4. OBSTRUCTION TO ACCESS TO OR EGRESS FROM COMPLAINANT'S PLACE OF BUSINESS BY LARGE ASSEMBLAGE AS GROUND FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

Where the presence of numbers, though not intimidating, yet actually obstructs access to or egress from the complainant's place of business or interferes with the freedom of the highway, an injunction will be granted on the ground of a continuing nuisance. (6 Pom. Eq. Jur., sec. 604; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers and Die Makers' Unions, 90 Fed., 608, C. C. N. D. Ohio, 1898; Foster v. Retail Clerks' Protective Association, 39 Misc., N. Y., 48.)

In American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers and Die Makers Unions (90 Fed., 608, 614) the court said:

It is just as much a nuisance to block up the street and impair the right by the continual presence of bodies of men, great or small, who obstruct the ingress and egress, as it would be to build barricades and embankments in the street.

In Foster v. Retail Clerks' Protective Association (39 Misc., N. Y., 48, 52) the court said:

Whatever may be said of simple picketing where only persuasion is used, certain things can not have been done without infringing the rights of the plaintiffs. The defendants have no right to enter upon their premises except for the bona fide purposes of trade. If they do, they are trespassers. If the plaintiffs own to the center of the street, the defendants have no right to station themselves in front of their store and there distribute circulars such as the one in question. If they do this, they are also trespassers. (Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb., 390.) The defendants have no right to obstruct access to the store in question. If they do, they commit a nuisance. The defendants have no right to so act as to collect crowds and thus obstruct movement along the sidewalk at or in the neighborhood of the store. This is likewise a nuisance.

5. RIGHT TO ENJOIN THE ASSEMBLAGE OF STRIKERS UPON PREMISES OF EMPLOYERS AS CONSTITUTING A CONTINUING TRESPASS.

A continuing trespass on plaintiff's property, though only for the purpose of persuading his workmen to quit, will be enjoined. (6) Pom. Eq. Jur., sec. 604; Knudsen v. Benn, 123 Fed., 636, Cir. Court Dist. of Minn., 1903.)

In New York, etc. Railroad Company v. Wenger (9 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 815, 825) the court said:

Now, it is a mistaken notion to suppose that men may go upon the premises of another, even although they go there in a peaceable way, and express to men the notions they entertain, that they ought to abandon the employment of the railroad company. I question whether they have even the right to go upon the premises and make a simple request of that sort, and especially so if back of all is the purpose and intention to obstruct the business of the company and prevent it from discharging its lawful business as a common carrier.

Again, at page 825, the court said:

From these facts it is clear to my mind that these men, when they went there, under the circumstances under which they went there, were clearly trespassers, and that it was altogether and essentially unlawful to go there, even seeking to compel or urge or invite other men to abandon their employment and to thereby obstruct the business.

Again, at page 818, the court said:

If the trespass is continuous in its nature, if repeated acts of wrong are done or threatened, although each of these acts taken by itself may not be destructive, and the legal remedy may therefore be adequate for each single act if it stood alone, then also the entire wrong will be prevented or stopped by injunction on the ground of avoiding a repetition of similar actions.

6. WHAT AMOUNTS TO UNLAWFUL COERCION.

The owner of a business is entitled to have workmen come to and leave his place of business without being subjected to violence or threats of violence. But this is not the extent of his rights. Any course of conduct upon the part of others which deprives or substantially affects the freedom of mind of such workmen in reaching a decision to remain in or enter into his employ, or the freedom of will in carrying this decision into execution, is an unlawful interference with such owner's business. (Martin's Modern Law of Labor Unions, p. 229, citing Eureka Foundry Company v. Lehker, 13 Ohio Dec. Nisi Prius, 398.) In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Ruef (120 Fed., 102, 124) they court said:

Picketing in and of itself when properly conducted is not unlawful, but when accompanied by violence or any manner of coercion or intimidation to prevent persons from engaging in the service of an employer it is unlawful.

In Rogers v. Evarts (17 N. Y. Supp., 264, 269) the doctrine is laid down:

Picketing may be done in such numbers as to constitute intimidation. Jeering and shouting at employees by strikers may constitute intimidation. Persuasion or entreaty may be so persistent as to constitute intimidation.

In Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union (110 Fed., 698, 701) Wing, J., said:

It has been said in an eloquent and learned decision that it can not too soon be learned, and learned thoroughly, that, under this Government at least, freedom of action, so long as a man does not interfere with the rights of others, will be protected and maintained; and that it is unlawful for any man to dictate to another what his conduct shall be and to attempt to enforce such dictation by any form of undue pressure. Nor must intimidation be disguised in the assumed character of persuasion. Persuasion too emphatic or too long and persistently continued may itself become a nuisance and its use a form of unlawful coercion.

In Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers' Union (165 Ind., 421; 75, N. E. 887, 881) it was said that

in a contest between capital and labor, on the one hand to secure higher wages and on the other to resist it, argument and persuasion to win support and cooperation from others are proper to either side, provided they are of a character to leave the persons solicited feeling at liberty to comply or not, as they please.

7. INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT BY FRAUD. In Martin's Law of Labor Unions, page 96, it is said:

No man can justify an interference with another's trade or business by the use of fraud, and the procuring of workmen to quit their employment and join in a strike by means of fraud is unlawful and in a proper case may be enjoined.

In Angle v. Chicago, etc., Ry. (151 U. S., pp. 1, 13) it is said:

It has been repeatedly held that, if one maliciously interferes in a contract between two parties and induces one of them to break that contract to the injury of the other, the party injured can maintain an action against the wrongdoer. Green v. Button (2 Cr. Mees. & R. 707), in which the defendant, by falsely pretending to one party to a contract that he had a lien upon certain property, prevented such party from delivering it to the plaintiff, the other party to the contract, and was held responsible for the loss occasioned thereby.

In Butterick Publishing Company Limited v. Typographical Union No. 6 et al. (100 N. Y. Supp., 292), there was granted an injunction restraining striking employees and local labor unions from resorting to threats, intimidation, or fraud in their relations with plaintiff's employees.

In this case the court said:

As regards their relation to the plaintiff's employees, it is clear from what has already been stated that the defendant local unions and their members must be restrained from resorting to any threats, intimidation, force, or fraud, whether through the means of picketing or otherwise (p. 296).

8. EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST COERCION THROUGH BOYCOTTS AND SYM

PATHETIC STRIKES.

While it may be lawful, in aid of a lawful strike, for the strikers to use peaceful noncoercive persuasion and argument to induce customers of the person against whom the strike is in operation to withhold their patronage from him, yet it is unlawful, as already pointed out, for this "persuasion " to take the form of even peaceful coercion.

It is also clearly unlawful for strikers to incite, even by entirely peaceful and noncoercive methods, the employees of a third party to strike against that party for the purpose of compelling him to withdraw his patronage from the party with whom the inciting strikers have a labor dispute.

In Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (62 Fed., 803), it was held that a combination to incite the employees of various railroads suddenly to quit their service without any dissatisfaction with the terms of their employment, thus paralyzing railroad traffic in order to coerce the railroad companies and the public into compelling the Pullman Co., whose cars were in use in operating the roads, to pay its employees more wages, was an unlawful conspiracy by reason of its purpose, whether such purpose was effected by means usually lawful or otherwise. Judge Taft, who delivered the opinion in this case, said:

Phelan came to Cincinnati to carry out the purpose of a combination of men, and his act in inciting the employees of all Cincinnati railroads to quit service was part of that combination. If the combination was unlawful, then every act in pursuance of it was unlawful, and his instigation of the strike would be an unlawful wrong done by him to every railway company in the city, for which they can recover damages, and for which, so far as his acts affected the Southern Railway, he is in contempt of this court (p. 817).

After referring to the fact that one purpose of the combination was to compel railroad companies to injure the Pullman Co. by breaking their contracts with that company, Judge Taft said:

But the combination was unlawful without respect to the contract feature. It was a boycott. The employees of the railway companies had no grievance against their employers. Handling and hauling Pullman cars did not render their services any more burdensome. They had no complaint against the use of Pullman cars as cars. They came into no natural relation with Pullman in handling the cars. He paid them no wages. He did not regulate their hours or in any way determine their services. Simply to injure him in his business, they were incited and encouraged to compel the railway companies to withdraw custom from him by threats of quitting their service, and actually quitting their service. This inflicted an injury on the companies that was very great, and it was unlawful, because it was without lawful excuse. All the employees had the right to quit their employment, but they had no right to combine to quit in order thereby to compel their employer to withdraw from a mutually profitable relation with a third person for the purpose of injuring that third person, when the relation thus sought to be broken had no effect whatever on the character or reward of their service. It is the motive for quitting, and the end sought thereby, that make the injury inflicted unlawful and the combination by which it is inflicted an unlawful conspiracy. The distinction between an ordinary lawful and peaceable strike entered upon to obtain concessions in the terms of the strikers' employment and a boycott is not a fanciful one or one which needs the power of fine distinction to determine which is which. Every

laboring man recognizes the one or the other as quickly as the lawyer or the judge. The combination under discussion was a boycott. It was so termed by Debs, Phelan, and all engaged in it. Boycotts, though unaccompanied by violence or intimidation, have been pronounced unlawful in every State of the United States where the question has arisen, unless it be in Minnesota, and they are held to be unlawful in England.

9. EVEN NONCOERCIVE PERSUASION TO DO AN UNLAWFUL ACT IS UNLAWFUL; E. G., PERSUASION TO BREAK A CONTRACT.

In A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union (232 Ill., 42, 83 N. E., 940, 945) it was said that

* * it must be conceded that argument and persuasion are lawful if not directed to the accomplishment of an illegal and unlawful purpose. The object of the defendants as set forth in the bill was illegal, and if there is a malevolent intent to produce an illegal result, and it is produced, it makes no difference whether it is accomplished by mere persuasion or by physical violence.

In Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy (63 N. J. Eq., 759, 763), the court said:

Where defendants, in combination or individually, undertake to interfere with and disrupt existing contract relations between the employer and the employee, it is plain that a property right is directly invaded. The effect is the same whether the means employed to cause the workman to break his contract, and thus injure the employer, are violence or threats of violence against the employee or mere molestation, annoyance, or persuasions. In all these cases, whatever the means may be, they constitute the cause of the breaking of a contract, and consequently they constitute the natural and proximate cause of damage. The intentional doing of anything by a third party which is the natural and proximate cause of the disruption of a contract relation, to the injury of one of the contracting parties, is now very generally recognized as actionable in the absence of a sufficient justification, and the question in every case seems to turn upon justification alone.

To the same effect see Flaccus v. Smith (199 Pa. St., 128; 48 Atl., 894); Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union (Cir. Ct. W. D. vy Tenn., 1901; 111 Fed., 49).

10. INJUNCTIONS TO PREVENT REFUSAL TO PERFORM SERVICES BY EMPLOYEES WHO ELECT TO REMAIN IN THE SERVICE, AND TO RESTRAIN NONCOERCIVE METHODS ON THE PART OF THIRD PERSONS TO INCITE SUCH REFUSAL.

Ordinarily every man has the legal right to stop work and to quit his employment whenever he chooses to do so, unless there be a contract that obliges him to continue for a definite time, but no man has the legal or moral right, while continuing in the employment of another, to refuse to do the work which he is employed and engaged to do. (In re Grand Jury, 62 Fed., 834, 835.)

While a court of equity has no power to compel employees to continue in the service of the employer, yet if the employees elect to remain in the service, performance of the duties incident thereto may be compelled by injunction. (Martin Modern Law of Labor Unions, sec. 53, p. 77.)

In Southern Cal. Ry. Co. v. Rutherford (62 Fed., 796) it appeared that the employees of complainant railroad company engaged in the transportation of interstate commerce and the mails, although remaining in the employ of the complainant, refused to handle or operate any train of cars of complainant to which a Pullman car was attached. It further appeared that such refusal subjected complainant to a multiplicity of suits and to great and irreparable damage, in that there was a contract requiring complainant to attach

a Pullman car or cars on all of its through trains for the carrying of passengers and the mail, and also retarded and interrupted complainant in the transmission of mail and interstate commerce. An injunction requiring the employees to perform their duties during their continuance in complainant's employment was issued as prayed. In Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Penn. Co. (54 Fed., 730) it was held that a mandatory injunction might be issued against several railroad companies and their employees, at the instance of another railroad company, enjoining defendant railroad companies and their employees from refusing to discharge the duties imposed by the interstate-commerce law and to receive and deliver complainant's interstate freight. In this case the court said:

Nor is the mandatory injunction against the engineers an enforced specific performance of personal service. It is only an order restraining them, if they assume to do the work of the defendant companies, from doing it in a way which will violate not only the rights of the complainant, but also the order of the court made against their employers to preserve those rights (p. 743).

In Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Penn. Co. (54 Fed., 746), a contempt proceeding for violation of the injunction awarded in Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Penn. R. Co. (supra), it appeared that an engineer who had notice of the injunction during the course of his run disobeyed orders of his employers to attach to his train a car of the boycotted company and announced that he had quit his employment. He nevertheless remained with the engine for five hours, and on notice from his union that he might handle the car promptly attached it to his train, which he brought to its destination. This was a plain case of a labor union attempting to determine the enforcement or nonenforcement of the act to regulate commerce. On these facts it was held that he had not quit the service in good faith; that his contract was a trick to avoid obeying the order of the court and that he was punishable for contempt for violating the order. This decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in Lennon v. Lake Shore, etc., Ry. Co. (22 U. S. App., 561), and the decree of that court was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in Ex parte Lennon (166 U. S., 518).

In Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Penn. Co. (54 Fed., 746, 755) the court said:

If the employee quits in good faith, unconditionally and absolutely, under such circumstances as are now under consideration, he is exercising a personal right which can not be denied him. But so long as he continues in the service, so long as he undertakes to perform the duties of engineer or fireman or conductor, so long the power of the court to compel him to discharge all the duties of his position is unquestionable and will be exercised.

11. PERSUADING OTHERS TO STRIKE FOR UNLAWFUL PURPOSE IS ITSELF UNLAWFUL.

In Martin's Modern Law of Labor Unions, section 60, it is said: The right of each party to strive to obtain the terms most beneficial to himself and the right of a number of persons similarly situated to unite to accomplish such ends is clear, and individuals having similar interests may, by all peaceable argumentative means, persuade others to join with them in their efforts to do what they fairly consider to be beneficial to themselves as a class. What is here said presupposes, of course, that the persons sought to be persuaded are not asked to do something unlawful as, for instance, to commit a breach of contract of employment for a definite time, and that the strike itself is lawful. If the strike is unlawful any acts done in furtherance thereof,