Battery, sixteen 12-inch 35-caliber guns. Four 4-gun turrets, with 2-inch sides, 3-inch fronts. No other armor, no armored decks. Oil supply, normal, 2000 tons. There would be no torpedo outfit and no secondary battery. These would appear to be out of place on a vessel of this character. The latter, for use against light craft, is replaced by the light 12-inch battery, and, if desired, there could be supplied for this purpose a thin-walled projectile of about half the standard weight. Needless to say, a vessel of this kind requires good visibility to develop its full usefulness against capital ships, though it should be within the limits of possibility to develop means of controlling the fire, somewhat in the same way as fire control is practiced ashore. This could probably only be done to a limited extent and under favorable circumstances. Thus, for instance, the battleships being engaged at shorter range, they might have a special fire control party to spot for the cruisers. Many other methods, more or less undeveloped, might be suggested, but of course good visibility makes these vessels independent, which is a great advantage. A partial range table for the gun described may be interesting: It will be seen that the angle of elevation has great relative intervals, so that errors in pointing will have correspondingly small effect, and so will differences in jump, roll of the ship, and other causes of dispersion. As is well known, at long ranges the dispersion in range decreases, so that, given good fire control, the vessel ought to make good practice at these ranges. At any rate, even if no more than 1 per cent of this is attained, the result, before the allowance is exhausted, would be 48 hits with 12-inch shell, most of them striking on the armored deck of the enemy, under conditions that would make complete penetration of the deck and explosion within the vital spaces nearly certain. It is not by any means intended to convey the idea that the cruiser described can take the place of the battleship, or that, if such vessels were built, the battleship would become unnecessary. The latter must always remain as the one vessel which, under any conditions of weather, can successfully stand up and fight any surface vessel of the enemy, provided only that she can come within range. The cruiser described, being an amalgamation of the scout cruiser and battle cruiser types, will do the necessary scouting and screen work of these types, and will finally, on the great day of battle, when all the forces possible must be made available, be ready to take her place in the line and fight the enemy battleships, after having, in all probability, been previously used to bring the enemy to action, by destroying his screen, his auxiliaries, in fact, by delaying the battleships themselves, on account of the tremendous fire they must receive without adequate return fire, until they turn to defend themselves. No success is however possible without the battleships, which alone can sustain action at close range and prevent the enemy from breaking through. The battleship is the only vessel that can never be caught at a disadvantage, assuming equal numbers, as long as she can get within sufficiently close range. The cruiser, on the other hand, must not be caught at close quarters, and must choose her conditions. These circumstances might be construed into a great handicap for the cruiser, and indeed they are so; but is it not the province of strategy to overcome such difficulties, to choose conditions favorable to oneself, and, if possible at the same time, unfavorable to the enemy? The numbers of these vessels that might be required would be determined on the basis of their use as scouts, and would be quite large. The use of these vessels against capital ships might even be considered incidental, yet we would have the satisfaction of knowing that, when action is joined, they would not be an encumbrance, they would not need protection, their crews would be fighting men instead of non-combatants, the money invested in them would not be an extra outlay for special purposes only, but would become actually available in action; in short, we would realize in one more type of vessel the kind of fleet efficiency and economy desired. [COPYRIGHTED] U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD. MISSION OF AIRCRAFT WITH THE FLEET The following is an attempt to point out the importance of aircraft for the navy, and to discuss briefly the duties which they can perform. After some experience, both at home and abroad, I have been struck with the suspicion, and, in some cases, downright antagonism, with which some officers and others in authority among the Allied nations regard all naval aviation. This has been carried to an extent which has seriously handicapped the flying personnel in carrying out duties outlined below; both because of failure to supply material and personnel, and also a general restriction of all aerial operations. A great many officers who are far-seeing and progressive believe in the future of aviation, but they have only the haziest ideas as to what aircraft should and can, do. Aircraft, due mainly to the reliability of the present-day motor and their large cruising radius, have now reached a point. where, with skilled personnel, they can carry out all the duties outlined below. Any fleet which has a number of aircraft squadrons will have a tremendous advantage over one which is not so equipped. We must get carriers in our fleet and aircraft bases at strategical points or we will invite disaster when the next crisis comes. The following duties, in order of importance, are those which should be performed by naval aircraft: I. Bombing enemy's men-of-war and bases. Shooting up bridges, tops, balloons, etc., with cannon and machineguns. Attack with torpedo-planes. II. Protection of own fleet from hostile aircraft. III. Scouting. IV. Reporting on movements of enemy over smoke screens, in low visibility and over the horizon. V. Detecting mine-fields, torpedoes and submarines. VII. Escort. I. BOMBING ENEMY'S MEN-OF-WAR AND BASES All offensive action must be carried on by heavier-than-air craft until a practical non-inflammable gas is in use for lighter-thanair craft. At present, dirigibles are easy targets, as one in U. S. N. "H-16" BOAT, SHOWING "ALL AROUND" ARC OF FIRE WITH FOUR SEPARATE GUN MOUNTS. ONE, TWO OR THREE GUNS CAN BE MOUNTED ON EACH. cendiary bullet will set them in flames. They must keep away from hostile aircraft. Offensive action against surface craft was not of much use in the war, but will become increasingly important, and, it is believed, to an extent that will revolutionize the construction of men-of-war. The reasons for the limited number of successful air attacks on vessels were: Lack of opportunity, small size of bombs, poor bomb sights, untrained bombers, insufficient number of planes and material, and a poor development of aerial strategy and tactics. Some good work was done against submarines, and one R. A. F. Squadron (No. 217) sank at least two German destroyers, using DH, and only 230-pound bombs. A Handley Page Squadron (No. 214) that was operating from our aerodrome at St. Inglevert was dropping 1650-pound bombs. They were loaded with about 1100 pounds of T.N.T., as against only 29 pounds for 14-inch A.P. shell. If heavy bombs were made U. S. N. NON-RIGID COASTAL DIRIGIBLE, SHOWING ONE BOMB ON SIDE OF CAR. armor-piercing, they would sink any but capital ships and undoubtedly put dreadnoughts out of action. Bombing campaigns would be carried out by large bombers, such as Handley Page, getting off a large flush deck carrier; by two-seaters, such as DH,, also operating from a carrier; and by large seaplanes hoisted overboard from a carrier. Of course, any type could operate from a shore base if the enemy were within their cruising radius. Shore bases, while necessary for supplying material, repair, etc., and for protection of the coast, |