RADICAL CHARACTER OF LAST SECTION.

Preliminary to the enunciation of the doctrine which follows, the bill determines that only one class of rights shall be protected by injunction in labor disputes, to wit, property rights. It disregards all other rights held sacred by citizens of this Republic; their civil rights are not entitled to protection, their religious or political rights are not entitled to protection, simply because a labor organization with or without justification becomes involved in dispute with employees or employer. Their civil rights in such controversies unquestionably are involved, their right to quiet, their right to peace, their right to walk the streets unhampered and unhindered, their right to comfort, their right to have their children attend school without the nuisance and annoyance of having others pester them; their right to protect themselves against the invasion of their homes; their right to see that their wives should not be offended and insulted by men associated with unions, all of which are common methods employed by union strikers in connection with labor disputes. The mere narration of the fact that civil rights of citizens can not be protected by way of injunction hereafter in the event of the passage of this bill is sufficient without further argument upon it, or without extended illustration, to convey to this committee forcefully the fact that this bill is an unjust bill and the law if passed would be a law working unjustly upon a large portion of the citizenship of this country.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose a man wants to go to work for me, and I hire him, and a union man or striker comes and clubs him and drives him away and will not let him work for me. Is not that

an invasion of his civil rights?

Mr. MONAGHAN. I think also it is an invasion of a property right. The CHAIRMAN. Both?

Mr. MONAGHAN. I think so.

Mr. DAVENPORT. The case of the United States v. Adair, reported in 208 United States, says that those are not only rights of liberty, but of property.

REMEDY AGAINST PICKETING, BOYCOTT, AND CONSPIRACY DESTROYED.

Mr. MONAGHAN. The following portion of the section is, to my mind, the most vicious in character to be found in the measure. To that I wish to bring the committee's special attention. With the committee's permission I will first read the section as a whole, and comment upon those portions of it which are especially subject to criticism.

It reads as follows:

And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at or near a house or place where any person resides or works or carries on business, or happens to be for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or of peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party to such dispute; or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from paying or giving to or withholding from any person engaged in such dispute any strike benefits, or other moneys, or things of value; or from peaceably assembling at any place in a lawful manner and for lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto.

Let us take the first phrase contained in that section of the bill: And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, of from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means to do so.

We heard a discussion yesterday with reference to the effect of this portion of the bill upon the railroads of the United States. We heard debated the effect of this act in relation to the interstate commerce act as well as to the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the fact that under this bill the injunction issued in the case of Debs, a report of which is found in 158 United States, entitled "In re Debs," could not have been issued. In that case the employees of the Pennsylvania Railroad Co. were advised by their officials, and sustained by the union, in refusing to carry Pullman cars. Under the Sherman Antitrust Act an action was brought and an injunction issued restraining them. The court sustaining the injunction, however, determined the questions at issue along the lines of common law, preferring to base its decision upon inherent and constitutional right rather than upon the force of any statute.

Under the proposed measure if at any time a labor union is in controversy with a railroad it may with impunity advise or persuade employees of that railroad or of any connecting railroad to discontinue their connection with that company and to violate the provisions of the interstate-commerce act as applied to common carriers. In other words, it is permitted to advise, persuade, and induce the employees of the railroad company involved, and in turn the employees of other railroad companies that may be indirectly involved by virtue of the boycott, to do an act which is a crime under the statutes of the United States. I do not intend, in view of the able discussion of the subject matter as pertains to railroads, to advert further to that phase of the situation, except to invite again the attention of the committee to the force of this objection. I wish, however, to emphasize to the committee the wide and vicious importance of this section of the bill as applied to the industries of the country. Let us take a concrete illustration. Let us suppose that the American Blower Co. is in controversy with its men and that the labor union involved saw fit to approach the locomotive engineers, the firemen, and the clerks in the employ of the various railroad companies, both local and in other States, and to advise them, induce them, and persuade them, whether peacefully or otherwise, to quit the employ of the railroad company or while in the employ of the railroad company to refuse to carry the freight of the American Blower Co. The union and its pickets under these circumstances would be inducing, advising, and permitting these men to commit a crime and would be guilty of an unlawful conspiracy under the law as it is to day and always has been in this country. But that sort of conduct under this bill is legitimatized. The concern involved primarily in the labor dispute can not secure an injunction against the terrorizing and demoralizing influence of such procedure and is left absolutely helpless under this bill to save itself from destruction.

