or parties' in proceedings in bankruptcy when necessary for the complete determination of a matter in controversy; (7) cause the estates of bankrupts to be collected, reduced to money and distributed, and determine controversies in relation thereto, except as herein otherwise provided; (8) close estates, whenever it appears that they have been fully administered, by approving the final accounts3 and discharging the trustees, and reopen them whenever it

4

1The bankrupt, the trustee and all his creditors wherever they reside or whether they have been individually served with notice are considered "parties." They are subject to the jurisdiction of the court, and are bound by its proceedings unless exempted by a special provision of law (Marsh v. Armstrong, 20 Minn. 81; s. c. II B. R. 125; Crocker v. Crocker [C. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 706), though testamentary trustees may also be made parties (in re Boudouine [D. C.], 96 Fed. Rep. 538). Unless they voluntarily appear or are brought in by the service of process, all persons other than the bankrupt, his creditors and the trustees are strangers to the proceeding, and an order of the court cannot affect their rights (Marshall v. Knox, 16 Wall. 551; s. c. 8 B R. 97). Nor can strangers to the bankrupt proceedings be summarily brought into court by the filing of a petition for that purpose (Marshall v. Knox, 16 Wall. 551; s. c. 8 B. R. 97; Smith v. Mason, 14 Wall. 419; s. c. 6 B. R. 1; in re Buntrock Clothing Co. 1 N. B. News, 228; s. c. 92 Fed. Rep. 886). They are entitled to an adjudication of their rights within the jurisdiction where the bankrupt, before the filing of the petition, might have brought or prosecuted the proceedings (See $23). The court of bankruptcy has power to hear and determine all questions pertaining to the estate of the bankrupt, and if strangers voluntarily appear the court thereby acquires jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the persons (Samson v Blake, 9 Blatch. 379; s. c. 6 B. R. 410). After the court once acquires jurisdiction of the person of a stranger, he cannot thereafter withdraw his appearance or except to the court's jurisdiction (In re Ulrich, 3 B. R. 133; s. c. 3 Ben. 355; in re Worthington, 14 B. R. 388; People v. Brennan, 12 B. R. 567; s. c. 3 Hun. 666; in re Ferguson & Peckham, 6 B. R. 569; O'Brien v. Weld, 92 U. S. 81; s. c 15 B. R. 405). Whether parties having claims adverse to the trustee can have them adjusted without the trustees consent, in a summary proceeding, seems to be an open question, there being authority favoring such an adjustment (In re Evans, 1 Lowell, 525), and opposed to it (Hurst v. Teft, 12 Blatch. 217; s. c. 13 B. R 108; Bradley v. Healey, 1 Holmes, 451; Wood v. Brooke, 9 B. R. 395). See also §70 and notes as to the title to property. All objections to so adjusting such differences, however, will be considered waived unless raised when appearance is first entered (In re Ulrich, 3 B. R 133; s. c. 3 Ben. 355). Under the Act of 1867, the objection to a summary adjustment of such differences related to the jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subjectmatter (In re Bonesteel, 3 B. R. 517; in re Ballou, 3 B. R. 717; s. c. 4 Ben. 135); but under the present act, it relates to both (§23 b).

2 For marshaling assets, see $47, for arbitration of controversies, see §26, for compromises, $27; and as to the jurisdiction of courts in suits by trustees, $236 and notes thereto.

The trustee must keep regular accounts, and make final report and account fifteen days before the final meeting of creditors ($47). These accounts and all papers in his hands as trustee are open to inspection ($49).

As to death or removal of trustee and effect thereof on pending suits, see §46 and notes.

appears they were closed before being fully administered;' (9) confirm or reject compositions between debtors and their creditors, and set aside compositions and reinstate the cases; (10) consider and confirm, modify or overrule, or return, with instructions for further proceedings, records and findings certified to them by referees;3 (11) determine all claims of bankrupts to their exemptions; (12) discharge or refuse to discharge bankrupts and set aside discharges and reinstate the cases; (13) enforce obedience by bankrupts, officers, and other persons to all lawful orders, by fine or imprisonment or fine and imprisonment; (14) extradite bankrupts from their respective districts to other districts; (15) make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this act; (16) punish persons for contempts committed before referees;9 (17) pursuant to the recommendations of creditors, or when they neglect to recommend the appointment of trustees, appoint trustees, and

'The administration of an estate consists of the trustee performing his duties in regard thereto. (See $47.)

2 As to confirmation of compositions, see §12, and as to setting them aside, §13. As to keeping and transmitting records, see §§39 (7) and 42. The orders and decrees of a court of bankruptcy may be made and corrected at any time, there being no regular sessions, and the court being always open (Mahoney et al. v. Ward [D. C.] 100 Fed. Rep 278).

As to exemptions of bankrupts, see §6.

"As to discharge of bankrupts, see §14; revoking discharge, §15; and as to debts not affected by, §17.

