offenders against the laws of the state, and sentencing them to an industrial school of this description; but questions have been raised as to the constitutionality of those provisions granting the power to the court or judge, without a jury trial, of sentencing incorrigible girls, or those without suitable parents or guardians to such school; and granting the power to the Board of Control to determine the length of the restraint in each case; and to the absence of a requirement in the statute compelling notice to be given to the parents or guardians; and to that provision making each county liable for the expense attending the safe keeping, care, maintenance and instruction of those girls sent from its jurisdiction. All of these points have been passed upon in the cases above cited, and declared to be constitutional, except that provision of the act making counties liable for the expense attending the inmates sent from them. Section 1, article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Colorado gives the Legislature ample power to provide for and protect this class of persons. It has been repeatedly held by the courts that the Legislature may make such disposition of the county revenues as it may deem proper. 4 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 350, 371. Beach on Public Corporations, section 723. People vs. Powers, 25 Ill., 169. Sangamon Co. vs. Springfield, 63 Ill., 66. Marion Co. vs. Lear, 108 Ill., 343. In my opinion, the case of Williamson vs. The Board of· County Commissioners of Arapahoe County, 23 Colo., 87, not only settles this latter question in the affirmative, but also practically sustains the constitutionality of the entire law under discussion. In the Williamson case a writ of error issued from the Supreme Court to review the action of the County Court in refusing an application for an order to be made sending William T. House to the Keeley Institute at Denver at the expense of the county in accordance with the provisions of chapter 74 of the laws of 1895. The County Court denied the order solely upon the ground that the act was unconstitutional; the contention of the defendant in error being that it was in conflict with section 34, article V; section 35, article V; section 1, article VIII; section 1, article XI, and section 2, article XI of the Constitution of the State of Colorado; thus embodying most of the grounds urged against the constitutionality of the act in regard to the State Industrial School for Girls. The court held, in brief, that legislative enactments, the object of which is to provide for the comfort and well-being of such persons as by reason of infancy, defective understanding, or other misfortune or infirmity, are unable to properly care for themselves, are not to be interfered with, unless some constitutional limitation plainly and unequivocally requires it, and that we have no such constitutional provision. And that the constitutional provision that no appropriation shall be made for charitable, industrial, educational or benevolent purposes, to any person, corporation or community, not、 under the absolute control of the State, has reference to State money only, and does not inhibit the Legislature from conferring upon counties the power to use county funds for the treatment and cure of their indigent inebriates, as provided by the act of 1895. The only question remaining, therefore, is whether the Legislature intended counties to be held liable for the fifty cents per day for each girl therefrom, as provided for by section 1, Session Laws of 1899, page 351, while said girl is on parole from the Industrial School. While the act of 1903, cited in full, supra, specifically states that the expense attending the safe keeping, care, maintenance and instruction of such girls, until they have been finally discharged by the board of control, shall be paid by the county at the rate of fifty cents per day for each girl, I do not think this amendment in any manner changed the intention of the former law, but simply affirmed in clearer language the law already existing. It will be noticed by a careful reading of the entire law that no other provision has been made for the expense attending the safe keeping, care, maintenance and instruction of such girls; and while it is true that when on parole they are probably selfsupporting in most instances, the officers must be paid for keeping a supervisory care and control over them; and if it should occur, which is possible, that all the girls sent to such school be out on parole, the institution would be left without any funds with which to pay its officers or carry on its business, a condition certainly never intended by the Legislature. However, I do not think any forced construction is necessary to be given either section 14 of the act of 1887, supra, section 6 of the act of 1897, supra, or section 1 of the act of 1899, supra, to clearly show the intention of the different Legislatures to make the several counties liable for the expense attending the commitment of girls to the Industrial School from the date of their commitment to the date of their discharge from said school, and the act of 1899, supra, simply fixed the amount of compensation to be paid. And in my opinion any other construction would cer tainly be a forced one, and not in harmony with the general purpose and tenor of this law. Respectfully submitted, N. C. MILLER, By I. B. MELVILLE, DISABLED INMATE OF INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL. Where inmate of Industrial School becomes disabled, so that he can not earn his own living, he should be returned