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dinances have any relation or reference to the facts of this case with the exception of Section 30 of Article 2 providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, and Section 3 of Article 10 providing for the uniformity of taxes, and Section 4 of Article 10 which provides that property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value. These three propositions can best be considered together, for the question at once arises as to what branch of the governmental powers these ordinances refer.

The police power, as was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Munn, v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 125, and repeated by this court in Houck v. Drainage District, 248 Mo. 373, 384, "are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, ; that is to say, the power to govern men and things." To make possible its exercise it must call to its aid the subordinate power of taxation, which has for its office the raising of the necessary funds for the performance of those governmental functions which it assumes to exercise. The government is a social compact, by which the whole people convenant with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people, that they shall be governed by certain laws to be enacted for the public good. The terms of this compact are defined by the Constitution. By that instrument the Legislature was created, and invested with a power to enact laws for the common good, which is limited only by the terms of the Constitution itself. This does not confer power upon the whole people, represented by the lawmaking branch of the government, to control rights which are purely and exclusively private. These rights represent private ownership and are private property, the inviolability of which is guaranteed by Section 30 of Article 2 of our State Constitution, to which we have already alluded. The due process of law to which it refers consists of all laws enacted by the Legislature in pursuance of its powers.

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These include the power, as was said by Chief Justice WAITE in the Munn case, supra, to establish law "requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very essence of government, and has found expression in the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. From this source come the police powers, which, as was said by Mr. Chief Justice TANEY in the License Cases, 5 How. 583, 'are nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty, the power to govern man and things.' This is the true test of the extent and character of the police power of the State. It governs everything necessary to regulate the conduct of citizens toward each other in such a way that all may exercise that measure of liberty of action consistent with the welfare and freedom of others.

that is to say,

Applying these principles to the matter here in controversy we find an excellent illustration of the rule which we have stated. It appears from the appellant's brief that the corporation which he represents is the owner of approximately 5000 feet of frontage along the sidewalk mentioned in the record. Some of the lands which originally belonged to him have been sold and are occupied by others representing the purchaser. The street as well as the sidewalk were like all public highways brought into being by the exercise of the police power of the State. It is the exercise of this power that has given the lands their urban character, and by which the whole people have assumed the responsibility for providing means by which these ways may be maintained for the use of all, and for the benefit such use confers upon the land of adjoining proprietors. The same governmental principle by which the Legislature may improve its streets, and construct sidewalks and reconstruct or repair them when they have fallen into natural decay, at the expense of adjoining proprietors, applies with equal force to the removal of such temporary obstructions as are the motif of this case. The

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duty is charged upon the occupant of the property a well as the owner, and relates solely to the use of his own appurtenant easement in such manner as shall not injure others in the enjoyment of a use to which they are entitled. He is entitled to the use in common with all others. In addition to this he has a special right of ingress and egress appurtenant to his ownership or occupation of the land which is clearly an element of its value. Should he be cut off from this access, the right of the public in the street would remain unimpaired except as a means of communication with his property. The charter and ordinances before us are framed upon the theory that the preservation of this right is dependent upon the preservation of the condition upon which it rests. If it stops at his gate it does not exist. Although he may keep the walks within his lot swept and garnished it gives him no access to the street. A snow drift against his gate excludes him as completely as would an iron bar extended across it.

Laws of this class rest largely, although not entirely, upon these and other special benefits to those upon whom their burden is imposed. The matter of public convenience which, as we have already said, all must consider in the use of their property, is also an element in the imposition of the burden. A snow storm. spreads itself as an obstruction over an entire city and the remedy must instantly spread itself over the same area to meet the emergency. It would be impossible otherwise than through the action of the law directly upon all in whose hands the remedy lay to meet the emergency. When this is done by the distribution of the burden upon those specially interested in the result the problem would seem to be well solved and public convenience and justice in the distribution of the burden are combined for the good of all. We need not wait until some Utopian scheme can be devised which would meet, with mathematical certainty, the conditions of every particular case. This duty of selection is necessarily inherent in the lawmaking department of every

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constitutional government. When in the exercise of the police power it has acted, it becomes the duty of every person within its jurisdiction to obey, unless he can point to some constitutional guaranty which absolves him from obedience.

This is the same power by which the citizens may be compelled, at the direction of a peace officer, to come to his assistance in the suppression of riot, to aid in the extinguishment of fire, or to suffer his building to be demolished for that purpose. His person and his property are at the disposal of the State whenever the circumstances require that he, of all others, should be selected for the service, either by reason or propinquity or special interest or both. This relation is to be determined by the Legislature, subject to those limitations prescribed by the Constitution for the protection of private rights.

In Ford v. Kansas City, 181 Mo. 137, 147, we said: "While there is respectable authority for the proposition that a municipal corporation cannot impose upon the citizen the obligation to keep the public sidewalk in front of his premises free from obstruction by snow, etc., at his own expense (Gridley v. City of Bloomington, 88 Ill. 554; Chicago v. O'Brien, 111 Ill. 532), the weight of authority is, however, the other way, and in favor of the position tentatively stated in the foregoing dicta, as to such power.”

Examining these authorities, we find that the Illinois. cases cited have little or no support except in State v. Jackman, 69 N. H. 318. On the other hand, the cases sustaining such ordinances are numerous, and the logic of some of the opinions strikes us as unanswerable. Among these are the following: Goddard, Petitioner, 33 Mass. 504; Clinton v. Welch, 166 Mass. 133; Commonwealth v. Cutter, 156 Mass. 52, 55; Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268; State v. McMahon, 76 Conn. 97, 105; Helena v. Kent, 32 Mont. 279; Reinken v. Fuehring, 130 Ind. 382. Many other cases sustain the same doctrine in principle. It has been received and an

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nounced with favor by the text-writers. [Freund on Police Power, sec. 620; Dillon on Municipal Corporation, sec. 713; McQuillin on Municipal Corporation, sec. 924.] In this court it has at least been taken for granted that these ordinances, when, as in this case, authorized by the Legislature, are a valid exercise of the police power of the State [Norton v. St. Louis, 97 Mo. 537, 541-2; St. Louis v. Insurance Co., 107 Mo. 92; Ford v. Kansas City, 181 Mo. 137, 147.]

The ordinance in question is, in our opinion, a valid exercise of the police power of the State and constitutes no violation of any provision of the State Constitution to which our attention has been directed. The judgment of the criminal court for Jackson County is affirmed. Railey, C., concurs.

PER CURIAM:-The foregoing opinion of BROWN, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court. All of the judges concur.