"For offenses, generally, see $29. Under this delegation of power, the bankruptcy court may require the bankrupt to surrender to the trustee property which the evidence clearly shows to be in his possession or under his control (In re McCormick [D C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 566; in re Schlesinger, Id., 930; in re Duell, 100 Id., 633; in re Tudor, Id., 796; in re Rosser [C. C. A.], 101 Id., 562; Ripon Knitting Works v. Schreiber, [D. C.], Id., 810; in re Schlesinger [C. C. A.], 102, Id., 117).

"For extradition of bankrupts, see §10.

"As to Rules, Forms and Orders, see $30. Under this subdivision, the court has authority to make an order in the nature of a writ of Ne Exeat when the arrest of the bankrupt is shown to be necessary for the enforcement of the bankruptcy law (In re Lipke et al. [D. C.], 98 Fed. Rep. 970).

As to what constitutes contempts before referees, see $41. See also $21, as to evidence.

upon complaints of creditors, remove trustees for cause upon hearings and after notices to them;' (18) tax costs,2 whenever they are allowed by law, and render judgments therefor against the unsuccessful party, or the successful party for cause, or in part against each of the parties, and against estates, in proceedings in bankruptcy; and (19) transfer cases to other courts of bankruptcy.3

Nothing in this section contained shall be construed to deprive a court of bankruptcy of any power it would possess were certain specific powers not herein enumerated.

1As to appointment of trustees by creditors or the court, see $44; relating to meetings of creditors at which appointments may be made, and who entitled to vote at, see $56.

As to costs in contested cases, see Rule XXXIV. The costs or expenses of storing personal property sustained by a creditor while holding the property under a lien, may, if the lien be dissolved by an adjudication in bankruptcy, prove the amount thereof as a claim against the estate, though such claim is not taxable as costs, and is not entitled to priority (In re Allen, [D. C.], 96 Fed. Rep. 512). The same is true when an intervening creditor is unsuccessful and property levied on is surrendered and sold, the costs of caring for it in the interim will not be taxed against the creditor, though all witness fees may be so taxed, except extra compensation to experts, which will not be allowed though the parties stipulated to that effect (In re Carolina Cooperage Co. [D. C.J, 96 Fed. Rep. 604).

When petitions shall be filed against the same person in different courts of bankruptcy having jurisdiction, the cases may be consolidated by a transfer. See 832.

SEC. 3.

2

CHAPTER III.

BANKRUPTS.

Acts of Bankruptcy.'-a Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall consist of his having (1) conveyed, transferred, concealed,3 or removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed, any part of his property with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors, or any of them;" or (2) transferred, while insolvent, any portion of his property to one or more of his creditors with intent to prefer

Under similar provisions of former bankrupt acts, the courts have been divided as to the liberality with which the same should be construed, some holding that the statute should be interpreted to include only such cases as clearly come within its scope (Wilson v. City Bank, 17 Wall. 473; s. c. 9 B. R. 97; Jones v. Sleeper, 2 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 131); and others that the construction should be so liberal as to effect the objects of the act and promote justice (In re Silverman, 4 B. R. 523, S. C 2 Abb. C. C. 243; in re Lock, 2 B. R. 123; s. c. I Lowell, 293; in re Muller & Bretano, 3 B. R. 329).

2 For definition as used in this act, see I (25).

The payment of money by a debtor on a valid pre-existing debt under circumstances which do not make it technically a preference, is not a "transfer of property" in such sense that the same may be recovered for the benefit of the estate within the meaning of 267 e (Blakey v. Coonville Nat. Bank [D. C.], 95 Fed. Rep. 267).

For definition, see 1 (22). If one procures or suffers a fictitious attachment to be made on his property for the purpose of misleading a creditor as to the extent of the owner's interest, he will, in the eyes of the bankrupt court, have concealed such property (In re Williams, 3 B. R. 286; s. c. I Lowell 406; O'Neill v. Glover, 5 Gray 144; in re Hussman, 2 B. R. 437). Yet, it has been held that a concealment to be within the meaning of the bankrupt law must be actual, not constructive (Silverman v. Bagley, 3 Mass. 487).

The intent to hinder, delay, or defraud is a question of fact and must be established by evidence (In re Cowles, 1 B. R. 280; in re Goldschmidt, 3 B. R. 165; s. c. 3 Ben. 379; Ecfort v. Greely, 6 B. R. 433; Perry v. Langley, 2 B. R. 596; s. c. 8 A. L. Reg. 427; in re Hirsch, [D. C.]. 96 Fed. Rep. 468; in re Rome Planing Mill [D. C.]. 96 Fed. Rep. 812), direct or circumstantial (Van Wyck v. Seward, 18 Wend. 374; Newman v. Cordell, 43 Barb. 456). A corporation is not guilty of an act of bankruptcy under this subdivision in allowing a receiver to be appointed in a State court which results in a conveyance to him of the corporate property (In re Baker-Ricketson Co. [D. C.], 97 Fed. Rep. 489), and it is a question whether it is so guilty in voluntarily applying for a receiver and for a decree dissolving it (In re Harper Bros. [D. C.], 100 Fed. Rep. 266).