to his parents, who are obliged, under the law, to support him. He is not a charge upon the county in which the institution is situated. Denver, Colo., February 1, 1904. MR. FRED L. PADDELFORD, Superintendent State Industrial School, Golden, Colo. Dear Sir-I am in receipt of your letter of January 26, and in reply will say: From your letter it appears that: "One George Merritt was sentenced to this school by the district judge of the county in which Cheyenne is situated, and was received at this school March 2, 1898. In 1899 he was injured by the caving in of a root cellar that he and some other boys were digging under the supervision of an officer. His spine was injured so badly that he has ever since been unable to do any work, and one ankle and foot have been constantly in a bad state. In short, he will never be able to do any work to support himself. "His time expired September 2, 1903, since which time he has been kept at the school and cared for as before. His mother and stepfather refused to receive him unless 'he were able to make his own living.' "The Board of Control has instructed me to seek your advice concerning the proper disposition of the case. The young man ought not to be kept with the other boys because his presence has a demoralizing effect upon their conduct and welfare. His physical condition precludes a forcible compulsion of obedience in his case, though his disobedience consists more in using vulgar and reckless language when alone with other boys than in anything else." You ask, first: "Should he be returned to the county from which he was received; and if so, to whom?" Second: "Or is he properly a charge upon the county in which this school is situated?" The State Industrial School is a place of detention for boys who are found guilty under the age of sixteen years of violating some statute or law of the State. It is a penal institution. The boy's home remains in the county from which he was sentenced. He should be returned to the county from which he was received, and to his parents in that county. Specifically, I would advise you to direct some officer of your institution to take and convey him to his home and there leave him. His parents must, under the law, support him. Second. In reply to the second proposition, I would say that he is not a charge upon the county in which the school is situated. If the boy is entitled to indemnity for the injury suffered by him, that is a matter for the Legislature to solve. The State Industrial School is not a place of detention for cripples or poor persons. It is a penal institution. Our State seems to have no place for the detention and care of cripples who are poor. Yours respectfully, N. C. MILLER, Attorney General. RE-INSURANCE. Denver, Colo., June 18, 1903. HON. FRANK TESCH, Deputy Superintendent Insurance, State Capitol. Dear Sir-In reply to yours of the 17th inst., in reference to the construction of section 2, chapter 127 of the Session Laws of 1899, I would say that I think your construction of that section is correct, and that you have no power to rule that any fire insurance company can re-insure the whole or any part of a risk taken out on property in this State in any other company not authorized to do business in this State. The papers submitted with your letter are herewith returned. Yours truly, N. C. MILLER, INSURANCE-LOCAL ADVISERS. Local advisers, so called, should be required to take out a license. Local advisers' contracts, so-called, are not in violation of the law so long as they are made use of in accordance with their express terms. Denver, Colo., March 12, 1904. HON. FRANK S. TESCH, Deputy Superintendent of Insurance, State Capitol. Dear Sir-I am in receipt of your communication of January 22, 1904, in regard to complaints having been made to your department that certain life insurance companies doing business in. this State are violating the provisions of section 2232 of Mills' Annotated Statutes in appointing and issuing policies of insurance to so-called "local advisers," and asking an opinion from this office as to whether or not this manner of doing business is in violation of said section, and if so, in what the violation consists; or, if not in violation of said section, should such advisers be required to take out a license in accordance with the provisions of section 2216 of Mills' Annotated Statutes? I also received from you copies of the application for appointment as "local adviser," the contract made with the adviser, the policy issued to him, the inquiries made of the adviser concerning applicants for insurance, and the typewritten estimate of results as used by The Security Trust and Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia, which I am informed is practically the same as those of all other companies in this State having this system in vogue. In accordance with your suggestion a hearing, after due notice, was given to the representatives of the different insurance companies, together with their attorneys, at my office on the 29th ult., in order that the facts and the rulings of the Attorneys General and the courts of other states might be fairly presented by both parties to the controversy. The application for appointment as special adviser is, in substance, that the applicant agrees to assist the said company by furnishing confidential information in regard to the characand habits of prospective applicants for insurance, or re-instatement, and also such information coming to the adviser's knowledge as may tend to protect the company from false or fraudu lent claims. It is further specially stipulated that the special |