurer reports that sweeping up of mines in entrances to the Baltic is being commenced at once, and he undertakes to use every endeavor to ensure that the forts, fortifications, batteries and defence works shall be rendered ineffective at the earliest possible moment to the satisfaction of the Allied and United States Naval Commission.

Under these circumstances the Allies and the United States are prepared to refrain for the present from exercising the right granted by this article of occupying the forts, fortifications, batteries and defence works. Articles XXVI and XXVII.-Admiral Meurer's written statement is satisfactory.

Article XXX.-Admiral Meurer undertakes to furnish the particulars required.

Article XXXII.—Admiral Meurer is requested to ensure that the notification required by this article is issued at the earliest possible moment.26/11/1918.

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