Where an insolvent corporation sells property and pays creditors with the proceeds, a petition filed more than four months after such payments is too late where the payments are alleged as the acts of bankruptcy, though within four months

such creditors over his other creditors;' or (3) suffered or permitted, while insolvent, any creditor to obtain a preference through legal proceedings, and not having at least

after the recording of the deed (In re Mingo Val. Creamery Ass'n [D. C.], 100 Fed. Rep. 282). If an insolvent transfer his entire stock to another in consideration or part consideration of an agreement on the part of the one receiving it to pay and discharge a certain debt due at a bank for money advanced, the intent referred to in this subdivision will be presumed, and the act will be one of bankruptcy (Goldman, Beckman & Co. v. Smith, [D. C.], 1 N. B. News, 160; s. c. 93 Fed. Rep. 182).

1For definition of "transfer," see 1 (25). As to preferences, see 860.

The transfer of property by an insane insolvent will not amount to an act of bankruptcy since he is not responsible for his acts, and a petition cannot be filed against such insolvent because of such transfer against the objection of the insolvent's guardian (In re Funk [D. C.], 101 Fed. Rep. 244).

An unexecuted agreement to make a transfer is not an act of bankruptcy (Winter v. R. R. Co., 2 Dill. 487; s. c. 7 B. R. 289), nor is a conveyance sought to be made by a void instrument (In re Dunham & Orr, 2 Ben. 488; s. c. 2 B. R. 17) The act of bankruptcy under this subdivision includes three ingredients, -The transfer, insolvency, and intent to prefer-all questions of fact. The intent to prefer must be proved just as the intent to defraud, in the preceding subdivision, (Morgan & Co. v. Mastick, 2 B. R. 521; Miller v. Keys, 3 B. R. 224; Doan v. Compton, 2 B. R. 607; Perry v. Langley, 2 B. R. 596; s. c. 8 A L. Reg. 427); but it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transfer, the acts of the bankrupt, and the natural consequences thereof (Morse v. Godfrey, 3 Sto. 391; Trader's Bank v. Campbell, 14 Wall. 87; s. c. 6 B. R. 353; s. c. 3 B. R. 498; Sampson v. Burton, 5 Ben 325; s. c. 4 B. R. 1; Terry v. Cleaver, 2 Bliss. 356; s. c. 4 B. R 126; in re Dibblee, 3 Ben. 354; s. c. 2 B. R. 617; in re Drummond, 1 B. R. 231; Curran v. Munger, 6 B. R. 33),-from any facts that will justify the inference (Linkman v. Wilcox, 1 Dill. 161; Beattie v. Gardner, 4 B. R. 323; s. c. 4 Ben. 479; Giddings v. Dodd, 4 B. R. 657; s. c. 1 Dill. 115; in re Rome Planing Mill [D. C.], 96 Fed. Rep. 812), the last case confining the question of intent to the bankrupt alone, that of the person receiving the preference not being material. If the preference must naturally follow the act, the law presumes the intention to exist and will not, ordinarily, permit such presumption to be rebutted by evidence of a want of intention (In re Smith, 4 Ben. 1; 3 B. R. 377; Miller v. Keys, 3 B. R. 224; in re Gay, 2 B. R. 358; Hardy v Clark, 3 B. R. 385; Hardy v. Binninger, 7 Blatch 262; s. c. 4 B. R. 262; Sawyer v. Turpin, 5 B. R 339; s. c. 1 Holmes, 251; 91 U. S. 114; S. c. 13 B. R. 271; Webb v. Sachs, 15 B. R. 168; in re Black & Secor, 1 B. R. 353; in re Silverman, 4 B. R. 523). An almost conclusive presumption of an intent to prefer is raised when one knowing himself to be insolvent makes payments in excess of the pro rata share of the payee (Toof v. Martin, 4 B. R. 488; s. c. 1. Dill, 203; in re Oregon Prtg. Co., 13 B. R. 503; in re Smith, B. R. 377; in re Batchelder, 3 B. R. 150; in re Silverman, 4 B. R. 523; Driggs v. Moore, 3 B. R. 602; s. c. 1 Abb. C. C. 440; Farren v. Crawford, 2 B. R 602; Rison v. Knapp, 1 Dill. 187; s. c. 4 B. R. 349), and especially when the transfer is of all one's property (In re Waite, 1 Lowell, 407; Johnson v. Wald [C. C.], 1 N. B. News, 325; s. c. 93 Fed. Rep. 640; Goldman, Beckman & Co. v. Smith, 1 N. B. News, 160; s. c. 93 Fed. Rep. 182). The presumption raised as above stated, of an intention to prefer, may be rebutted by the debtor showing that at the time he made the preferential payments, he believed himself to be solvent, and that his affairs were in such condition that he could reasonably expect to pay all his debts (Toof v. Martin, 13 Wall. 40; s. c. 6 B. R. 49). The testimony of a party himself, however, on the question of intention, is