More than this, the section of the bill to which I refer legitimatizes the primary, secondary, and tertiary boycotting by labor. Let us illustrate again. Suppose that the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. makes machinery or makes tools and it has some trouble with a labor organization. That labor organizations may with impunity, singly

or in a body, by one or by many, persuade all of the men in its employ to quit in a body in the first instance.

In the second instance they may seek out the customers of that establishment and induce and persuade, by veiled coercion or by notice of boycott, so long as they act peacefully, the employees of a concern that uses the tools manufactured by the Allis-Chalmers Co. to quit employment. They may further approach the customers of the Allis-Chalmers Co. and persuade them by numbers and by the strength of their influence and by the force of the fear of boycott, not to use the products of the Allis-Chalmers Co., and if the customer who is imprudent refuses to obey the dictates of the union, they may in turn importune his customers and use the same force, the same strength, and the same numerical terrorism upon them in the fear of boycott in order that they may ultimately force the Allis-Chalmers Co. to subscribe to the dictates of unionism.

In this connection let me emphasize further that it make no difference what the cause of the strike was, it make no difference whether it was for a just or an unjust cause, it makes no difference whether the employees of the Allis-Chalmers Co. were contented and satisfied with the conditions under which they worked, but the mere fact that a labor dispute has fomented between the Allis-Chalmers Co. and either an organization of labor or the employees of its establishment, the force of law is lost, equity relief denied, and the individual conscience substituted in place of both. The injustice of the demands of unionism have absolutely no bearing upon the proposition. It is simply a forceful and more polite statement of the phrase that the end in this event would justify the means. Even if the end be unlawful, even if the end is improper, even though, as happens in the South to-day, the employees of the concerns wish to continue without the union dominating them or attempting to dominate the free employees of an establishment in their community, all law with reference to boycotting is absolutely suspended under this act for the sole reason that a labor battle is on.

PEACEFUL PICKETING AS PART OF A CONSPIRACY.

Let us consider the next provision. It reads:

And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons * * * from assembling at or near a house or place where a person resides or works, or carries on business, or happens to be for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or of peacefully persuading any person to work or to abstain from working.

This constitutes the union definition of peaceful picketing. I might say in comment here that the majority opinion rendered by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives uses expressly the term "picket" in the judgment justifying this section. There is a well-defined distinction in definition between peaceful picketing and peaceful persuasion, but no difference in effect as to what is enjoined. There is a difference as a matter of definition, but not a difference as a matter of result, and if this bill were to be construed as justifying the so-called peaceful picket, the interpretation placed upon it by the majority opinion of the Judiciary Committee of the House, then it creates an intolerable condition, and, as it is stated, it would place the industrial institutions of this country

almost absolutely under the control and dictation of unionism and some of its radical leaders. Peaceful persuasion as here applied might be defined as an attempt upon the part of one man to quietly argue with another, without force or show of force, the matters concerned in an industrial difficulty. Picketing has been defined by Webster, and his definition has been adopted by the courts, as follows: Picketing is a body of men, belonging to a union, sent out to watch and annoy men working in a shop not belonging to a union, or against which a strike is established.

The court, in the case of Beck v. The Teamsters' Union (118 Michigan), comments on that definition as follows:

The word originally had no such meaning, but this definition is the result of what has been done under it and the common application that has been made of it.

The definition was also adopted in the typographical union strike in the case of The Chicago Typothetæ v. The Press Feeders, reported in 1905, which I think has a bearing upon the method and manner invoked by labor organizations in their disputes and the effect which has been found to result from the so-called peaceful picketing. It is pertinent to read briefly a section of this decision into the record. The CHAIRMAN. That is a Supreme Court record?

Mr. MONAGHAN. The appellate jurisdiction of the State of Illinois. The picket system once established, the intimidation, assaults, slugging, and bloodshed followed as naturally and inevitably as night follows day. There can be no such thing as peaceful "polite and gentlemanly" picketing any more than there can be chaste "polite and gentlemanly" vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing or lawful lynching, In these days of industrial strife, the nonunion man acts on the union man as the red rag on the violent bull, and the average union man apparently needs no incentive by way of direction or authority from his fellows, so bitter has the feeling become, to promptly endeavor to exterminate the "scabs" at sight. Certainly, then, if the union man has a union behind him, he will promptly endeavor to exterminate the scab at sight. This is as well known to the public as it is to counsel. Some men can be intimidated only by being knocked down, but most peaceful and law-abiding men can be and are intimidated by an array of unfriendly men, known to be so brutal and depraved that they not only assault men, but even women and girls It is idle to talk of picketing for lawful persuasive purposes. Men do not form picket lines for the purpose of conversation and lawful persuasion. Such picketing as is established by the evidence in the case at bar is intended to annoy and intimidate, whether physical violence is resorted to or not, and is unlawful in either case. Courts should be practical. When they form an opinion from evidence it must be a practical one. They should touch the earth at every step. They have no opportunity, no license for star gazing, or for indulging in poetic fancy. In imagination and in theory, a peaceful picket line may be possible, but in fact a picket line is never peaceful. It is always a formation of actual warfare, and quite inconsistent with everything not related to force and violence. Its use is a form of unlawful coercion.

