These two acts are inconsistent with each other in so far as the manner of the execution of the patent is concerned. The patent submitted to me by you for my opinion is executed in accordance with the requirements of the latter of these two acts, namely, section 2 of the act approved April 11, 1891, above quoted. In my opinion, the act approved April 11, 1891, being the later of the two acts, repeals, so far as it is inconsistent with it, the former of the two acts, namely, the act approved April 1st, 1891. And in this connection, I would call your attention to section 4 of the act approved April 11, 1891, which expressly repeals all acts and parts of acts in conflict therewith. While repeals by implication are not favored, our Supreme Court has held in common with other courts that, of two acts of the legislative assembly on the same subject, which are repugnant to each other, the last should be regarded as repealing the first; and this is especially true when the act contains a clause repealing all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with it. Purmort vs. Tucker L. Co., 2 Colo., 470, 472. See, also, Keese vs. City of Denver, 10 Colo., 112, 121-122. I am, therefore, of the opinion that Patent No. 1188, to Lewis C. Olmstead, signed by the Governor, attested by the Secretary of State, with the great seal of the State of Colorado thereto affixed, is executed in full compliance with our statute. Yours respectfully, N. C. MILLER, Attorney General. By HENRY J. HERSEY, STATE BOARD OF HEALTH. Statute providing for emergency appropriation. Construction of section 3546 of the third volume of Mills' Annotated Statutes, in relation to permanent appropriation to meet emergency. Held, that this appropriation is available whenever the emergency is declared to exist, but once exhausted it is terminated. Denver, Colo., September 8, 1903. HON. JOHN A. HOLMBERG, Auditor of State, State Capitol. Dear Sir-The Governor has entered an order declaring that in his opinion it is necessary to draw from the general fund, on the warrant of the Auditor, a sum not to exceed $1,500 during the present fiscal year, out of the $5,000 appropriated under section 3546a of the 3d volume of Mills' Annotated Statutes. The matter has been referred to this office for an opinion as to whether the funds are available as of the first class or otherwise. I refer you to the opinion of Attorney General Charles C. Post, found at page 33 of the Attorney General's Report, 19011902, where he holds that an appropriation of $4,000 under a similar act of the Legislature is to be treated as of the first class. In this construction I agree with him, because it would be utterly useless for the Legislature to make an appropriation for an emergency and then to have it treated as of the fourth or fifth class, and thus render it unavailable in case of a deficiency in revenues. An emergency appropriation is an appropriation made for the executive department to meet a present condition. Further, the Legislature has the right to appropriate a given sum for the maintenance of one of the departments of the State, and then, in addition, say that a certain other sum is available for the further operation of that department in case of an emergency. The nature of the emergency provided for in this instance makes it very important that the money should be expended during periods of time when there is striking need for it. If any of the funds belonging to the Health Department are to be paid as of the first class, in my judgment, the emergency fund is of that class. In relation to that part of Attorney General Post's opinion in which he holds that no part of the emergency fund is to be used to defray the ordinary expenses of the Health Department, I have to say that this is clearly correct where the Legislature has made an appropriation for the continuation and operation of the department in its ordinary way. But where an emergency exists, and the declaration of this is solely a matter with the executive, as in the case under consideration, and the declaration has been made by the Governor, then the manner in which the fund can be used to prevent the introduction or spread of a particular disease dangerous to public health, is under the control of the department, and if the first expenditure is to be made to maintain the department in order to deal with the disease, then the money is properly applicable to the payment of the ordinary expenses of the board to act promptly and effi ciently, and if the very existence of the board at the time is dependent upon the fund, then it is as properly applicable to the payment of its ordinary expenses as to the employment of outside help; indeed, the employment of outside help can not be made unless the board is in practical working existence. I, therefore, see no objection to the payment of the sum of $1,500 during the present fiscal year, and the maintenance of this department as a means of preventing the spread of the epidemic threatened; and that it should be paid as of the first class. Yours respectfully, N. C. MILLER, Attorney General. STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS. State Medical Board has no authority to decline to issue a certifi cate on the ground of immorality. Denver, Colo., October 24, 1903. DR. S. D. VAN METER, Secretary State Board of Medical Examiners, Denver, Colo. Dear Sir-I am in receipt of your letter of October 20, asking for an opinion on the following: First. "As to whether we have any right, on general principle, to refuse an applicant for medical license on the ground of gross immorality or confirmed morphinism." By reference to sections 3550 and 3556, Mills' Annotated Statutes, I am of the opinion that the board has limited authority to decline to issue a certificate on the grounds of immorality. Where the licensee has been convicted of a crime the certificate may be revoked. Where an applicant has been convicted of crime it may be refused. I do not see any other ground for refusing this certificate. It would appear necessary to convict a licensee or applicant of some crime of malpractice before a license could be revoked or refused. Second. "Whether we can revoke a license granted upon the acceptance of affidavits subsequently found to be fraudu lent." If the affidavits were material to the granting of the license its issuance was procured by fraud, and you will have a right to revoke it. Third. It seems that a case is pending in the district court, entitled State vs. Hagenburger, and its dismissal has been under consideration by the district attorney of the City and County of Denver and the State Board of Medical Examiners. Either body being anxious to avoid the final decision in the premises, the following resolution was passed: "Be it resolved that the board's action in the case be governed by the advice of the Attorney General.” In reference to this resolution I must say that I must decline to act. The district attorney is the one to act in this matter, and the decision of the point raised by a request for a dismissal is always founded on so many considerations that this office could not pass upon it in the abstract, and has not time to enter into the full consideration of all the matters and things that might be submitted for the purpose of forming a just judgment in the premises. Respectfully submitted, N. C. MILLER, By H. J. HERSEY, TRANSFER OF INMATES FROM REFORMATORY TO STATE PENITENTIARY. An inmate of the Reformatory can be transferred to the Penitentiary, in accordance with provision of M. A. S., 4157. Inmate, while on parole, can be prosecuted for offense committed prior to his sentence, and a parole prisoner can not be recalled while under an indictment. M. A. S., 4157, providing for transfer to Penitentiary, should be considered constitutional. Denver, Colo., November 20, 1903. MR. A. C. DUTCHER, Warden Colorado State Reformatory, Buena Vista, Colorado. Dear Sir-In reply to your request on the following points, I beg to say: "1. Can an inmate of this institution be transferred to the Penitentiary by the management for any cause? If so, what?" Persons coming within the provisions of section 4157, Mills' Annotated Statutes. "2. Can a prisoner of this institution who is out on parole be prosecuted for an offense which was committed prior to his sentence to this institution?" If the offense has not been outlawed under the Statute of Limitations he can be prosecuted. "3. Under what conditions, if any, can the management of this institution take a prisoner who is out on parole, from any civil officer who has such person under arrest for some offense committed while on parole?" The answer to question three depends upon the circumstances of each case. If he is under the control of the district court, under indictment, you can not take him away from that court. If some civil officer holds him under process, in almost every case I can conceive of you will have a right to demand him under your mittimus, but you can not interfere with the processes of the district court. In relation to section 4157, I will state that I am of the opinion that the statute is not unconstitutional. There may be some possibility of a mistake, but I would advise you to proceed as though it were constitutional, and, if any prisoner wishes to test it, he can get the decision of the court on it. I would advise |