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Then, in commenting upon the subject of peaceful persuasion, the Supreme Court of the State of Massachusetts has very well expressed it as follows:

Freedom is the policy of this country. But freedom does not imply a right in one person, either alone or in combination with others, to disturb or annoy another, either directly or indirectly, in his lawful business or occupation, or to threaten him with annoyance or injury for the sake of compelling him to buy his peace.

This is precisely what this section of this bill permits.

The case of O'Neill v. Behenna is quoted with approval in various decisions of the United States courts which have passed on this subject and reported in 182 Pennsylvania, 236. It says:

Even if the arguments and persuasion had been confined to lawful means, they were exerted at an improper time and were an interference with the plaintiff's rights, which made the perpetrators liable for any damage the plaintiff suffered in consequence.

The arguments, persuasion, and appeals of a hostile and demonstrative mob have a potency over men of ordinary nerve which far exceeds the limit of lawfulness. The display of force, though none is actually used, is intimidation, and is as much unlawful as violence itself.

I wish to refer to the case of the Old Dominion Steamship Company v. McKenna (reported in 20 Fed., 48), wherein the court said:

The procurement of workmen who are employed upon terms as to wages which are just and satisfactory, to quit work in a body for the purpose of inflicting injury and damage upon the employer, by persons who are not in his employ, and until the employer shall accede to the demands of such outside persons, which he is under no obligation to grant, constitutes in law a malicious and illegal interference with the employer's business which is actionable.

In the case of Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Rueff (120 Fed., 102) the court says:

The whole fallacy of the defense against this bill and the proof offered to sustain it lies in a convenient apprehension of a necessary misunderstanding of the character of that force or violence which all agree is not permitted in the conduct of a strike. It seems to be the idea of the defendants that it consists entirely of physical battery and assaults, and that if these appear in the proof, and they can be justified as they might be, on a criminal indictment or in a police court, that ends the objections, and the justified assaults and batteries will not support an injunction. The truth is that the most potential and unlawful force or violence may exist without lifting a finger against any man or uttering a word or threat against him.

Again, in the same case, the court says:

This picketing has been condemned by every court as a pretense for persuasion, but is intended for intimidation. Gentlemen never seek to compel another to listen to the art of persuasion. To stop another on the street, get in his road, follow him from one side of the street to another, pursue him wherever he goes, stand in front of his residence, is not persuasion. Intimidation can not be defined; neither can fraud be defined; but every person knows whether his acts are fraudulent, and he knows whether his acts are intimidating. And the courts, when the facts are presented, will adjudge accordingly.

Without further comment we submit the following authorities declarative of the law relative to injunction and the limit of the authority of courts in the issuance of them:

United States v. Agler (62 Fed. Rep., 824), Indiana. The court said:

Now this party defendant is not named, and to say now that process of injunction may not be issued to be binding upon men who are not named, or shall not be binding until they are actually served with subpoena, as they are on the civil side, on the equity side of the court, it would defeat the purpose of the law. It is not within the language of the statute itself. I think the injunction as against unknown defendants is valid and binding when the injunction order is served upon them, although they are not at the time parties to the suit. Indeed, I think an injunction that is issued against one man enjoining or restraining him, and all that give aid and comfort to him, or all that aid or abet him is valid against everybody that aids or gives countenance to the man to whom it is addressed. I do not entertain any doubt about that.

Ex parte Lennon (166 U. S., 548). The Supreme Court of the United States said:

To render a person amenable to an injunction, it is neither necessary that he should be a party to the suit in which the injunction was issued, nor to have been actually served with a copy of it, so long as he appears to have actual notice.

Conkley v. Russell (111 Fed., 417):

When a Federal court has issued an injunction directed against the defendants in a suit and which has been served upon them, such court has jurisdiction to punish for contempt any person whom with actual knowledge of the injunction and of its scope and effect, combines and confederates with the defendants who were enjoined for the purpose of violating and resisting it, and who in pursuance of such conspiracy, aids and assists in the commission of acts which were enjoined. This jurisdiction exists